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Introduction: Politics of Secularity 
How God disappeared from the Second Chamber1 
In the fall of 2017, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s third cabinet was inaugurated. The new 
cabinet was formed by the right-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the 
social-liberal D66 (Democrats 66), the Christian Democrats (CDA), and the orthodox-
Protestant ChristenUnie (CU). The cabinet’s formation took unusually long, more than 200 
days. D66 and CU in particular had disagreed about several so-called immaterial matters and a 
compromise for both ran the risk of appearing as a break with the respective party’s fundamental 
principles and values.2 The Dutch news channel, NOS, for example, ran a report, “How 
progressive can D66 stay in a coalition with the ChristenUnie?”, while a former D66 parliament 
member and current chair of the Dutch Humanist Association expressed his concern that in 
such a coalition, progressive issues like a further liberalization of the euthanasia law and other 
medical-ethical issues would be put on hold (NOS 2017b). NOS also reminded its viewers that 
in 2008, only a few years prior, D66 had protested a coalition between CDA, PvdA, and 
ChristenUnie because of its allegedly too orthodox course. By contrast, the chair of the social-
liberal youth organization felt positive about a cabinet that bridged competing poles in Dutch 
society and was thus likely to be a government for all Dutch people (Ibid.). He still hoped that 
D66 could realize certain liberalizations in collaboration with non-governing parties in the 
chamber, independent of the government coalition (Ibid.). The ChristenUnie’s faction leader 
conversely aimed to preclude such initiatives that would force him into a position on such 
matters as well (deVolkskrant 2017c). His ideological steadfastness was moreover carefully 
watched, not the least by the pietist-reform newspaper, Reformatorisch Dagblad, commonly 
seen to cater to SGP—another orthodox Protestant party in the Netherlands—voters (RD 2017). 
In the end, the eventual coalition agreement acknowledged irreconcilable differences with 
respect to medical ethics and, aside from listing some concrete compromises, sketches a 
procedure for dealing with legislative initiatives on such matters in a way that respects these 
differences (VVD et al. 2017).  
 
1  This is the title of a book by Eginhard Meijering (2012) who has written on the decreasing relevance of 
bible-based and theological references in Dutch parliament. The title echoes that of the prominent book, How God 
disappeared from Jorwerd, by Geert Mak. 
2  In the Netherlands, it is common to distinguish between material (economy related) and immaterial (non-
economic) political matters—and the latter frequently concerns matters contested between Christian and secular 
parties and concern notions of sexuality, gender, family, life and death, as well as the place of religion. 
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The coalition formation was not the first situation in which a political collaboration between 
D66 and the CU made headlines. In 2013, Rutte’s second cabinet had also depended on both 
D66 and SGP as well as the ChristenUnie’s support in order to pass its budget. The liberal 
newspaper, NRC Handelsblad, captured this coalition in the headline: “‘Purple with the Bible’ 
is the last lifebuoy” (NRC 2013). Those familiar with Dutch politics understand this headline 
as pointing to the bridging of the religious-secular poles in Dutch politics: While purple (in 
Dutch: “paars”) stands for the first secular-only cabinet in Dutch post-war history and was a 
core aim of the D66 party; both the SGP and CU consider the Bible an important guideline for 
politics.3 While the CU and especially the SGP maintain the opposite pole, the Christian 
Democratic (CDA) generally claims the middle position. Although the 2017 coalition formation 
bridged religious-secular divides, the dynamics surrounding the coalition’s establishment 
underscore the degree to which the religious-secular divide matter in Dutch politics especially 
when it comes to immaterial matters.  
One can further understand the coalition agreement as an example of the pragmatic tolerance, 
Lijphart (2008 [1967], 117-119) deemed central to the Dutch tradition of “consociational 
democracy”: the readiness among politicians of opposite camps to accept their mutual 
differences and competing religious and secular ideals in “agree to disagree”-arrangements, 
respectively to seek compromises when matters were urgent. This comparison with the historic 
pacification politics further explains why the coalition formation was watched with scrutiny by 
some. Lijphart (2008 [1967], 27, 99-116) states that the consociational democracy had their 
high time in the period between 1917 and 1967, a time in which Dutch society was organized 
along confessional and worldview as well as socio-economic divides, something referred to as 
pillarization. Large parts of the public institutional life were organized according to, especially 
confessional principles, which resulted in a segmented and pluralist organizational structure in 
Dutch society. The main political strands matched with these pillars and divides. While the 
Christian parties integrated people of different class backgrounds, socialists and liberals held 
two, materially distinct, secular—or general—positions. In this divided society, political 
stability was based on a pacifying political culture, based on the readiness to compromise for 
 
3  Until today, the political field is sketched via two axes: an economic right/left axis and an immaterial 
progressive/ conservative axis (Oomkes 2012). In this spectrum, D66 is considered to hold a center-right and top 
progressive position. The party GreenLeft (GL) is equally progressive, followed by the labor party (PvdA), the 
Socialists (SP), and the Older People Party (50+). At the conservative side of this scale, the right-liberal VVD is 
considered the most progressive, followed by the Christian Democrats (CDA), the ChristenUnie (CU), the Party 
for Liberty (PVV) and in the utmost conservative spot, the SGP. While all conservative parties are also 
considered right in economic terms (the VVD holding a pole position here), all progressive parties except D66 
are considered economically left leaning.  
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the sake of gaining a broad support for political decisions as well as on the equal distribution 
of crucial resources among different population groups (Lijphart 2008 [1967], 116-163.)  
In the late-1960s, the consociational democracy came to an end when, succeeding the gradual 
depillarization of Dutch society, deconfeesionalization also manifested itself in the political 
field. The two main Christian parties (especially the Catholic one) declined, as did the pillar 
parties more generally, and new political leaders opposed the rules of political compromise in 
the name of democracy (Lijphart 2008 [1967], 11-24, Daalder 1995).4 D66, the aforementioned 
social-liberal party was founded in 1966 and successfully positioned as a strong critique of the 
pillarized political system and especially the political culture based on the compromises made 
by a political elite. Later in its history and for similar reasons, it struggled to achieve a purple–
–paarse––and secular coalition which constituted a precondition to realizing certain 
liberalizations in the field of immaterial politics. This brief historic background explains the 
remarkable character of Rutte’s third cabinet, as well as the scrutiny with which the coalition 
formation was observed. While some observers apparently feared that D66 might betray the 
liberal-progressive legacy of the purple phase for the sake of harmonizing the differences with 
orthodox Christians, others by contrast, aimed to ensure, that the political representatives of 
orthodox Christianity in the Netherlands did not allow themselves to support the continuation 
of the purple project.  
The adequacy of these fears is not of central concern to this thesis. Rather, I will focus on D66’s 
history prior to these most recent events to analyze a shift in Dutch secularity that occurred in 
the late-20th century and climaxed in the mentioned purple period. In reference to the multiple 
secularities approach by Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), this can be described as the shift 
from an institutionalized arrangement of secularity that focused on the pluralist accommodation 
of religious-nonreligious diversity––described as pillarization in other literature––to a model of 
secularity, centered on individual liberty and equality. I further show, how each model of 
secularity relates in different ways to yet another notion of secularity, centering on functional 
differentiation and autonomy. Speaking about different arrangements of secularity means to 
understand secularity not in the singular, but as a term for multiple institutionalized 
arrangements that differentiate religion from other realms (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012). 
The pluralist model implies that competing ideals and interests of religious and nonreligious 
groups are harmonized in a pluralist and parity-based arrangement and that further, also 
 
4  On pillarization and depillarization see also: Knippenberg 1998, 211f, De Rooy 2002, Kennedy 1995, 
Ellemers 1979, Pennings 1998, Righart 1995, 48-53, 203f.. 
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functional realms are co-determined by such harmonizing and pluralist logic. The individualist 
model, by contrast, implies that diversity is organized in an individualist way, with legal and 
institutional arrangements referring to the individual as a carrier of liberty and equality rights 
and seek to safeguard them both vis-à-vis the state and other groups. This model further links 
positively with notions of functional differentiation and autonomy, something which is not the 
least shown with respect to debates about the integration of Islam. I further focus on the field 
of integration politics to analyze a second––contested and possibly reversed––shift of 
secularity. With respect to Islam and integration, a functionalist-individualist notion of 
secularity is challenged by one centering on national integration and defense vis-à-vis Islam. 
While both, the pluralist, the individualist, and the nationalist model of secularity refer to the 
state’s stance with respect to social diversity, D66’s project of secularity has been broader and 
also entailed the aim to secularize politics for the sake of the autonomy and efficiency of 
politics. 
In analyzing these shifts of secularity, I take two interrelated perspectives: First, I focus on 
struggles about the political field and competing notions of the “religion-relatedness” 
respectively autonomous logic of politics (Quack, Schuh, and Kind 2019). Second and 
interrelatedly, I focus on the competing political programs of defining the relationship between 
state and religion and of organizing social (religious-nonreligious) diversity and on how parties 
use their power in the political field to shape the place and role of religion in society.  
Reaching back beyond D66’s foundation and into mid-19th century, I sketch the emergence of 
the pluralist model as a result of a historical challenge posed to nineteenth-century liberalism 
and its claim of a neutral public beyond confessional divides. Orthodox Protestant and Catholic 
social-political movements opposed this claim, and socialists as well as challenged the liberal 
idea of neutrality. As a consequence of the increasing influence of these three movements, the 
political field as well as large parts of the public institutional life were organized according to 
their respective principles, which resulted in the segmented and pluralist organizational 
structure later referred to as pillarization. The pluralist system was not merely a complete defeat 
of liberalism but was instead a compromise between different organizational ideas (Van Dam 
and Van Trigt 2015), but still the pluralist compromise has always also been contested.  
I subsequently focus on the second half of the 20th century and the early 21st century, and more 
specifically the 1967 elections and the period of the two purple cabinets (1994-2002) as two 
central moments in which a pluralist model was challenged and eventually replaced. I hold D66 
to be a central agent in this process. The first date concerns the party’s opposition to 
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confessionalism in politics and the aim to secularize politics. While there was an earlier 
movement against pillarization, led by the social-democrats, this one had aimed at national 
unity, while in the late-1960s however, functional autonomy, as well as liberty became core 
motives. D66 was founded in 1966 and according to the party founders, politics was meant to 
facilitate citizens’ transparent, free, and influential participation in a process of democratic 
collective decision-making and efficient governance, and they felt that this prime function of 
democratic politics had been hampered by the confessional parties and the pluralist system. 
They seemingly were not the only Dutch who held such beliefs. D66 profited from its strong 
criticism of the political system and the established parties in the 1967 elections.5 Both, the 
Catholic KVP and the Social Democrats, two parties which had dominated post-war politics, 
suffered great electoral losses, and as a consequence of the loss of the KVP, the confessional 
parties lost their absolute majority for the first time since 1918. D66 by contrast, gained 4.48% 
and seven seats in the parliament and was considered both a manifestation and catalyst of 
deconfessionalization.6 Almost a quarter of the votes for D66 came from the three main 
confessional parties (NIWI 1967, 225).7 Since the mid-1960s, and interrelated with the process 
of depillarization, the share of non-denominationalism accelerated and the frequency and 
relevance of theological references in parliamentary debates declined—an observation that 
Meijering expressed in the aforementioned title to his book, “How God disappeared from the 
Dutch Parliament” (Meijering 2012, 9, 11, 179). While still, about half of Dutch 
parliamentarians self-describes as religious; two thirds more or less agree that religious 
arguments should not dominate political debates (RD 2012b, a).  
Beyond their concern for secular politics, D66 became a central promoter of individual liberty 
and equality as the prime principle of governance and law. Feeding on the emancipation 
movements of the 1960s/70s, this principle was gradually institutionalized, first in the early 
1980s and then in the mentioned purple cabinets of the late-1990s. This principle of individual 
liberty and equality implied a further secularization of state and law, which had been welcomed 
and intentional by D66’s politicians but was criticized by orthodox Protestants. More recently, 
the principle of individual liberty and equality has been institutionalized in a way that 
 
5  At the time of its foundation, the abbreviation still carried an apostrophe (D’66), which was later removed. 
6  Other so-called protest parties gained relevant support as well. In addition to D66, these included the 
Boerenpartij (Farmers’ Party) founded in 1958, as well as socialist and communist parties, the PSP and the CPN, 
respectively.  
7  Another quarter came from the left parties and one-third came from the right liberals and a right protest 
party; almost 7% were new voters. 
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challenges the autonomy of religious organizations and religious exemption rights and thus 
poses a direct challenge to the pluralist tradition.  
A further perspective of this thesis, developed in reference to Quack’s (2014, 2013) diversity 
of nonreligion approach, is to focus on the contested notions of the secular and its relationship 
with religion. Historically, a part of the nineteenth-century orthodox Protestant attack on 
liberalism had been the depiction of secular liberalism as a worldview that competes with 
Christianity, and this notion of a worldview struggle had constituted an epistemic foundation 
of the pluralist confessional order and the subordination of liberalism. Liberals have opposed 
this attribution and considered their political principles and the principle of state and the 
constitution, to be differentiated from and neutral with respect to the diversity of worldview 
positions. The contrast between two notions of the secular, as an autonomous/ neutral position 
vis-à-vis religion, or an antagonistic one, has an ongoing actuality in contemporary 
contestations about secularity and in particular D66’s relationship with religion. Orthodox 
critics depict the party’s politics of secularity as an expression of anti-religiosity and of a radical 
notion of the enlightenment which they seek to assert as a single dominant ideology. Politicians 
of D66 by contrast, seek to defy against such accusations of being anti-religious and hold that 
their notion of secularity would constitute a neutral and fair ground for all. Aside from these 
contested understandings of what constitutes an autonomous (or differentiated), and what an 
antagonistic position vis-à-vis religion, distinctions between secular politics and nonreligious 
worldviews have been institutionalized in different ways over the course of the twentieth 
century.  
All in all thus, I consider D66 an important agent of the shift in Dutch secularity and a focus on 
the party seems a fruitful way to explore the contestedness of secularity in the Netherlands. 
While, politics are not the sole, and possibly not the most important arena of secularity––courts 
play an important role here as well––the focus on politics of secularity speaks to two themes 
crucial in debates about secularity: the relationship of religion and politics as well as that 
between religion and state. In what follows, I give an overview on the different chapters of this 
thesis.  
This thesis combines a historic focus on the different shifts of secularity in the Netherlands with 
several more detailed analyses and case studies that zoom in on specific arenas of secularity. 
The historic focus of the thesis is quite broad, covering a period from the mid-19th century to 
the most recent past. This broad focus allows for a focus on several periods in which the notion 
of secularity became a central object of political struggles in the Netherlands, with competing 
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models of secularity being placed against each other by competing political parties. It shows 
how political power relations changed in relation to changes in the broader religious landscape 
and how this allowed parties to institutionalize different notions of secularity. The thesis is 
thereby structured along chronological and thematic criteria. 
Chapter one briefly outlines the theoretical perspective that guides this thesis and it succeeded 
by a small second chapter that elaborates the process of data gathering and interpretation. 
Chapter three then centers on the first aspect of what is described as politics of secularity in 
this thesis: struggles about the secularity of politics. I hereby contrast the period of the late-19th 
and early- 20th century with the period of D66’s foundation in the mid-1960s. The 19th century 
was characterized by the competition between liberals and confessionals, primarily Calvinists, 
which predominantly concerned the organization of the public-political spheres as well as that 
of other emerging social spheres, such as that of science. Liberals hereby promoted both, 
national integration and unity as well as functional differentiation, two principles which stood 
in mutual tension. While they thought to de-politicize confessional divides and promoted a 
notion of politics that was differentiated from religious and nonreligious worldviews, Calvinists 
reframed politics as being fundamentally religion-related and divided across belief and unbelief. 
This challenged the liberal notion of neutrality by framing it as a form of irreligion and it backed 
a worldview pluralism which would include the differentiated secular realm as one 
particularistic strand. In consequence of this struggle, the late-19th and early- 20th century was 
the formative period of the pluralist model of secularity (type 2). The model that was eventually 
institutionalized can be seen as a compromise between both orders, but it still included 
liberalism in a pluralist system. The chapter very briefly shows how the pluralist system was 
reinstalled under the changed political context of the post-war era when a call for national unity 
under the social-democratic lead (now understood to bridge religious-nonreligious diversity) 
failed and the political power was shared between Catholics and social-democrats until the late-
1950s.  
Against this background, the chapter’s second part describes the foundation of D66. It shows 
how the party positioned in opposition to the pluralist system and the central role of the 
confessional parties therein, both of which it perceived to hamper genuine democratic freedom 
as well as the efficient functioning of politics as a system of collective action and decision 
making. Two subsequent sections show how their ideology critique demarcated politics as 
secular in four interrelated ways, and briefly draws on election research of the time to show 
how the concern with secularity and the ideal of secular politics resonated with voters. A further 
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section explores the party’s later adaption of a social-liberal profile and its more general aim to 
articulate a concise and recognizable standpoint without becoming ideological.  
Chapter four shifts the focus to the principle of individual liberty and equality as a second 
motive for secularizing politics and the state, which was a core issue for the party founders from 
the onset and which gained special importance in the 1990s and early 2000s. In this period. a 
frame of individual liberty and equality was institutionalized and asserted against religious 
exemption rights founded in the pluralist order as well as against the remnants of a Christian 
imprint on the legal order. The chapter is subdivided in four parts. The first part (ch. 4.1) reaches 
back to the 19th-century conflict and briefly sketches the contestedness of individualism as a 
principle of organizing society. This provides the background for understanding the religious-
secular conflict dynamic involved in the so-called immaterial matters around sexuality and end-
of-life decisions. Two subsequent parts demonstrate the gradual assertion of an individual 
liberty and equality frame drawing on the examples of two legislative changes: the opening of 
civil marriage to same-sex couples (ch. 4.2) and the legalization of euthanasia (ch. 4.3). While 
in the case of same-sex marriage the separation of state and church constituted an overt motif 
in parliamentary debates and the legislation process, in the case of euthanasia its compatibility 
with Christianity was stressed. The final part of the chapter (ch.4.4) focuses on an example of 
a minister’s alleged blasphemous expression in the context of the euthanasia debate to show 
how, despite the shift of secularity, all parties seem to agree with a basic notion of political 
secularity as a realm of legitimate religious-nonreligious diversity and necessary moderation 
and tolerance. The chapter closes by summarizing political contestations about the purple 
period’s legacy since the fall of the second purple cabinet (ch. 4.5).  
Chapter five also covers a timespan from the 1980s to current day but deals with the policy 
field of minority or integration policies as another field in which the model of secularity was 
contested. It shows how in the course of the 1990s, also with respect to the integration of 
Muslim migrants a similar shift from a pluralist model of secularity to one centering on 
individual liberty and equality took place. Additionally, the chapter shows how the field of 
integration policies and a growing concern about Islam also gave way to a second shift in 
secularity that has manifested in Dutch politics since the early 21st century but might also retreat 
in the future. This second shift gave dominance to nationalist and culturalist notions of 
integration. The chapter is divided in five parts. The first part (ch.5.1) sketches the mentioned 
two shifts in political and public debate on migrants and integration and shows how D66 and 
the purple parties also asserted an individualist and functionalist frame here. Complementing 
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this overview, this part further shows how the debate on Islam and integration, by catalyzing 
renewed ideological importance in politics, challenged the functionalist-individualist approach 
to integration and secularity as well as the party’s anti-ideological tradition. Accordingly, the 
second part (ch.5.2) starts with D66’s political transformation and its gradual positioning as the 
counter-pole to a nationalist and culturalist critique of Islam. A third part (ch.5.3) then shows 
how emphasizing the equal liberty of Muslim citizens, is only one aspect of the party’s 
positioning, complemented by an assertion of state secularity vis-à-vis Islam and the 
confinement of religious freedom along the principles of individual liberty and equality.  
This rather broad historical overview is followed by three chapters of different length, each 
presenting an empirical case study that engages with a specific aspect of the general dynamic 
of secularity. Chapter six is relatively short and explores how both aspects of the party’s 
secular positioning––the defense of religious freedom and the assertion of secularity––can also 
stand in mutual conflict with each other. The chapter presents a small case study that shows 
how these tensions concerning the party’s positioning found expression in an internal party 
working group on religion and worldviews.  
Chapter seven as well, engages with the matters of Islam and integration and presents a second 
and broader empirical case study on the 2014 campaign for the municipal elections in one of 
the secular cities in the Netherlands. Linking these elections to the initial concern with secular 
politics, this part centers on the political integration of the Dutch migrant Muslim population 
as voters and candidates. It illustrates a shift in focus from Islam and Muslims as a topic in a 
debate on integration to a focus on communicatively offering a secular-liberal position towards 
Muslim and migrant voters who are thus understood as genuine or at least potential liberals. I 
illustrate how the party’s campaign strategy for migrant voters gives expression to an 
individualized notion of secularity. I illustrate how this example marks the development of a 
campaign strategy for migrant voters. Second, I explore the candidacy of a young Muslim 
woman who had held a pronounced position in the religious field and has articulated an 
individual liberty and equality frame from the perspective of a Muslim in the Netherlands as 
well as an inner-Islamic religious perspective. Altogether, the chapter shows how D66 
emphasizes both the notion of a neutral secular state as well as the principle of individual liberty 
and equality with respect to Muslims in the Netherlands and the nationalist and culturalist 
critique of Islam.  
Chapter eight, finally, presents a more detailed case study of a small town in the Dutch Bible 
Belt, a setting where D66 was part of a progressive party merger that saw it positioned alongside 
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a strong orthodox reformed Christian presence. To a certain extent, party members face a 
similar situation as liberals at the turn of the century in the sense that local pluralism of religious 
schools dwarfs the scope of public education, and the secular is integrated as another 
“confessional” minority. Besides the issue of confessionalization, the strength of Protestantism 
manifests itself in its more direct influence on the organization of the public and—most 
controversially—on the local regulations on Sunday rest. After outlining the contestations 
around the confessionalization and the Christian imprint on the local public, the chapter shows 
how both the pluralist dynamic as well as the ideal of individual liberty and equality find 
expression in the campaign for the municipality elections in 2014. Here, the party seeks to 
reverse local power relations by mobilizing non-orthodox voters while also symbolically 
evoking a reversion of the secular model along the lines of the national situation.  
The thesis concludes with a detailed summary and final discussion.  
Before I proceed, I wish to briefly sketch the ways in which this thesis aims to contribute to the 
existing body of literature about religion in the Netherlands and Dutch (political) history. The 
pillarization of Dutch politics has long constituted the core concept with respect to the history 
of Dutch modernization since the mid-19th century. It describes the emergence of a network of 
confessional (Calvinist and Catholic) (and partly also socialist and liberal) organizations that 
gave Dutch society a segmented and pluralist organizational structure (Kruijt 1959, Pennings 
1998, Van Dam 2011). Within political science and as a more abstract conceptual equivalent to 
pillarization, the concept of segmented pluralism was introduced by Lorwin (1971). Arend 
Lijphart further introduced the notion “consociational democracy,” as a specific form of 
governance and political culture in such a segmented society. It implies political cooperation 
between segmental elites according to the rules of the game of Dutch political culture, the value 
of toleration being a central part thereof (Lijphart 1977, 5, 2008 [1967], 116-130) see also: 
Daalder (1995). Since the second half of the 20th century, the term “depillarization” has referred 
to the disintegration of these organizations.  
Lijphart’s work in particular seems to have long been quite influential with respect to the Dutch 
model, presumably as it is also available in English. In recent years, though, Dutch academic 
discourse, especially in history, has reflected a certain discomfort with the binary pair of 
pillarization/ depillarization (Van Dam 2011). Criticism of the binary, however, is not—at least 
from my perspective—overly convincing as it is mainly directed against its oversimplified use 
in polemic counter-distinctions from the past, simplified notions of an individualized presence, 
and the understanding of a uniquely and non-comparable Dutch history (Dam 2011). 
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Alternative concepts that go beyond the binary of pillarization/ depillarization have nonetheless 
been developed. For example, Duyvendak and Hurenkamp (2004) speak of a shift from heavy 
to light communities as a means to counter an oversimplified notion of an individualized society 
in the sense of a complete breakup of social bonds and communities that would underestimate 
the great similarity in apparently individualized lifestyles. This account does not, however, 
challenge the notion of individualization as a shift in the attributed role of the individual and 
the pattern of social organization. Another concept that goes beyond the 
pillarization/ depillarization frame and centers on the shifts in the notion of democracy and 
citizenship is Tilly’s concept of “repertoire,” which De Jong (2014) adapts to analyze shifts in 
the notion of democracy and citizenship over time. In my impression, also this 
reconceptualization does not radically break with the historic account of 
pillarization/ depillarization, its nuance can be found in its focus on a specific aspect of this 
general shift. This also holds for this thesis as well, as it re-analyzes the existing literature with 
a conceptual focus on secularity.  
A conceptual approach very close to that of secularity is Van Dam and Van Trigt’s (2015) 
adaption of Van Rooden’s (1996) concept of “religious regimes,” which they define to mean 
“an institutionalized arrangement regulating the social position of religion in a society during a 
certain period” 3 (see also: (1998). The concept of religious regimes seems to have been 
developed and used in counter-distinction to a secularization theory that takes the decline and 
marginalization of religion in modern society for granted (Van Rooden 1996, 10-16). Moreover, 
it understands the notion of differentiation as being tied to the notion of an inevitable course of 
modernization (Van Dam and Van Trigt 2015, 2f.). Their choice is understandable given that a 
common way of looking at secularization is to focus on the decline of religious beliefs and 
affiliations. In the Netherlands, however, this research has also captured attitudes with respect 
to the role of religion in the public sphere and, more specifically, the perceived legitimacy of 
churches to have a say in people’s private lives, the value of confessional institutions, or the 
entanglement of religion and politics (Becker and De Wit 2000, 71f.). By comparison, 
secularism is used for political philosophies and ideologies seeking to exclude religious voices 
from the public-political realm and debate (Bader 2010, 94). The term secular is further seen to 
only make sense from the observational perspective of religion and thus fails to give full justice 
to the actual logic and requirements of liberal democracies (Bader 2010; 93).  
Notions of mere decline or of a strict privatization of religion are not how secularity is used 
here. Instead, the concept is applied to analyze competing institutionalizations of religion under 
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one frame, including those that grant a public and important role to religion in modernity. While 
the concept of secularity as used in this thesis functions similarly to that of religious regimes, it 
has, at least in my understanding, a certain advantage given that the term secularity, also 
etymologically, implies a differentiation between realms and their interrelation—something the 
concept of religious regimes also addresses (Gorski and Altınordu 2008, Casanova 1994).  
1 A Theoretical Approach on the Politics of Secularity8  
The central term in this thesis is “secularity,” as coined by Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt as “the 
culturally and symbolically as well as institutionally anchored forms and arrangements of 
differentiation between religion and other social spheres, including the public sphere” 
(Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012, 881). The notion politics of secularity refers to the process 
of seeking and using political power to influence the place of religion in a given society and 
more specifically in relation to the political as well as other social realms. Political struggles 
concern secularity in two ways: first, in questioning what the appropriate relationship between 
politics and religion should be, and, second, by addressing the relative position of religion with 
respect to other social fields and its influence thereon. The root word “secular” further links the 
notion of secularity with other related terms such as secularization, the secular, and secularism. 
The process word secularization can refer to processes and arrangements of differentiation as 
well as to religious decline or the privatization of religion (Casanova 1994). The secular is that 
what is distinguished from religion and is used synonymously with nonreligion in this thesis.9 
Secularism is used for more or less elaborated ideas and programs of secularization, that is, for 
ideologies in the value neutral sense of the word.10  
In what follows, I focus on and combine three conceptual approaches that together allow for 
the conceptualization of political struggles about secularity central to this thesis: Drawing on 
conceptual approaches by Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012) I focus on the problem 
constellations addressed and solved within different arrangements of secularity, the 
differentiational patterns of these arrangements, as well as the cultural ideas associated with or 
guiding such arrangements. It thus allows for conceiving competing political programs and 
 
8  Parts of this chapter have already been published in a collective book that emerged from the diversity of 
nonreligion project (Schuh 2019, Schuh, Quack, and Kind 2019). 
9  Neither the term religion nor that of the secular is conceptualized substantially. Rather, in reference to 
Asad, the authors stress the co-constitutionality of both domains which are only identified as such through their 
differentiation (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012, 881). 
10  I sometimes use the word root plus asterisk (secular*) to indicate that it refers to secularization, secular, 
secularism, and secularity. 
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pathways of secularity. Second, Quack’s (2014, 2013) diversity of nonreligion provides an 
analytical frame for understanding how competing notions of the secular or nonreligion are 
played out in struggles about secularity and that can be institutionalized in different ways. Last 
but not least, I refer to Bourdieu’s (2001, 2014) political field to conceptualize the interrelated 
struggles about the secularity of politics and secularity more general.  
All three approaches offer ways to understand secularity as a multifaceted and contested 
phenomenon. Partly in a programmatic way, they thereby offer alternatives to a normative and 
critical tendency in the academic debate on secularity. I briefly sketch two themes and 
tendencies in the social-scientific and political-philosophical debate about the secular*, which 
resonate with the outlined struggle about the role of religion in the Netherlands as well as the 
competing notions of liberal secularity. First, it pertains specifically to the tendency to challenge 
the notion of differentiation as an analytical and normative category in the name of public 
religion and pluralism, and second to the focus of the secular/ secularism as a culturally 
particularistic position. 
1.1 Contested Secularity 
Early sociology, particularly in Max Weber and Émile Durkheim’s work, assumed that religion 
would lose authority and importance in modern society (Casanova 1994, 18, see also: Schimank 
2002).11 Weber developed the notion of the differentiation of different autonomous value 
spheres each based on their own autonomous logic. Luhmann took up Weber’s early work and 
later established the notion of differentiation of functional systems (Casanova 1994, 20f.). In 
this scheme, religion loses its prior encompassing authority and integrating function for society 
and becomes one functional realm among others (Casanova 1994, 20f., Knoblauch 1999). 
Interrelated with the thesis of differentiation, two other sub-theses informed the understanding 
of secularization: that of religious decline and religious privatization (Casanova 1994).12 More 
recently, this notion of a teleological process of differentiation and privatization has given way 
to the understanding that modern societies might also be characterized by other arrangements 
with respect to religion, such as pluralist ones, and that religion might hold different public 
roles (Eisenstadt 2000). This realization of the existence of multiple modernities seems to have 
 
11  While Durkheim assumed that the old Gods would be replaced by new ones, Weber assumed that they 
would lose against the pluralization of value spheres (Casanova 1994)18. 
12  Privatization has thereby been understood in two distinct ways: by Luckmann, as a localization of religion 
in and its focus on the private realm of people’s lives, and by Luhmann as the privatization of decisions and 
positionings in the religious field (Wohlrab-Sahr and Krüggeler 2000. 241f.).  
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come, at least generally, with a normative preference for pluralism over differentiation and 
public religion over its privatization. The work of Casanova seems key here.  
In 1994, Casanova challenged the notion of privatization13 on both empirical and normative 
grounds. He first plead for a legitimate role for religion at the level of civil society (Casanova 
1994, 219), and later followed Stepan in acknowledging an even greater public role, extending 
religion to the political realm (Stepan 2000, 39f., Casanova 2008). Casanova’s core argument 
in 1994 was to defend differentiation as the first sub-thesis of the secularization theory, arguing 
that under the conditions of religious diversification,  the differentiation of the state implied the 
gradual implementation of principles of religious tolerance and state neutrality while religion 
was confined to the private sphere (Casanova 1994, 22). Later Casanova also questioned the 
notion of differentiation, both in the sense of a single teleological process of modernization, as 
well as an adequate description of European secular states; he considered this account of state-
secularization a mere foundational myth and the late expression of Enlightenment critiques of 
religion (Casanova 2008). Rather than a historic achievement, the notion of the differentiated 
state is now portrayed as an aspect of a secularist ideology while empirical cases of incomplete 
separations are seen to further prove this point.  
Casanova’s shifting views serve as an example of a more general shift in the notion of the 
secular* from something neutral and differentiated to an equally particularistic equivalent to 
religion. This critique has further entangled social-scientific with political-philosophical 
debates on the role of religion in modern societies. The propagation of a legitimate public role 
of religion both draws on and entails a critique of liberal political philosophies, which in one 
way or another promotes secularism in the sense of a commitment to religious freedom, state 
neutrality with respect to religion, the secular character of political discourse and practice, and 
the confinement of religion to the private realm and civil society (rather than that of politics and 
state) (Casanova 2008, Bader 2010, 17, 24, Stepan 2000, 45). Such liberal philosophies 
seemingly demanded more religious secularism than was necessary for modern democracies to 
function or even conflict the democratic ideals of liberty when failing to treat religion (or new 
religious minorities) with genuine fairness (Casanova 2008, Bader 2010, 27, Asad 2016). Post-
colonial studies in particular point to the oppressive, discriminative, and partly violent methods 
and effects the institutionalization of secularism had in colonial and post-colonial regimes as 
well as in the post-9/11-West (Asad 2016, Jansen 2011, Mahmood 2006). As, according to 
 
13  In the sense of a localization of religion in and its focus on the private realm of people’s lives. 
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Bangstadt (2009, 191), Asad views secularism as being “not so much about a differentiation 
between religious and secular spheres or about the generation of toleration as it is about the 
sovereign power of the modern nation-state (cf. p. 508).” And it is “precisely the asymmetry of 
power between the secular state and what it defines as ‘religion’ that articulates the sovereign 
power of the state (cf. Asad, 2006b: 505)” (Ibid.). It seems that the liberal state is criticized for 
the fact that it is not entirely neutral towards all ways of living but “permits and develops certain 
ways of being and living, while disdaining, tacitly prohibiting, or stunting others” (Cannell 
2010, 90f.) Asad’s book thus problematizes the assertion of a liberal worldviews to religious 
minorities (Ibid.).  
For Stepan, the liberal idea of privatization is countered with the notion of democracy and 
democratic bargaining (Stepan 2000, 45). Others by comparison, have contrasted secularism 
with a pluralist legal, political, and administrative recognition of religious organizations (Bader 
2010, 20, see also: Bader 2003). This normative placing of pluralism against differentiation 
seems to reverse older (somewhat teleological) notions of a gradual development from pre-
modern segmentation—as a differentiation along the lines of equal elements—to modern 
functional differentiation (Tyrell 2008, 79, Koenig 2016, 14f.). While Bader seeks to combine 
pluralism with the protection of individual rights, others have suggested that pluralist systems 
might also stand in tension to individual liberty rights (Bhargava 2006, Kymlicka 1992, 
Beckford 2014, 19). In a more general sense, though, different pluralist visions in the sense of 
the acceptance of different values and rationalities can also contrasted with totalistic views that 
place a single value or rationality central and attribute it with total authority Eisenstadt (2000, 
7-9). 
One aspect in the critique of the differentiation and the concern with a fair conception of state 
and politics vis-à-vis religious citizens is the notion of the secular or secularism as a 
particularistic position, and this is the second point in which debates in the social sciences 
resonate with political contestations about secularity. In a very general way, this notion of the 
secular and secularism as a particularistic position seems to be based on their culturality as 
something historical and constructed, as well as on their understanding as something tied to the 
interests and motives of certain agents––the work of Asad and Taylor being prime examples. 
Taylor’s cultural theory of secular modernity is based on the quasi-phenomenological 
reconstruction of the historical genesis of an immanent frame and allows him to adapt a 
reflexive position with respect to this notion of immanence. An immanent frame can then be 
perceived as a “shared cultural horizon” and “sacred canopy” (Koenig 2011, 656). This position 
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of a reflexive distance towards a notion of immanence resonates, as argued by e.g. Hunter 
(2011) and also illustrated by this study, with orthodox Christian perspectives and historic 
contestation of liberalism. Likewise, according to Koenig, Taylor’s project calls on the social 
sciences of religion to let go of their taken for granted assumption of immanence and exchange 
it for the equal integration of all religious and nonreligious perspectives in modernity, including 
faith positions (pp. 655-657). Hunter (2011) respectively—and in reference to Gordon—
classifies Taylor’s work as an expression of a neo-Thomist perspective of secularization.  
Asad’s notion and critique of secularism, as mentioned, has a different thrust. It concerns the 
secular state’s alleged assimilative force. His work has inspired an anthropology of secularism, 
which, according to Gorski (2008, 73), shows “that secularism is not a disenchanted political 
stand […] and that the promotion of secularism is not an innocuous plea for public neutrality 
vis-à-vis the plurality of beliefs and worldviews” (Gorski 2008, 73). By contrast, secularism “is 
carried by social actors with specific interests who associate it with concrete lifestyles, 
emotionally identify with it, sacralize it […] and mobilize against religious movements through 
complex strategies” (Ibid. 73f.). Here, the reference to the culturality of secularism and to its 
propagation through specific agents is accordingly used to counter its legitimacy.  
Complementing these critical projects, others have pointed to nonreligion as a particularistic 
position rather emancipatorily. Lee (2015), who has together with Quack (2014, 2013), initiated 
the emerging field of nonreligion studies understands nonreligion as a substantive position in 
the sense of “philosophies and cultures developed in contradistinction from religious ones,” 
(Lee 2015, 32, see also: 7, 39).14 She further conceives nonreligion as a binary other and 
equivalent to religion. Lee respectively claims the recognition of nonreligious people on a par 
with religious ones (Lee 2015). 
All in all thus, in the recent debate on secularity, the awareness of multiple possible social 
orders has come, by tendency, with a normative preference for public religion and pluralism 
while the secular is by tendency framed as a particularistic position rather than a neutral ground 
with respect to religion. At an empirical level, the notion of public religion fits Dutch reality. 
The claim that “no group in civil society—including religious groups—can a priori be 
prohibited from forming a political party” (Stepan 2000, 40) can aptly describe the political 
 
14  Generally speaking, the focus on the culturality of the secular/ secularism and its comparability to religion 
echoes older concerns for functional equivalents to religion. Already theories of differentiation have assumed that 
the decline in the role of religion was matched by the emergence of functional equivalent alternatives, examples 
being political ideologies or forms of civil religion (Pickel 2011, 119, 127-129).  
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reality of Dutch society (and others) since the nineteenth century. Moreover, in the Dutch case, 
the presence of religious parties in the political field are the result of a historic challenge to 
liberalism. Empirically though, contestations about secularity are not simply solved through 
pluralist arrangements. While Stepan (Stepan 2000, 45) placed the historic pacification that 
gave way to the pluralist order as an empirical demonstration of successful democratic 
bargaining with liberal ideas of separation, the confessional pluralism in the Netherlands has 
not only emerged as a solution but has also been itself contested and challenged in the name of 
individual rights and differentiation. Also the critical notions of the secular as a particularistic 
position echo contestations about secularity in the Netherlands. The creation of a reflexive 
distance to an immanent frame, most recently proposed by Taylor, has also been made useful 
in (historic) political struggles about secularity in the Netherlands. 
Rather than a normative proposition of pluralism or public religion, this thesis aims to analyze 
ongoing struggles about the public role of religion and the state’s relationship with religion. 
While a defense of liberalism or liberal secularity is not the intention of this thesis, it shows that 
it is not only liberal but also religious politics and pluralist regimes have the power to shape 
and constrain lives. Furthermore, it points to the interrelatedness of the religion-relatedness of 
politics and that of the state and thus the inner rationality of liberal claims for secular politics.  
1.2 Multiple Secularities 
The multiple secularities concept was established as a cultural-sociological and comparative 
approach to secularity, that allows to differentiate pathways to and models of secularity, but 
also goes beyond such formal distinctions by emphasizing the value-boundness of competing 
notions of secularity (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2011, 2012). Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 
(2012, 880, 884) speak of “cultures of secularity” with respect to “the meaning that is attached 
to the institutions, practices or discourses of differentiation and distinction with regard to 
religion.” The multiple secularities concept was partly modeled after Shmuel Eisenstadt’s 
notion of multiple modernities, which suggests a minimal unifying concept of modernity while 
acknowledging different development paths (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012, 877, 880).15 
In the same way that modernity is interpreted and shaped differently in and by different 
contexts, also secularities must be understood as culturally embedded and as expressions of 
 
15  In reference to Weber, Eisenstadt (2000) defines the onset of modernity via the moment of deconstruction 
and increasing reflexivity, when an unquestioned legitimacy of a (once divinely sanctioned) social order declined 
and the notion of a possibility of visions and social orders emerged (4). This open horizon and the reflexivity also 
created the possibility of different modernities.  
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“culture[s] of secularity” (p. 880, see also: 882).16 The reference to Eisenstadt is important 
because the authors place their reconceptualization of secularity against the polarized 
opposition between defenders and critiques of classic secularization theory, against those 
critiques that declare the concept of secularity/ secularization unsuitable for research contexts 
beyond “the West,” and especially against the, by tendency, normative ideology critiques of 
secularism, which place “’natural religiosity’” against an ideological secularism and thus dwarf 
the liberating aspects of modernity and secularism in comparison to aspects of domination and 
exclusion (pp. 875-879). Aside from its focus on the ideas and values behind arrangements of 
secularity, the authors suggest a moderate functional perspective that centers on the social 
problems solved by secularities—even if not in a universal or uncontested way.17 Competing 
multiple modernities and secularities are not only played out in inter-state (and post-colonial) 
relations but have also determined inner-European processes of modernization with lasting and 
renewed manifestations until today. The multiple secularities approach is thus placed against 
teleological notions of a single process of modern secularization as well as against critiques of 
secularism alike. In line with other authors such as Christian Smith (2003), secularity is thus 
understood as an outcome of social conflicts or negotiation processes in which certain actors 
based on different motives and ideas seek to limit or redefine the influence of religion by 
emphasizing the tensions between religion and other spheres and by mobilizing support for their 
respective goals. The notion “cultures of secularity” does not suggest a binary opposition to 
religion in the sense that only nonreligious people or ideas might contribute to secularity. 
Rather, both religious and nonreligious actors and ideas can contribute to cultures of secularity. 
The importance of liberty in both protestant and enlightenment thought and their at least 
possibly equal contribution to a liberal secularity is a case in point here (Wohlrab-Sahr and 
Burchardt 2012, 892). As indicated, Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt’s basic suggestion is that 
secularities “‘respond’ to specific societal problems (as their reference problems) and offer 
solutions to them” (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012, 887). The authors distinguish between 
four such problems: “(1) the problem of individual freedom vis-à-vis dominant social units, be 
they groups or the state; (2) the problem of religious heterogeneity and the resulting potential 
or actual conflictuality; (3) the problem of social or national integration and development; and 
(4) the problem of the independent development of institutional domains” (Ibid.). Reference 
 
16  They do not adapt Eisenstadt’s focus on long term civilizational pathways, but aim to focus on the 
interrelation of ancient histories and modern encounters (p. 885).  
17  Burchardt (2016) speaks of “imagined or real problems” to which secularities ‘respond’ to, thus 
emphasizing the constructive and perspectival aspect concept. 
28 
 
problems constitute latent motives for certain orders of secularity and they also stand in at least 
latent mutual tension to each other.18 There might be different and competing interpretations of 
what problem is at stake or what matters the most. The authors suggest that one motive will 
gain (at least temporary) cultural dominance (and institutional expression) by being linked to 
guiding ideas that—according to the authors—epitomize the respective reference problem. 
Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012) emphasize that guiding ideas constitute fundamental 
values in the sense of Taylor’s “’strong ideas’” (p. 893), embedded in a cultural context in a 
deeper and more general way and might orient matters unrelated to religion and secularity as 
well (p. 896). Moreover, Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt stress the processes of interpretation, 
framing, and authorization that precedes and enables such forms of cultural and institutional 
dominance (p. 887f).19 Drawing on different empirical examples, Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 
(2012, 889) develop four ideal-types of secularity based on the four above-mentioned reference 
problems: “(1) secularity for the sake of individual rights and liberties; (2) secularity for the 
sake of balancing/ pacifying religious diversity; (3) secularity for the sake of societal or national 
integration and development; and (4) secularity for the sake of the independent development of 
functional domains of society.”  
Another way in which multiple secularities can be understood as one aspect of multiple and 
contested modernities is that different kinds of secularity imply different forms of social 
differentiation which might also be of more general relevance in a society, namely: functional 
differentiation, pluralism/ segmentation, individualism, and de-differentiation 
(homogenization/ totalization).20  
Functional differentiation has been central to the understandings of modernization and 
modernity of most of the founding fathers of sociology, be it under the label of the specialization 
of work, the autonomization of value spheres, or the later label functional differentiation 
 
18  The authors distinguish between the motives of secularity as a kind of motivations, rooted in certain 
reference problems, and motifs as overt expressions or articulations of such motivations and their interlocking with 
culturally rooted values. Political programs present overt motifs that are presented as motives. From a methodic 
point of view this claimed equivalence of motifs and motives constitutes a challenge this thesis cannot deal with. 
Consequently I use motives and motifs somewhat interchangeably.  
19 They also argue that guiding ideas might serve as a point of reference and common denominator for different 
actors and groups including those with competing religion-related interests and commitments (887f., 894), a 
notion similar to that of an “overlapping consensus” in the sense of Rawls (Fuchs 2006).  
20  According to Eisenstadt (2000, 7-10), political struggles about the shape of modernity follow the lines 
of antinomies deeply engrained in the modern project, that is, the tension between pluralism and universalism as 
well as totalitarianism. 
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(Schimank 2002).21 Functional differentiation has thereby been contrasted with pre-modern22 
forms of social segmentation—a term which has been prominently coined by Durkheim but has 
gained more recent relevance in political science and debates about pluralism (Tyrell 2008, 
79).23 Durkheim understood segmented societies to be composed of equal elements such as 
clans and kinship groups and integrated via a form of mechanical solidarity, and he 
distinguished them from societies based on functional differentiation and cooperation as well 
as a form of organic solidarity (Koenig 2016, 14f).24 In later work, and partly in reference to 
the Netherlands, segmentation came to be used for forms of religious and worldview 
pluralism—still however in contradiction to functional differentiation (Lorwin 1971, 141f.).25 
Also Lijphart’s (2008 [1967], 1977) mentioned work needs to be mentioned here.  
In current debates about pluralism, it is commonly contrasted with individualist forms of social 
organization, centering on individual liberties.26 Historically, individualism has been 
institutionalized in various constitutions and other legal documents in consequence of or 
interrelated with religious and confessional diversification, and the emergence of modern 
capitalism, bureaucracy; and also functional and role differentiation are seen to have enabled 
individualization in the sense of allowing individualized biographies (Hazelrigg 2001) 
(Schimank 2002, Turner 2005). The aspects of individual liberty and equality are thereby 
closely interrelated. Luhmann (1977, 36) e.g. argued that “a functionally differentiated society 
will become, or has to pretend to be, a society of equals” in which “nothing but function justifies 
discrimination” (Luhmann 1977, 36). Liberal authors in particular, seem to emphasize the 
importance of individual rights, their interrelation with state neutrality, as well as the tensions 
 
21  Luhmann has distinguished three basic forms of differentiation: segmentation, stratification, and 
functional differentiation. While segmentation differentiates society into equal systems and stratification into 
unequal (hierarchical) subsystems, functional differentiation implies that systems are based on “special functions 
to be fulfilled at the level of the society itself” (Luhmann 1977, 35, Turk 2001). 
22  The notion of multiple modernities obviously conflicts with such evolutionary models of modernization 
as a singular process. 
23  Before Durkheim already Spencer had worked on differentiation.  
24  Durkheim assumed that communities based on ethnic, lingual, and religious bonds would lose relevance 
in modern differentiated and individualized societies (Koenig 2016, 21). 
25  While Durkheim understood segmented societies as those, based on a strong collective religious identity 
(and thus the equality of individuals), Lorwin explicitly uses it for religious and worldview diversity and this also 
links to current debates on pluralism within both sociology and political science/ philosophy. Other similar 
concepts are Fogarty’s notion of “vertical or ideological pluralism,” Gusfield’s “superimposed segregation,” or 
Steiner’s “subculturally segmented political systems” (Lorwin 1971, 144). Kruijt (1959, 107) speaks of “vertical 
ideological pluralism,” for cases where ideological divides cross-cut horizontal class-based divides.  
26  Lorwin (1971, 143) emphasized that segmented pluralism is based, at least initially, on individual choice, 
which makes it different from pluralist orders based on caste, communalism, race, or language. Still however, he 
also stresses that in practice there may be high costs of communal drop out, in terms of social pressure or individual 




of such an individualism with the recognition of collective rights (Kymlicka 1992, 34, 39).27 
Last but not least, the focus on functional differentiation and social (individualist or pluralist) 
diversification is contrasted with totalistic notions of integration or cohesion Eisenstadt (2000, 
7f.) speaks of the rift between “universal and pluralistic visions—between a view that accepted 
the existence of different values and rationalities and a view that conflated different values and, 
above all, rationalities in a totalistic way” as the perhaps most critical rift (both ideologically 
and politically) of modernity.28 Different from such a notion of totalism, Durkheim 
conceptualized social integration as a moral consensus underlying differentiated societies and 
based on what he called the cult of the individual (Koenig 2016). 
Different kinds of social differentiation imply heterogeneous institutionalizations of religion 
and as such also constitute arrangements of secularity. They consider religion as an individual 
liberty, as a collective identity or right, as either identical or opposed to a national or social 
identity, or as a functional sphere, among others. The multiple secularities’ approach, as said, 
centers mainly on the ideas and motives behind arrangements of secularity, and this is what the 
typology centers on mainly. Still, the tensions between different forms of social differentiation 
as such seems at least equally important for the distinction of different secularities and 
somewhat independent from the level of ideas. That is to say that the motives and ideas might 
also be linked in different ways with patterns of differentiation than that in those ways 
illustrated by the typology. Liberty, to give an example, might not be claimed in the name of 
individuals exclusively, but also in the name of groups (as collective freedoms and liberty from 
the state), while further also individual freedoms might lead to pluralist collective arrangements 
of differentiation. Conversely, the reference problem of diversity might be interpreted and 
solved in individualistic or pluralist terms. In a general sense, this means that cultural values 
might guide competing ideals of secularity in a given society.  
In line with the elaborations above and based on the empirical parts of this thesis, I have slightly 
modified the original typology (see Table 1): I speak of type 1 as “secularity for the sake of 
individual liberty and equality” in order to emphasize the aspect of status equality which at least 
in this case is central and motivating for this type. The importance of equality thereby shows 
that also type 1 is to some extent centered on the governance of diversity as a reference problem. 
With respect to type 2, the focus can be placed on the motive of balancing/ harmonizing 
 
27  Others, by contrast stress the merits of a simultaneous recognition and balancing of both individual and 
group rights (Bader 2003, Bhargava 2006, 652f.).  
28  He thereby mentions totalizing conceptions of rationality, the nation, or politics (Ibid. 8f.). 
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religious-nonreligious diversity as well as that of collective autonomy or parity. The first 
emphasizes the dealing with competing collective interests, while the second makes liberty and 
equality claims towards the state. Type 3 always has a de-differentiating tendency and stands 
in tension with notions of legitimate diversity or functional autonomy. The emphasis can 
thereby be either on social/ national progress and development or on social/ national integration 
and defense. Type 4 emphasizes the autonomy of different realms to develop an autonomous 
and differentiated logic.  
 
Table 1: Modified Typology of Multiple Secularities 
Type 1: Type 2: 
secularity for the sake 
of individual liberty 
and equality 




secularity for the sake 
of collective autonomy 
Type 3: Type 4: 
secularity for the sake 
of social/ national 
progress and 
development 
secularity for the sake 
of social/ national 
integration and defense  
Secularity for the sake of the autonomous 
development of functional spheres. 
 
 
1.3 The Diversity of Nonreligion  
While the multiple secularities typology helps to distinguish different patterns and motives of 
secularity, the diversity of nonreligion frame centers on the diversity of secular or 
“nonreligious” others to religion, on different modes of nonreligion, distinguished among other 
factors by their relation to religion (Quack 2013, 2014).  
The emerging field of nonreligion studies, as mentioned, was initiated by Lee (2015) and Quack 
(2014, 2013). Both share the idea that secularization theory has placed insufficient attention to 
the fact that religion is not without equivalents and others, respectively fails to take the diversity 
of nonreligious others of religion into account. Beyond that however, the two authors slightly 
differ in how they conceptualize nonreligion. Lee distinguishes between nonreligion as a 
position developed in direct contradistinction from religious ones, and on the other hand, 
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secular positions that are rather indifferent to religion (Lee 2015, 32, see also: 7, 39).29 Prior to 
Lee, Colin Campbell had made a similar distinction in his sociology of irreligion. Working on 
19th and 20th century secularist movements (such as freethinkers, humanists, or ethical 
movements), he defined irreligion as an expression of hostility or indifference toward religion, 
either aiming at the abolition of religion or at its functional substitution, and he distinguished it 
from merely secular realms such as politics or the economy (Campbell 1971, 21, 24f, 26f., 37-
39, see also: Kind and Schuh 2019).  
Quack as well distinguishes nonreligion from areligious positions, unrelated to religion. In 
reference to Bourdieu, he defines nonreligion as all positions that are not religious while they 
are also related to religion in relevant ways by producing and suffering field-effects from the 
religious field (Quack 2014, 450). Quack provides various examples of what might constitute 
a form of nonreligion: atheism and secular humanism, the science of religion in the sense that 
it self-positions as agnostic or atheistic while relating to religion in relevant ways, and he even 
contends that the religiously indifferent might be construed under the frame of being entangled 
with and placed in relation to religion through social interaction and conflict (Schuh, Quack, 
and Kind 2019, Quack and Schuh 2017, Quack 2014, 2012). In a collective volume, we 
distinguish between two ways in which nonreligious positions can be related to religion: We 
speak of religion-likeness with respect to positions in a certain equivalent position with religion, 
and of religion-relatedness with respect to other, non-equivalent, relations certain positions 
might have with religion (Schuh, Quack, and Kind 2019). Quack speaks of a religion-related 
surrounding of the religious field, which encompasses all nonreligious positions (Quack 2014, 
450).30 The religion-related surrounding can be understood as the religious field’s borderland, 
determined by the ambiguity and contestation of the religious field’s borders. It is a field of 
religion-related phenomena and as such the notion resonates with Bourdieu’s observation of 
“the dissolution of religion” as a consequence of ways in which matters of health, wholeness, 
and salvation were fused (Bourdieu 1992). 
 
29  Generally speaking, the focus on the culturality of the secular/ secularism and its comparability to religion 
echoes older concerns for functional equivalents to religion. Already theories of differentiation have assumed that 
the decline in the role of religion was matched by the emergence of functional equivalent alternatives, examples 
being political ideologies or forms of civil religion (Pickel 2011, 119, 127-129).  
30  Quack uses the notion of a religion-related surrounding (Umfeld) primarily to denote the research field 
of nonreligion studies. His articles on the topic offer insight into how different modes of nonreligion also 
similarly determine each other as they are co-determined by positions in a religious field. As such, it seems 
legitimate and in line with his overall concept to conceive it through a Bourdeusian lens.  
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All in all thus, Quack’s notion of nonreligion seems to be broader than that of both Campbell 
and Lee, entailing both, the notion of the secular as a binary other to religion, and, second, the 
notion of the secular as a differentiated, neutral, or indifferent position with respect to religion. 
At the same time, his approach also offers the possibility to conceptualize tensions and 
differentiations between such different forms of nonreligion. This will be elaborated in the next 
section. Prior to that though, I suggest understanding irreligion and the differentiated secular as 
two ideal-typical forms of nonreligion.31 
Irreligion denotes positions that stand in a binary opposition to religion, either in the sense of 
an explicit hostile and conflict-based position, or in the sense of a direct competitor of religion 
seeking to replace it with a secular and “religion-like“ alternative or equivalent. Further 
differentiations would be possible, given that such positions might refer to different religious 
others or different aspects of religion. While irreligion generally points to this binary relation, 
other terms also qualify this relation. While the notion of nonreligious worldviews suggests an 
initial equivalence with religion, the notion of worldview secularism suggests the sacralization 
of a formerly differentiated secular position.  
The notion of differentiated or autonomous positions implies neither antagonism nor 
equivalence with religion. Instead, it is based on an autonomous logic. In this sense, Max Weber 
(1980 [1922] b, ch. V, §11) speaks of the autonomy (Eigengesetzlichkeit) of the different 
secular social spheres from the religious one as well as from each other. Rather than constituting 
a binary and direct other to religion, differentiation transcends (such binary divides (and partly 
relegates religion to the ‘private’ sphere of the individual). A differentiated position can be 
conceived as a common ground between, as a space of equal distance to, or as merely distinct 
from religious and irreligious positions. In the mentioned previous publication, we speak of a 
“third space” position to emphasize that differentiation is always based on claiming a third 
position and alternative to a binary divide between religion and worldview secularism (Quack, 
Schuh, and Kind 2019). Differentiation does not imply the absence of competition or conflict; 
it also does not ascribe interrelation. According to Wohlrab-Sahr (2008), Weber argued that the 
autonomization of value spheres in the long run threatened the position of religion and that the 
differentiated value spheres might also come to compete with religion by offering inner-worldly 
salvation, while religion might aim to rationally explain the world. At least potentially such 
forms of competition can also lead to a de-differentiation of realms or fields (Karstein 2013). 
 
31  This analytical distinction however, does not exhaust all the possibilities of nonreligious positions 
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Stolz (2010, 264) accordingly speaks of a functionally distinct form of competition where 
competition is based on a different logic.  
The distinction between the secular as a neutral or particularistic position is thereby likely to be 
contested among different actors. From an absolute claim on religious truth and an 
encompassing notion of its scope, a neutral or differentiated secular position is hardly 
conceivable. An example of this are the Catholic reservations against the notion of a mere 
“political peace” in the 16th century Peace of Augsburg, which was based on encompassing 
claims of the truth and validity of Catholic Christianity (Heckel 1959, 141-145, 216-225, Hunter 
2014). Conversely, Quack (2011) as well as Kind (2019) show that groups and agents 
commonly classified as worldview secularist at times strive to develop a neutral/ differentiated 
position vis-à-vis religion.  
1.3.1 Institutionalized Differentiations Between Modes of Nonreligion 
The diversity of nonreligion can be linked with the concept of secularity by focusing on 
institutionalized differentiations between different modes of nonreligion as a part of 
arrangements of secularity. Quack’s approach facilitates an analysis of the institutionalized 
divides between different modes of nonreligion as one aspect of secularity (Schuh, Quack, and 
Kind 2019). From a perspective of differentiation, the religion-related surrounding of the 
religious field constitutes a realm from within which further borders can be drawn depending 
on which different forms of nonreligion become part of different distinct fields.32 Here, I will 
only offer a few examples of what this implies: nonreligious positions in a religion-related 
surrounding can claim and gain entrance to the religious field and thereby transform it into a 
religious-nonreligious worldview field. The religion-related surrounding might contain both 
differentiated and irreligious positions, but their interrelations might be less important than the 
relations these positions have in other fields. For instance, a secular party and an irreligious 
group might both be part of a religion-related surrounding, but the secular party is likely to be 
oriented towards the political field primarily, while the irreligious group might, e.g., seek 
entrance into the religious field.  
Distinctions between different forms of secularism are not uncommon in existing literature, 
both in normative as well as descriptive fashion: An example is Casanova’s distinction between 
“political secularism” and “ideological secularism” (Casanova 2009): Political secularism 
 
32  This resonates with Bourdieu’s notion of fields emerging from positions “yet to be built,” from yet 




constitutes a statecraft principle and implies “some principle of separation between religious 
and political authority,” be it for the sake of state neutrality or for individual liberty and equality 
rights, and it functions without a concrete notion of what religion is (Ibid.). As an ideology, 
secularism is based on an essentialist (negative) notion of religion as being outdated or irrational 
(Casanova 2009, 1052). According to Casanova, political secularism can therefore easily 
become ideological if it sacralizes the political or claims absolute and universal rationality for 
the secular (pp. 1057f.). Distinctions between neutral and particularistic notions of secularism 
can include ideas about their ideal relationship. Bader, as an example suggests a model of 
pluralism that conceives state neutrality as a form of equidistance to both religious and secular 
worldviews (Bader 2010, 26). Others, by contrast, have analyzed respective 
institutionalizations on an empirical level. Hunter (2011) e.g. focuses on 19th century Catholic 
Neo-Thomism and its rivalry with Protestant-rationalist notions of secularity while also 
distancing these from the factual historic processes of administrative and political 
secularization. Although he is predominantly focused on contrasting both Catholic and 
Protestant-rationalist readings, he also mentions their tensions with political projects of 
secularization and shows how 19th-century German rationalist groups positioned were 
eventually institutionalized as worldview rivals and equivalents to religion (Hunter 2011) 
(Hunter 2015, 17). Also with respect to Germany, Weir (2015a, 2014, 12f) distinguishes 
between organized worldview secularism, on the one hand, and liberalism as a carrier of state 
secularization (or: political secularism) on the other hand. While for worldview secularists, 
secularism meant “not religious,” for liberals it meant “non-sectarian,” and, turning against the 
worldview secularism of their time, at least some liberals pursued a differentiation between 
science and politics from ultimate questions (Weir 2015b, 10).33  
This work about empirical differentiations between different “modes of nonreligion” as well as 
Quack’s (2014) emphasis on the diversity of nonreligious positions contrasts with the work of 
others who have operated with a singular notion of the secular or secularism, and further have 
fused cultural understandings of the secular or secularism with a tone of critique––the work of 
Asad and Taylor being the prime examples (ch. 2.1). Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), as 
mentioned above, position against the normative, and often critical, tone in the academic debate 
 
33  He argues that liberal sociologists Weber and Tönnies neutralized the concept of secularization, 
distinguishing the comparative science of ethics from the anticlericalism of worldview secularism and gave up 
the notion of a unified scientific worldview (Weir 2015b, 10). At the same time, he also refers to more recent 
reinterpretations of Weber’s work, whose theory of secularization is now interpreted by some as a “partisan 
contribution to the anti-Catholic Kulturkampf in which he, as a Protestant liberal, was raised” (Ibid. 9).  
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about secularity. Quack (2014) seems to especially position against the debate’s neglect of 
nonreligious diversity, while he seems to share some of the critique of secularity. This thesis, 
in any case, is based on the notion, that qualifications of the secular are very likely to be 
empirically contested and that the different “kinds of nonreligion” their competing 
qualifications and the arrangements through which they are distinguished from other kinds 
remain an empirical question––this it seems is the core of Quack’s relational approach to 
nonreligion (Quack 2014).  
I close this section with a brief and heuristic sketch of how this distinction relates to the multiple 
secularities typology. Type 1 and type 2 integrate irreligion as a legitimate aspect of an 
individual’s liberty and thus of legitimate diversity, and they organize it as an individual right 
and liberty (type 1) or as a collective position to be balanced with religious ones, as well as with 
the differentiated positions of various nonreligious realms. Both consider the state to be distinct 
from religion and irreligion (and thus also as somewhat differentiated). Type 3 conceives 
society/ the state in irreligious terms vis-à-vis religion. Type 4, last but not least, centers on 
different autonomous (differentiated) secular realms and might concern irreligion as an 
autonomous field in its own right or, alternatively, irreligious positions as part of an extended 
religious field.  
1.4 The Political Field as an Arena for Contested Secularities 
In this section I draw on Bourdieu’s notion of the political field to conceptualize politics as an 
arena for struggles about secularity. Here, I focus on two different ways in which secularity can 
be an object and outcome of political struggles: First, the secularity of politics might be an 
object of contestation; second, the political arena as a central field of legitimate power struggles 
constitutes an arena for influencing secularity in a broader sense. Building on Max Weber, 
Bourdieu describes the political field as an arena where struggles over symbolic power and 
legitimate categories and world-views occur (the visions and divisions of the world) (Bourdieu 
2001, Schwartz 2012, 168, Bongaerts 2008, 190, 195f.). Different from other fields of symbolic 
struggles, the aim of power acquisition is explicit and accepted in the political field—it is 
political power that entitles a person to use political resources, including law and administration 
(Bourdieu 2001, 17, Bourdieu 2001, 83). Bourdieu’s notion of the political field is closely 
linked to his understanding of the state as the administrative field and as a sector of the field of 
power, as a monopole of physical and symbolic power (Bourdieu 2014, 18f.).34 The state is the 
 
34  While Weber understands the state as the monopole of power, Bourdieu emphasizes the primacy of 
symbolic power as a precondition to a monopole over physical power (Bourdieu 2014, 18f.). This must be 
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producer of classification principles in the sense of “structuring structures, that can be applied 
to all phenomena in the world, and in particular to social phenomena” (Ibid. 293). Historically, 
states emerge from the accumulation of different sorts of capital through one central instance 
and it is this process of centralized accumulation that gives the state the capacity to rule over 
the other capital forms (Ibid. 329, 347).35 In reference to Eisenstadt, Bourdieu (2014, 142f.) 
claims that the emergence of a somewhat autonomous political realm, the differentiation of 
political roles, and the emergence of institutionalized arenas of political struggles are central to 
the concentration of power that constitutes the state (Bourdieu 2014, 142f.).  
In parliamentary democracies, political struggles take place in parliament as the space of 
“regulated dissent” and between different parties who compete for electoral votes and party 
members (Bourdieu 2001 82-84, 96, Bourdieu 2014, 615.36 Similar to the religious field, the 
political field is also thus characterized by its orientation towards a lay audience. This echoes 
Weber’s notion of (party-)politics as (at least in parts) an arena of demagogues, in which parties 
seek to enforce competing substantive political ideals (Weber 1980 [1922]-b, ch. XIII §4)—
this leads to politics as a world-view struggle (Weber 1988 [1920], 544-553, Tyrell 2011). In 
Bourdieu’s conceptual language, political conflict comprises a struggle to conserve or reform 
the social world by conserving or reforming its perceptual categories and classifications 
(Bourdieu 2001, 17, 81). Bourdieu combines this understanding with his notion of capital: He 
understands political capital as a form of symbolic capital that is gained through transforming 
other forms of capital into electoral support; it is the capacity to mobilize electoral support via 
competing “idées-forces” (fundamental ideas) (Bourdieu 2001, 51, Bourdieu 2001, 96, 98, 
 
understood against the backdrop of Bourdieu’s general notion of power relations in the sense that obedience 
always implies an act of identification and recognition (Ibid. 291).  
35  Bourdieu (2014, 340-343) points to four phases in the historical accumulation of capital: 1) a phase of 
concentration and emergence; 2) a phase of dynastic states in which the accumulated capital is more or less 
private; 3) the transition from a monarchy to the notion of raison d’état; and 4) the transition from a bureaucratic 
state to a welfare state. 
36  While the political field thus partly overlaps with the “field of power” it also extends the borders of the 
field of power because of its dependence on the mobilization of voters. For Bourdieu, the accumulation of 
political capital in the political field goes hand in hand with the disempowerment of citizens who can only 
participate in the political process via voting while the political discourse is predetermined in the political field 
(Bourdieu 2001, 67, 69).  
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Swartz 2012, 163-166, 177, Bongaerts 2008, 195).37 The mobilization power of ideas is based 
on their resonance with the position and relation of certain social groups.38 
This conception of political capital, and the relative openness of the political field, imply that 
its acquisition requires reaching beyond the political field’s borders. Moreover, there is no a 
priori way to determine the borders of the political field, as they are determined through inner-
field struggles. The openness of the political field and the possibility of “bottom-up” political 
movements is also what allows new ideas and actors to enter the political field and state renewal. 
In his introduction to Bourdieu, Fritsch (2001, 17) describes political action as the attempt to 
publicly articulate a so far unexpressed individual experience unrepresented by the common 
sense of an established political system.39 
One of the paradoxes of the interrelation between politics and the state is that while all 
classification systems are bound to or interlinked with concrete historical contexts and the 
observational perspective of certain groups and are asserted through political struggles, the state 
itself is (in the process of its autonomization and the simultaneous emergence of the public) 
associated with the common and the general in the sense of standing outside or beyond of the 
social realm Bourdieu (2014, 294, 62f., 505).40 Politics constitutes a mediator between the 
private and public realms, while state authority is thus claimed and defended against 
relativization as it is counter-distinguished from the notion of specific and particularistic 
 
37  Bourdieu (2001, 89-100f.) distinguishes three kinds of personal political capital: that which candidates 
gain from the party they belong to, that based on their personal prominence, and that based on their heroic and 
charismatic capital. Schwartz contends that the mobilization power of ideas is that what Bourdieu considers 
specific about ideas in the political field. He criticizes this, claiming that religious ideas can also have a 
mobilizing power (Schwartz 2012, 178). Conversely, any idea that mobilizes voters becomes political, but only 
those ideas that mobilize people as voters and not only as believers are political. In any case, it is only within the 
boundaries of the political field that social capital can be transformed into political capital. 
According to Swartz (2012, 169f.), Bourdieu is ambivalent about whether only the genuinely political 
institutions and actors in a society or the whole field of power relations in politics and society ought to be 
considered and this ambivalence reflects the openness of the political field towards the social realm where ideas 
and collectives can be formed and gain at least potential political ambitions and relevance. In the context of this 
thesis, I mainly focus on the narrow field of party politics, while the analysis recurrently takes the formation of 
political movements from more general cultural and religion-related tensions into account. 
38  This does not imply a pre-political self-understanding as a collective; rather the process of political 
mobilization can explicate latent notions and create such collectives.  
39  The extent to which a party-political system is open to such renewing factors might be regulated by laws 
on party formation and election laws and differs from context to context.  
40 In reference to d’Auguesseau, Bourdieu (2014, 97f.) distinguishes two notions of the public: as a counter-term, 
and as a counter-term of the hidden and invisible. 
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standpoints.41 A related paradox of the state is generalized submission under its authority in the 
sense that its categorization system is recognized (2014, 291, 295).42  
1.4.1 Secularity of And Through Politics 
Of relevance for the understanding of secularity is the relationship of religion with that notion 
of the general and official claimed by the state, and political struggles are what allows different 
religious and nonreligious perspectives to compete about the power to control the state and 
define the general and official (compare Bourdieu 2014, 62). More specifically, there are two 
different ways in which the political field can become an arena for struggles about secularity: 
the first concerns the secularity of politics—and via the mentioned interrelatedness of politics 
and state, the secularity of power in general—as well as, second, the secularity of other spheres 
to the extent that their borders are co-determined by political (e.g., legislative and 
administrative) regulations. In this section, I will illustrate this with a simplified abstract 
consideration of the dynamics central to the case at hand.  
It is a very basic remark that in a given society, different religious and nonreligious actors or 
groups can seek to shape the official order based on their values, experiences, and lifestyles as 
a way of living their notion of the good life. The greater the influence of the state and other 
institutions are on people’s lives, the greater the need to create a basic accordance between the 
two, respectively the need to ensure that one’s own notion of the good life is enabled by the 
state. Different religious and nonreligious actors might thus compete about the state and might 
also claim either their own perspective as the official one, or one that grants them both positive 
and negative freedoms. This is one way of focusing on possible relations between the religious 
field, respectively a field of nonreligious positions on the one hand, and the political field on 
the other hand. From a different perspective, one can focus on the actors in the (party-)political 
field as competitors about political capital and thus voters. From this perspective, a basic remark 
is that aside from material, cultural, or social capital, also religious authority (such as status 
roles, religious knowledge, concepts, and networks) can be used to mobilize voters and can thus 
 
41  Bourdieu obviously contrasts this notion and claim of the state with a more deconstructive perspective 
on whose particular interests are served through the general and public (Bourdieu 2014, 327f.).  
42  This obviously echoes Bourdieu’s general notion of symbolic capital as that capital which is recognized 
(Ibid. 337). Thus, while the categorizations of the state can be understood as particularistic, their power depends 
on their miscognition as general and common. This is also the way in which the state can be understood as the 
base for logical and moral integration in Durkheim’s understanding (Ibid. 19f.). It is only in periods of political 
crises and revolutions that everyone has the same chances of gaining the monopole of legitimate power, and it is 
then that symbolic struggles of each against everyone else take place (Ibid. 127). 
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transferred into symbolic and political capital.43 For some actors, the transformation of religious 
capital into political capital might be desirable and advantageous. Others might compete with 
them by mobilizing voters using other (nonreligious) forms of capital. As part of their mutual 
struggle for dominance in the political field, these actors might also contest the notion of politics 
and the necessary relation between religion and politics, in terms of, respectively, its 
nonreligious character. While some might claim a necessary relation between religion and 
politics, others might claim that politics is by necessity non-religious (and religion as non-
political). While some might construe nonreligious politics as being irreligious, others might 
frame it as holding a differentiated third-space position. Others still might seek to distinguish 
between either form of nonreligious politics. One example for an attempt to secularize politics 
can be found in the liberal Dutch constitution from 1948, which prevented “servants of 
religion,” thus priests and pastors, from becoming members of one of the Dutch chambers.44 
Another example is the common secular liberal claim that religious arguments should be 
translated into secular ones in public political debates (Asad 2016). Where no official 
regulations regarding the secularity of politics exist, the convertibility of religious capital into 
political capital is then decided in political power struggles as such.  
Interrelated with such contested notions of politics, struggles in the political field might also 
concern competing religious and nonreligious ideas about how society ought to be organized 
and about how religion matters in relation to different realms. Struggles over the secularity of 
politics might thus also be a strategic intermediate goal for realizing broader social change and 
might influence the relation between religion and law, science, education, or other policy areas 
as well as the notions of individual liberties and social relations. Examples include the extent 
to which religious norms find an echo in laws, medical services, or school curricula, or to the 
extent to which religious individuals and organizations are granted the freedom to offer such 
services. In particular, by concerning the relation between religion and law, the politics of 
secularity also concerns state secularity and overall relations in the field of power.45 Where 
religious and secular political mobilizations are successful, both the political field as well as the 
 
43  According to Bourdieu, the relative weight or power of a field is based on the generalization of its 
capital and its influence on other fields, while fields are autonomous to varying degrees depending on the way in 
which they are determined by other fields (Mangez and Liénard 2014, 182). The religious field—as any other 
field—is to some degree influenced by and influences other fields. 
44  Protestant pastors though could resign from their office for their tenure in parliament. Given the 
different status of priesthood as a calling rather than an office, liberals opposed the inauguration of the first 
Catholic priest as a member of parliament in the late 19th century (Dragstra 2013).  
45  According to Bongaerts (Bongaerts 2011, 124), law is one of the fields co-constituting the state and is 
central to the field of power.  
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field of power more generally will be co-structured by religious (-nonreligious) divides and 
competing ideas of (political) secularity. While Bourdieu saw the opposition between cultural 
and economic capital as the main divide in the field of power, others have also argued that it 
should be seen as being co-structured by other divides including that of religious versus secular 
positions (Mangez and Liénard 2014, 184).  
The perspective that the political field comprises the arena through which particularistic 
positions can be institutionalized as universal standpoints allows for an understanding of the 
inner rationality of liberal concerns with political secularism in the sense that struggles about 
the secularity of politics can be understood as a new stage in the struggle about state secularity. 
Weber respectively argued that it was “only under conditions of democracy where power is 
placed in the hands of elected representatives, that hierocracy46 can accept the ‘separation of 
state and church’” (Weber 1980 [1922]-b, ch. IX, 6).47 In any case, the politics of secularity 
encompasses political struggles and actions that concern the secularity of politics, the state, and 
society.  
In order to close this section I briefly link back to the two concepts elaborated earlier. The 
multiple secularities approach complements a Bourdieusian understanding of political 
contestations about secularity in the sense that it points to the values and reference problems 
that mobilize political movements for (or against) secularity (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 
2012). The formulation, “secularity for the sake of […]”, gives expression to the analytical 
distinction between institutionalized separations of religious and non-religious spheres on the 
one hand, and the ideologies underlying such arrangements on the other hand (p. 879). Beyond 
that, also the multiple secularities approach points to struggles about interpreting and framing 
a certain situation and its alleged secular solution. Politics constitute an arena in which different 
values are played out and in which parties can compete to identify the reference problem at 
stake in a given moment in the political arena. 
 
46  Hierocracy means a “distinct kind of religious rulership––either the ruler gets his or her legitimacy 
through religion or the religious leader is also the political ruler” (Agevall and Swedberg 2005, 112).  
47  During Weber’s time, the Catholic “Zentrum” was a core example of how religious positions cold gain 
political relevance. Weber refers to the Zentrum as well as the Social Democrats as worldview parties (Weber 
1980 [1919]). Different from how the concept of worldviews has been used by Lorwin (1971) and will be used 
later in this text, worldviews are not used as an other or equivalent to religion; rather worldview parties are mainly 
contrasted with those parties that primarily seek out official appointments. The differentiation between politics 
and the state as it is used here echoes Weber’s distinction between political associations (politische Verbände) as 
carriers of legitimate violence on the one hand, and, on the other hand, politically oriented associations (politisch 
orientierte Verbände) that aim to influence political associations; examples being parties and clubs (Weber 1980 
[1922]-a, I §17). 
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Last but certainly not least, the notion of diverse modes of nonreligion as well as the distinction 
between differentiated and irreligious forms of nonreligion also complements the understanding 
of politics of secularity. One can e.g. focus on the nonreligiosity of certain political actors be 
they individual politicians or political parties, on whether they position themselves as irreligious 
or differentiated, and on how they are perceived by others. One can further focus on the notions 
of nonreligion used in the competing ideals of secularity played out in the political arena. What 
appears neutral to some might be considered to favor religious or, respectively, irreligious 
positions by others. The perspective of possible differentiations between different forms of 
nonreligion further speaks to the outlined understanding of the political field as an arena for 
secularity in the sense that the relation between politics and state on the one hand, and irreligion 
on the other hand might just also be a matter on which different political actors position 
themselves differently. With respect to the previous section, it is further likely that 
differentiations between different modes of nonreligion will further be informed by the same 
guiding ideas that also orient those between religion and nonreligion in the first place. Last but 
not least, Quack (2014) as mentioned, speaks of a religion-related surrounding of the religious 
field as that which encompasses different nonreligious positions. His exact understanding of 
such field is not important here but what matters is that the notions of secularity actors promote 
is likely to correspond (that is: be homologous) to their positions with respect to a religious 
field, respectively in such a religion-related field.48 
1.5 The Rhetoric of Political Struggles 
A rhetoric genre central to political struggles is that of ideology critique. Mannheim (2015 
[1929], 171f.) defines ideology as a set of ideas that transcend the given reality and provide 
motives for action. Different from utopias, however, these ideas are never realized but are 
instead consciously or deceptively changed in the course of (en)action. The allegation of 
ideology devalues the position of a competitor in both epistemological and ontological terms; 
it declares it as politically irrelevant and unrealistic (pp. 66f.). What is denoted as ideological 
is seen to have failed in the political praxis. A particularistic notion of ideology thereby 
criticizes certain concrete ideas, while a total notion of ideology questions an opponents’ entire 
 
48  Bourdieu speaks of a structural homology between fields, and points to the structural affinity of actors 
in homologous positions of different fields or the social structure (Bourdieu 1985, Hilgers and Mangez 2014). 
These homologies are the consequence of the fact that each semi-autonomous field is co-determined by the 
relations in the field of power. As argued before, it is possible to understand such power relations as being co-
determined by non-economic factors.  
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world-perception and his categorical thinking structure and is thus directed at the noological 
level (pp. 53-55).  
Genealogically, the concept of ideology is rooted in the 18th-century philosophy of conscious, 
which compensated for the broken medieval-Christian notion of an objective world unity by 
construing the subject and its conscious as that in which the world is constituted (Mannheim 
2015 [1929], 61f.). While the conscious was first conceived in a universal fashion, it was later 
historicism that shaped the notion of the consciousness as being something historically shaped 
and group specific. In an even later stage, the emergence of socio-economic classes as an 
important category of thought and the related experience of class differences contributed to the 
awareness of the diversity and incomprehensibility of worldviews (Mannheim 2015 [1929], 
63f., Mies and Wittich 1990, 784f.).  
According to Mannheim, thus, the rise of the concept of ideology reflects the secularization 
process of (European) modernization in the sense that it reflects the growing dominance of the 
state over the church and politics over theology (as well as philosophy). Prior to the 
pluralization of political worldviews, it had been the absolutist state that had claimed a 
worldview of its own, seeking to inherit the church as the guarantor of the world order (pp. 
32f.). Political struggles, then, seemed to underscore the interest of groups and individuals to 
maintain their dominant social position and limited their “capability to see things that might 
disturb their sense of dominance” (p. 36). Ideology critiques thus constitute a combat-rhetoric 
in political struggles about competing political ideas and programs. Reality is thereby evaluated 
in relation to the political realm and its pragmatic orientation rather than to God (pp. 66f.). 
Ideology critiques thus also concern the notion of the political itself. Although the notion of 
ideology has changed over time, according to Mannheim, it has maintained its orientation 
towards “that ontic that is primarily perceivable from the political practice” or in other words 
towards the pragmatism of modern man (p. 67).  
The term ideology was coined by French philosophers, working on a study of human perception 
(Mannheim 2015 [1929], 66, also Dierse 1982, 132f., 136-138). In its pejorative meaning and 
function as a politically combative term, ideology was used by Napoleon when he denounced 
these philosophers as ideologists after they had come into conflict with his own power 
ambitions (Mannheim 2015 [1929], 66, also Dierse 1982, 132f., 135, 136-138). Napoleon 
labeled the philosophers as metaphysicians49 and fanatics, and thus declared their ideas not only 
 
49  In these philosophers’ understanding, their idéologie was non-metaphysical.  
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as politically irrelevant but further associated ideological politics with rigorism and 
Robespierre’s terror regime (Dierse 1982, 136-138).50 Important in this context, the reception 
of the term outside the borders of France51 also gave way to non-pragmatic notions of politics. 
The question whether politics could be separated from theory, and thus non-ideological, or 
whether it had to be based on principles was controversially discussed (Dierse 1982, 141).52  
Since the end of the 19th century, the notion of ideology has been centrally influenced by the 
work of Marx and Engels. In their writings, ideology was used to criticize the autonomization 
of an idealistic “Überbau” from a materialist “Basis” (Dierse 1982, 146-153).53 What rendered 
certain ideas ideological was the denial of their rootedness in a particularistic class position 
(Dierse 1982, 153). While socialism had given the greatest prominence to the genre of ideology 
critique, it was later adapted by all political factions and also turned against socialism itself 
(Mannheim 2015 [1929], 70). Furthermore, the allegation of ideology could also be used against 
all positions in a given political field, such as when Mannheim criticizes the competing political 
strands of his time for missing out on relevant social realities and claims a critical social-
scientific reflection of political thinking (Mannheim 2015 [1929], 3, Kaube 2015 [1929], VI-
IX). The motive for such reflection, however, was necessary for pragmatic reasons, given that 
humanity depended more than ever on the rationality of politics and political recognition 
(Mannheim 2015 [1929], 3, Kaube 2015, VIII). In the context of the sociology of knowledge, 
Mannheim developed a value neutral notion of ideologies (Mannheim 2015 [1929], 75-78). In 
politics, and more specifically in the social-democratic tradition, a value-neutral concept of 
ideology was developed in the sense that Marxism came to be understood as the ideology of 
the proletariat, based on a realist notion of history (Dierse 1982, 158-162).54 Here, the history 
of the concept of ideology intersects with that of the concept of worldviews, as manifested in 
the caption of Marxism-Leninism as the scientific worldview of the working class (Buhr and 
Kosing 1979, 5). 
 
50  According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, though, the founder of the philosophical project of ideology 
had been arrested under Robespierre’s reign. 
51  Dierse deals with the USA and Germany. 
52  While I have no information about the reception of the term in the Netherlands, it seems that this 
question also resonates here. 
53  They did not give much explanation of the term, and within the Marxist movements and among its 
opponents, different notions of ideology developed simultaneously (Ibid.). 
54  Marx and Engels understood the working class as having the sole view on actual reality, but they had no 
positive idea of ideology (154, 156f.). Notions regarding the importance of ideologies for the socialist cause 
remained different. Karl Mannheim (2015 [1929], 70f., 77, 109) developed a value neutral notion of ideologies 
in the sense of pointing to the relatedness of worldviews and way of thinking with a specific social position 
(Seinslage) (see also: Dierse 1982, 165). 
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As indicated above, the emergence of a worldview concept constitutes an aspect of the history 
of the ideology concept in the sense that it points to the subject as the locus of world-perception. 
The notion of worldview was thereby presumably first coined by Kant and developed further 
throughout the Enlightenment and later philosophical traditions (Mannheim 2015 [1929], 61f., 
Mies and Wittich 1990, 784). The concept refers to the sensual perception of the outer world, 
to the emotional acquisition of the world and the inner mental formation of an outer universe.55 
Weber conceptualized worldviews as “based on value and not on empirical truth” and thus 
distinguished them from science (Weir 2015b, 10). At least in the Dutch case it seems that the 
concept of worldviews was further used with respect to the mentioned question of whether or 
not politics had to be grounded in ideas. Via the concept of worldviews, thus, a non-pragmatic 
sense of politics was expressed which further challenged liberal notions of the general. 
Moreover, the concept of worldviews has been used to express equivalences between religious 
and nonreligious world-conceptions, while ideology critiques have conversely been central to 
projects of secularizing politics. 
  
 
55  Mies and Wittich (1990, 795) distinguish worldview (Weltanschauung) in the sense of a unifying 
coherent notion of (the essence of) reality from worldview (Weltbild) as the totality of all different aspects of a 
reality. They also stress, however, that both terms have partly been used synonymously.  
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2 Data Collection and Interpretation 
The methodical approach of this thesis can be best discussed against the background of the 
grounded theory approach and its focus on the research process as a whole. In what follows, I 
give a very brief summary of the grounded theory approach and elaborate on my research 
process, particularly in terms of data interpretation and sampling.  
2.1 The Grounded Theory Approach in Very Brief 
The grounded theory approach was developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in the 
1960s. This summary is based on Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr’s (2008, 184-217) overview of 
the method. Methodically, the grounded theory approach guides the entire research process and 
centers on the interlocking of data collection and interpretation with the gradual development 
of an empirically based theory. Important hereby is the dialectic interlocking of the collection 
and interpretation of data in the sense of the development of concepts and the gradual 
integration of different concepts into subordinated categories. Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 
name five core principles of the grounded theory approach: 1) the principle of theoretical 
sampling and the interlocking of data gathering, interpretation and sampling; 2) theoretical 
coding and the gradual theoretical integration of concepts and categories; 3) constant 
comparison; 4) the writing of theoretical memos; and 5) the constant inter-relating of data 
gathering, coding, and memo writing.  
The grounded theory approach does not prescribe a specific data type or data collection method. 
Rather, the researcher can draw on all kinds of data depending on the empirical relevance for 
the case at hand. The methodological approach centers on the integration of different kinds of 
data and their interpretation into a gradual process of theory development. Aside from empirical 
data, existing theoretical literature can be integrated into the process of data interpretation as 
contextual knowledge and in a heuristic and comparative manner.56 In a first step, the collection 
of data is based on a preliminary definition of the research interest and question as well as the 
research field. Importantly, though, the overall strategy with respect to the data collection––the 
question of who might be relevant interview partners, what situations should be observed, and 
which additional data needs to be gathered––is not defined at the beginning but over the course 
of the research process. This is called the principle of theoretical sampling.  
 
56  Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr point to an inductive self-misunderstanding with respect to the founders of 
the grounded theory in the sense that they underestimated the importance of conceptual and theoretical knowledge. 
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Theoretical sampling implies that the sampling strategy and the data collection is based on the 
interpretation of early data and the gradually developing theory. The data interpretation process 
evolves from the extensive interpretation of first data to a gradually more narrow and specific 
focus on certain concepts as the research continues. With respect to the interpretation of data, 
there are three subsequent steps: A process of “open coding” aims at the definition of 
preliminary codes while during the process of “axial coding” different codes are integrated into 
categories. Categories are theoretical terms of a higher order that entail a phenomenon in its 
conditions of origin, characteristics, and consequences. In a third step of “selective coding,” the 
process of sampling and coding is selectively focused on the key categories that have emerged 
over the course of the earlier steps.  
Central to the ongoing analysis is to constantly compare phenomena and concepts. Such 
comparisons can draw on the empirical material as well as various forms of context knowledge, 
including existing theoretical concepts. Generally speaking, it is through comparison that the 
specific characteristics of an empirical phenomenon, a concept, or case can be discerned. 
Comparisons can highlight similarities, variations, and differences, all of which enhance the 
understanding of a certain case. The principle of constant comparison also implies that the 
developing theory is continually tested and verified against new empirical material. Przyborski 
and Wohlrab-Sahr (2008, 197) distinguish between the verification in a specific single case, in 
relation to other, structurally identical cases, and negative verification through comparisons 
with structurally different cases. During the research process, the researcher writes theoretical 
memos that entail both theoretical and methodical notes. From an early stage in the research 
process onwards thus, the growing theoretical understanding of the case is documented.  
In sum, the grounded theory approach centers on interrelating the processes of data collection, 
coding, and memo writing for the sake of developing a theory that is based in empirical data. A 
further methodologically founded demand is that such theory should be process oriented and 
sensitive to the structural preconditions of a social phenomenon, something which, according 
to Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr, derives from its foundation in a pragmatic outlook that centers 
on agents and action from a process perspective. Having thus briefly summarized the 
methodical principles of the grounded theory approach, I will now describe and analyze the 
research process at the base of this thesis.  
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2.2 The Research Process  
This thesis is based on a number of semi-structured interviews conducted during a ten-months 
stay in the Netherlands, on the notes I took during party- and election- events as well as flyers 
and Facebook posts from such events. I further drew on different kinds of material and data that 
could be accessed via online research. The most important source I used were minutes from 
parliamentary debates and—partly—city council debates as well as other parliamentary and 
government documents. Data from election research studies were an additional source. Lastly, 
I drew on existing literature. In what follows, I first describe my initial difficulties with defining 
the research question and the research field, as this has influenced the process of data gathering, 
which is elaborated in the subsequent section. Third, I describe and illustrate the data 
interpretation. 
2.2.1 Research Object, Research Question, Research Field 
My interest in politics as an arena for negotiations about secularity ––particularly in the 
Netherlands––stemmed from the prior research for my master thesis in the context of the 
multiple secularities project (headed by Monika Wohlrab-Sahr) in which I was involved as a 
student research assistant. In that context, I had come across D66 as an agent of secularity in 
the sense that it played an active part in political negotiations over the place of religion in 
relation to other realms. After settling for a research object though, I found it difficult to define 
my research interest in the conceptual terminology of the nonreligion approach central to the 
diversity of nonreligion project (headed by Johannes Quack) in which the thesis was started. 
Both approaches are elaborated in more detail in the theory chapter (ch.1). I was more familiar 
with the concept of secularity and it was of obvious relevance for understanding the party as a 
central agent in political renegotiations of the relationship between religion on the one hand and 
the (secular) state or other (secular) realms of Dutch society. However, I was skeptical as to 
whether the nonreligion approach was adequate for a secular party and the case at hand––the 
concept of nonreligion seemed to mainly focus on positions in a competitive or rivaling relation 
with religion and to question or criticize notions of differentiated or neutral positions with 
respect to religion; its general thrust further seemed to lay on competing definitions of what 
was religion and nonreligion. At later stages of my research, I began to focus on the contested 
qualifications of secular (or nonreligious) realms that are part of notions and institutional 
arrangements of secularity, and to think of differentiation as one form of nonreligion, distinct 
and partly institutionally differentiated from irreligious positions (be they antireligious or 
secular substitutes for religion). This made it possible to bring the two conceptual approaches 
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together and understand secularity as a differentiation between religious and nonreligious 
spheres as well as between different forms of nonreligion—a perspective that is now part of the 
theory chapter.  
This is not the place to engage in more detail with these conceptual matters; rather what matters 
here is that at the time I planned and started my empirical research and for a longer period 
thereafter, my conceptual insecurity hampered the formulation of research questions and 
interview guidelines, as well as an initial definition of the research field. Although the empirical 
research was not meant to be simply derived from a theoretical perspective, both conceptual 
approaches suggest different interview and sampling strategies. One possibility in line with the 
nonreligion approach would have been to analyze the diversity of religious and nonreligious 
commitments of party members; another would have been to focus on the party’s secular self-
positioning and its relationship to religious and nonreligious others both within and outside the 
party-political realm including, but not exclusively, nonreligious worldview organizations. A 
focus on secularity could have started out with exploring leading party members’ notions of 
secularity as well as their aspirations and concerns with respect to the Netherlands and beyond. 
A different possibility would have been to focus on different arenas of secularity––local, 
national, and transnational ones––given that the party has operated at different political levels.57 
Each focus implies a differently defined research field.  
Throughout my empirical research phase, I tried all these foci, which gave my research process 
a somewhat explorative character. In addition to my conceptual undecidedness, some early 
research strategies faced dead ends quite soon and required a focus shift. Different from what 
would be ideal according to the grounded theory approach, I did not develop a sense of the core 
categories for the thesis until after my empirical research had ended, given that at the time, one 
of my research strategies proved successful, I was so busy with conducting interviews and 
following the election campaigns that I had no time to interpret data before ending the official 
research period. This also placed some limitations to the process of theoretical sampling. The 
next section gives more detail on the research process.  
 
57  There is obviously an overlap here––a secular understanding implies a notion of secularity and so does a 
party’s dealings with the diverse religious and nonreligious views of its members. At the time, this made it even 
more difficult for me to grasp the thrust of the nonreligion approach. 
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2.2.2 Data Collection 
This section provides an overview of the empirical direction of my research, the process of 
sampling, and the broad set of data that resulted from this approach. A subsequent section gives 
more detail on the process of data interpretation.  
Generally speaking, I used semi-guided interviews as well as participant observations to collect 
my empirical data. I started my field work by contacting a party-internal working group on 
religion and worldviews that I had come across through internet research. My idea was to start 
out with a group that obviously cared about religion and after a first interview with a group 
member, it seemed that the group offered an ideal starting point for my research, as it was new 
but active and motivated, meeting regularly to discuss viewpoints and seeking influence within 
the party. My interview partner suggested that I could join their meetings and thus learn about 
their activities. Taking the group as an empirical starting point would have come with the 
advantage that I did not have to decide in advance whether to make secularity or nonreligion 
the main focus, but rather to decide this on the basis of empirical insights into the group. 
Unfortunately, the group quickly dissolved and I lost my contacts. It was only much later during 
my research that I was able to reestablish contact with some former group members and through 
these contacts as well as online information, I could reconstruct the group’s history as well as 
a subsequent initiative.  
For some time after my contact with the working group on religion and worldviews had ended, 
I contacted people from other party-internal working groups on themes where I assumed that 
matters of religion and secularity might be of relevance: a group on democracy and the state of 
law, on integration and participation, and on gender issues and human rights. My impression 
was, however, that matters of religion and secularity were rather marginal themes and were not 
discussed frequently enough to justify a longer observational period. This was different in the 
case of a political platform for secularism in the European Parliament (the EPPSP), that I 
engaged with for some time and in more detail. The platform, which was co-chaired by a 
member of D66, brought different NGOs with an interest in secularism together with European 
politicians. This research was very interesting, as here the notion and differentiation between 
political secularity and worldview secularism were centrally at stake. Eventually though, the 
case study was not broad enough to use it as a single base for the thesis while it was too broad 
to be integrated with the other data and foci. 
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Parallel to and partly crosscutting my contacts with the working group on religion and 
worldviews, I contacted party members who had led legislative campaigns or had been quoted 
in the press with public statements concerning secularity: two high ranking party members who 
had initiated such legislative changes, three young party members who had either aimed at 
starting debates or movements on secularity within the party or had worked with high ranking 
politicians engaged in secularizing initiatives. Moreover, I contacted party members in 
positions that, as I hoped, gave them some general knowledge about the party and an overview 
about the debates therein: people from the national office, someone who had supervised new 
party members, someone responsible for press contacts, and people from the party-related think 
tank. Complementing the party-internal perspectives I further began to contrast these with 
outside perspectives and positions. I visited a few events organized from within Dutch atheist 
freethought movement and further started a small analysis of how D66’ religion-relatedness 
was portrayed in different Dutch newspapers. Looking back, the thus mentioned research 
approaches could have been broadened into a detailed analysis of the party’s secular self-
understanding and notion of secularity. At the time though, I was disheartened by the disparate 
nature of the data and my ongoing insecurity with respect to the nonreligion framework. 
Eventually I left much of the data aside, focusing instead on a research strategy that eventually 
worked out. I had begun to geographically diversify the foci of my research, and to concentrate 
on different cities with distinct religious-secular majority relations. In the Netherlands, 
confessional as well as religious-secular divides manifest in clear geographical terms, and at 
the level of municipality politics, religious-secular majority relations can vastly differ from 
those at the national level. I started by grouping Dutch cities according to the biggest political 
party in the city council and I contacted D66 fraction leaders from cities with contrasting 
majority relations. My contacts with people from two cities in the so-called Dutch Bible Belt 
proved to be particularly fruitful sites for my research because here “religion” was highly 
relevant for local politics. Traveling back and forth between the secular city, where I lived, and 
the Bible Belt towns, I began to treat them as maximal contrasting cases with respect to Dutch 
secularity. In the Bible Belt towns, orthodox Christian parties had a significant political 
influence, in which secular concerns about religious establishment and confessionalization 
provided motives for political activism and informed political agendas of secularization.  
Gradually, I began to focus on the political sphere and on how in the different local settings, 
secularity became a matter of political contestations. I soon discovered that the upcoming 
municipal elections provided a good anchor point for empirical research given that in both Bible 
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Belt towns, the local parties made secularity a matter of contestation in the election campaigns. 
In the secular city, by contrast, traditional Dutch Christianity was not a major factor in politics 
while all parties emphasized their contribution to historic liberalizations contested among 
orthodox Christians. Consequently, the research praxis itself was more difficult, as religion and 
secularity were not major political issues during the elections. I then found that, there, secularity 
was renegotiated in relation to the Muslim minority in the city–an issue that was not completely 
absent in the Bible Belt but was by far not as relevant as the relation between D66 and the 
sizeable Christian parties in the region. In the context of this research, thus, I decided to focus 
on secularity as a main concept, and further on the political field as the arena in which struggles 
about secularity were fought (theory section). I planned a four-city comparison (with two 
‘religious’ and two ‘secular’ cities) based on different contrast-axes and focusing on how 
notions of and political struggles about secularity crystallized in in the election campaigns. The 
two Bible Belt cities differed from each other in the sense that in one, different secular parties 
had formed a joint progressive opposition to the conservative religious parties, while in the 
other city, the secular opposition split along economic divides. I further added another secular 
city to my comparative frame, where, different from the first one, an Islam-critical party was a 
relevant political power.58 The choice of these four cities thus followed the theoretical 
hypothesis, that the diverse political setups might indicate different secular dynamics and 
possibly varying local notions of the secular or kinds of nonreligiosity. Eventually, though, I 
had to reduce the comparison to two cities: First, the local party chapter of my second secular 
city ended its cooperation with me; I assume that my demeanor at the time was insufficiently 
sensitive for the scandalized nature of the topic. Then I discovered that it was sheer impossible 
to simultaneously cover the election campaigns in four different cities given that the event 
schedules overlapped, and I increasingly had to choose between election events. In the end, as 
I was writing the thesis, I decided to also leave out the second Bible Belt town for mainly 
pragmatic time reasons and also because the overall focus on the interrelations of secularity 
with economic liberalism became less important than planned.  
All in all, the focus on local arenas of secularity eventually allowed for the comparative research 
structure I had wanted, and after interpreting the interviews from the Bible Belt and engaging 
more with the party’s history, I decided that the thesis would deal with the role of the D66 party 
 
58  This being said, I did not develop the two case studies as strict mirroring examples. I did not, e.g., check 
how debates about the school sector in relation to confessionalization and deconfessionalization in all cases, 
although these debates are of relevance in the secular city as well. I also did not investigate whether there were 
controversies about Sunday shopping hours here as well.  
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in a number of relevant shifts in (and contestations about) Dutch secularity, both historically as 
well as at present. In line with the multiple secularities approach, this entailed the sub-question 
about the competing motives that informed such contestations and about the different 
arrangements of secularity that dominated at different historical times and in different historical 
places. Following the diversity of nonreligion approach, this further implied a sub-question 
about the notions of nonreligion used in such contestations and as part of different arrangements 
of secularity. In consequence of this choice, I had to exclude a considerable part of the empirical 
data gathered before and gather more historical data. At the beginning, it had only meant to 
briefly sketch how the party history linked with a general history of secularity in the 
Netherlands. This turned out to require more work than expected given that I often had to 
research and consult party-related parliamentary documents aside from quite detailed literature 
in order to get an idea about how certain shifts in secularity were discussed and decided at the 
level of politics and what role and position D66 had taken hereby. Beyond that, based on my 
empirical research and existing literature, I gradually developed the conceptual frame outlined 
in the theory chapter. 
In sum, my research has taken different directions and I kept several possibilities open during 
my research process. Gradually, it became clear that it was impossible to integrate all themes 
and materials into the thesis and I decided to focus on the party’s positioning in national and 
local conflicts about secularity and further on the city-comparison as the core of my empirical 
research. I added a rather broad historical part the chronology of core shifts in the arrangements 
of secularity. The historical focus is complemented by three case studies each of which both 
illustrates and complements aspects of the larger historical argument. The sampling process 
was imperfect in the sense that I gathered too much data at once which I could no longer use 
after deciding on the research focus, while conversely, I then lacked the time to gather data that 
might have been of further use. The overall set of empirical data used in this thesis is thus not 
so much gained from a theoretical sampling process in the strictest sense; rather it was the 
interpretation of early data that shifted my focus to historical literature and data, while I used 
the insights gained from that to interpret the empirical data. The overall composition of the 
thesis was thus based on a constant comparison between different empirical and historical data, 
positions, and dynamics, and the case studies are chosen to illustrate specific aspects of a larger 
shift in Dutch secularity.  
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2.2.3 Data Interpretation  
In this section I first briefly describe the interviews I conducted and then the process of 
interpreting these interviews and other data.  
As mentioned, a core data foundation for the thesis were the semi-structured interviews I 
conducted with D66 members (and selective other informants). I had developed an interviews 
guideline with three foci: First, I commonly started with an open question about how people 
had come to be politically active in the party. Second, I then asked my informants to position 
the party in the political field and with respect to religion and secularity. In some interviews, I 
also asked more explicitly about orthodox religious criticism against the party, or about how it 
aspired to be perceived in terms of its religion-relatedness. Third, I asked about the rise of anti-
Islamic populist parties and its consequences for D66 and, further, about some recent nationally 
relevant conflict issues concerning secularity. Uncertain about the conceptual frame and about 
the precise empirical focus, I greatly struggled in designing this guideline. Looking back, the 
current structure of the thesis would have required a somewhat modified guideline, as it would 
have been helpful to encourage informants to speak about secularity and crucial shifts in Dutch 
secularity––and to place the party in relation to such interviews.  
In its current state, the historic parts of this thesis that deal with the party’s role in key shifts in 
Dutch secularity are mainly based on existing literature, historical documents published by the 
party office or otherwise available, as well as parliamentary and government documents. I only 
selectively integrated interview data in this part. By contrast, the three case studies in this thesis 
are mainly based on interviews. With respect to all three case studies, the interviews often 
differed from this basic outline in the sense that I added questions about the specific case at 
hand (and partly skipped others). In the interviews with a specific local focus, I asked my 
informants not only about their local political activism, but also about how they had come to 
live in the place, how they had experienced local life. I asked about the relevance of religion in 
local politics, and with my gradually growing understanding of how religion and secularity 
mattered locally, I began to address more specific local events and developments. In the case 
of the working group on religion and worldviews, I developed more specific questions about 
people’s involvement with the group as well as about the internal differences within the group. 
All in all, I gradually began to treat the interviews as contributing to different case studies, 
placed in relation to the historical frame developed based on the other material.  
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With respect to the first interviews, I thoroughly transcribed them word by word. With respect 
to some later interviews that were completed after central categories had been developed and 
when I was looking for specific aspects to complement the developing case study, I used a more 
selective form of transcription. Those parts that were non-important, I transcribed in less detail, 
still ensuring to capture the content and frames, but I shortened longer illustrations and paid 
less attention to the exact word order. With respect to the important parts, I did a detailed word-
by-word transcript as in the early interviews, and I always marked the changes between the two 
styles in the transcript itself. In some cases, during the process of data interpretation, I 
discovered that a part was more important than I had first thought; I then changed this transcript 
into a more detailed version.  
For several reasons, a complete anonymization of the interviews is not possible. Some of my 
informants have quite singular roles, and newspaper articles I used as sources partly reference 
city’s or people’s names in the article headlines. A little research would nevertheless probably 
still allow a reader to identify informants. I first considered using people’s real names as a 
consequence of the problems with anonymization and I asked my informants about this. Most 
but not all agreed, and for this reason, as well as in order to emphasize the thesis’ focus on 
figurations of secularity rather than individual people, I decided to change the names. I further 
checked back with all interviewees about the quotes I used, and I added footnotes wherever 
people felt uncomfortable with their previous statements.59 In some cases, I also added some 
more context because interviewees convinced me that my data presentation could be 
misinterpreted. The thesis still nonetheless presents my interpretation of the data and cases. 
Quotations from the interviews in the thesis have the interviewee’s name as well as the line 
numbers. Beyond that, they are transcripts of spoken language rather than following 
grammatical rules. All words, except proper nouns, are decapitalized.  
Table 2: Transcription Symbols 
//words// short turn taking speakers, if not indicated otherwise: interviewee and 
interviewer 
() pause 
(.) (1) (2) longer pause 
[…] or ((…)) omission in transcript 
[writing] or ((writing)) comments by the author  
[word] or [?] or (word) word/ part of word not (clearly) understandable 
@ or ^^ laughing 
 
59  Some interview partners did not respond, though. 
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n:o stretched pronunciation 
underlined emphasis 
somethi- unfinished word 
CAPITALIZED COMENT marks shift between literal to summarizing styles in transcript 
 
Generally speaking, I interpreted the interviews sequentially and wrote down codes on the side 
of the transcript. I integrated those codes that seemed of relevance in several interviews and 
thus arguably for the case as such, and that had interrelations with each other into broader 
categories. Other codes, by contrast, became less central. As already indicated, the Bible Belt 
material was central for my research in the sense that I developed central categories using the 
examples from this material. Other codes developed using this interview material were of lesser 
importance. At the beginning I, for example, developed codes for people’s paths into political 
activism, as my research continued, though, I did not pursue these codes further. Another 
example of codes that I developed but did not pursue for long are those I defined for how people 
positioned D66 with respect to religion and secularity. While this theme is important to the 
thesis at large, the interviews were not sampled in a way to focus on this aspect of the interviews 
(here a focus on national party leaders or on contrasting positions would have been better).  
With respect to the Bible Belt chapter, a relevant set of codes captured how my interview 
partners described the field of religious (and partly nonreligious) positionings in town. I noticed 
that interview partners recurrently compared different religious population groups and people 
by their grade of strictness, differentiations that could come with different associations. Central 
codes in that respect were “the strict and the rest,” “easy religion,” “the semi-strict,” and, in a 
more encompassing way, “grades of strictness.” Another relevant distinction which overlapped 
with the notion of different grades of strictness was the distinction between “progressivists and 
conservatives.” Especially at the beginning of the interpretation process, I focused on individual 
differences with respect to how my interview partners’ religious and nonreligious self-
positionings. I hereby developed different codes such as a “Catholic minority in Protestant 
town,” “religious indifference,” “humanism and light religion versus sinister religion.” As my 
interpretation proceeded, however, I sensed that these positionings and the differences between 
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them, were less important for their political activism than their shared opposition to a local 
majority of semi-strict and strict Protestants.60  
The set of codes that became most important for the thesis as a whole were those that I later 
combined in the two categories “the confessionalization of the public” and “a Protestant public 
order.” Both sets of codes were interrelated but also somewhat distinct from the grades of 
strictness my informants distinguished with respect to the religious and nonreligious 
positionings in town. I had noticed that my interview partners frequently spoke about having to 
adjust to a Protestant culture in town, and about processes of communal segregation. I 
developed different codes around both themes and eventually synthetized them in the two 
categories, “the confessionalization of the public” and “a Protestant public order.” Table 3 
below presents a short interview sequence with different codes. The same section is also 
elaborated in more detail in chapter 8. The sequence also shows how a frame I introduced with 
my question is modified by the interviewee.61 It further highlights aspects of what I categorized 
as “confessionalization” and points to the interrelation with the category of “a Protestant public 
order.” The subsequent Table 4 gives an overview on the different codes that constitutes aspects 
of the category “confessionalization.” Here the codes are already formulated in a more abstract 
way and the table further points to the interrelation with the category of “a Protestant public 
order” and the multiple secularities typology.  
 
Table 3: Example Coding 
Lines Interview sequence Codes 
118-
125 
A: And a couple of years later, I tried to start this eh, well 
it was eh on our website people could fill in a form if they 
would want a public high school, […] Because I was 
stating, that there was also interest with parents who have 
their children on a Christian primary school, because all 
these little villages around [town name], they don't have 
public primary schools, they only have Christian primary 
schools. So they did this () ehm research and found out 
Initiative to investigate/ mobilize the 
demand for a public high school 
 
Demand for public higher education 
bigger than public primary education 




60  Another code developed with reference to how the social relations in town were described was that of 
“local versus newcomers.” While it seems relevant to the case and interrelated with the categories of 
confessionalization and a Protestant public order, I did not have enough data to analyze this interrelation.  
61  In conducting the interviews, I was not always successful in granting my informants the necessary space 
to elaborate their own narratives and determine what was relevant for them, but I tried to take this into account 
when interpreting the data. I carefully took my own stimuli and frames into account, contrasting them with the 
responses I received from my interview partners.  
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that there was enough interest for a public high school, but 
not enough to start a school that could be on his own. […] 
Not enough demand for autonomous 
school, but for a different form/ 
Preference for religious schools dwarfs 




I: crazy. eh. what is () with the Christian schools, what are 
what is problematic about them, in terms of what are the 
issues of conflict why do you, I mean there is () ehm 
maybe for for you and I don't know if you know about 
people ehm that are | not so religious  
Stimulus:  
Something must be problematic with 
Christian schools 
not-so-religious people in town as those 
who might have such problems 
147-
153 
A: | well they, well a big problem no I wouldn't call it a 
problem; the only thing is that they () of course, well I tell 
my children, () I told my children, I'd rather have you go 
to a public high school which is 15 kilometers from here, 
but the high school they go to, or they went to, is like a 
five minute walk from here, from this house; and all their 
friends are going to that school, so they wanted to go to 
that school, I can understand that; so I said, well if you go 
there, you should respect the rules, from that school. And 
that means that you pray every morning; […] 
Takes up stimulus “problem” 
Rejects this stimulus 
Accepts it in a moderated way 
(unconcluded) 
Interruption to elaborate her school 
preference: 
 
Actual preference for public school 
public school not a feasible alternative 
when compared to Protestant school/ lack 
of actual choice/ Protestant school default 
option 
Attending Protestant school still framed 
as choice 
Necessary adaption to school’s rules as 





And, () eh well you have to do, as a subject on school, 
which is part of your exams too, so it counts, they can eh 
eh () if you wanna go from class four to five and you have 
an insufficient for ehm religion, and this is protestant 
religion of course, then you can they won't let you turn to 
the other class right? I don't know what the word is, but // 
I: yea you stay, you have to repeat // A: you have to repeat 
the class, because you have to have a sufficient for it 
together with the other eh () results of your tests. So then 
they need to study, ehm what I think sometimes nonsense, 
or //why// because I don't believe what they believe; and, 
well they have to study it, but they don't believe it either, 
At Protestant school, one has to study 
Protestant religion to succeed 
 
particularistic beliefs determine official 
standards  
 
Potential disadvantage for non-
Protestants/ Necessity of pragmatic 





so that's () and it's a, they are very nice to my kids, and the 
the kids love it there in the school, that is not that that is a 
problem, but the problem is that they learn some things 
that I think well,  
……….. 
but they also say like Islam is is ehm well backward 
people, they don't know; but they say that about the 
Catholics too, like if you are a Catholic, you better be a 
non-Christian, but Catholic is horrible. Like that. Like 
they are very very Protestant. And that is what I don't like, 
just I want respect for everyone, I want respect every 
religion, I want my kids to go schools I want them to learn 
about all the religions in the world and to be eh a ci- a () 
person that lives in the world and not only on that 
protestant church, right, they have to know, they have to 
know about the world and what is going on and to see () 
what people believe and how they live and learn about 
God, I mean, I see it as something cultural right? And not 
as the truth. and they are taught that this is the truth and 
the only truth and nothing but the truth. () And that is very 
difficult if you don't believe it. 
General school climate not the problem, 
but the epistemic-ontological 
disagreement with content of teaching; 
No absolute (rationalist, scientific) 
rejection of school’s beliefs 
…….. 
Schools teach exclusive religious 
perspective rather than respect for 
everyone and every religion 
 
 
School raises children to live in the 
church not as world-citizens / openness 
for diversity in the world vs. closed (and 
normative exclusive) cosmos of church/ 
Value of generalized and equal respect for 
everyone and every religion  
Religion as something cultural vs religion 
as an exclusive and singular truth.  
 
Conclusion: Absolute truth claims of 
school creates difficulty for those who 
have to choose for it for a lack of better 
options. (conclusion is no absolute 




Table 4: Example Categorization 
confessionalization 
Codes  Link with other categories/ 
concepts 
lack of public primary schools  
Preference for religious organizations dwarfs scope for public ones  
Claim for public organizations as alternative option (parity claim; secular 
public as ‘confessional’ option in pluralist system) 
Type 2 Multiple Secularity 
Typology (balancing collective 
interests) 
Rivalry between public and religious organizations within pluralist setting  




The second core category, as mentioned, was that of “a Protestant public order” and without 
going into detail, it points to more direct (orthodox) Protestant influences on the public in terms 
of the regulation of public space. The two categories are interrelated in the sense that, as 
described, the confessionalization also creates quasi-public Protestant realms.  
As indicated by Table 4, I also compared the categories with the multiple secularities typology. 
The process of confessionalization and the quasi-confessionalization of the secular public 
thereby resonated with type 2 of the typology. The point of a Protestant public order contrasts 
the notion of secularity in the sense that it stands for the de-differentiation of state/ public and 
religion. I then used the typology in a heuristic fashion to look for what was placed against 
these two aspects of Protestant dominance. The typology hereby proved extremely helpful to 
show how different counter-models and motives of secularity were mentioned in interviews 
and—partly—in the material I collected and played out throughout the election campaign.  
In the further stages of the research process, I used the typology as a heuristic tool in analyzing 
the party-related and parliamentary and government documents in order to analyze struggles 
about and shifts in Dutch secularity as well as the party’s role therein. Again, I found the 
typology helpful while the empirical case was also feedbacked into a brief discussion of the 
conceptual relationship between motives of secularity and patterns of social differentiation 
(theory section). Furthermore, some codes developed in the detailed interpretation of the Bible 
Belt material offered a helpful contrast to analyzing parliamentary and party-related documents.  
The historical focus added to the understanding of the more recent debate on Islam, which as 
mentioned, had not been central in the Bible Belt, but played out nationally. Still, this more 
recent history could also be analyzed through the typology and the insights could be used to 
understand the case study on the secular city. With respect to this case study, the fit with the 
typology was still discovered through a close consideration of the empirical material. I carefully 
read all interviews and did a more detailed interpretation (coding) of those interview parts as 
well as party materials that showed how competing models of secularity played out here as 
well.  
Exclusive organizations cause segregation, social distrust  
Relatively open religious institutions take over role of public ones, become 
default option 
“A Protestant public order” 
Necessity of adaption to religious organizations’ rules “A Protestant public order” 
61 
 
In sum, the analysis of the Bible Belt case and the development of the two main categories, “the 
confessionalization of the public” and “a Protestant public order,” informed my decision to 
focus on secularity rather than nonreligion as the central concept for the thesis at large. 
Nonetheless, the interpretation of empirical data and other documents also showed how the 
notion of diverse forms of nonreligion was an integral part in competing secular arrangements 
and, as such, the reference to the nonreligion framework remained relevant. A central 
terminological distinction used throughout the thesis is that between differentiation and 
irreligion. In developing this distinction, I set out with different codes based on recurrent 
remarks of D66 members such as the “many atheist members,” “the legitimacy of (certain) 
religious members,” and “private atheism versus political secularism.” Beyond that, I compared 
D66 with the humanist association of the Netherlands and Dutch freethinkers as well as an 
atheist fringe party that was founded from within the freethought movement.62 Based on these 
remarks and contrasts, I framed D66 as a “secular party” in the sense of being differentiated 
from religious and nonreligious worldview positions by privatizing them. Through a parallel 
reading of different sociological literature, I settled for the categories of irreligion and 
differentiation in order to address two distinct kinds of nonreligion. A second road through 
which the categories of irreligion and differentiation became relevant in the research was 
through reading about the intellectual mastermind of the confessional model and, in other ways 
as well, I heuristically used this terminological distinction in approaching the historical 
literature, trying to discern how the relationship between politics, religion, and irreligious 
positions was differently construed throughout Dutch political history. Once I began to deal 
with this distinction, I also began to think about secularity as a differentiation between different 
modes of nonreligion as well, rather than only between religion and nonreligious spheres––
something which is also part of the theory chapter.  
I mainly wrote theoretical memos in the early stages of analyzing the interview material from 
the Bible Belt and these memos clearly enhanced my understanding of the case and also helped 
to discern similar logics in other cases. An example is the memo I wrote about “two notions of 
Sunday rest” on the basis of which I developed the gradual understanding for the difference 
between Christian and secular notions of Sunday rest (ch.8.3) and which I could also use to 
discern the difference between respect as a worldly disposition versus respect as a disposition 
in terms of a religious sacred cosmos (ch.4.3). After this early stage, I wrote less memos. After 
 
62  This comparison was in itself very fruitful, not the least because the case of this atheist party exemplifies 
the structuring power of democratic politics in shaping the positioning of atheists in the political field.  
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settling for the multiple secularities typology as a useful conceptual tool, I used this approach 
heuristically in approaching the existing literature as well as for other material such as party 
and parliamentary documents. At this stage, I wrote and multiply rewrote the theory section, 
trying to bring my gradually developing understanding of the empirical developments and 
dynamics into this section.63 Given that for a considerable time while I was working with the 
material I had not yet decided whether secularity or nonreligion should be the guiding concept, 
I wrote notes about how, based on the material I analyzed, the concepts of secularity and 
nonreligion had bearings with respect to the case at hand as well as on how the two concepts 
could be integrated. These notes functioned as memos. A collective volume published on non-
religion in Summer 2019 also offered an opportunity to develop conceptual ideas.   
 
63  With respect to the multiple secularities section, I tried to integrate my understanding that, at least in my 
cases, the relationship between motives and patterns of differentiation was more complex than suggested by the 
typology. Other challenges like a more refined understanding of the interrelation of motives and motifs were left 
undiscussed. I further tried to bring Quack’s notion of diverse nonreligious positions in relation with Bourdieu’s 
notion of the political field as a field in which different experiences from the social realm could be expressed and 
claim political relevance and I tried to relate that with the idea that politics itself could be ascribed as being religious 
or nonreligious in competing ways.  
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3 The Secularity of Politics64 
This chapter establishes the historical background for the thesis at large. It sketches the 
emergence of a pluralist model of secularity, centered on balancing religion and nonreligion. 
Against this background, D66’s political position at the time of its foundation can be 
understood, particularly in terms of the degree to which it also determines contemporary 
negotiations over secularity.  
The first part of the chapter deals with the period between the late-19th and early- 20th century 
and, more specifically, the competition between liberals and confessionals. This competition 
resulted first in a pluralization of the political field understood as an arena in which competing 
principles were positioned against each other, and second, in a compromise that gave way to 
the pluralization of many other social realms. As I briefly noted above, the first social-political 
movement against this pluralism achieved only limited institutional changes but provided the 
grounds for deconfessionalization since the 1960s. 
The second part of this chapter describes the foundation of D66 in opposition to the pluralist 
system and the central role of the confessional parties therein. It shows how the party documents 
of the time reveal an ideal of secular politics as well as how its concern with secularity resonated 
with voters. The chapter closes with a sketch of the party’s later adoption of social-liberalism 
and party leaders’ aims in terms of formulating a concise and recognizable standpoint for the 
party.  
3.1 The Construction of a Pluralist Modernity since mid-19th Century 
A more encompassing history of Dutch secularity would have to start prior to the 19th century, 
since important inroads were made in the context of the Dutch Revolt (1555-1590). With 
respect to the political thought of the revolt, liberty constituted the core value, both in the sense 
of positive freedoms and the privileges guaranteed to the Dutch provinces as well in the sense 
of a generalized and universalized value of both the republic to come and its individual citizens 
(Van Gelderen 1989). The liberty of conscience which was conceived as the base of individual 
liberty was institutionalized in the Union of Utrecht (1579), while claims for a more 
encompassing freedom of expression and worship did not gain general support at the time. Of 
more immediate importance for the case at hand, though, are the developments in the 19th 
century, which has been dubbed as the second confessional era with respect to European history 
 
64  Parts of this chapter have already been published in a collective book that emerged from the diversity of 
nonreligion project (Schuh 2019, Schuh, Quack, and Kind 2019). 
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(Blaschke 2000). As I described earlier, this period is central to the conceptual focus of this 
thesis for two reasons. First, the struggles over secularity that unfolded in this period take the 
separation of church and state as their historic precondition and, accordingly, encompassed the 
centralizing ambitions of liberalism as a moral project centered on the nation and the 
simultaneous emergence of a political field as an arena that enabled competition about the state 
in new ways. Second, the pluralism that was developed since the late-19th century went beyond 
religious diversity and rather constituted a pluralist way of accommodating processes of 
modernization such as the (functional) differentiation of different realms, the emergence of 
irreligious movements and ideas, and the emphasis on human self-rule (or: popular sovereignty) 
that had gained importance with the French Revolution and found an expression in later liberal 
constitutions.  
The emergence of a political field was linked to the rise of the middle classes since the mid-
18th century who claimed political influence vis-à-vis the Dutch king and aristocracy. 
Liberalism emerged as the intellectual and political expression of this emancipation movement, 
aiming at a robust middle-class society in a strong nation-state where rule and liberties were 
guaranteed via a constitutional system and the control and division of power. Influenced by the 
French Revolution, liberals also feared mass rule, which presented itself as a second motive for 
supporting a constitutional system.65 In the revolutionary year of 1848, the Dutch King tasked 
the liberal leader, J.R. Thorbecke (1798-1872), with revising the existing constitution from 
1814. The new constitution would not only guarantee the freedom of religion, press, 
association, and gatherings but would further transfer full political responsibility from the King 
to the ministers. It gave more control over the government and legislation to the parliament and 
introduced a system of direct and census based (district and majority) suffrage for the Dutch 
parliament.66 The constitution thus not only made it easier for individuals to organize 
collectively but also made the mobilization of electorates conditional to political power, and 
thus facilitated the emergence of a political field and eventually mobilization along religion-
related and social divides.  
Liberals were the first to profit from the political changes and in 1860 became the dominant 
party, claiming politics as a realm of the common, above particularistic religious divides. 
Orthodox counter movements emerged beginning in the mid-19th century and in the latter half 
of the 19th century, successfully opposed the dominance of liberalism, something which 
 
65  The term liberalism, which has been present in the Dutch language since 1820, had a pejorative notion. 
66  Liberals were constitutionalists, not democrats. 
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ultimately resulted in the segmented pluralism called pillarization. Blom and Talsma consider 
the period between 1830 and 1860 as a pre-phase of pillarization (De Rooy 2001). The next 
section sketches how liberals were both interrelated with the religious and religion-related 
tensions of the time as well as advocates of a neutral state and public. 
3.1.1 The Liberal Project 
To understand how religious and religion-related divides were translated into political ones, it 
is important to first understand liberalism’s link to the religious field and the emerging 
irreligious movements of the time as well as its influence on the relations of state and church 
and the place of religion in society. Since the revolt against Catholic Spain in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, Reformed Christianity had been the official religion in the Netherlands, with 
Catholics being the main religious minority. The Dutch Reformed Church was the public church 
while Protestant dissenters and minorities, Catholics, as well as non-Christians had limited (but 
constitutionally guaranteed) religious freedoms.67 Furthermore, since at least the 17th century, 
new developments in philosophy and science challenged the authority of the Christian 
revelation.68 In the course of the century, two distinct notions of natural science and their 
relation to religion were developed: first, the idea that the sciences were independent and 
differentiated from religion, and, second, the transformation of the sciences into worldview 
alternatives to religion (Flipse 2014, 16-20). Conversely, the scientific challenge to religion was 
met by either the assertion of orthodoxy or aims to reform and modernize Christianity. The 
emergence of nationalism was another development that formulated new demands towards 
religion, all of which led to another form of religious (and intellectual) diversity, which cross-
cut confessional and church divides.  
Liberalism was rooted in the liberal or modernist strands of Dutch Reformed Christianity and 
found its supporters among Protestant minorities and, until 1870, also among Catholics. For 
these minorities, calls for political influence since the 18th century had coincided with claims to 
reform the relation of state and church. Eventually, as a consequence of the French invasion in 
the late-18th century, the Reformed Church was first stripped of its privileged position, and the 
liberal constitution of 1848 asserted the separation of church and state. This primarily provided 
the Catholic Church in the Netherlands organizational freedom—put into law by the first liberal 
 
67  The Union of Utrecht (1579), which served as a constitution for the early republic, guaranteed basic 
religious freedom in the sense of a freedom of conscious.  




cabinet—and led to massive protests against the cabinet and its eventual downfall.69 The liberal 
call for a separation of church and state was further linked to the ideal of a unified nation and a 
public-political realm beyond confessional and dogmatic (as well as class-related) divides 
(Aerts 1997, 129, 197). They conceived the state and politics as having an autonomous 
responsibility towards the general interest, understood as a combination between universal 
rights and the continuity and unity of the nation (Aerts 1997, 197, 323f.). Churches were meant 
to be free, but church teachings and interests were to remain outside the political sphere. It was 
only at the level of individual inspiration that religion was considered to be legitimately linked 
to politics (Aerts 1997, 197). Rather than being translated into pluralism— and rather than being 
problematized as such—religious diversity served as a motive to prevent a potential 
segmentation of the public sphere and the nation (Aerts 1997, 190,197). The liberal notion of a 
national public rendered all those forms of Christianity sectarian or particularistic, which did 
not fit with liberal notions of a general religion above faith divide. The rise of liberalism led, 
e.g., to the reduction of religious education in schools, whereby children were educated about 
general Christian values and virtues rather than dogmatic knowledge (De Rooy 2002, 62-62, 
72-74).70 Given the emphasis on virtues and the common good, liberalism has been described 
as a moral project, which means that at the same time that liberalism asserted certain social 
differentiations like that between church and state and between private and public realms, it 
was also directed towards the moral state of the nation and its citizens (Kennedy and Zwemer 
2010, 243f.).  
Towards the end of the century, liberal intellectuals transformed their original Protestant 
orientation into an immanent idealism, centered on a public morality, which was no longer 
based on Christianity, and in which God and religion was a mere symbol for human moral 
aspirations—a position that Aerts (1997, 481-485) refers to as humanist idealism. Taken 
together, the liberals therefore not only contributed to the institutionalization of several 
differentiations that re-organized the role of Christianity in the Netherlands, they also gave 
shape to a form of “exclusive humanism” (Taylor 2010, 41-44). Since the mid-19th century, 
 
69  Van Rooden (1996, 28) emphasizes that even in the short period of late-18th century French rule, the 
separation of church and state was not motivated by the opposition to an absolutist religious power, but by the 
aim to end discrimination on the grounds of religion. The role of churches was seen to be the moral shaping of 
citizens, but religion should no longer have been the base of societal difference. This egalitarianism was asserted 
by the constitution of 1848. 
70  Given the explicit reference to Christianity, the notion of liberalism as a carrier of secularity might 
sound misleading. The conceptualization of a public realm set apart from confessional divides might 
nevertheless also be seen as a predecessor of a more secular understanding of such a public. The general 
argument also fits liberal support for an equal religious freedom.  
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thus, Liberal authors were also among those who positioned the notion of humanism as a 
nonreligious worldview (in Dutch: levensbeschouwing), construed either in counter-distinction 
from Christianity and religion whatsoever or as its progressive contemporary form (Derkx 
2002, 64).  
3.1.2 The Orthodox Protestant Counter-Movement  
In the mid-19th century an orthodox Calvinist “anti-revolutionary” movement constituted itself 
as a separate faction in the reformed church and later in parliament, where it replaced 
conservativism as the main other of liberals (Lucardie 2002, 16-22, De Rooy 2002, 64-92). At 
the ideological core of this anti-revolutionary movement was the rejection of the French 
Revolution and the principle of popular sovereignty seen as the fundamental reversion of a 
godly moral and state order, and therefore a revolt against Christ, which inevitably led to 
radicalism and tyranny. Liberty was a core value to Calvinists alike liberals but in anti-
revolutionary thought, god was the sole legitimate authority and the precondition for and 
guarantor of human liberty. The revolutionary act of giving authority to man was conceived as 
a reversal of the legitimate order and as ultimately subjecting man to the illiberalism of mass-
rule and totalitarianism (Jellema 1957, 481, Kuyper 1999 [1931], 87f.).71 The individualism 
implied in the revolutionary ideals of liberty and equality was further seen to destroy traditional 
social groups and foundational hierarchies, primarily the family, which rather than the 
individual was seen as the fundamental social unit. By contrast, individualism was not 
considered to be a bearer of liberty but ran the risk of spiritless uniformity and atomism. Within 
orthodox Protestant thought as well, humanism in the sense of an irreligious worldview gained 
relevance, albeit in pejorative terms (Derkx 2002, 64).  
One of the first intellectual and political leaders of the antirevolutionary movement was G.W. 
van Prinsterer (1801-1876). Most important for the case at hand was his successor Abraham 
Kuyper (1837-1920), as he turned Calvinism into a mass movement and organized it as a 
separate part of the nation by establishing a network of Calvinist organizations including a 
newspaper (1872), the Antirevolutionary Party (ARP, 1879), the Free University (1880), and a 
separate reformed church (1892). Liberals opposed these beginnings of pillarization. Most 
strongly, they objected to the confessional movement in state-politics (Aerts 1997, 352). The 
antirevolutionary strand was conceived as representing not the general but church-related 
 
71  Beyond these theological motives, it was also under French rule that the Reformed Church was 
disestablished and that the state gained increasing control over churches (which only ended with the 
establishment of the liberal constitution) (Kennedy and Zwemer 2010, 243f.).  
68 
 
interests, as it was seen to be purporting a sectarian and minority program on the nation rather 
than being a genuine state party (Aerts 1997, 198, 323f.). Kuyper opposed the liberal claim of 
privatizing confessional divides by reframing politics as fundamentally religion-related and 
divided in belief and unbelief.  
In opposition to Kuyper’s course, competing Protestant parties emerged in the beginnings of 
20th century (Lucardie 2002, 18, 38). The Christian Historical Union (CHU) was one of the 
first. It was based in the upper classes and opposed the pillarization of Dutch society. More 
important for the case at hand is the SGP (“Political/ State Reformed Party) Staatkundig 
Gereformeerde Partij), which was founded in 1918 (Dölle n.d.). Its founders rejected political 
cooperation with Dutch Catholics as well as acceptance of pluralism. Crucial for the SGP’s 
ideological course was the non-shortened article 36 of the Belgic confessions, one of the core 
documents of Reformed Christianity, which obliges the government to counter all false beliefs 
to defeat the power of the antichrist. Under the influence of Kuyper, this respective section was 
rejected by the Reformed Churches Netherlands (Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland; GKN) 
at the beginning of the 20th century. Despite this theocratic orientation, the SGP also rejects the 
notion of a church-state. It is rooted in the puritan and pietistic strands of Dutch Reformed 
Christianity, but not in one single church. While the CHU could mobilize about 10% of the 
electorate, the SGP represents about 2% of the electorate. Aside from liberalism and Calvinism 
two more political strands emerged during late-19th and early 20th century – political 
Catholicism and socialism. Catholics had traditionally adhered to liberalism as a supporter of 
equal religious freedom, but in the context of the global and national culture wars, they began 
to oppose liberal rule.72 Catholic political thought opposed state centralism as it was believed 
to conflict with an organic social order, in the name of a “subsidiarity principle” (Lucardie 
2002, 18-22, De Rooy 2002, 68-72, 81-86). To this end, Catholic organizations were formed, 
starting around 1900, and the Roman Catholic State Party (RKSP) was founded in 1926.  
Socialism emerged as a fourth political strand in Dutch politics and its rise as well as the social 
question as such had a strong influence on all other parties and political strands. Unlike 
liberalism, which as mentioned was rooted in liberal Protestantism and later in immanent 
idealism, socialism was the first major carrier of non-denominationalism of materialism and 
atheism (Aerts 1997, 202, 220, 251, 472, Knippenberg 1998, 211, 213, Lucardie 2002, 25, 
 
72  Kennedy and Zwemer (2010, 251) argue that Dutch Catholics did not really engage in a genuine 
“Kulturkampf” as they were confident in building up their own organizations.  
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Derkx 2002, 65).73 As a movement, socialism was both anti-religious while it also borrowed 
and transformed elements and symbols of Christianity within and with reference to its own 
movement and leaders (Groothuizen and Bos 2013, Van Veldhuizen 2013). Religion was 
portrayed as an ideology and associated with the established interests of the King, the Church, 
and the Capital. While the confessional parties objected to the irreligious and revolutionary 
character of Marxism, they shared a concern about the social costs of an unbound capitalism 
(Jellema 1957, 477).74 The social question also divided liberals and gave way to a new strand 
of social-liberalism which counter-distinguished itself from the economically-liberal classic 
liberalism. Blom and Talsma consider the period between 1830 and the 1860s, marked by the 
self-organization of Calvinists and the eventual adaption of liberals to the new situation as the 
second phase of pillarization (De Rooy 2001). The build-up and mutual competition of Catholic 
and socialist organizations emerged in the third phase between 1890 and 1917.  
The fusion of socialism and atheism was also manifested within the organized freethought that 
had developed since the mid-19th century (Derkx 2002, 65). The political and material project 
of socialism was thereby meant to compensate for the aspired loss (or better dissolution) of 
illusionary religious hope in salvation. The emphasis was not the necessarily religion-
relatedness of politics, but instead the necessary political dimension of all religious criticism; 
this nonetheless led to the entanglement of political and worldview secularism, as 19th-century 
freethought became an arena of liberal-socialist conflict. Liberals successfully claimed 
freethought a mere intellectual project and confined the socialist project to the political realm 
and the socialist party (Gasenbeek 2007, 5-7, Derkx 2002).75 The Social-Democratic Workers’ 
Party (SDAP) was founded in 1894.  
In sum, by the beginning of 20th century, four different political strands had emerged. They 
were rooted in different religious and nonreligious milieus and differed with respect to their 
 
73  It was only at the end of the 19th century that non-denominationalism became an urban and upper-class 
phenomenon (Knippenberg 1998, 214f.). 
74  Kuyper’s relation with socialism seems to have been ambivalent: On the one hand, he was also opposed 
to the social costs of capitalism and even spoke of the need for a “Christian socialism” (Jellema 1957, 477). On 
the other hand, he considered Marxism the most logical heir to the French Revolution and thus a central 
antagonist. In the early 20th century, it was his cabinet that harshly suppressed a socialist workers’ strike (Jellema 
1957, 477, 480). Global Catholicism developed its own (anti-socialist) social teachings with the encyclical 
Rerum Novarum which also offered guidance to Dutch Catholics. Moreover, the competition with socialism 
acted as an incentive for the foundation of confessional unions and employer associations (Pennings 1998, 
introduction). For social liberals, state intervention into the social and economic realm were necessary to 
guarantee equal chances and counter class struggles and capitalist exploitation (Dudink 1997, De Rooy 2002, 59, 
62-64, 66f., 72-76, 92-96; see also: Aerts 1997, 482f.). 
75  Derkx speaks of the party becoming the cultural and possibly spiritual home for the non-church 
affiliated left. This only changed with its transformation into the labor party (PvdA) after the Second World War 
when Christian socialists were explicitly addressed as potential party members (Ibid.). 
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religious and nonreligious positioning in politics. While liberals had sought to construe politics 
as differentiated, such differentiation was (variously and for varied reasons) countered by both 
socialists and orthodox Christians.76 The next section centers on the intellectual work of the 
Calvinist leader, Kuyper, who opposed the liberal claim of privatizing confessional divides by 
reframing politics as being fundamentally religion-related and divided across belief and 
unbelief.  
3.1.3 An Antithesis of Belief and Unbelief 
Since at least the mid-19th century, as mentioned, Dutch intellectuals had a clear sense of an 
irreligious option in the sense of an antagonistic and binary irreligious other to religion and also 
within orthodox Protestant thought, which referenced an irreligious, humanist worldview albeit 
in pejorative terms (Derkx 2002, 64). In this context, Kuyper’s innovative move was to 
conceptualize Calvinism as a worldview and to further interpret his time as being characterized 
by an encompassing and antithetic worldview conflict—an antithesis—between belief and 
unbelief, that is, between Christianity and Modernism.  
According to Kuyper, a worldview meant a “coherent set of presuppositions and foundational 
ideas that enabled an individual to interpret reality” (Miller 1999, see also Sire 2015, 23). The 
concept implied a simultaneously encompassing and perspectival vision of the world—and 
Kuyper spoke in similar fashion of life-systems, life-views, and of principles and faith positions 
that necessarily guided all perspectives of the world. Different worldviews could be compared 
based on their understanding of God, man, and world (Molendijk 2008, 240). From this 
perspective, immanent and non-orthodox perspectives on the world and religion could be 
framed as epistemic equivalents and rivals to Christianity. He coined the concept “modernism,” 
initially to criticize liberal Protestantism, but later came to denote a general and single opponent 
of Calvinism associated with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, thus extending the 
critique beyond the realm of theology (Molendijk 2011, 410-412, Jellema 1957, 480).77 By 
definition, modernism comprises that which “is bound to build a world of its own from the data 
of the natural man, and to construct man himself from the data of nature” (Kuyper 1999 [1998], 
11). A Christian response to such comprehensive modernism would have to be equally 
comprehensive, positioning Christianity as a life system rather than merely a church order or 
theology. For him, it was Calvinism that represented such a form of Christianity (Kuyper 1999 
 
76  While Calvinists opposed the separation of politics from religion, socialists rejected the differentiation 
of a mere intellectual criticism of religion from the project of political reform. 
77  He thereby distinguishes between modernity and modernism. 
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[1998], 11). Calvinism and Modernism were thus the two antipodes in a worldview struggle 
between belief and unbelief.  
Kuyper took up the theological, intellectual, and political struggles of the time and integrated 
them in a specific “map” which depicted all positions along a binary divide and as part of an 
encompassing religious-irreligious worldview field. He denaturalized so to speak the emerging 
immanent frame, and this mapping left no conceptual space for an immanent perspective that 
was not a direct epistemic other to religion. In his view, the different social realms were not 
based on some logic differentiated from religion, but required a foundational principle that 
could only be found either in belief or unbelief. Respectively he criticized “partial” 
understandings of religion as being confined to a limited sphere, be it that of inner life, of ethics, 
or of sentiments (Kuyper 1999 [1998], 50f.). As a worldview, Calvinism was not merely a 
theological system but relevant for the central (functional) domains of society, a legitimate base 
for science, politics, art, and family life (Sire 2015, 33f, Kuyper 1999 [1998], 50f.).78 Kuyper, 
as an example, argued that all scientific interpretations were either based on a theistic or 
atheistic worldview (Kuyper 1999 [1998], 131-134; Kuyper 1880, 31f.). Thus, there was no 
conflict between religion and science, but one between two different kinds of science, one based 
in belief and the other in unbelief. At the same time, he did not oppose all forms of social 
differentiation, but rather spoke of the sovereignty of different social spheres or circles, both 
from each other as well as from the state—examples being the church, the family, business, 
science, art, and so forth (Kuyper 1999 [1998], 90, see also Jellema 1957, 482, Molendijk 2008, 
244). His Calvinist university was thus independent from the Calvinist Church.  
Politics as well, was either based on the authority of God or on human reason and insight 
according to Kuyper; it was either religious or anti-religious (De Rooy 2002, 96). From the 
onset, the self-understanding of anti-revolutionaries had been based on a counter-distinction 
from mere power-centered politics, positioned as a getuigenis of beginselpolitiek (politics of 
witness or principles), as politics of a higher sphere, and as representing the Christian voice in 
politics (De Haan and Te Velde 1996). Kuyper’s ARP party’s program of principles denounced 
the principles of popular sovereignty and confessed—also in the realm of politics—the “eternal 
principles” revealed by God (ARP 1918).  
 
78  This explicit reference to social or functional differentiation distinguishes Kuyper from other Christian 
thinkers of his time.  
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The notion of an encompassing antithesis of belief and unbelief allowed for an attack on 
conservativism, liberalism, and socialism alike as mere variants of a single ideology rooted in 
the Enlightenment (Jellema 1957, 480). Furthermore, Kuyper’s notion of different worldviews 
served as an intellectual backing of social and political pluralism, which allowed him to present 
Calvinism as genuinely tolerant and accuse liberalism of a “spiritual tyranny” against those of 
a different mindset (Kuyper 1999 [1998], 78, 109). Thus, his reconceptualization of modernity 
and Calvinism challenged liberals’ claims that they represented a neutral, general position and 
the nation and it claimed a future for Calvinism in modernity at a time when liberalism seemed 
to be the “the wave of the future” (Jellema 1957, 473; also: Molendijk 2011, Miller 1999). 
Kuyper introduced a new style of politics and eventually succeeded in changing the rules and 
divides of the political field. Until 1879, and under liberal dominance, there were no political 
parties but only so-called chamber clubs. Kuyper was the first to establish a modern party as a 
representative body of likeminded people with a published program (“Our Program”) and 
shared principles (De Rooy 2002, 89, Tanja 2011).79 The notion of principled politics as such 
was far from alien to liberals—liberal intellectuals and politicians spoke of the principles of the 
constitution and of principles determinant for a certain historical period (Aerts 1997, 193, 
2009). The notion of party-specific and thus multiple principles and that parliamentarians 
should primarily stand for such principles rather than being generally trustworthy conflicted, 
however, with the liberal ideal of the common good and a national political public beyond 
religious and worldview divides.  
Eventually though, liberals also started to establish parties and publish election programs and 
programs of principles.80 The third program of the Liberale Unie speaks of its own principles 
and further claims that “the main principle of our constitutional system: a government of and 
by the people should [shall] more than ever demand complete tribute (huldiging)” (LU 1918). 
The program of the Liberal State Party is particularly interesting for the case at hand as it speaks 
of liberalism as a “strand of the intellectual-spiritual (geestelijk) life,” while also stressing that 
its “political aspirations” and principles were differentiated from (and not conflicting with) “the 
source from which […] one takes the elements of one’s spiritual, moral, or religious world- and 
 
79  The ARP did not remain the only party in the Protestant camp. In 1908, the Christian Historic Union 
(CHU) a right-economic split off from the ARP was founded, and in 1918 the Reformed Political Party (SGP), 
which, in contrast to Kuyper, was against the separation of church and state.  
80  The first liberal party (Liberal Union, LU) was founded in 1885. In the liberal camp, various parties 
resulted from schisms or mergers: such as the Alliance of Free Liberals (BVL), the Liberal State Party (LSP), 
and the Liberal Democratic Union (VDB). The VDB is by now recurrently seen as the predecessor of D66 
(Lucardie 2004, 411-413).  
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lifeviews” (LSP 1921). On the one hand, thus, the party adapted to the changed terms of political 
competition and self-positioned as a particular strand while, on the other hand, it positioned 
itself as a third space position beyond religious-irreligious divides—the latter being rendered 
to the private sphere of belief and unbelief. In that sense, the program gives a first example of 
the symbolic subordination of the notion of a differentiated political public under a logic of 
worldview pluralism. At the same time, the program also gives expression to ongoing struggles 
between liberals and Calvinists about the religion-relatedness of politics.81 Prior to this party 
internal differentiation between politics and worldviews, similar differentiations played out in 
other liberal institutions. With respect to the mid-19th century editorial department of the liberal 
paper De Gids, Aerts (1997, 239) writes that the editors were divided about whether the paper 
should have a shared political or a shared worldview base.82 This struggle, while apparently not 
clearly resolved for the sake of either direction, underscores how mid-19th century liberals also 
operated with a distinction between politics and worldviews as two different value spheres and 
that organizational homogeneity should be established along the lines of either. 
Additionally, the political culture changed with the rise of Calvinism as Kuyper introduced a 
more polarizing style to politics than was the custom before (Tanja 2011, Meijering 2012). In 
the words of De Rooy (2002, 91) parliament now became “less a place […] for making 
decisions, but a great stage from which the public was addressed,” in which not agreement but 
at the most compromises could be reached.83 The antithesis further manifested itself in the 
collaboration of Catholics and Protestants in the period between 1888 and 1919.84 It also 
manifested in how the left-right distinction in politics was interpreted, with confessionals 
labeled right and non-confessionals left. Moreover, with the foundation of confessional 
cabinets, references to God and Bible and theological debates became integral to parliamentary 
debates. Liberals and socialists objected to the antithesis and the confessional claim of 
representing the sole legitimate Christian voice as well as the mix of theology and politics 
 
81  Based on party programs, the positioning of socialists is more difficult to assess. The characterization of 
the SDAP as a cultural or spiritual home refers to its more or less implicit humanist and atheist profile (Derkx 
2002). The SDAP programs of principles from the end of the 19th century as well as from 1912 and 1937 do not 
make any reference to a worldview position, to religion, science, or materialism. They center on the social 
question and a transnational class struggle. Since 1937, the programs name democracy as a core principle. Only 
the PvdA program of principles from 1947 explicitly states that the party is open to “persons with very different 
life-convictions that agree with its program of principles” and further recognizes “the intimate relation between 
life-convictions and politics.” 
82  In terms of the latter, they referred to Christianity as a shared foundation. 
83  With respect to their combative style of politics, socialist leader Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis has 
been compared to Kuyper as someone who took political divides and conflicts seriously; like the Calvinist party, 
the socialist party was also based on a particular propagated ideology (Tanja 2011, 68, 71, Van Veldhuizen 
2013). 
84  Between 1888 and 1919, liberal and confessional cabinets alternated. 
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(Meijering 2012, 21-25). Irrespectively, these debates inevitably took on a theological tone, 
and, among liberals and socialists as well, former preachers engaged in these debates. Aside 
from such theological tones, the struggles between the different parties in parliament also 
referenced (predicted) developments in the religious field. Socialists gladly pointed to declining 
numbers of church-affiliation, which they linked with the growth of socialism, while liberals 
predicted a growth in liberal Christianity rather than religious decline. Their other was not 
religion as such, but clericalism and the gradual “churching” of the country (Meijering 2012, 
47f.).  
Accordingly, by introducing the notion of the necessarily religion-relatedness of politics (their 
rootedness in principles and worldviews) as well as the notion of a binary divide between 
religion and irreligion to politics, Kuyper changed the rules of the political game. Even if 
liberals retained their ideal of a differentiation between politics and worldview positions, they 
had to do so under changed circumstances and in the form of a particularistic stance. 
3.1.4 Contesting Differentiations  
The contested differentiation of politics and religion was only one aspect in a more general 
struggle about the differentiation of society, in which two competing models of social 
differentiation were placed against each other: On the one hand, the differentiation and 
secularization of different realms, and, on the other hand, the segmentation or pluralization of 
all realms along the lines of worldview divides. In the sense that political struggles concern the 
power to give manifest and objective expression and authority to certain social categorizations 
over others, political struggles also concerned the religion-relatedness of other realms, the 
struggle over science being a case in point.  
In line with their general dominant social and political position, mid-19th century liberals also 
dominated universities and an orthodox opposition challenged this dominance as well as the 
notion of a single undivided and secular science as such (Flipse, 2014, 83, 133). Generally 
speaking, the relation between science and religion, as mentioned, could be construed as one of 
binary opposition or differentiation (Flipse 2014, 16-21). According to Flipse, antireligious 
conceptions of science were mainly received among Dutch freethinkers but did not find much 
support otherwise in the Netherlands (Flipse 2014, 24f.). Liberal authors, however, placed 
science against religion to the extent that modern theologians drew on science and especially 
historical criticism to question miracles and the bible (Aerts 1997, 238, 247, see also Flipse 
2014, 36). Materialist and atheist notions of science, however, were not well received, and 
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liberal intellectuals felt that materialism was both inadequate and corrosive to the understanding 
and nurturing of morality (Aerts 1997, 245, 465-472). They respectively differentiated between 
materialism as a base for the (natural) sciences on the one hand, and the realm of worldviews 
on the other hand.85 Darwinism was not to become a new religion in the eyes of liberals (Ibid. 
473). Despite this, their dominance in the academic field was also challenged in the name of a 
legitimate worldview diversity.  
In line with his general approach to modernity, Kuyper also understood science to be 
necessarily based on a faith position and structured by the antithesis between two scientific 
systems: One was based on the notion of a non-ideal world originally created by God and in 
need of redemption, the other was exclusively based on the notion of evolution and an idea of 
process and perfectibility (Kuyper 1999 [1931], 131-134). Strategically, this conception paved 
the way for a Christian science carried by Calvinism and claimed scientific liberty vis-à-vis 
pope and state (Kuyper 1999 [1931], 115-117).86 Kuyper challenged liberal dominance in 
academic institutions by claiming state neutrality vis-à-vis the competing scientific systems and 
an equal treatment of the different population groups in the lifeworld of which the respective 
scientific systems were rooted (Flipse 2014, 74, 77). The Free University Kuyper founded in 
1880 was meant as a place for scientific engagement free of both church and state (Flipse 2014, 
38, 53).  
Liberals criticized Kuyper’s aspirations and advocated a scientific practice and ethos 
differentiated from religion and anti-religion, as was evident in parliamentary debate of the time 
(Flipse 2014). The notion that people of different religious background claimed a space in 
science was not perceived to be problematic, given that, from the liberal perspective, faith and 
scientific standards could very well come together in one person Flipse (2014, 70f.). The notion 
of a worldview-laden science was nonetheless considered a historic anachronism and 
inadequate in terms of the then-current state of science where most subject areas were 
independent of worldview perspectives (Ibid. 71f. also 78). I cannot assess the state of science 
at the time; what suffices for the argument though is that regardless of how legitimate Kuyper’s 
 
85  According to Aerts (1997, 481), the authors of De Gids, his reference point here represented the left 
spectrum of theological modernism because their critique had an anti-bourgeois tone, centered on social reform, 
and perceived morality as the ambition of man to create a good and moral world. Such morality, even if 
presented with a transcendent framing, was mainly immanent in orientation.  
86  The notion of Christian science did not imply a biblical literalism as Kuyper also found that God spoke 
in many different ways and the exact notions of the reformed principles meant to guide Christian science and 
their relation to different subject areas remained an object of varying and contested interpretations (Flipse 2014, 
54f.). Furthermore, the anti-thesis between irreligion and religion was not complete, but Kuyper distinguished 
these competing worldviews from empirical research and a basic logic (Ibid. 58).  
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critique of the natural sciences at his time was, his antithesis left little room for a mere secular 
and immanent understanding of science. In the mentioned parliament debate, he replied that 
only those scientific explanations that recognized a “thinker” and “creator” behind the 
discovery of basic material principles of life could be considered not-irreligious (Flipse 2014, 
77). Liberals further opposed Kuyper’s ambitions in the institutional and legal realm, criticizing 
what they considered “sect-schools” and “sect-lecterns” (Ibid. 70). There was thus both a 
motive of unity and of functional differentiation—unity though not in the sense of a holistic 
community determined by a single logic or value, but rather the unity and autonomy of different 
systems.  
As Prime Minister, Kuyper provided the legislative frame for a further pluralization of the 
academic landscape (Ibid. 67-70). Ultimately, however, the political power he processed in 
terms of shaping the relations of religion and science were limited. Calvinist natural scientists 
soon began to demarcate a realm of mere research, distinct from worldview matters (natural 
philosophy), and, in that context, accepted the biological theory of evolution (Flipse 2012, 
118f.).87 Calvinist theologians by contrast, already in the interbellum, received and promoted 
US American creationism (Ibid. 124-127, 131-133). 
The case of science shows that the struggle between liberalism and confessionalism was less 
concerned with the relation between church and state but the very organization of society and 
the shaping of the gradual rationalization of different social realms. Kuyper’s ideology provided 
the base for a compromise between this rationalization and the religious and religion-related 
worldview struggles of the time in the sense that it conceived all realms as being dominated by 
an antithesis Like politics proper, the politics of science became an arena in which the notion 
of an antithesis between religion and irreligion was played out against the liberal notion of a 
general neutral realm. Consequently, the academic field was also organized along a pluralist 
logic. The political debates about science and religion were thereby somewhat independent of 
the rationalization of differentiated logics within fields or emerging spheres as well as the 
related border struggles. To close to this historic sketch, in the following section I will briefly 
outline how a pluralist structure was institutionalized and how it was reasserted in the mid-20th 
century despite a relevant counter-movement. 
 




3.1.5 Contested Institutionalizations of Pluralism 
According to Blom and Talsma, the period between 1917 and 1965 marked the fourth phase 
and the completion of pillarization, as the pillars were consolidated and extended to other parts 
of society (De Rooy 2001). The confessional movements had been transformed from 
emancipation movements into holders of political power with access to the means of legislation 
and administration (Pennings 1998). The collective (self-)organization, legal, and structural 
preconditions that had benefitted pluralist society were now institutionalized. In a prominent 
political compromise—the pacification of 1917—debates over education were resolved with a 
constitutional guarantee of equal state subsidies for special schools on a par with public ones, 
a provision that allowed for building a system of religiously-based schools and resulted in a 
segmented educational sector (Art. 23 GW). Moreover, the 1917 agreement introduced general 
male suffrage and further stabilized the existing party pluralism through the introduction of 
proportional representation.88  
While it was only in the first half of the 20th century that the proportion of students in 
confessional schools as well as the number of confessional organizations and associations really 
became dominant in a quantitative sense, the post-war era was already characterized by a strong 
popular movement against pillarization (Knippenberg 1998, 211). German occupation during 
the Second World War suspended most pillarized institutions. After the war, however, the 
pluralist structure was rebuilt. At the same time, the Dutch Reformed Church and the newly 
founded labor party (PvdA) in particular led a movement that aspired to overcome the divides 
of pillarization (Mellink 2011, Kennedy 2007 [1995], 29-37, Van Dam and Van Trigt 2015, 11-
13). With respect to politics, the post-war order was characterized by a compromise between 
secular and religious ideas. While the idea of breaking through the old divides found resonance 
in other parties as well, still all main parties of the pre-war era were rebuilt after the war 
(Kennedy 2007 [1995], 30-33). Although the labor party had hoped to break though the 
confessional lines in politics and achieve a new progressive majority, it failed and governed as 
part of a coalition with the Catholic party KVP (Mellink 2011) between 1945-1958.89 PvdA 
and KVP dealt with political issues such as the laws on Sunday rest and cremation, which were 
sensitive for both Christians and secular people alike, in a manner of compromise by upholding 
 
88  Women’s suffrage was introduced in 1918. 
89  The main confessional parties (the Catholic people’s party KVP, the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party 
ARP, and the Calvinist Christian Historical Union, CHU) were re-established and the former liberal parties 
ultimately merged into the current VVD. The Social Democrats (the SDAP) participated in a short-lasting 
cabinet with confessionals and social-liberals for the first time in 1939.  
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a Christian public order while tolerating diverging interests. Liberals were strongly opposed to 
this compromise. They perceived it as a betrayal of PvdA’s principled progressive position, 
which sought to establish equal and individual liberty, in favor of ensuring that they would 
breakthrough as a party (Van Baalen et al. 2001).  
The general ambivalences of the breakthrough movement also manifested in the organization 
of the welfare state. The post-war era was based on a new consensus on state secured individual 
social rights, and this replaced the pre-war idea that rendered welfare a responsibility of the 
different communities (pillars). Even if the state was given more responsibility in the new 
welfare system, the segmented social organizations remained largely responsible for 
implementing the new social policies of the state (Van Dam and Van Trigt 2015, 13). Last but 
not least, the breakthrough movement, while professing the ideal of a renewed and united 
democratic community, was also rooted in the paternalist idea of educating or disciplining the 
general population, something which the liberalism of the 1960s opposed (De Jong 2014, 39, 
74f., 149f.).  
Even if the breakthrough movement did not have a great impact on the pluralist institutional 
structure of politics, the new labor party carried out its own separation of politics and 
worldviews. In its aim to overcome pillarization, the party gave up its former irreligious profile 
and opened itself up to Christian members and voters. Moreover, it differentiated itself from 
the modern humanist movement that had emerged after the second world war and claimed to 
provide a moral base for the religiously non-affiliated (Derkx 2002, 67). The humanist project 
was rooted in the social-democratic milieu, but when the post-war PvdA opened itself up to 
Christians, the Humanist Association (Humanistisch Verbond, HV) was founded and inherited 
the PvdA’s former the worldview-function (Derkx 2006, 69). The labor party institutionalized 
confessional and humanist subgroups within the party, and thus chose a different, more pluralist 
form of differentiation than the liberal parties’ privatization model (Van Dam and Van Trigt 
2015, 9). Complementing the transformation of social democracy, the Humanist Association 
opened its door to liberals and announced its de-politicization (Derkx 2006, 69).90 In the course 
of 20th century, the differentiation between secular politics and irreligious worldviews found an 
 
90  The de-politicization of humanism did not imply abstinence from political activism but cut the 
exclusive ties between socialism/ social democracy. Consequently, humanism came to be defined via what 
liberals and social-democrats could agree upon—the so-called immaterial matters like abortion, euthanasia, and 
same-sex marriage central to humanism, while atomic weapons or income distribution were rendered outside of 
its frame (Derkx 2006, 65f., 69). 
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institutional expression in the constitutional protection of worldviews and the integration of 
humanism in the still pluralist fields of broadcast, pastoral care, and education.  
3.1.6 Summary and Discussion 
The previous sections sketched the emergence of a pluralist arrangement of secularity that 
focused on the harmonization and balancing of competing religious and nonreligious ideals and 
interests. The struggle about the secularity of politics and the eventual pluralist organization of 
the party-political sphere was a central moment for the establishment of the pluralist model. 
This pluralist arrangement was institutionalized in consequence of a (mainly orthodox 
Christian) challenge posed to an earlier liberal project of secularity at a time when the 
emergence of political field offered new possibilities for power struggle.  
With respect to the multiple secularities approach, this earlier liberal project can be understood 
through the comparison with different types of the typology. Central to their struggle with 
confessionals was that they aimed to privatize religious diversity for the sake of a common 
national political public. This latter point could be described as a form of secularity for the sake 
of social integration in a political society (type 3)––notions of liberalism as a moral project 
point to this integrative and unifying aspect––yet from a different perspective, the liberal project 
of secularity could also be described as a variant of a struggle for functional autonomy and 
differentiation in the sense of type 4. This interpretation centers on the notion of the political 
public as a differentiated sphere with a distinct logic that went hand in hand with the liberal 
focus on integration and further resonates with liberalism’s more general claim for the 
differentiation of social realms (type 4). With respect to politics, liberals, in any case, coined 
and promoted the notion of a “political morality” associated mainly with a concern for political 
rule in accordance with the constitution as well as the common good (Aerts 1997, 198). Finally, 
their ideal of the state as well as the organization of religion was centrally based on a notion of 
individual rights and equality (type 1). The liberal foci on integration and sphere autonomy 
stood in mutual tension, and this inner antinomy contributed to the eventual decline of 
liberalism. In any case, liberalism lost its dominant position to confessionalism in the late 19th 
and early 20th century and the inherent antinomies of the liberal project were dissolved by the 
pluralization of the nation under confessional lead.  
While the liberal model fused the motives of national integration and functional differentiation, 
the pluralist counter-model propagated by Calvinists compromises functional differentiation 
(type 4) with a focus on collective autonomy and a pluralist balancing of diversity (type 2). It 
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was placed against the centralism of a common national public (type 3) and the individualism 
(type 1) associated with the democratization and emancipation movements of the time, both of 
which threatened the various collectivities and social realms through which religious and other 
cultural milieus are shaped and reproduced. It did not, however, challenge the constitutionally 
guaranteed individual freedoms vis-à-vis the state. Furthermore, Kuyper’s confessionalism 
compromised but also defended and institutionalized a form of functional differentiation as part 
of its overall idea of the plurality of society (type 4).  
This section sketched how in consequence of the increasing relevance of politics and the state 
in the overall negotiation of power relations, also the religious and religion-related divides were 
translated into competing positions in the political field. Changing power relation in the political 
field then led to the consequential pluralization of politics and resulted in a specific institutional 
setup for society at large. 
The emergence of the political field coincided with a gradual authority-loss and orthodox 
defense of Christianity and the emergence of two competing notions of religion’s other: that of 
a binary opponent and that of a position and realm differentiated from confessional and 
worldview divides. In consequence, by the beginning of the 20th century, four different political 
strands—two confessional and two secular—had emerged. While confessionalism was based 
on the notion of a binary divide between religion and irreligion, the two secular parties differed 
in their religion-relatedness. Liberal intellectuals had turned from liberal Christianity to 
immanent humanism and as such they were involved in the creation of an irreligious option (or 
exclusive humanism). As a political movement, however, liberalism positioned itself as being 
differentiated from particularistic (and private) worldview positions. This distinguished them 
from socialism which was not only correlated with non-denominationalism, but also positioned 
in a generalized opposition to (the alleged illusion of) religion as such and construed politics as 
a road to material, inner-worldly salvation. From the perspective of orthodox Protestants, 
however, both constituted a form of irreligious modernism. This section mainly pointed to the 
intellectual work of orthodox leader Kuyper and his attack on the liberal notion of 
differentiation. With respect to the confessional milieus in 19th-century Europe, Koenig (2011, 
622) argues that their emergence took an immanent frame (in the sense of Taylor), as their 
precondition. With respect to the Dutch case, at least, one could also reverse his argument in 
the sense that the emergence of confessional milieus was built on the de-naturalization of such 
an immanent frame. Here, the concept of worldviews and the epistemic relationalism it implies 
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was central, because it allowed all immanent and differentiated perspectives to be construed as 
epistemic equivalents and rivals of an all-encompassing Christianity.91  
The pluralist model of secularity that was institutionalized over the course of late-19th and early-
20th century was one centered on pluralist accommodation of religious-nonreligious diversity 
(type 2). Against the background of the historical trajectory outlined above, this does not imply 
the pre-existence of a diversity of religious-nonreligious worldviews, which is only to then be 
balanced. Rather this diversity as well as the primacy given to worldviews as a basis for societal 
organization was also created in a process of competing interpretations of social reality and 
played out in politics, without ever being agreed upon. Van Dam and van Trigt (2015, 8) 
respectively argue that Dutch pluralism was less the result of balancing different confessional 
and worldview groups, than of different and competing notions of how society ought to be 
organized. The pluralist model secured an encompassing role of Christianity in modernity 
against the competing notion of the privatization and functional differentiation of religion. At 
the same time, it also entailed or integrated aspects of individualism and the differentiation of 
spheres. Liberals, after having lost to the confessional opposition, had to thus accommodate the 
new rules of a pluralist politics and society. In the same way public institutions became 
particular options in a pluralist setting with schools being the prime example.  
As indicated by the case of science, the struggle between liberalism and confessionalism was 
neither concerned so much about the relation between church and state nor the relation of 
politics and religion. Instead, it was primarily a struggle between two competing models of 
social differentiation that would each give a different locus to Christianity/ religion in modern 
society. On the one hand, the notion of different realms (state, public, politics, science) as 
differentiated from religion and worldviews which are consequently pushed to other and 
remaining social spaces, be it theology or pushed even further the emotive, moral, or 
psychological faculties of man (Aerts 1997, 484f.). On the other hand, the notion of a segmented 
structure of society based on the different but equal worldviews of different population groups 
penetrating all social realms, which were thus both independent from each other as well as part 
of an organic ideological whole.  
Until today, diverging evaluations and notions of differentiation echo in scholarly writings on 
Calvinism and pillarization: The theologian Molendijk (2008, 241, 247), e.g., argues that 
 
91  To a certain extent obviously, the conceptualization of Calvinism as a worldview also implies an 
immanent frame in the sense of placing the perceiving subject at the center of world-construction. 
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“Calvinism was compatible with modern processes of differentiation,” and that the Calvinist 
notion of modernity was even more modern than the liberal one because it recognized pluralism 
“in various spheres of human life,” while liberals only claimed hegemony for their own 
perspective. The sociologist Ellemers (1997, 430), by contrast, seems to contrast pillarization 
with a functional differentiation as the “normal case,” writing that, as a consequence of 
pillarization, “almost the entire Dutch society [was] organized on a worldview basis; also those 
sectors92—this is the most relevant characteristic of pillarization—that do not directly have 
something to do with belief and worldviews.”  
After the war, this pluralism was challenged in the name of national unity and renewal, a 
movement which could only achieve limited institutional changes. The New Labor Party, the 
central carrier of this movement, sought to overcome worldview pluralism while also 
emphasizing it in its internal organization and facilitating its institutionalization in the welfare 
state. After the relative failure of this movement to achieve unity, Dutch politics of the post-
war era and the 1950s was based on a compromise between (Catholic) confessional and secular 
(socialist) ideals, which prepared the grounds for a renewed opposition to pillarization, this time 
with a more liberal profile.  
The next section sketches how the context of general deconfessionalization in the late-1960s, 
—the borders and relations of politics with religion and nonreligious worldviews became once 
more an object of power struggles in the political field. In that phase, the newly founded D66 
party would give a prominent voice to the critique of a pluralist political system, claiming to 
disentangle politics from the problem of worldview diversity as well as the disenchantment of 
political aims and programs.  
3.2 D66 and the Secularization of Dutch Politics 
D66 was founded in Amsterdam in 1966, a time of economic growth, suburbanization, the 
gradual transformation into a post-industrialized society, and protests, especially in Amsterdam 
and most prominently by the so-called Provo movement (Lucardie 1997, 445, Ellemers 1979, 
432)—a development which was accompanied by a “regime of self-development” (De Rooy 
2002, 238-241) or by what De Jong (2014) calls a “libertarian repertoire” focused on individual 
freedom and development.93 After the successful 19th-century emancipation movements, it was 
time for aspirations of individual emancipation (as well as that of women, homosexuals, and 
 
92  Ellemers does not specify which sectors he means. 




migrants) (Lucardie 1997, 447). D66’s founders were a group of young professionals in their 
early 30s, belonging to a generation between the political establishment and the Provo 
movement (Van der Land 2003, 19-29).94 Some were affiliated with the liberal VVD or the 
labor party but sought a political path that was more progressive than the VVD and in between 
liberalism and socialism. They envisioned a renewed social-liberal party similar to the historic 
VDB (Van der Land 2003, 19, 411-413). Most of the founding members were not active 
politicians, but were instead scientists, civil servants, business people, or working in 
advertisement, with many of them working as journalists.95 As such, they were not yet part of 
the party-political field but were at least close observers and participants in a public-political 
debate about what was perceived to be a crisis of Dutch politics.  
Up to that point, the 1960s had been a period of considerable political instability with recurrent 
cabinet crises and mounting tensions within the main Christian parties.96 In the period between 
1959 and 1965, the Christian parties (ARP, CHU and KVP) formed the center of cabinets and 
mainly governed together with the VVD. Two subsequent cabinets fell early over both 
economic politics as well as the future of the pluralist social institutions. It was not only the 
instability as such that was criticized, but also the fact that the KVP had simply swapped its 
liberal coalition partner for the labor party (PvdA) after the fall of one of its cabinets and without 
consulting voters in advance. In the eyes of critics, this was an anti-democratic strategy to 
ensure the conservation of political power (Righart 1995, 205-210). The protests of the 1960s 
further contributed to the perceived urgency with which the political reform was claimed (Van 
Mierlo 1968). The sense of political crisis provided an “opportunity structure” for a new party 
(Lucardie 2004), and the founders of D66 became strongly vocal about the crisis, calling for 
comprehensive democratization centered on a reform of the political system. They consciously 
opted for founding a party rather than a social-political movement to assert electoral pressure 
on the other parties and thus gain factual influence.97 
 
94  The first initiative for founding the party had come from Peter Baehr and Erik Visser. But given that Hans 
van Mierlo became the first party leader, he is considered the “face” of the party during its first decade. 
95  Bourdieu speaks of the journalistic field as part of the political field, a notion which has also been 
challenged (Bongaerts 2008,199f). 
96  The political developments of the time are summarized well in the following short articles on the 
website, parlement en politiek: Kabinetscrisis 1960: de bouwcrisis, Kabinetscrisis 1965: de omroepcrisis, 
Kabinetscrisis 1966: de Nacht van Schmelzer, Kabinet-De Quay (1959-1963), Kabinet-Marijnen (1963-1965), 
and Kabinet-Cals (1965-1966) (https://www.parlement.com/). 
97  D66 was not meant to become an institutionalized party, but was only founded as a means to 
temporarily undermine the political system. This was followed by a considerable period in which the party 
collaborated with the labor party and other small left parties to realize a progressive political front (Van der Land 




Predating the formal party establishment, its initiators published an appeal “to all Dutch people 
who are concerned about the serious devaluation of our democracy” (D66 1966).98 It contained 
an assessment of the democratic deficiency, a plan for political and state renewal as well as a 
draft program for the future party. From its onset, the focus on equal individual liberty and 
emancipation constituted a second key party point. The critique of the political system was in 
the first place one of its pluralism, and further of the central position of confessionals in the 
political field. The party founders criticized the established parties for their allegedly outdated 
ideologies, which worked to preserve the political status quo. They instead positioned D66 as 
a “program party” and soon adapted the concept of “pragmatism” to indicate its ideal of making 
politics. For the first period of its history, this pragmatism would dominate the party’s profile, 
while later being complemented by a focus on social-liberalism.  
According to Van der Land (n.d.), it was co-founder Hans Gruijters who had learned about the 
philosophical strand of pragmatism during a trip to the USA and who introduced it within the 
party circles. Moreover, Glastra van Loon, a legal philosopher who prominently published on 
the political crisis in the 1960s and whose views seem to have been influential for the party and 
who would go on to join D66 in the early 1970s, is said to have been strongly influenced by 
American pragmatism and to have introduced such thinking into Dutch legal thought (Schuyt 
2003, 43, 46). Pragmatism in this sense meant to think about issues in relations rather than in 
absolute terms, the thinking in action and its consequences rather than in abstract principles and 
values, and the understanding of concepts via their consequences rather than in any essentialist 
way (Schuyt 2003, 42-44). Already in the post-war breakthrough movement, pragmatism had 
been guiding educational reformers and it was criticized for denying the necessity of founding 
knowledge and action in a Christian revelation (De Jong 2014, 259-261, Biesta and Miedema 
1996, 16). The founders of D66 thus stepped into an established conflict, and the party’s break-
away from the notion of principles-based politics was respectively attacked as opportunistic, as 
lacking a vision, and as ultimately un-Dutch and dangerous (Van Mierlo 1968, Van der Land 
n.d.).  
 
98  In addition to this manifesto and the first party program, this chapter draws on the following documents: 
two early speeches of the long-term party leader Hans van Mierlo (1931-2010), an early party note on its 
political positioning, selective writings of intellectuals who were associated with the party and influenced its 
course and which are by now considered part of the party’s historical canon. Sources pertaining to the third point 
include a book by co-founder Hans Gruijters (1931-2005) in which he elaborates why he chose D66, and two 
early articles by the legal philosopher Glastra van Loon (1920-2001), who prominently published on the political 
crisis in the 1960s and whose ideas were taken up by the party founders, and who joined D66 in the early 1970s. 
I also integrate one later publication by the party’s program commission central for the issue at hand from 1997, 
as well as an article in which this publication is announced in the party’s member magazine.  
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The fact that the party clothed its critique in the genre of ideology critique further seems to echo 
the broader end-of-ideology debate that had concerned European and especially US 
intellectuals since the 1950s and which gained broad publicity with Bell’s 1960-book, The End 
of Ideology.99 The end of ideology theme was part of a broad debate among Western 
intellectuals about the future of the Soviet Union and Stalinism (Bell 1988a, 132). In this 
context, ideological politics were seen as intrinsically totalitarian because of being based on an 
ethic of ultimate ends rather than an ethic of responsibility (to use the Weberian distinction) 
(136f.). Additionally, the end of ideology theme in the Netherlands seems to have been broadly 
perceived (De Haan 1997, De Jong 2014, 141-143, Rejai 1971). Here, though, it seems to have 
been linked with the pillarization debate. In D66’s ideology critique—but apparently also 
beyond—the notion of ideologies was associated with the old pillars and seems to have been 
used in the sense of worldviews in terms of the different parties’ central ideas and principles. 
Prominent politicians of the labor party and the KVP problematized the alleged end of 
ideologies as an end to political ideals and a road towards political indifference (De Haan 1997, 
De Jong 2004, 141-143). For the founders of D66, by contrast, it was not the end of ideologies 
that constituted the problem, but the way in which the established parties seemed to cling to 
outdated ideologies, mobilizing around the outdated principles and symbolic divisions of the 
pillarized past, thereby falsely-concealing positions and divides which factually mattered with 
respect to the political problems of the time.  
D66’s ideology critique had an anti-totalitarian tone given that the ideological positions of the 
exiting parties—if taken seriously—were incompatible with democratic politics in a diverse 
society (Van Mierlo 1968). According to D66’s founders, the ideological passion Bell feared 
had long cooled in the Netherlands; Dutch parties were not seeking to realize their respective 
utopias.100 Instead, it was only during elections that they promoted socialism, liberalism, and 
confessionalism as the three electoral choices, while not factually basing their political actions 
on either ideology. Their ideological polarization though would block the road for political 
innovation and the appropriate formation of political camps and majorities. This had turned the 
historic emancipation parties into obstacles to the complete political emancipation of their 
 
99  The end of ideology debate was associated with the works of Daniel Bell, Martin Lipset, Edward Shils, 
and Raymond Aron. 
100  Mannheim, as mentioned, distinguished ideologies from utopias based on whether their ideas were 
realized. Generally speaking, it seems that D66’s texts also use the notion of ideology for ideas that are not 
factually guiding the practice of actors but that, if applied, would have totalitarian implications. In that sense and 
different from Mannheim, ideology and utopia are used interchangeably.  
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followers by keeping them divided and preventing the formation of majorities on genuinely 
political matters (Gruijters 1967, 59-62, Van Mierlo 1968).  
In many ways, the party’s ideology critique was a critique against the objectivization of political 
capital through the established parties, a form of critique that Bourdieu (2001, 30) calls the 
anticlericalism of politics. The party manifesto claimed, “we are no politicians,” and the 
foundation of a party was explicitly labeled a mere tactical enterprise, a means to reform after 
which the party itself should not remain. This counter-distinction from the political 
establishment contrasts with the importance given to politics and the concern with a 
dysfunctional democracy and political indifference. The ideology critique did not imply a 
rejection of political ideas or visions; instead it acted as a rhetorical combat strategy in a field 
where power is electorally upheld and changed through the mobilization of ideas. In the next 
section, I will show in what ways the ideology critique implied a programmatic strategy of 
secularizing politics.  
3.2.1 Secularizing Politics 
D’66 did not emerge from a movement based on a life stance or a societal 
perspective, it emerged out of concern about the direction in which the development 
had gone.101 
D66 is focused on reality.102 
This section uses the party’s ideology critique and its agenda of political and state reform to 
understand its programmatic strategy of secularizing and disenchanting politics. I subsequently 
elaborate different aspects of the programmatic disentanglement of politics from religion(-like) 
positions and realms.  
1) Disentangling politics from the problem of (religious-nonreligious) diversity 
The party’s critique of the political system was in important ways a critique of its pluralism and 
a claim to change the function of elections from balancing diversity to enabling collective 
decision-making. Van Loon’s writings are crucial in that respect. He compared the Dutch 
election system to that of England and the USA. The Dutch proportional electoral system—for 
historical reasons—mainly aimed at ensuring the proportional representation of different social 
 
101  Pieter Fokking (1980, 1) “The History of D’66 [De Geschiedenis van D’66],” Fokking is a former 
university lecturer in Philosophy and member of the D66’s program commission.  
102  Hans Gruijters (1967, 67) “Daroom D66.” 
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groups—allegedly represented by the different parties (Van Loon and Frederik 1964, Van Loon 
1967, also D66 1966). Consequently, governments and the political course were not directly 
determined via the democratic choice of voters, but the outcome of coalition formations, inter-
party negotiations, and compromises between different ideologies. This was negatively 
compared to the political systems of England and the USA in which fewer and broader parties 
existed, and where elections directly aimed at determining a government and an opposition. 
The Dutch system had been adequate until the Second World War, but by the 1960s the 
worldview and class divides of the past had been bridged by a sense of unity. This rendered the 
old system dysfunctional and an obstacle to genuine democracy (Van Loon 1967, D66 1966).103 
It was the sense that the established parties still operated with the by-then outdated categories 
and divides of a pillarized past, which linked the critique of the pluralist political system with 
the ideology critique.  
2) Demarcating political reasoning from religious and religion-like principles  
A second and related aspect of the ideology critique claims the impracticability of revealed 
truths and religious principles for politics. Gruijters’ (1967, 60f.), e.g., argued, that it was simply 
not possible to derive concrete political programs by drawing on religious convictions—first 
because it required an interpretation of religious principles, and second because a godly will 
could hardly be determined by immanent means. Respectively, even those who claimed to hold 
religious positions factually only voiced their political views. Gruijters emphasized that his 
purpose was not to criticize religion, but those who counter-factually claimed that political 
decisions could be based on articles of faith. The ideology critique thus also had an epistemic 
focus and marked an insufficient differentiation between two realms and logics. It further 
frames religious truth as something that ought to only be personal, given that it could not be 
tested by an immanent means. Following this private-public distinction and slightly modifying 
the more general epistemic tone, a party note from 1970 asserts that for individual citizens it 
was certainly possible that they would base their political goals on principles; it was only that 
as guidelines for collectivities and as a party profile, principles had no relevance.104 
 
103  Somewhat surprising against that background is that the appèl states that the rules of the political 
system would date back to 1848, and not, e.g., 1917 when proportional representation was introduced. In my 
understanding, 1848 is associated with the double structure of Dutch parliament and the only indirect vote of the 
First Chamber, which D66 aimed to abolish. The First Chamber, which was meant to balance potentially extreme 
results of the more democratic Second Chamber, was/is thus in conflict with the party’s ideal of more direct 
democracy. Some authors criticize that the Dutch political system has accommodated prior monarchical rule too 
much. (Compare: D66 1967, VMS 2016, Gruijters 1967, 32f., 43).  
104  The same note also stressed that the party, despite its rejection of confessionalism, left sufficient scope 
for the political activism of Christian party members. 
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Aside from politics based on religious principles, those based on a “fixed image of society” 
were also rejected because they upheld a certain course and image “through changing 
circumstances,” which led to a mental inflexibility and the incapability to respond to new 
situations or to pragmatically learn from the effects and faults of certain policy directions 
(Gruijters 1967, 66f.). This critique was mostly directed against the PvdA, which would “preach 
collectivism” even when there were better solutions at hand (Gruijters 1967, 62f.). This word-
borrowing from the religious context shows that the ideology concept itself was conceived as 
being religion-like. According to Weber’s sociology of religion, the sermon as a collective 
teaching about religious and ethical matters, was originally the medium of prophets but had 
become central to the ethical-religious communities of especially Protestant Christianity 
(Weber 1980 [1922]-bV §6). The metaphorical use points to a process of religious community 
building and a top-down transmission of authoritative knowledge and suggests a disposition of 
the political towards the religious (Tyrell 2011)—something which is seen to conflict with an 
open debate and the constant process of collective learning and adaption necessary for genuine 
politics (Gruijters 1967, 59, D66 1966).  
All in all, the counter-distinction from religious principles frames politics as secular, while the 
lending of words from the religious context frames socialism in particular as being religion-
like. The last point will be further elaborated in the next section. 
3) Disenchanting politics:105  
While the previous point centered on the gap between revelation and concrete political 
positioning, another aspect of the ideology critique is the distinction between politics and a 
“disenchanted” reality on the one hand and transcendent and chiliastic hopes on the other. 
Ideological politics are associated with merging the two realms, which is expressed in the word 
“heilstaat,” which Van Mierlo (1968) uses to speak of socialist, liberal, or Christian political 
utopias. The word links the Christian notion of spiritual salvation (heil) to a worldly social-
political order (staat).106 Here the eschatological dimension of religion is transferred to the 
 
105  Weber uses disenchantment for the declining faith in magical relations and meanings which set in with 
the ancient Jewish prophecies and was furthered by Hellenic scientific thought and completed by the Puritan 
reformation and later empirical scientific developments (Weber 2002 [1919], 1986 [1920], 94f., 564). In this 
context, disenchantment means a state of soberness vis-à-vis ultimate truth claims and salvation hopes.  
106  The word “heil” (literally: health, wellbeing) carries a religious connotation by also referring to the 
Christian concept of salvation from sin. It is still used in a somewhat spiritual meaning in compound words such 
as Leger des Heils (Salvation Army) (EWN 2004-2009a). The word “staat” literally translates to status, 
condition, status groups, politics, and government by the people (EWN 2004-2009b). The compound word 
heilstaat can be used as a state of devotion towards God and can be thus found in an 18th century verse-
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political in the sense of making politics a tool or object of ultimate means and absolute states 
of salvation. Such a chiliastic orientation towards some ultimate means conflicted with an 
alleged disenchanted present, the idea of realist politics, and a democratic constitution in a 
diverse society (Van Mierlo 1968). Mannheim also linked the concept of ideologies with a 
narrative of secularization; here, however, it is a narrative of incomplete secularization, 
which—and this was also Bell’s idea—considered the emergence of ideologies as a “political 
expression of eschatological creeds” after the “break-up of chiliastic religious movements as a 
political force” (Bell 1988b, 324). A different aspect of this theme of disenchantment is the 
skepticism towards strong securities, which was also linked to a narrative of secularization. Van 
Loon (1997) considered ideologies as derivatives of a “conviction deeply rooted in our culture, 
which is that history knows fixed principles and securities, which tell us how we have to live 
our daily lives and how we should face the insecurities therein.” Such conviction was inspired 
on the one hand by the Christian notion of history, and, on the other hand, by the 18th-century 
belief in progress.  
Ideologies were thus marked as both a secularized expression of Christianity and as religion-
like and contrasted with a genuine disenchanted political perspective. The party manifesto states 
that it does not offer a “single saving (alléén-zaligmakende) solution” but possibilities for a 
solution—this obviously being a reference to the dogma of the Catholic church as only saving 
(D66 1966). Breaking with 19th-century tradition, the party did not publish a program of 
principles and announced that it would only recurrently update its program in the light of 
present developments.  
4) Demarcating a common public realm from sectarian concerns  
A fourth aspect of claiming politics as secular is the distinction between public political debates 
and shared public concerns on the one hand, and particularistic religious and nonreligious 
worldviews on the other hand. The notion of a common realm is thereby linked with an ethos 
of collective responsibility for a live-able future, which transcends different material and 
spiritual expectations (D66 1997, 17). The party note from 1970 rejects party-foundations on 
the base of confessionalism, but also stresses that D66 and other secular parties would leave 
enough scope for Christian politics. D66 is characterized as a program party, which brought 
together “people with very different religious and worldview convictions, who found each other 
 
composition of psalm 119, 37 (“Al wie U vreest , zal op mijn' heilstaat letten”). Today it is most commonly used 
for somewhat eschatological political utopias. 
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in their concern over the shortcomings and dangers of the political and social system and in 
their shared consciously radical-democratic sentiments” (D66 1970). As an individual source 
of inspiration, religion is accepted, but not as a principle and base for collective organization 
and action.  
5) Renewing politics in the light of a depillarized and disenchanted present era  
A more general point to mention is that the ideology critique of the party founders had a tone 
of keeping up with times. They referred to a historic process of deconfessionalization and 
disenchantment to which established politics still had to adapt. The pluralist politics were not 
merely denounced as politically inefficient, but as inadequate for a post-pillarized presence 
(Gruijters 1967, 50, Van Loon 1967). The party manifesto claimed that the ideologies of the 
current Dutch political parties “give no answers anymore to the questions that matter to us” 
(D66 1966, emphasis mine). The present was “no longer marked by truths, securities, by 
dogmas” and that this was “what you had to live with, and also do politics with” (Van Mierlo 
1968; emphasis mine; see also: D66 1997, 19). Speaking on behalf of the party founders, Van 
Mierlo (1968, emphasis mine) stressed that “we no longer wanted ideologies, […] we no longer 
believed in them.” The end-of-ideology theme was thus considered a social reality, but both the 
dynamics of an old political field and the culturally deep urge for meaning made it necessary to 
claim and keep alive the urge to courageously live in a state of soberness, facing a disenchanted 
world in life and politics. 
At the base of the party’s ideology critique is the ideal of a democratic public-political realm in 
which free and emancipated citizens107 engage in collective decision-making for the sake of 
“world mastery” (Weber 1986 [1920], K&T VIII). Governance should not be based on a 
compromise between different ideologies or worldviews, but on one consistent vision and this 
required a public culture of debate and controversy, a (shared) notion of reality, fact-based 
decision-making and goal-oriented politics as well as a transparent and efficient way of 
determining and executing a majority will (D66 1966).108 Weber linked the concept of world 
mastery with Reformed Christianity in particular, but D66’s founders placed it in opposition to 
religious, or, more accurately, confessional politics (Weber 1986 [1920], K&T VIII).109 The 
 
107  De Jong (2014, 178) writes that in contrast to the earlier breakthrough movement, D66 portrayed the 
citizen as already emancipated, emphasizing that this is also why they claimed an abolition of the then still 
existing electoral duty.  
108  In similar terms, Bell also spoke of a new pragmatic consensus. 
109  Weber also discussed the tensions between the rationalisms of different value spheres (Schluchter 1976, 
275). Schluchter (1976, 280) linked the notion of conscious world mastery with Weber’s notion of an ethic of 
responsibility, which again was central to Bell’s thinking and fits with the ideas of the party founders.  
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theme of ‘actual’ problems and threats, which could not be left unaddressed without negative 
consequences was central to the ideology critique, and while ideological politics were seen to 
distract from reality, the founders of D66 made a claim to reality (Gruijters 1967, 66f.). Such 
an ethic of soberness, realism and responsibility was most explicitly articulated in a much later 
party publication entitled, “From Ideology to Political Responsibility,” and an article 
announcing this publication with the title, “survival, and collective responsibility” (D66 1997, 
Van Loon 1997).110 The paper sketches a dystopian notion of a technocratic future in which the 
“survival of man on earth” itself is threatened, and asserts the necessity of an active society and 
a change of mentality and life style to address this threat. Politics need to have (lead) the debate 
on the future of society, not only for its own sake, but because it would have negative social 
effects if it failed to do so. By bringing chiliastic hopes into politics, ideological politics were 
seen to conflict with both (liberal) democracy and with the political realism necessary to 
adequately addressing real problems.  
In sum, D66’s ideology critique demarcated politics as secular in four interrelated ways: 
Through disentangling its function from the problem of balancing (religious-nonreligious) 
diversity, through disentangling political reasoning from religious and religion-like principles 
as well as from chiliasm, and through demarcating a public political realm against religious and 
religion-like sectarianism. These claims were made and emphasized by claiming them as a 
requirement of the time, as demanded by a secularized presence. In that sense, the ideology 
critique of the party does not directly counter the notion of a necessity to represent worldview 
pluralism in politics but claims that the worldviews allegedly represented were no longer 
relevant in society. They did so as part of and reflection on the general trend of depillarization. 
The critique of ideology neither implied a critique of political ideas as such nor did it advocate 
technocratic solutions. A core motive for the party’s aspiration of secularizing politics was the 
possibility of adequate and efficient collective action and, in that sense, it was linked to an ethic 
of soberness, realism, and responsibility.  
Despite of its initial aim to blow up the political system, D66 later exchanged and collaborated 
with the labor party and the small left party, PPR, and from 1973 to 1977 participated in the left 
cabinet of Den Uyl (PvdA). The D66 leaders had hoped that a broadly progressive people’s 
party could be formed, but the project proved both difficult and electorally disadvantageous for 
the party and was eventually given up. After this progressive project, D66 moved further to the 
 
110  Again, this was also central to Bell’s work (1988a, 136f.). 
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right in economic matters. Generally, and in line with the break with a pluralist system, the mid-
1960s and 1970s also brought a change in the setup and character of Dutch parliament. Until 
then, both chambers had been organized by the principle of pluralist representation in the sense 
that its members represented different pillars as well as different social groups such as unions, 
employers’ organizations, broadcast organizations, etc. (NationaalArchief 2016, 26f.). From 
the 1970s onwards, the First Chamber members held functions in social organizations of 
different social sectors while the share of academics rose. In the Second Chamber as well, 
academic and professional politicians took the place of the former representatives of 
pillarization.  
3.2.2 The Electorate 
The focus on secularity and the ideal of secular politics also resonated among D66 voters. More 
generally, the electorate shared the dissatisfaction with the political system.111 The 1960s mark 
the beginning of a rapid decline in church affiliations. In the late-1960s, the non-church 
affiliated constituted one third of the Dutch population (Bernts and Berghuijs 2016). 
Importantly, D66 was not a party of the religiously unaffiliated people per se. The percentage 
of non-church members was about national average—something the party shared with secular 
parties like the labor party and the right liberals but which greatly distinguished them from the 
communist and socialist parties of the time (CPN, PSP) (Table 5). According to data from 1979, 
D66 voters also over-proportionally identified with humanism, more so than voters of VVD, 
PvdA, and CPN but far less than those of the PSP (Goddijn, Smets, and Van Tillo 1979) (Table 
6). This link between D66 and humanism also manifested in the fact that since the foundation 
of the Humanist Association, five out of twelve times, the chairperson was affiliated with 
D66.112 Still, the share of religiously affiliated voters was more than three times that of voters 
with humanist affiliations.  
 
111  In 1967, the Free University (VU) conducted survey-based research among Dutch voters. Regarding the 
research conducted after the elections by researchers from the Free University (VU), there is a publication (NIWI 
1967a) as well as a dataset (NIWI 1967b). Parts of the dataset were lost before digitalization and the 
accompanying book publication did not focus much on religious matters. Thus, numbers taken from that dataset 
must not be read as absolute numbers. I compared the available dataset with the numbers presented in the book 
wherever possible and it seems that no systematic loss occurred. As such, I do think that the data can be used to 
highlight inter-party differences. 
112  In 1969, succeeding the founder Jaap van Praag, Max Rood became chair of the humanist association, 
leading the organization until 1977. He had also been a member of D66 since 1966 and in 1982 was Minister for 
the Interior in the Van Agt cabinet. The second social-liberal chair of the HV was Jan Glastra van Loon (1987 – 
1994) who had been among the party founders and was State Secretary and senator for D66. Liesbeth Mulder 
held the chair from 1998 to 2000, and Roger van Boxtel from 2003-2005. Since 2012, Boris van der Ham, also a 
former member of parliament for D66 (2002-2012), has been chair of the humanist association. Conversely, D66 
is among those parties that get positive reviews by the Humanist Association before elections. Criteria in 2010 
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To a certain extent, survey data also gives information on people’s normative ideas regarding 
the relation of religion, worldviews, and politics. In the 1960s, e.g., D66 voters were far less 
inclined to consider their party choice a principled one, something which resonated especially 
well with the voters of the Protestant parties (NIWI 1967, 99). Also more direct indicators show 
that D66 voters stood out with a particularly high level of support for secular politics (Table 7). 
While respective numbers are higher here than among VVD and PvdA voters, the main divide 
is that between Christian and secular parties. 
A third characteristic of D66 voters of the time which also set them apart from those of other 
secular parties was their over-proportional concern with religion-related tensions in society. 
The researchers at the time had asked respondents to state which inter-group divides and 
tensions they found to be strongest in Dutch society and one option given was the divide 
between religious and nonreligious people.113 In absolute figures, agreement to this was very 
low. Still, as Table 8 shows, there were relevant differences between parties and D66 voters 
had much higher scores compared to all established parties, something they shared with the 
voters of the socialist and communist as well as the strict reformed parties. Among the secular 
parties, it was only those at the margins of power who gave expression to the frustration with 
the political establishment and system, whose voters also perceived religious-nonreligious 
tensions as relevant.114 In my understanding, this shows that the political frustration of the time 
was both and interrelatedly a struggle about political power and about secularity.  
The last point to mention is that D66 voters were over-proportionally committed to liberty also 
where it conflicted with religious sensitivities. The research data does not give much detail 
about possible religion-related conflict issues at the time. One question though concerned the 
legitimate scope of freedom for anti-religious propaganda (Table 8). Generally speaking, 
satisfaction with the status was quite high with more than half of the people asked on average 
stating that there was enough freedom. D66 voters stand out here with a much higher 
satisfaction rate, while among voters of the small orthodox SGP, satisfaction was low.115 While 
the religious parties were those who—to differing degrees—aimed to limit the scope of 
 
were: liberty rights, the separation of church and state, care and education, immigration and integration policies, 
and medical-ethical matters, privacy, and sustainability (HA 2010).  
113  Options were: the divide between old and young, employers and employees, people with low and high 
income.  
114  D66 voters also over-proportionally considered their vote a protest vote, similar to voters of the socialist 
and communist parties and the new farmers’ party (Boerenpartij; founded in 1958) (NIWI 1967, 34). 
115  Whether this satisfaction with the status quo contradicts the party’s official claim to abolish blasphemy 
law or not cannot be determined on the basis of statistical data alone because people might object to a law even if 
they do not perceive it to have factual influence. 
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freedom, the socialist and communist parties were those over-proportionally claiming greater 
freedom. This is no great surprise, given that, historically, socialists and communists were those 
mainly targeted under blasphemy law (Van Stokkom, Sackers, and Wils 2007, 90). Among D66 
voter (and the labor party) support rates were much lower (though still above national average). 
It is remarkable that D66 voters (like those of the PSP) showed by far the lowest inclination 
towards curbing existing liberties and in that respect, they stood at the opposite end of the 
spectrum when compared to SGP voters.116  
Election researchers of the time characterized D66 as a protest party. As shown throughout the 
previous sections, the party further gave political expression to secular and anti-confessional 
sentiments and this message apparently matched those of their voters. Among voters of all 
secular parties at the time there was a great consensus on the separation of religion and politics, 
but especially the voters of D66 and the communist/ socialist parties also gave over-
proportional relevance to tensions between religious and nonreligious groups. Different from 
the latter, however, non-denominationalism was not a coherent characteristic of D66 voters. In 
that sense, as a collective, they are better described via the concept of differentiation than as 
irreligious. In a different way this also echoes in their great support for the existing freedoms 
for propaganda against religion, at least if one interprets this as a committed to liberty rather 
than an inclination towards making or distributing such propaganda.  
 
Table 5: Non-Church Affiliation; Party Comparison. 
Non-church affiliated 
voters (%) 
VVD  D66 PvdA CPN PSP CDA CU SGP 
1967 (NIWI 1967a) 256 29 34 38 64 50    
 
Table 6: Relatedness with Humanism; Party Comparison. 
 
 
116  I have no reasonable explanation for the relative high scores among CPN voters.  
117  This does not mean membership in the Humanist Association. 
GNL 1979  Ø  ND  VVD  PvdA D66 CPN PSP CDA SGP 
Strong relatedness with 
humanism (%)117 
9 15 9 12 18 15 52 2 0 
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Table 7: Attitudes on Religion and Politics, Party Comparison. 
1967 (NIWI 1967a)  
(%) 
Ø  VVD  PvdA D66 CPN PSP KVP ARP SGP 
Religion and politics 
should be separate (fully/ 
agree)118 
71 81 79 96 85 
 
96 65 34 23 
Bible good guide for 
politics (fully/ disagree) 
54 71 75 82 79 
 
71 34 21 0 
 
Table 8: Perceived Religious-Nonreligious Conflict. 
1967 (NIWI 1967b) 
(%; values not exact) 
Ø 
 
ND VVD PvdA D66 CPN PSP KVP ARP SGP 
Main conflict 
religious/ non-religious 
7 9 3 6 15 9 
 
10 4 11 14 
Too much freedom for 
propaganda against 
religion  
32 17 23 28 5 20 
 
4 37 41 79 
 
3.2.3 Defining a Non-Ideological Standpoint 
So far, this section has elaborated D66’s ideology critique and stressed how this and the party’s 
anti-pluralism were from its establishment paired with positive counter-ideas grouped around 
values of soberness, responsibility, goal orientation, rationality (Sachlichkeit), and realism. 
Countering its ideology critique, political opponents have recurrently accused the party of not 
having a reliable position, but there were also internal critics of a mere pragmatic course. 
Already at the party’s beginnings, there was a faction that criticized a mere pragmatic 
orientation and feared that it would prevent the development of a vision of man and society. In 
the early years, however, this strand remained in a minority position but similar critiques were 
recurrently voiced throughout the party’s history (Lucardie and Voerman 1991, 2).  
To some extent, early party documents reveal tentative aims to define and articulate an 
epistemic, ontological, and moral standpoint for politics beyond pragmatism and—even if this 
was not meant to be written down—in a concise program. Gruijters (1967, 66f.) e.g. referred to 
the ideal of a radical democratization as a starting point and guiding idea for the party. In his 
mentioned 1968-speech, party leader Van Mierlo engaged with the matter in a procedural way, 
 
118  With regards to the diverging results for this and the next questions, it is possible that one was 
associated with the separation of church and state and the other with Christian party politics. 
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elaborating the intellectual process of how to derive a “vision” for political action. He describes 
that while the party founders had developed their program using a pragmatic and case-to-case 
approach, they then discovered a binding glue and shared motif orienting the different program 
points. This, as the argument goes, was the start of a vision, and such a vision, “the spirit of the 
program,” could be used to derive at new positions in a more deductive manner. In Van Mierlo’s 
view, this dialectic approach of a constant and mutual influence of action and vision was what 
distinguished D66 from the other parties where “rigid vision or ideology was the imperative 
starting point” and action was forced into that pattern.119  
The speech was titled “the choice of D’66” and aside from defending the party course against 
its outside critics, one possible motive behind it was to answer to internal criticism of the 
pragmatist course, offering something like an intellectual compromise. The speech seems to 
have been an early and important occasion to reflect on the original aims and positions of the 
party and to decide its future course.120 Furthermore, the speech also seems to document a 
particular challenge in the practice of representative politics, which the party founders by then 
had gotten to know: Van Mierlo explains that they constantly had to take positions on matters 
that had not been addressed in the program in parliament, a point which potentially raises 
questions of representation and transparency. Regarding this problem, his notion of a “grounded 
vision”121 provided a solution in the sense that political action could draw on “a combination 
of the spirit of the program, common sense, and if possible the expertise of working groups” 
when it came to matters that had not been in the party program. Thus, in that respect as well, 
the matter of cohesion might have been at stake.  
Eventually it was only after the strong decline in electoral support that the party began to 
formulate its substantive outlook or standpoint in respective programs, and this seems to be 
related or at the least simultaneous with the party’s gradual adoption of a social-liberal profile. 
The party’s electoral strength varied greatly over time and party-support had fallen to 1% for 
the first time in the mid-1970s and membership numbers were similarly declining (Van der 
 
119  The speech seems to have been an early and important occasion to reflect on the party’s original aims 
and positions and to decide its future course. It was possibly also directed at the internal critics of the pragmatist 
course, offering something like an intellectual compromise. Moreover, Van Mierlo explained that in parliament, 
they constantly had to take positions on matters that had not been addressed in the program and that here, one 
could draw on “a combination of: the spirit of the program, common sense, and if possible the expertise of 
working groups”(Van Mierlo 1968). 
120  More specifically at stake was a progressive collaboration with the labor party and other left parties. 
121  I use this expression in analogy to the concept of “Grounded Theory” where theoretical insights are also 




Land 2014, dnpp n.d.). Jan Terlouw (1973-1976), front runner and faction leader between 1973 
and 1981, then claimed an autonomous position for D66 vis-à-vis other progressive parties and 
further placed D66 in the social-liberal tradition.122 Later, in the 1990s, an inner-party 
movement comprising a younger generation of party members pressured for a stronger social-
liberal positioning. In other respects, the party chair—especially Van Loon in collaboration 
with the party’s scientific bureau—also began to explicate and articulate what could be called 
the party’s “ideological” foundation (Van der Land 2014, Lucardie and Voerman 1991, 
Varkevisser 1998, 26f.). 
From the late 1970s onwards, the attempt to articulate a form of non-rigid guiding principles 
emerged in the party’s so-called “policy papers.” The policy program for 1977-1981 begins 
with a separate section that elaborates the party’s “principles of action” and in 1980 another 
policy program renamed this introduction as “starting points” (uitgangspunten) for thought and 
action of D’66.” The election programs of the time selectively adapted their ideas (D66 1977, 
D66 1981). All these papers uphold the counter-distinction from dogmas and ideologies. With 
respect to the policy program from 1980, e.g., Lucardie and Voerman (1991, 22f.) explain that 
the term “uitgangspunten” was chosen over the earlier alternative “grondslagen” (starting point, 
cornerstone, foundation), because the latter was perceived as too dogmatic. Most striking in 
that respect is the already mentioned book, “From Ideology to Political Responsibility” which 
aimed to “more specifically formulate the political-substantive perspective for D66” while 
carrying the counter-distinction from ideologies in its title (D66 1997, 7). In re-articulating the 
party’s ideology critique, these texts also demarcate politics as a secular realm, differentiated 
from religion as well as from nonreligious worldviews or worldview secularism. The election 
program from 1977 states: “We don’t see politics as a battlefield or a pulpit but as a non-
predictable row of big and small problems that have to be solved as good as possible” (D66 
1977, 1); the policy program from 1980 refers to democracy as an “ethical attitude” and as both 
the “goal and means of political action.” It further states: “Our opinions are not irrevocably 
rooted in dogmatic writings, but are always open for discussion.” And continues:  
D’66 does not magically present principles pulled out of a hat but derives the starting points 
for its political action via controllable, public procedures. Democracy is no new faith 
 
122  Aside from party chairs and faction leaders, Dutch politics is also familiar with the unofficial position of 
political leaders who are considered the face of a party but who are not officially elected. Terlouw is commonly 
seen to have succeeded Van Mierlo as D66’s political leader (see: “politiek leider van een partij” at: 
wwww.parlement.com). Van Loon would similarly position D66 as a fourth strand in Dutch politics (Van der 
Land 2003, 144f.). 
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(geloof). Democracy is a hopeful and risky adventure, it began in a period in which humans 
started to emancipate from paternalistic and oligarchic traditions. In this ongoing 
emancipation process, we discover new aspects that are worth our political attention daily 
and that we therefore express in our political program (D66 1980, 3f.). 
As mentioned, Mannheim distinguished ideologies from utopias based on whether their ideas 
were realized. D66’s texts seem to make a similar distinction without using utopias in a positive 
sense as Mannheim does. They use ideology for ideas that are not really guiding political 
practice but that, if applied, would have totalitarian implications. Utopias are referred to with 
respect to the dangers their realization implied. Regardless of the distinction between ideologies 
and utopias, the core point is the notion that the sacralization of political ideas is seen as that 
which bears the risk of totalitarianism (D66 Dec. 1980, 6), and, in that sense, which has also 
resulted in bad things happening in the name of democracy (VMS 2015 [1978]). 
Most recently (since 2007) the think tank related to the party, the Hans van Mierlo Foundation 
(VMS), has been responsible for articulating and detailing the party’s social-liberal profile. The 
then director of the think tank, Frans, summarized its mission to work out a social-liberal 
foundation in a dialectic recourse on social realities.  
Eh, so from 2007 onwards we have been working on trying to () to give it meaning, so what 
does it mean if you say that you are social liberal, what is that? and what () what does that 
say about the challenges that present day society is confronted with. And also what do the 
challenges of present day society say to us, tell us about social liberalism? So both ways. 
(Interview Frans 2013, 41-45) 
As section 5.2.1 below demonstrates, the most recent focus on articulating the party’s 
foundation has also come about in response to challenges in the political field as well as a 
renewed struggle about secularity. Gradually it seems that a value-neutral sense of ideology 
seems to have gained ground within the party. 
3.3 Summary and Discussion 
This chapter has dealt with two crucial phases with respect to Dutch secularity: the 
establishment of a pluralist model of secularity in the late-19the century and an important 
challenge to this model in the late 1960s. The first part of the chapter traced the rise of a 
confessional movement in 19th century politics, its ideological underpinning of framing the 
secular as a particularistic (worldview) perspective rather than a common, neutral ground, and 
its assertion of the pluralist model against a prior liberal project of secularity. Struggles about 
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the religion-relatedness of politics were hereby a central aspect in a broader contestation about 
these competing notions of secularity. The second part of this chapter showed how D66 opposed 
the worldview-pluralism of the political field and claimed politics as something secular, distinct 
from both religion and irreligion.  
In the three previous sections I have first sketched how the founders of D66 entered the political 
field with a principled critique of the political system and the existing parties of their time. Their 
attack on pluralist politics was thereby motivated by a concern with a democratization of 
politics and society as well as the functional efficiency or adequacy of politics understood as 
an arena for individual and collective decision making and agency. The founders of D66 
believed that the existing pluralism was hampering political rationality by bringing in sectarian 
concerns (rather than focusing on the common good) as well as politically inadequate 
(ideologically distorted and misleadingly eschatological) perspectives into the political realm. 
They further criticized the central position of the confessional parties that determined the course 
of politics. 
I have shown how their ideology critique demarcated politics as secular in four interrelated 
ways: by disentangling it from the problem of balancing (religious-nonreligious) diversity; by 
differentiating political categories of mobilization and forms of organization from religious 
ones; by constituting politics as an immanent and disenchanted realm, distinct from religious 
and religion-like chiliasm; and by demarcating a public-political realm against religious and 
religion-like sectarianism. Second, I have drawn on election research to show how this party 
position resonated with a certain part of the electorate. Third, I have depicted the party’s later 
adoption of a social-liberal profile and its more general aim to articulate a concise and 
recognizable standpoint without falling into the trap of ideological politics.  
The most immediate concern behind the critique of ideologies and political pluralism seems to 
be the efficiency of politics as a system of enabling collective decision making for the sake of 
world mastery. In reference to the conceptual language of the multiple secularities approach, 
the founders of D66 aimed to transform politics from a focus on the reference problem of 
balancing religious-nonreligious diversity and the organizational form of worldview pluralism 
(type 2) into a form of political secularity centered on the efficiency of the political system in 
facilitating collective agency and decision making towards the rational dealing with real 
challenges—something which can be understood as a variant of functional autonomy in the 
sense of type 4. The secularization of politics, or its differentiation from religion and the 
problem of religious-nonreligious diversity—was seen as a precondition for enhancing such 
100 
 
functional efficiency. The dominant role of the confessional parties was further seen to impair 
the democratic freedom of voters, now understood in individual terms rather than members of 
a certain worldview group. More broadly, the ideal of democratization was bound to that of 
individual liberty, which placed the party’s democratic focus in the tradition of a longer project 
of human emancipation, moving society and political culture away from paternalistic and 
oligarchic traditions (VMS 2015 [1978], 3, 5). In that sense it also resonates with type 1.  
It also seems that democratic values tend to be deemed of importance for the organization in 
other spheres such as law and the economy and, in that sense, the party’s position does not 
appear to be limited to the autonomy of politics but also ascribes a more general integrative 
function to the political system (D66 Dec. 1980) based on the ideal of an undivided national 
political community built by free and equal individuals who are capable of realizing social 
progress. In that sense, the party’s position can be seen to also carry features of type 3 of the 
multiple secularities’ typology but the ideal of a political community is not placed in opposition 
to worldview diversity or political divides in the sense of proposing a single-party system. 
Instead, implies opposition to the quasi-ethical segmentation of an electorate into diverse pillars 
which prevents alternative thematic or situational and thus allegedly more rational divides; that 
is, individualization and rationalization rather than genuine unification in the sense of type 3 
are at stake here. 
Moreover, the party’s claim was not based on the depoliticization and pacification of otherwise 
violent worldview divides but on the notion of an already occurred depillarization which had 
yet to be translated into politics. The ambition to secularize politics was not only directed 
against religious-based political identities but also against an eschatological charging of 
politics—here mainly socialism. While at the time of the party’s foundation, all secular parties 
self-understood as being differentiated from religious and worldview positions, they were 
rendered religion-like in D66’s critique. The notion of religion-likeness is based on a notion of 
religion as an immanent phenomena and aspect of human culture, rooted in the capacity and 
urge to build worlds and to associate institutions and acts with (partly ultimate) meanings and 
hopes. Socialism in particular was portrayed as “ideological” and “religion-like” because of its 
alleged eschatological tendencies. This shows that claims of secularization can be made vis-à-
vis genuine religious politics, but also against positions perceived as being insufficiently 
disenchanted. For the founders and leaders of D66 in any case, the readiness to abandon 
ideologies was central to the project of human emancipation, a courageous act and moral duty 
101 
 
necessary for political problem-solving and a precondition for political responsibility and for 
claiming agency in a world where real challenges had to be addressed.  
The fact that this section describes the struggle against an allegedly insufficient separation of 
politics and religion does not imply that the political field was not autonomous in the Bourdieu 
sense. Here, the autonomy of fields means that the positions of actors in the political field are 
exclusively determined by their inter-relations. The party founders’ call for differentiation, by 
contrast, can be understood as a struggle about the notion of politics as well as the political 
field. This (obviously tentative) distinction can be grasped by referring to Luhmann’s 
conceptual language of differentiation.123 Luhmann distinguished five characteristics of all 
functional systems including politics (the respective points for politics added in brackets): 1) 
function (collectively binding decisions), 2) contingency formula (common good), 3) 
symbolically generalized medium (power), 4) binary code (power/ powerlessness, 
government/ opposition), and 5) programs (party programs) (Fuhse 2005, 73). These 
distinctions are relevant for his notion of structural linkages, the relations and adaption 
processes between (operationally closed) systems and their surroundings (Ibid. 90). According 
to Luhmann, such linkages manifest at the level of programs (rather than that of the function or 
code) (Fuhse 2005, 90f., 96).124 He does not assume structural linkages between the political 
the religious field but his general argument regarding the level of linkages seems analytically 
helpful for the case at hand (Fuhse 2005, 96).125 Thus, once religious capital is transformed into 
political capital this marks an intrusion at the level of programs (concerning the epistemic and 
normative content as well as the notion of politics) while it does not affect the binary code of 
power/ powerlessness. Different from Luhmann’s suggestion, though, the founders of D66 felt 
that the intrusion of religious categories into political programs hampered the function of 
politics in facilitating collective decision making. They also found that the election system and 
the diverse party landscape impeded this function in a similar way by binding politics to the 
function of balancing social diversity and thus making compromises rather than decisions. With 
Luhmann, one might consider compromises a form of decision making, but the point of the 
D66-founders was that the diversity-focus hampers the decision-making process by preventing 
 
123  Bourdieu counter-distinguished his own approach from cybernetic models and from Luhmann in 
general (141), yet not from the concept of differentiation as such. With regard to Bourdieu’s contribution to 
theories of differentiation see: Russo (2009), Bongaerts (2011). With respect to the overlap and differences 
between the sociological work and the normative undertones of Luhmann and Bourdieu see: Reckwitz (2004).  
124  Programmatic linkages mean that, e.g., political programs are checked in terms of their affordability, 
their constitutionality, and their compatibility with the media (Fuhse 2005) 91. 
125  With respect to the political system, he discusses the linkages of politics with individuals in their 
political roles, with the media, the economy, law, science, education, and with healthcare/ medicine. 
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stable majorities as well as through concealing more adequate divides by giving ideological and 
institutional primacy to outdated categories – an argument not the least made on the backdrop 
of factually instable and failing governments and an insetting depillarization.126 Luhmann’s 
elaborations thus face a limit where programmatic linkages might also hamper the function of 
a field and with respect to empirical contestations about the adequate function of a certain realm. 
Here, Bourdieu’s focus on fields and struggles again is more adequate. In combination, the two 
approaches nonetheless allow for an understanding of the D66 founders’ perceptions.  
Mannheim (2015 [1929], 7, 86), as mentioned, was deeply concerned about the ideological 
politics of his time and his book was meant to provide an “epistemological foundation for a 
party-based democracy” (Kaube 2015 [1929], IX, also XIV). His aspired sociology of 
knowledge was meant to point to the boundness of all knowledge in life and historically 
concrete situations as well as the relational co-determination of competing positions in a certain 
system (Mannheim 2015 [1929], 71-78). Different from Mannheim, the D66 founders neither 
sought out a solution to the political crisis outside the political system nor did they wish to claim 
a new vision against the allegedly false, outdated, and unnecessarily divisive perspectives 
already represented in the political field. Instead, as Van Mierlo (1968) stresses, a new 
perspective was not yet ready, and in the current time one was left with the task to search and 
gradually build up such a new perspective. The abstention from an ideological profile was 
criticized by opponents as well as from within the party as being politically (or 
programmatically) vague and arbitrary. It was seen to prevent the articulation of a social vision 
and created a strategic weakness in defending one’s ideals against one’s competitors in the 
political field (see also ch.5.2.1). Respectively, the party’s first profiling as “pragmatic” was 
gradually complemented with a positioning in the social-democratic tradition and the 
articulation of a standpoint in the sense of a somewhat generalized perspective from which 
complex and varying political matters could be perceived and tackled.  
The next chapter centers on the gradual institutionalization of a new model of secularity 
centered on the ideas of individual liberty and equality (type 1). While the previous section 
centered on the party’s ideals of democratic politics as a means of self-determination and 
agency. The subsequent chapter shifts the focus on D66’ ideal of individual liberty and equality 
as a second motive for secularizing politics and the state. The principle of individual liberty and 
 
126  Similarly, they complained that the processes of determining the positions of the 
government/ opposition had run afoul and that power was illegitimately conserved by one established faction––
again with negative consequences for the system’s “good” functioning.  
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equality was core to the party founders from the onset and gained special importance in the 
1990s. The chapter shows how shifting power relations in politics eventually enabled legislative 
changes that would re-organize the place of religion in Dutch society according to a logic of 
individual liberty and equality. By doing so, the section follows the notion that struggles about 




4 Secularity for the Sake of Individual Equality and Liberty127 
The ultimate minority is the individual.128 
This chapter takes up the matter of individualism which had been a core issue of the political 
struggles of the 19th century and which is central to understanding the second core motif of 
D66: individual liberty and equality and its interrelation with notions of differentiation. To 
explore these concepts, I focus on the period of the purple coalitions in the 19990s which is 
largely known until today as being a period of major shifts with respect to the role of religion 
in Dutch society. The late-1960s constituted a break with a confessional majority, and the first 
all secular government came to power in the 1990s. Under this government, the principle of 
individual liberty and equality gained dominance in determining secularity. Here again, D66 
had a pole position in that development.  
The chapter traces these developments in five parts. The first part (ch.4.1) briefly outlines the 
notion of individualism as well as three basic conflict lines along which its contestedness and 
importance for struggles about secularity can be understood. This part also outlines the 
changing political power relations and actor constellations in the party-political field since the 
1970s. It shows how individualism in the sense of a principle of individual liberty and equality 
became contested in debates about so-called “immaterial matters” concerning life-, death-, and 
sexuality as well as the equal treatment legislation that had been institutionalized since the 
1980s. The second part (ch.4.2) centers on the case of same-sex marriage as a crucial step in 
the assertion of an individual liberty and equality frame against a Christian public order and a 
pluralist accommodation of worldview diversity. I then (ch.4.3) focus on the regulation of 
euthanasia as a second illustration of an individualist shift in the notion of secularity. In the case 
of same-sex marriage, the separation of church and state constituted an overt motif in the debate. 
In the debate on euthanasia, by contrast and as the third part exemplifies, the D66 defenders of 
the bill stressed the compatibility of euthanasia with certain forms of Christianity and further 
pointed to the legitimate diversity of end-of-life wishes. Both strategies, the assertion of church-
state separation and the evocation of liberal notions of Christianity and an individualization of 
morality can be understood to counter the notion of an anti-thesis between belief and unbelief 
and thus also an association with an irreligious form of secularity. In a fourth part (ch.4.4) I 
 
127  Parts of this chapter have already been published in a collective book that emerged from the diversity of 
nonreligion project (Schuh 2019, Schuh, Quack, and Kind 2019). 
128  Boris van der Ham (2014).  
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take the case of a scandalized and allegedly blasphemous statement by the minister responsible 
for the legalization of euthanasia to analyze competing notions of respect and a shared ideal of 
political secularity in the basic sense of upholding the political sphere as a realm in which 
religious-nonreligious differences had to be bridged. The fifth and final section (ch.4.5) closes 
the chapter with a brief sketch of how the individualization of the 1990s corresponded with a 
neoliberal reform of the welfare state, as well as of the ongoing struggles about secularity after 
the fall of the second purple cabinet in 2002.  
4.1 Contested Individualism and Shifting Power Relations 
Individualism had been a core object of struggle between confessional and especially liberals 
since the 19th century. This section briefly describes the contestedness of individualism and 
points to three conflict lines with traditional and orthodox Christianity: 1) the tension between 
a self-determination of men and a godly authority, 2) the tension between individual rights and 
the family as a social entity in its own right, and 3) the tension between individual equality and 
liberty and a social order based on complementary but different sexes and the normative 
restraint of sexuality within the confines of reproduction. I hereby mainly refer to Bussemaker 
(1993, 48-62) who (in reference to Gallie) considers individualism to be an essentially contested 
concept pointing to different concepts that have been associated with or distinguished from the 
concept of individualism: egoism, privacy, self-interest and citizenship, autonomy and 
morality, and self-development. He further showed how it could be applied to the different 
realms of economics, politics, the social, or the juridical. In the subsequent sections, however, 
the tension between two competing models of secularity—one centered on individual liberty 
and equality and the other on a pluralism of different religious and nonreligious worldviews—
is central to the discussion.  
Although individualism was coined as a concept in the 19th century, individualist notions of 
men are much older, dating back at the least to ancient Greek or Roman thought, the 
Renaissance, the Reformation, 17th century contract theories, the Enlightenment, and the French 
Revolution (Bussemaker 1993, 27f.). Most relevant for the case at hand is the (contested) 
individualism that emerged with the contract theories in the wake of the Enlightenment and the 
European and American revolutions (Bussemaker 1993, 30-40). Contract theories (especially 
that of John Locke) developed the notion of the individual as a carrier of inalienable rights and 
the ideal of a political organization based on the individual’s consent and, in Locke’s vision, 
contractual agreements between citizens. The self-possessing individual came to be seen as the 
ultimate reality while the various social communities were rendered artificial. The 
106 
 
enlightenment fused notions of political liberties with economic individualism and the 
revolutions popularized the idea that man was by principle—and in his competence for reason 
free and equal—a carrier of natural rights to be guaranteed by the state. Opponents to the 
individualism of the enlightenment were manifold. In addition to theocrats and reactionists, 
utopian socialists and the romantic movement also objected to the ideals of the enlightenment. 
Their critiques and counter-visions nonetheless differed, and these counter-movements also 
partly entailed somewhat individualist ideas. Bussemaker (1993, 63f.), e.g., distinguishes the 
political and economic liberalism centered on the notion of an abstract individual with non-
contextual needs and inalienable rights from a romantic individualism centered on the ideals of 
self-development, individuality, and authenticity.129 
Enlightenment individualism changed the so-far established notions of political authority 
including the notion of a God-ordained social order. Enlightenment individualism thus 
conflicted with antirevolutionary thought, where liberty was bound to the sole sovereignty of 
God. With respect to 19th-century Dutch politics, Liberals were, despite internal differences, 
mainly positive about the ideals of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, namely the 
objections to church authority and the prime focus on liberty (Bussemaker 1993, 73-83).130 
Moreover, socialists also supported the notion of political liberty. Like liberals, they understood 
society as makeable/ designable, while unlike liberals, they placed the ideal of solidarity above 
economic individualism and especially the emphasis on property rights.131 Confessionals, as 
mentioned, objected to the dethroning of God in the social order.  
Second, the focus on individual rights challenged established social bonds and loyalties and 
foremost the family which in both confessional traditions constituted one of the natural and 
organically related communities on which society was build and which enjoyed their own 
autonomy (Bussemaker 1993, 83-92). Confessionals opposed the allegedly atomizing 
individualism of the revolution and the recognition of individual rights were seen to conflict 
with the autonomy of the family; Kuyper, e.g., rejected women’s suffrage for that reason.132 
Conversely, liberals did not simply aim to disassemble the family into a conglomerate of 
 
129  While individualism and individuality were imagined as counter-terms at first, they were gradually 
fused and treated as equivalent.  
130  While the first generation of liberals placed negative liberty in opposition to state intervention, the later 
generation of social-liberals considered state intervention a necessary precondition for (positive) liberty. 
131  The socialism of the breakthrough period had a more communal thrust.  
132  Antirevolutionaries propagated a universal family-based suffrage in place of individual suffrage. 
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individuals, while organic notions of society had some influence among liberals.133 Still, like 
their socialist counterparts, they were much more inclined to grant and claim equal civil and 
political rights for women and men as it was seen as a means to elevate the family and contribute 
to the common good (Ibid. 106). The social liberal party, VDB, was the first to support women’s 
suffrage (Klijnsma 2007, 66f., 103f., 183, 240, 246).134 
Third and relatedly, the notion of individual equality and liberty challenged a social order based 
on complementary but different sexes and the normative restraint of sexuality within the 
confines of reproduction. In confessional thought, gender difference and complementarity was 
central and the notion of distinct male and female qualities was linked to the differentiation of 
private and public sphere (Bussemaker 1993, 93-96, 105).135 Like the indivisibility of the family 
and its social place, gender roles and relations were also considered God-given and 
unchangeable. Marriage was centrally tied to reproduction and raising of children. This 
remained unchanged until the 1950s as the ties between marriage, reproduction, and sexuality 
were loosened with the growing awareness and availability of contraception. Bussemaker 
(1993, 90) argues, in reference to Stuurman, that liberals and socialists were additionally 
strongly influenced by certain aspects of Christian morality; nevertheless, prominent liberals 
had been part of the 19th century neo-Malthusian movement that promoted birth control. The 
movement’s motives were to control population growth and fight poverty rather than a 
liberalization of sexuality, but the availability of contraception nonetheless played a role (at 
least potentially) in disentangling sexuality from reproduction and thus also the family.136 In 
1911, a confessional cabinet implemented a number of morality acts meant to curtail the 
distribution of contraception, outlaw brothels and homosexuality, and restrict abortion 
 
133  The liberal leader, Thorbecke, influenced by the German romantic tradition, considered the state as an 
organic unity of particular value and status (rather than a mere functional necessity as had been suggested by 
contract theories).  
134  Socialists were skeptical of women’s suffrage and feminism where it seemed to jeopardize the workers’ 
movement. Liberal objections to a general women’s suffrage were based on the long upheld idea of tying 
suffrage to economic self-sufficiency.  
135  Although Liberals had at least since the late 1930s propagated the legal, civil, and economic status 
equality of the sexes, they still assumed somewhat natural differences between men and women. 
136  Thomas Malthus had been an English clergyman and economist, propagating sexual continence for the 
sake of preventing a disastrous population growth. The neo-Malthusian movement was standing in the Anglo-
American tradition of organized freethought and secularism and it aimed at countering population growth via 
birth control rather than continence. Since the late 19th century, the Dutch strand was the main propagator of 
contraception. Dutch pioneers of movement included the doctor and feminist Aletta Jacobs, and the liberals 
Samuel van Houten and Carel Victor Gerritsen. While working-class women constituted a main target for 
education programs on contraception, socialists remained highly skeptical of Malthusianism and the underlying 
idea that it was family size that caused poverty (Quast n.d.).  
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(Bussemaker 1993, 90, (Drexler 1996). Liberals and socialists did however unsuccessfully 
oppose the laws.  
In the reconstruction period after the Second World War and the subsequent buildup of the 
welfare state, the family gained general importance and was considered central for social and 
individual moral integrity and as a counter-weight to a changing, utilitarian, and individualist 
outside world (Bussemaker 1993, 98-108, 115). Women’s paid labor remained controversial 
among social-democrats as well.137 The welfare state was centered on the family in both 
economic and social-pedagogical ways, and it was marked by the tension between a Christian 
family ideal on the one hand, and a more egalitarian idea of gender relations and of equal rights 
on the other hand.138 Since the late 1960s, as mentioned, individualism gained much greater 
influence and values like individual liberty, autonomy, and equality served as guidance for 
different political movements and agendas such as the youth movement and especially the 
Second Feminist Wave (Bussemaker 1993, 109-136, De Jong 2014, 181, Kennedy 2007 [1995], 
152–155, 173-179). Individualism implied claims of liberty from paternalism, that is, for equal 
liberty and individual self-development. It was placed against the Christian gender order, the 
materialism of the welfare state, as well as against the “old” collectivities of the pillarized era. 
All in all, this liberty frame accelerated the emancipative moment of the first breakthrough 
movement while also challenging the paternalism of its social-political elites.  
From within the confessional circles, the changes were partly welcomed and facilitated, while 
they were partly countered in the name of an allegedly necessary moral revival. As I have 
argued above, the claims that women ought to be considered equal restructured traditional 
Christian notions of gender relations, the family, as well as the notion and interrelation of the 
private and public spheres. Later the emancipation of other groups—foremost 
homosexuals139—but also migrants asked for a reorganization (and thus the secularization) of 
 
137  In the mid-1950s, legal hurdles for the employment of married women were removed but confessional 
parties in particular remained reserved and somewhat ambivalent on the matter. Also within Catholic circles, 
though, the ideal of the family changed towards a more equal and less hierarchical (patriarchal) understanding. 
138  Liberals and socialists were thereby more concerned about the economic aspects of the welfare state, 
while confessionals placed more weight on the moral aspects of wellbeing (Bussemaker 1993, 111). 
139  Currently it would be more inclusive and politically correct to speak of LGBTs than homosexuals given 
that it is a more inclusive term for non-heterosexual identities. Historically however, homosexuality was the term 
used in the Netherlands. The Equal Treatment Law e.g. claims the equal treatment of people irrespective their 
“hetero- or homosexual orientation” among other characteristics listed (AWGB n.d.). More recently, the discourse 
seems to focus on LGBTs more generally. During my interviews, I switched between the two terms and interview 
partners sometimes spoke of gay people, homosexuals, and LGBTs. In the context of this thesis, the precise 
question of who and what sexual identities are imagined belonging to such group, is less important than the rights 
of non-heterosexuals in general and in relation to religious people. Throughout the thesis, I try to remain as close 
as possible to the terminology used by informants and historic material, and I thus use different terms.  
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social institutions influenced by Christianity. The ultimate consequence was the gradual 
emergence of an understanding of diversity as something individual (as evoked in the present-
day quote above). The emphasis on individual liberty and equality further echoes a transnational 
focus on non-discrimination and equal treatment, and, as such, this principle has also gained 
legal relevance in the Netherlands. A crucial landmark in that respect was the constitutional 
amendment from 1983 and the subsequent equal treatment law from 1994. Until today these 
anti-discrimination regulations are core to determining the place of religion in Dutch society 
while at the same time these regulations and the adequate weighing of religious and other 
freedoms have been and remain contested.  
In what follows, I briefly sketch the changing political power relations and actor constellations 
in the party-political field since the 1970s, the gradual and contested assertion of an individual 
equality and liberty frame, and the related political controversies about so-called “immaterial 
matters.” 
4.1.1 Religious and Political Power Relations Since the 1970s 
The period since the 1970s has further been marked by the simultaneous liberalization of the 
former orthodox Protestant milieu and a tremendous decline in religious affiliations. In the late-
1960s, the non-church affiliated constituted one third of the Dutch population while both 
Protestants and Catholics constituted another third each (Bernts and Berghuijs 2016). Since 
then, church decline accelerated and since 1996 at least, the religiously non-affiliated have been 
an absolute majority. As Table 9 shows, until most recently it seemed that church decline would 
not be accompanied by an equal decline in religiosity and belief: In 2006, an absolute majority 
still believed either in God or a higher power and further self-positioned as religious. In 2015, 
the number of religious and believers has dropped below 50% for the first time while the 
number of atheists has more than doubled since the late 1990s. The share of those who never 
go to church also rose above 50% for the first time. Since the mid-1990s, the general 
secularization has been countered by a complementary rise of orthodoxy among church-
members (Table 10). This trend manifested first among the younger generations which has 
gradually become more orthodox than the older generations (De Hart 2014, 87-90). The general 
trend of depillarization was further matched with a process of late pillarization among those 
orthodox groups that had opposed the 19th century pillarization but were now confronted with 
an increasingly secularizing and liberalizing society (Snel 2007, 78, Wallet 2007). The 
mentioned newspaper Reformatorisch Dagblad was first published in 1971 and also orthodox 
reformed schools were founded (Snel 2007.). Evangelization constituted an alternative 
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organizational form for orthodox Protestants and also here, different institutional innovations 
manifested such as the Evangelical Broadcast (EO) that was build up in the second half of 20th 
century (Wallet 2007). Geographically, the contrast between a general secularization and a 
consolidated orthodoxy manifested in the so-called Dutch Bible Belt.  
Beyond this, the religious decline as well as the continued orthodoxy also manifested itself 
politics. In the parliamentary elections from 1967, as mentioned, the confessional parties lost 
their absolute majority for the first time since 1918. In the subsequent elections, the collective 
power of the confessional parties declined further. Between 1967 and 1972, their share fell from 
44.55% to 31.28% of the total vote. In response to this electoral decline, the three main Christian 
parties (ARP, KVP, CHU) engaged in a merging process in which a Christian Democratic Party 
(CDA) was founded. In order to accommodate inter-confessional differences, the new party 
merger no longer positioned itself as being directly based on the gospel, but as representing a 
“political conviction” that had been developed as a response to the gospel’s appeal (Ten Napel 
2012). In that sense, the main Christian party institutionalized a certain differentiation between 
religion and politics. Orthodox Protestantism finds its political representation in the SGP and 
the ChristenUnie (CU). The ChristenUnie was founded in 2000 as a merger of the two small 
orthodox parties (GPV and RPF). Both small parties constitute an orthodox flank to the CDA. 
The CDA succeeded in mobilizing a third of the vote until the mid-1990s and has remained in 
the center of political power until 1994.  
The deconfessionalization of politics since the 1960s had also manifested in radical left split 
offs from the confessional parties as well as the later CDA.140 In 1990, the Political Party of 
Radicals (PPR) and the Evangelical Peoples’ Party (EVP)—two such split-off parties—merged 
together with the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) and the Pacifist-Socialist Party 
(PSP) into the contemporary GreenLeft (GL) party. The Christian founding parties had already 
been open to non-Christians and thus started the gradual secularization which was completed 
by the foundation of GL.141 Prior to this fusion, as mentioned, a progressive collaboration with 
D66 had been discussed but was eventually given up. In the early 1980s, D66 had moved closer 
to the CDA on economic matters and participated in the second and third CDA-led cabinets of 
 
140  See the entries on each party at parlement.com. 
141  The EVP had been open to non-Christians willing to contribute to the evangelical mission of building a 
solidarity-based and peaceful society. The PPR also wanted to be open to nonreligious people with similar ideas 
and thus did without a reference to Christianity in the party name. GreenLeft refers to its rootedness in 
progressive religious groups among others, but the party itself has no religious profile.  
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Van Agt (1981-1982).142 Furthermore, especially with respect to its power position and its 
position on immaterial matters, the CDA became a central other for D66.  
From the onset, D66 was central to translating the rise of individualism to the political realm, 
both in the sense of claiming political liberty and equality as well as promoting an ideal of 
individual self-development and thus giving expression to what Bussemaker calls 
enlightenment and romantic individualism. The party aimed to facilitate the 
spiritual/intellectual (geestelijke) and material self-development of each human, disregarding 
their worldview, political orientation, race, nationality, language, social background, or sex; it 
claimed to facilitate female labor participation; and, last but not least, it aimed to increase 
knowledge and the availability of contraception and suggested a liberalization of abortion 
(respectively to develop a responsible opinion on abortion) (D66 1967). Aside from 
democratization and collective agency, the ideal of individual liberty and equality thus 
constituted a second guiding idea for the party and informed its secularization program.143 
Individualism did not constitute an explicit or sole motif in all cases. Contraception and 
abortion, as examples, were informed by a Neo-Malthusian concern with population growth, 
but still also with respect to these matters, the scope of individual liberty was broadened. The 
program also claimed to reform or abolish the laws on blasphemy, film censorship, the legal 
requirements for reasons in divorce cases, as well as laws on pornography – not in the name of 
liberty but as a means to update the law to incorporate current notions of the good life.144 All 
points in any case increased individual liberties vis-à-vis traditional Christian ideas of family, 
 
142  From 1977 to 1982, Dries van Agt (CDA) led three subsequent cabinets together with, first, the right 
liberals and then the labor party and D66; from 1982 to 1994 Lubbers (CDA) led three cabinets, two with the 
VVD and the third with the labor party. Van Agt’s third cabinet only functioned as an interim government. 
Within D66, the coalition with the CDA was contested, especially among those members with confessional 
backgrounds (Rood 1983, 48f).  
143  De Jong (2014, 171) argues that the focus on liberty rights rather than political criticism was what was 
actually new about D66. His view seems based on the mentioned book by Gruijters (1967), who considered the 
assertion of individual liberties to be of greater relevance than the program of state reform.  
144  While I cannot trace the legal history of all these laws, several of them were passed by different 
confessional cabinets in the first third of the 20th century. The legal regulation of pornography had its roots in the 
morality acts that had been implemented by a confessional cabinet in 1911 despite opposition from liberals and 
socialists (Bussemaker 1993, 90). The law on film censorship was passed in 1926 by the interim confessional-
liberal cabinet De Geer I (1926-1929). It institutionalized a centralized censorship organization and further 
granted municipalities the right to conduct an additional test. The law on blasphemy was issued in 1932 by Ruijs 
de Beerenbrouck’s third cabinet (1929-1933), and. as mentioned, had primarily been used to target socialists and 
communists. It resonates both with the notion of a Protestant nation and of a somewhat balanced and harmonized 
public discourse. See: articles on the cabinets of De Geer and Beerenbrouck at parlement.com as well as 
(kijkwijzer.nl n.d.).  
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gender, and sexuality and the idea of a Christian and God-ordained public order and countered 
the commitment of politics to the pluralist balancing of worldview diversity.145  
In the religious field at the time there was a considerable ‘liberalization’ with respect to so 
called “immaterial matters,” but the political conflict lines with regard to individual autonomy 
and equality did not disappear in the decades to come. The orthodox Protestant parties held (and 
still hold) a pole position in the debates on life-, death-, and sexuality-related matters and based 
their platforms on these matters (Timmermans and Breeman 2012, 42f.). The CDA objected to 
the individual liberty frame, but, all in all, it stood between the orthodox and the liberal parties, 
and was attacked from both sides (De Rooy 2002, 256-258, Timmermans and Breeman 2012, 
48-51). In the 1970s, abortion catalyzed a major cultural and political polarization between 
Christian and secular parties, and under Van Agt’s leadership, the CDA positioned itself in 
sharp opposition to the social-democratic and liberal policies on abortion.146 The CDA later 
liberalized its position, compromising with the right-liberal VVD. The abortion law passed 
under Ruud Lubbers’ first cabinet (CDA, 1982-1986) granted impunity for abortions under 
certain conditions without legalizing it (P&P n.d.-l).147 In subsequent ethical debates as well, 
the Christian Democrats sought to avoid and depoliticize moral controversies (Timmermans 
and Breeman 2012, 39). A core example is the debate about the equal treatment law in 1994 in 
which a pattern became visible that also shaped the debate on same-sex marriage and ongoing 
debates about the future scope of religious freedom. This pattern is determined by the conflict 
between the established notion of secularity as a balancing of and compromise between 
competing worldviews and collective identities (type 2), and, on the other hand, a principled 
assertion of individual liberty and equality (type 1).  
 
 
145  The program is ambivalent with respect to weighing such reform claims against the autonomy of 
religious institutions. The program asserts the legitimacy of religious schools. On the other hand, though, it also 
claims certain reforms such as to prepare girls for paid work outside of marriage without discussing possible 
exemptions for religious schools. By contrast, sexual education in schools is said to not be made obligatory 
through a centralized law.  
146  The formation of Den Uyl’s cabinet (1973-1977; PvdA, CDA, D66) lasted almost half a year given the 
numerous differences between the parties. The matter of abortion divided the CDA from PvdA and D66. 
Ultimately, the secular parties succeeded in asserting the freedom of their respective parliamentary factions to 
table a bill. CDA-leader Van Agt thus gave in to public pressures in support for abortion. See: “Kabinetsformatie 
1977” at parlement.com. Assisted reproduction, embryo and stem-cell research and same-sex marriage received 
much less consideration by parties in electoral struggles (Timmermans and Breeman 2012, 42). 
147  Given the woman was in a situation of need (not exclusively physical) and had consulted a counselor.  
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Table 9: Church non-affiliation and belief over time. 
2015 (Bernts and 
Berghuijs 2016)  
Non-church 
affiliated  
Believing in God or 
higher power 
Agnostics Atheist 
1966 33 78 16 6 
1996 53 63 27 10 
2006 53 60 26 14 
2015 67,8 42 34 24 
 
Table 10: Rise of Orthodoxy. 
Necessary to adhere to all church 
rules (De Hart 2014) 
1975 1995 2002 2006 
Total 30 21 18 33 
17-24 21 24 30 40 
55-65 41 12 13 28 
 
4.1.2 The Equal Treatment Clause 
In 1983, a new first article was added to the Dutch constitution, guaranteeing that all people in 
the Netherlands would be treated equally in equal situations, which also banned discrimination 
on the basis of religion, life-stance (levensovertuiging), political ideology, race, gender, etc. 
(Art. 1 GW).148 One implication of this constitutional change was the further disestablishment 
of religion in the sense that not only a particular confession or religion, but religion as such is 
disestablished and put on par with nonreligious worldviews.149 The constitutional change thus 
gave official recognition to the notion of irreligious worldviews and institutionalized them as 
 
148  Earlier versions of the Dutch constitution also include new articles on equality. Since the early and mid-
19th century, these guarantee the equality of rights and duties independent of rank or birth as well as the equal 
protection of person and goods of foreigners residing in the Netherlands (see: 
https://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/9353000/1/j9vvihlf299q0sr/vkjaj9cv36zi). Van Dam and Van Trigt 
(2015, 19) interpret this as furthering a regime of national unity. While I see the interrelatedness of national unity 
and an individualist social organization, I do think it makes sense to distinguish between legislations that places 
the national community central and those that place the individual/ citizen central. 
149  The equality of worldviews also echoed in the amendment of the religious freedom clause (Art. 6 GW) 
and the article on educational freedom on which the pluralist school system rests (Art. 23 GW). Religion is not 
directly equated with worldviews or subordinated to worldviews as a subordinate category, but both categories 
are mentioned on a par with one another. According to Bijsterveld and Vermeulen (2018), nonreligious life-
stances are not explicitly defined, the government only said that it should be interpreted in the frame of what 
constitutes religion in the 1980s (p.6). The authors argue that as such, nonreligious worldviews must show 
something like a comprehensive set of ideas, with humanism and anthroposophy being the most evident 
examples. The equal recognition for worldviews on par with religion as well as the principle of status equality of 
all intellectual streams (geestelijke stromingen) before the state has also been one of D66’s claims (D66 1967). 
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being “religion-like.”150 Throughout the 1980s in particular, equating religion and nonreligion 
was a much-discussed issue in terms of legislative change.151 In the long run, however, the 
greater controversy was the fact that the place of religion was also relativized with respect to 
other fundamental characteristics or basic liberties, such as race or gender. This was accelerated 
in the aftermath of the constitutional change when the constitutional principle was to be 
implemented through further legislation and marital status and homosexuality were also named 
as criteria of non-discrimination.152 The conflict was further compounded by explicit 
discussions of the horizontal application of the principle with regard to relations among citizens 
(TK 1990-91).153  
Different parties sought to influence the law-making process, giving varied weight to the 
principle of nondiscrimination, respectively the freedom of religion and most importantly the 
autonomy of religious organizations (foremost schools) (DRS 1990). D66 (and similarly the 
labor party and VVD) claimed that nondiscrimination should prevail above the freedom of 
behaving according to one’s religion or worldview (de vrijheid om zich naar godsdienst of 
levensovertuiging te gedragen). It further states that no exceptions should be made for religious 
or worldview-based organizations (not churches though), as preventing discrimination was 
relevant in all social contexts and relations (PN 1989).154 By contrast, orthodox Protestants 
feared and criticized any limitations on the autonomy of religious institutions and legal changes 
that could force them to act against the word of God (DRS 1984).155  
Eventually, the “general law of equal treatment” was prepared and passed by Lubbers’ two 
subsequent cabinets (Lubbers II—1986-1989—in coalition with the VVD and Lubbers III—in 
 
150  The equal status of worldviews had been preceded by an emancipation struggle among Dutch humanists 
(Van Baalen and Ramakers 2001, 287-302).  
151  The constitutional changes and the equal treatment law institutionalized not only the equal status of 
religion and worldviews, but they also institutionalized the distinction between religion-like and mere secular or 
differentiated positions. Distinct from nonreligious life-stances, e.g., “societal ideas” are protected under a 
different article.  
152  At least since the early 1970s, this had been a claim of respective action groups as well of a commission 
initiated by Den Uyl’s cabinet (1973-77). In fact, the earlier suggestions aimed at a law that would ban 
discrimination on the basis of sex, homosexuality, and marital status, the inclusion of religion and worldviews 
into a broad non-discrimination law was meant to accommodate concerns over a confinement of the freedom of 
religion (DRS 1990).  
153  The vertical application of a law concerns the relations between state and citizens; the horizontal 
application, those among citizens.  
154  In 1986, D66 published a note, “Gelijk zijn en gelijk krijgen,” and parts of the note are quoted in the 
orthodox Protestant journal, “Protestant Netherland,” as part of a critique on the reform plans. The association 
“Protestants Nederland” that publishes the journal was founded in 1923 in opposition to the Catholic 
emancipation that accompanied pillarization. It was strongly anti-Catholic (PN n.d.). 
155  Already earlier legislation for the equal treatment of men and women had curtailed the autonomy of 
religious schools in hiring staff (DRS 1992). 
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coalition with the PvdA—1989-1994) (AWGB n.d.). Already the cabinet’s bill offered a 
compromise between individual equality and pluralist autonomy rights which was retained in 
the final law (DRS 1990, TK 1990-91). The core point in which this compromise becomes 
apparent is the matter of exemptions from the equal treatment principle on religious grounds 
and for religious organizations. Here, the bill introduced a distinction between an institution’s 
profile and function and limited exemption rights in cases where an institution’s function was 
at stake, while also acknowledging, however, that for educational institutions committed to the 
teaching of morals and values such distinctions would be particularly difficult to determine. 
Furthermore, it introduced a phrase that has become known as the “enkele feit constructie” (sole 
reason construction). This phrase implies that religious and worldview organizations (different 
from churches) were not entitled to discriminate on the “sole ground” of the categories in 
question, while additional factors might legitimize such discrimination. Inadvertently, then, a 
same-sex relationship might be interpreted as such an additional factor while it seems that the 
CDA had originally only meant to refer to ostentatious symbols of the homo-emancipation 
movement (DRS 1984).156  
Neither orthodox Christians nor the secular parties consented to this compromise proposition 
and the sole-reason construction was criticized from both sides for insufficiently protecting 
homosexual rights vis-à-vis religious institutions, as well as by the Council of State for the 
vagueness of its wording (TK 1991-92a, TK 1991-92b, DRS 1991). If one looks at the orthodox 
lines of argument, the principle of individual liberty and equality is not only seen to breach the 
principle of worldview pluralism but also the unlimited authority of god and thus a more 
theocratic social order—that is, the law was seen to conflict with the government’s commitment 
to the word of God (DRS 1990).157 It was primarily orthodox commentators, however, who 
 
156  At the time, orthodox commentators also interpreted the law similarly, lamenting the fact that while a 
candidate living in a homosexual relationship could be refused a position as a teacher for religious lessons but 
not as a, e.g., gymnastic teacher as here his sexual orientation was not seen as relevant (DRS 1991).  
157  In parts, strategies of civil disobedience were discussed and linked with Protestant notions of legitimate 
rebellion dating back from the period of the Dutch revolt against Catholic Spain (DRS 1984) see also: (Van 
Gelderen 1986). At the same time, though, tolerance towards social diversity and a commitment to a state of law 
were also hailed and used to urge the state to also consider the rights of the orthodox minority (DRS 1992).  
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lamented the alleged breach of religious freedom of religion as well as the alleged un-equal 
treatment of Christians when compared to homosexuals (DRS 1991, 1992, PN 1989).158  
The “general equal treatment law” that was eventually passed in 1994 retained the controversial 
passages (AWGB 1994), but the rights of homosexuals in relation to that of (orthodox and 
conservative) religious people and institutions remained controversial in the years to come. All 
in all, the law furthered the disestablishment of religion and relativized worldview pluralism in 
the name of individual equality. At the same time, the changes did not fully assert a principle 
of individual equality but constituted a compromise and, as such, also prepared the ground for 
ongoing negotiations. 
4.1.3 Hopes for a Secular Coalition 
As the previous section illustrated, the compromises on immaterial matters frustrated secular 
liberal-progressive parties. The CDA’s power position did as well. According to its critics, the 
CDA was perceived to be an obstacle to democratization and liberalization and this frustration 
fueled hopes for an all secular “purple coalition” between Liberals, D66, and Social 
Democrats.159 Already in the second half of the 1970s and under the influence of the abortion 
debate, members of the liberal youth organization, JOVD,160 the right liberals, the labor party, 
D66, and the humanist association held semi-official talks in order to pave the way for such a 
purple cabinet which could reform immaterial matters such as abortion, euthanasia, and same-
sex marriage (Derkx 2006, Klei 2017).161 Once more, D66 gave a crucial voice to secular 
critiques and ambitions. This time the party leaders’ concern was not the ideological intrusion 
 
158  Arguments made in that respect were that the law defined the church as a certain limited institution of 
space rather than a more encompassing institution, the legal distinction between an institution’s profile and 
function (DRS 1991). The law was seen to impair a school board’s right to insist on an accordance of life with 
doctrine among all its staff, something which would fundamentally alter such a school’s profile and internal 
culture (DRS 1992). An article in the orthodox Protestant journal “Protestant Nederland” lamented that while 
homosexuals were increasingly protected and hailed, blasphemous or antireligious satire would remain 
unembedded (PN 1989). A similar argument goes that the protection of one minority now resulted in the 
discrimination of another minority and thus a breach of the state’s responsibility of protecting the weak (DRS 
1992). 
159  The contrasting picture of the envisioned Purple Coalition was the so-called “staphorst Variant,” a 
possible minority cabinet of Christian Democrats and right-liberals with support (gedoogsteun) from the small 
orthodox parties (Klei 2011, 232). 
160  It was only in the mid-1980s that the youth organization, “Young Democrats” (Jonge Democraten) was 
founded, which is now the youth organization affiliated with D66. 
161  According to Klei (2017), the De Indes meetings had initially been designed to facilitate a merger of the 
VVD and D66 as one larger liberal party. In both the PvdA and D66, there were also concerns about a coalition 
with the VVD. 
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of religion into politics, but more directly the power position of Christian Democrats which 
made other parties compromise on ethical matters (Koenenman et al 1987, 29f.).162  
In 1994, the first of two of such purple coalitions was eventually realized after the Christian 
Democrats’ electoral decline and D66’s enormous electoral success (15.5%), which left the 
party in the position to block any other but the intended coalition.163 The new cabinet was 
observed with care by contemporary observers with much focus on symbolic acts of displaying 
loyalty and affiliation with Christian traditions. The cabinet members at large aimed to avoid 
the association of an antithetic opposition to religion. At the inauguration, the new Prime 
Minister, Wim Kok (PvdA), downplayed the secular character of the coalition, stating that it 
was a “normal cabinet” and he also urged his ministers to attend the regular ecumenic church 
service on Princess Day (Klei and Van Mulligen 2013, 13) and almost the entire cabinet 
accepted the Dutch Bach Association’s invitation to attend the annual Passion of Matthew 
(Derkx 2006, 72). With respect to legislative changes, the second purple cabinet (1998-2002) 
in particular accelerated and codified the individualization and liberalization of society, ethics, 
and morality (Table 11).164 Some of the contested immaterial issues like euthanasia and equal 
treatment were placed on the political agenda via interest groups and court decisions, i.e., 
European regulations, while others still, like the shop openings, same-sex marriage, adoption 
 
162  Apparently, prior to that the PvdA had declared that it did not consider legislation on euthanasia 
necessary at that time. Van Mierlo considered this to be a concession towards the CDA. Similarly, during the 
parliament debate in 1993, D66 member Groenman remarked that it was CDA’s power position that further 
blocked reforms and hampered the reformist spirit of its secular coalition partners (TK 1992-93). In a recent 
documentary on the (late) legal regulation of euthanasia, Roger van Boxtel, a prominent D66 politician and co-
initiator of a respective bill in 1998, asserted that with the CDA in government no political solution for 
euthanasia would have been possible (Rosens 2016). The idea was that the party’s power was not only based on 
electoral strength but also on its strong position within the (non-electable) state bureaucracy. In a party 
publication from the 1980s, Max Rood, former D66 member of parliament in Van Agt’s second cabinet states 
that “even if the CDA for one period would not be in government, not much would change. They are 
everywhere, a real power circle in the national bureaucracy. Among the secretaries of the Queen, only the five 
CDA members have their own council, the rest doesn’t” (Rood 1983, 74f.). In retrospect, evaluations of the 
importance of the secular dimensions differ. In a recently published book on the purple cabinets, prominent 
VVD members dismissed the relevance of the secular, non-Christian face of the coalitions; claiming that also 
with the CDA the most important reforms could have been reached (Van Weezel and Zonneveld 2002, 18-21, 
111f.). The authors, however, argue that this evaluation seems to reflect the party’s current position towards the 
CDA instead of that of the mid-1990s. 
163  Internationally, the purple coalition was most famous for its so-called polder model, an institutionalized 
dialogue between employers, unions, and politics for determining economic and loan policies, commonly 
regarded as part of the third way movement in European social-democracy (Economist 2002, for a more critical 
analysis see: Van Apeldoorn 2009). In fact, this structure has its origins in the more corporatist policies of the 
prior CDA-PvdA cabinet, but it was continued under the Purple Cabinet and then gained international 
prominence. 
164  Another controversial topic during that the period was prostitution. “Voluntary” prostitution was 
eventually legalized in 2000 after two decades of debates and various bills were written and revised. The 
discourse that dominated the liberalization process was a liberal discourse on voluntary sex work differentiated 
from the involuntary trafficking or exploitation of women. The 1999 vote had split parliament along religious-
secular lines. For more details see mainly: Outshoorn (2001) and also Drexler (1996). 
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rights, and the legalization of brothels, were raised by politicians themselves (Trappenburg 
2000, 56f.). Among the most controversial issues during the time of the purple cabinets, were 
the opening of civil marriage for same-sex couples and the legalization of euthanasia. In what 
follows, I focus on these two cases to show how an individual liberty and equality model was 
institutionalized and asserted against the idea of an institutionalized Christian public order as 
well as a pluralist accommodation of religious-nonreligious diversity. In both cases, the 
initiators invested most of their efforts in countering the notion of an antithesis between belief 
and unbelief and tried to frame the legislative changes as acts of secular differentiation rather 
than irreligion.  
Before this is elaborated, though, it must be briefly noted that aside from being known as the 
first all-secular coalition, the purple coalition has also been prominent with respect to its 
economic profile. On the one hand, it is internationally known as a successful example of the 
“third way” movement in European social-democracy (Economist 2002), while on the other 
hand, it has been positioned as being emblematic of the high time of neoliberalization (Van 
Apeldoorn 2009).165 Purple coalitions were also formed in other European countries but it was 
only in the Netherlands and Belgium that they have had such a secular connotation (Van 
Kersbergen, Verbeek, and Van Schie 1997). While the VVD was the strongest supporter of 
neoliberalization, D66 and later the PvdA also underwent their own liberal turn.166 According 
 
165  As an ideological project, neoliberalism began already in the decades after the second world war and 
this was also the period of a mutual polarization between VVD and the labor party (De Haan 1997, 
Oudenampsen 2016, Mellink 2017). Since the 1980s, liberal ideas gained dominance in the public discourse, 
manifesting in a growing critique of the welfare state and the idea of a “makeable” society (Duyvendak and 
Haan 1997). As a political project, neoliberalism took off in the 1980s under the cabinets of Lubbers and was 
consolidated under the purple cabinets (Van Apeldoorn 2009, 219, Oudenampsen 2016, 142). According to Van 
Apeldoorn (2009, 219), neoliberalization implies three interrelated shifts of power; that from unions to capitalist 
class power, from industrial to financial capitalism, and from national to transnational capital. He refers to the 
European model of neoliberalism as “embedded neoliberalism,” meaning that the state is given the role to protect 
society from the destructive consequences of free markets while it ultimately subordinates protection to the 
guarantee of free markets (Ibid. 24f.). Neoliberalization in the Netherlands was predated by the much hailed 
Wassenaar agreement from 1982 in which the unions accepted wage cuts in exchange for reduced working hours 
for the sake of economic growth and countering unemployment. The agreement was signed by then-union leader 
and later Prime Minister Wim Kok (PvdA). Van Apeldoorn (2009, 214) speaks of the Wassenaar agreement as 
the watershed for the dominance of capital articulated in the language of social partnership. Still and different 
from other countries, Dutch unions remained players in the field and social inequality and liberalization 
remained lower than, e.g., in Britain (Ibid. 214). All in all though, Van Apeldoorn (2009, 216-18) challenges the 
success story of the purple coalition and argues that the rising employment numbers resulted from a shift towards 
part time and insecure jobs, with the state remaining the main provider of secure and fulltime jobs. The success 
story further builds on the general economic strength that lasted from the 1980s to the turn of the century, a trend 
which was reversed after 2001 when the Netherlands were hit harder by the international economic crisis after 
9/11. He understands the rise of a populist and anti-immigration movements at the end of the second purple 
cabinet (ch.5) as not the least fueled by an opposition to the neoliberal project (Ibid. 223). 
166  According to Apeldoorn (2009, 215), the a neoliberalization of Dutch social democracy was framed a 
break with the ideological ties with socialism. In a prominent speech, labor leader Kok refers to “old dogmas” 
concerning the role of the state and a declining “faith” in elaborate ideals of social reform (Kok 1995). It would 
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to Pennings and Keman (1994, 134, 141), the D66 program was almost as left as that of the 
PvdA in the 1960s but became more centrist thereafter. Ideologically, the turn away from the 
left seems to have been cloaked in the non-materialist frame of a post-socialist liberalism that 
centered on immaterial concerns such as social inequality and the critique of a bureaucratic and 
alienating welfare state (Terlouw 1976). Up until the late 1970s, a coalition with the right-
liberal VVD had been principally ruled out. In 1989, however, predating the purple coalition, 
D66 joined the liberal faction in the European parliament (Van der Land 2003, 256f.).167 Van 
der Land (2014) explains that the party has been considered the Netherlands’ non-confessional 
centrist party since the early 1990s, while Van Apeldoorn (2009, 215) classifies it as somewhat 
less neoliberal than the VVD. In the context of the 1990s, certain traditional themes and party 
claims were reframed and given an economically liberal touch: The first election program of 
1967, e.g., claims that the party aims to contribute to the spiritual and material development 
(ontplooiing) of all humans (D66 1967); that of 1994 sketches the ideal of a government 
reduced to its core tasks and leaving the greatest possible room for the development 
(ontplooiing) of personal and social initiative (D66 1994). The program of economic 
liberalization further motivated a renewed emphasis on secularization and depillarization, this 
time in the sense that civil society became more important in the context of welfare cuts, while 
the remains of a pillarized structure in civil society, which would no longer attract people, was 
seen to hamper its adequate functioning (D66 1994).168 In a renewed civil society, cooperation 
was to be problem-centered and would transcend worldview and cultural or ethnic divides.169 
The Shop Opening Law though aimed to balance economic rationality with the importance 
given to Sunday rest by parts of the population and respectively granted a relatively broad scope 
to municipalities for deciding on Sunday shop openings––eventually though, the law increased 
the possibilities for Sunday shop openings (TK 1994-95, RD 2009d).  
 
 
be interesting to see whether such a liberal turn has been framed as secularization in the sense of giving up the 
eschatological hopes of immanent social justice. But I have found no traces of such dialogue. 
167  Until 2012 it was known as ELDR (European Liberal Democrats and Reformists), now ALDE (Alliance 
of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party).  
168  A strong civil society is thereby not only seen as a necessary compensation for the state, but rather as a 
way to prevent the domination of either the state or the market. 
169  The references to the religious and cultural diversification through immigration also points to another 
problem-context, the integration debate, which will be dealt with in chapter 5. 
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Table 11: Secular Legislation Purple Cabinets.170 
Year Law Second Chamber First Chamber 
  Pro contra pro contra 



















1997 Registered partnership 
open to same-sex couples 
next to marriage 
(geregistreerde 
partnerschap) 




1999 Abolition ban of brothels 





 All other CDA, 
RPF/GPV, 
SGP 
2000 Opening of civil marriage 
for same-sex couples (Wet 
openstelling huwelijk)  
PvdA, 
VVD, D66, 








2001 Law to control life-ending 
and assisted suicide 
(euthanasia law) (Wet 
toetsing levensbeeindiging 







46 votes 28 votes 
 
 
170  Based on overviews from parlement.com (P&P n.d.-i, n.d. ) as well as the First Camber’s online 
overviews on the respective laws and their enactment: (EK n.d.-b, c, e, d, EK n.d.-a). 
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4.2 The Opening of Civil Marriage  
The Netherlands was the first country to formally allow same-sex marriages in 2001. In both 
chambers, the respective law was recognized by nearly the complete faction of the secular 
parties (including the non-government parties, GreenLeft and the Socialist Party) while the 
Christian parties (with a few individual exceptions) opposed the law. The law ultimately also 
won over an alternative solution the CDA had supported, which would facilitate the legal 
emancipation of homosexuals according to a pluralist and compromise-based logic rather than 
the equality focus that informed its eventual successor.  
It was only since the late-1980s that equal marriage rights emerged as a claim of the homosexual 
emancipation movement (Bos 2017).171 It was then that the gay-journal “gaykrant” began to 
sideline the Dutch LBGT interest-group, COC and campaign for the opening of civil marriage, 
initiating and creating publicity for respective court rulings. In a ruling from 1990, the Dutch 
High Court criticized the legal inequality for same-sex couples that resulted from the 
heterosexual definition of marriage (without criticizing the latter in itself), and it urged the 
legislator to change this situation. Thus, a government commission recommended some form 
of a registered partnership and many municipalities institutionalized ways to register same-sex 
partnerships (Boele-Woelki et al. 2006, 4, Bos 2017, 191). The genuine pioneers in the field of 
rituals, however, were liberal churches such as the Remonstrant Brotherhood which had already 
conducted a blessing for a same-sex partnership in 1987 (Bos 2017).172 Moreover, Catholics 
(and thereafter Protestants) had developed a pastoral discourse on the homophile and supported 
fidelity-based homosexual relations since the late-1960s. Even if this discourse greatly differed 
from those of celebrating sexual liberty or principled equality it contributed to the visibility of 
homosexuals and opposition to their discrimination. The emancipation of homosexuals, thus, 
was not a nonreligious project exclusively, and secular parties by contrast were divided over 
the matter of same-sex marriages until the late-1990s.173 In the political field, however, the topic 
divided religious and secular parties.  
 
171 Bos (2017) has reconstructed the developments that predated the opening of civil marriage. Beyond 
that, a good overview covering the history of homosexuality until the 1970s and 1980s can be found in Tielman 
(1982).  
172  The Remonstrant Brotherhood is an early 17th-century split off from the mainline reformed church, 
which asserts man’s free will over the orthodox Calvinistic notion of predestination and conceives tolerance and 
liberty as its main tenants . 
173  Bos (2017, 189f) points out that the CDA report was laughed off by the Left, “suggesting that CDA 
wanted to force gays and lesbians into the straightjacket of matrimony.” Among the right-liberals, by contrast, a 
more conservative hesitance towards full equality with marriage prevailed until the late 1990s.  
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In 1994, the Lubbers’ third cabinet (CDA and PvdA) issued a bill to reform the First Civil Law 
book to include a registered partnership for those living together but exempted them from the 
entitlement to marriage, a provision which would not only include same-sex couples but also 
people closely blood related such as siblings as well as parents or grandparents with their 
children (TK 1993-94).174 According to Bos (2017, 189), the bill was a compromise between 
CDA and PvdA, the latter of which at that time still objected to the institution of marriage as 
such. In contrast to what the list of different non-marital relations suggests, the bill did not aim 
to de-sexualize homosexual relations, but it emphasized the exclusive tie between marriage and 
heterosexuality and rendered the bond between homosexuals less special and distinct than that 
between heterosexual spouses.175 In the sense of paving a parallel (but distinct) way for 
homosexual emancipation—which was inherently unequal to heterosexuals but granted 
equivalent rights—the bill fit into the logic of a pluralist and parallel organization of diversity 
and it further retained a certain establishment of Christianity in the sense of leaving the 
exclusive bond of marriage and heterosexuality intact. Before the bill was passed, though, the 
1994 election brought the first purple cabinet into power, and here, the course was consciously 
changed towards a break with the traditional notion of family for the sake of a principled 
individual equality-approach.  
A first step in the direction of the new course was a government note from 1995 aimed at a 
reform of family law in the light of the actual diversity of lifeforms (TK 1995). The note 
suggested that partnerships be established as an alternative to marriage, open to both 
heterosexual and homosexual couples, but not to close relatives. This suggestion fundamentally 
changed the logic of the previous CDA bill as partnerships would then no longer be the 
equivalent of marriage but an alternative to it, and further organized according to a logic of 
individual equality. While two members of parliament from the PvdA and of D66 (Boris 
Dittrich176) had already filed a motion in support of an opening of civil marriage already in 
1996 (TK 1996), the government kept focusing on a registered partnership instead and, in 1997, 
issued a law on registered partnerships (TK 1997/1998). According to several press and internet 
 
174  The bill has been preceded by a report published by the CDA think tank (Bos 2017, Heggen 1996). The 
report placed the relational aspect above the focus on the institution of marriage and thus also opposed an 
individualistic vision of society (Heggen 1996, 263f., 267f.). It suggested a separate legal institution for 
homosexual couples, alongside other lasting and responsible relationships such as those between siblings and 
close friends. As such, the report retained the heterosexual character of civil marriage and the special character 
of church-based marriages. The report faced much party internal criticisms, but the solutions it suggested seem 
to have influenced the later party positioning (Koeneman, Lucardie, and Noomen 1986). 
175 At the least, the report had clearly differentiated between several different forms of relations.  
176  He was MP from 1994 to 2006 and faction leader from 2003 until 2006.  
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articles based on an auto-biographical book by Dittrich it seems that within D66 itself there was 
also no generally shared support or enthusiasm for opening marriage and Dittrich together with 
some other members campaigned first internally in the party and then in the coalition for his 
cause (RD 2001b, NRC/Handelsblad 2001, GaySite).177  
After the coalition agreement in any case, the opening of civil-marriage became the official 
government position (TK 1998-99, 1999-00b, a). The bill was explained by linking it to the 
ritualistic tradition as well as by emphasizing equal rights and state-secularity: Equality was 
declared to be not about the material aspects of legal marriage alone (a line of argument that 
had been used for the sake of partnership), but also about making the institution of marriage in 
its symbolic meaning open to all (TK 1999b). In line with the previous note, the institution of 
a registered partnership, which had been in place since 1998, was kept in place, equally 
accessible to all couples and serving those who wished to avoid the symbolism of “traditional” 
marriage. The institutional pluralism was thus re-defined, from a pluralism of group-specific 
institutions to a logic of different general institutions distinguished by their traditional and non-
traditional character. The change in course was also made explicate by the government, which 
stated that it had been a decisive aim to disentangle marriage from its exclusive link to 
reproduction and heterosexuality (TK 1999-00b, 5). The government explained that it was well 
aware that it was breaking a long tradition of Western civilization and was essentially changing 
the notion of marriage (TK 1999-00b, 7). The law on opening civil marriage was accepted by 
the Second Chamber in September 2000. VVD, D66, GL, SP, PvdA (except one PvdA member) 
as well as some members of CDA voted in favor of the law. The First Chamber accepted the 
law in December 2000 despite opposition from CDA, RPF/GPV and the SGP.  
4.2.1 Obligations to Secular Self-Restraint  
During the process of legislation, the reservations of orthodox Christians were met by pointing 
to the mere secular character of the new law. After the bill had been introduced to the chamber, 
the then-secretary of justice, Job Cohen (PvdA), stated that the government had been well aware 
of the diversity of ideas on the notion of marriage and the fact that some would consider it part 
of a Godly order rather than an institution of human law. The law, he continued, respected these 
ideas by looking at marriage in its civil relations exclusively (TK 1999-00b, 6). The legislative 
 
177  As Bos mentions, the VVD remained strongly divided over the issue of same-sex marriage until the 
late-1990s. Only after the elections of 1998, the faction leader supported the cause and the faction ultimately 
supported the bill. Half the VVD faction had rejected the earlier bill by, among others, Dittrich (NRC 2017c). 
D66’s 1994 election program still called for a registered partnership, while that from 1998 focuses on marriage. 
Evaluations in the press differ. The RD (2001) claims that the persuasive argument in favor of same-sex 
marriage was that such claim allowed a polarization vis-á-vis the CDA.  
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change was thus explicitly linked to the separation of civil and church marriage as an aspect of 
the separation of church and state. The government explained that it had consciously introduced 
a notion of marriage that was differentiated from, among other, religious ideas of marriage. The 
same reasoning was also integrated in the law itself and in Article 30 of Dutch family law, 
which now reads:  
1. A marriage can be started by two people of different or the same sex. 
2. The law only focuses on marriage in its civil meaning. 
The law is thus based on and articulates the differentiation between civil and church marriage 
and restricts its scope to civil marriage alone. The cabinet argued that the differentiation 
between the two institutions was already applied in Art. 68 of Dutch family law, which prohibits 
conducting religious ceremonies prior to a marriage being officially registered (TK 1999-00b, 
7). As such, the bill did not change the existing pattern of church-state separation but remained 
within its boundaries. The multiple secularities approach operates with the formula of 
“secularity for the sake of” and one might argue that the bill secularized the state institution of 
marriage for the sake of individual liberty and equality. Rhetorically though, the secularity of 
civil marriage was referred to in order to make the break with the traditional notion of marriage 
more acceptable to (orthodox) Christians. This tone of secular self-restraint links to the 
distinction between irreligion and differentiated third place positions as two different modes of 
nonreligion (ch.1.3).  
The emphasis of neutrality constitutes a communicative effort meant to win over those who 
have lost the political process and to ward of allegations of being irreligious. Regardless of 
these rhetoric assertions of secular neutrality, same-sex marriage has remained politically 
contested, and the legal change was only a temporary stage and only one aspect in that struggle. 
Similar to the debates surrounding the equal treatment law, the horizontal scope of the new law 
has also now become an object of contestation. Currently, however, it was not the status of 
religious civil society organizations that was at stake but rather the case of civil registrars and 
the distinction between the (secular) state and the (private) realm of citizens.  
Already during the debate about the opening of civil marriage, the question emerged whether 
registrars should be allowed to claim conscientious objections to conducting same-sex 
marriages. State secretary Cohen gave in to the desires of the small Protestant parties and 
guaranteed that registrars would not be forced to act in conflict with their conscious, as long as 
the conduct of same-sex marriages was assured in every municipality (NRC 2007, TK 2000-
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01a). At the time, this was a compromise between those claiming exemption rights and those 
primarily concerned about the realization of equal marriage rights. Different from the prior bill 
on registered partnerships, this compromise was not some pluralist solution arrived at through 
the establishment of different institutions but was instead achieved by rendering the state as 
being not neutral from but shaped by worldview diversity. In the current debate, registrars with 
conscientious objections have been dubbed “refusing civil servants” (weigerambtenaren), a 
punt at what is perceived to be legal relativism and a subjectivation of law by many of the liberal 
minded. In what follows, I briefly deviate from the chronological order of this chapter to sketch 
the most recent developments concerning this case because they show how the logic of state 
secularity and individual equality was completed by making it obligatory for civil servants. This 
decision is structurally similar to other recent changes that institutionalize an individual liberty 
and equality approach with respect to sexual diversity and assert it vis-à-vis religious 
organizations and institutions---a core example being the decision to oblige religious schools, 
alike others, to teach about sexual diversity (Trouw 2017a).  
With the end of the second purple cabinet and the subsequent Christian democratic cabinets, 
the debate on the rights of civil registrars was reopened. In 2014, the First Chamber accepted a 
bill, introduced by two D66 parliamentarians in 2012, that changes the equal treatment law to 
make it illegal for civil registrars to discriminate against same-sex couples (TK 2012b, 4f.). The 
law change obliges civil registrars to act according to the law and the principle of church-state 
separation. While the Dutch constitution makes no explicit reference to the separation of church 
and state, the bill states that that in the case of civil and church marriage such separation was 
clearly codified.178 The law change thus complements the logic of the opening same-sex 
marriage; rather than stressing the secular state’s obligation to respect to the autonomy of the 
church (and its institution of marriage), it obliges civil servants to differentiate between their 
personal beliefs and their official duty and to conform with the principle of individual equality 
in this function. The bill argued that, despite the Dutch tradition of tolerance towards religious 
views, only a strict assertion of the equal treatment principle was adequate in a context were 
religion could both support and undermine tolerance (TK 2012b, 4f.).179  
 
178  Generally speaking, the separation of church and state is considered a non-codified legal tradition based 
on the combined reading of Art. 1 (equal treatment) and Art. 6 (freedom of religion) (Van Bijsterveld 2015, 
502). 
179  The orthodox Protestant parties objected to the bill, and stressed that objections to homosexuality 
should be accepted in the same way as acceptance of homosexuals, and that there should be equal room for civil 
registrars without and with objections to same-sex marriage (Trouw 2013a, b). The latter line of argument 
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Important for the case at hand, the bill not only obliges civil servants to respect individual 
equality as a core principle of the state and to privatize their religious objections, it also obliges 
them to respect the secular character of civil marriage. The bill argues that civil registrars, who 
for religious reasons objected to conducting same-sex marriages, not only harmed the same-sex 
couples they refused to marry. Rather they also harmed those heterosexual couples, who had 
assumed to partake in a mere secular or civil act of the state but were unintentionally and 
unknowingly drawn into a ritual that was implicitly framed as (indistinct from) a religious or 
church-related issue by a state representative.180 The refusal to conduct same-sex marriage was 
thus seen as proof of a lack of respect for the secular character of civil marriage and with it the 
(negative) religious freedom of those being married by them. The explanation to the bill claims 
that municipalities should ask heterosexual couples if they can accept being married by a civil 
servant incapable of differentiating between civil and religious marriage (TK 2012b). This 
potentially somewhat mocking request strategically broadens the group of those harmed by 
registrars with conscientious objections and it universalizes the principle they harm. It is not 
about the unequal treating of homosexuals alone but also about the symbolic subordination of 
all those who are either not religious or for whatever other reason care about the secular 
character of civil marriage. The separation of church and state is explained as an important 
precondition of the equal freedom of and from religion and thus an individual concern. Its 
stability depended not the least on the inner commitment of civil servants. In 2013, in any case, 
the second chamber accepted the bill, and the first chamber did so in 2014 (in both cases against 
the opposition of CDA, CU, and SGP). 
All in all, this most recent legislation asserts a principled constitutionalism against a pragmatic 
and compromise-approach to accommodating diversity that had been guiding the previous 
legislation. It establishes individual liberty as a principled, secular value and right, both 
protecting and limiting religion. Last but not least, it reframes the equality of homosexuals as a 
matter of general concern. Complementing the bill, a similar argument was made in the public 
debate on the matter. In a non-official newspaper comment, two young intellectuals affiliated 
with D66 and the labor party, e.g., argued that a state accepting exemption rights on religious 
grounds grants a privileged status to religious people when compared to nonreligious ones, an 
argument which has also been made with respect to other legislative issues concerning 
 
echoes the idea of parallel pluralism by relativizing the constitutional principle of equality to a particularistic 
perspective and by thus asking the state to treat both perspectives equally. 
180  A similar argument, with respect to t a different case, was made by Wohlrab-Sahr in talk at the closing 
conference of the Emmy-Noether Project in 2016.  
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secularity (Duyvestijn and Kleinpaste 2011). What if, the authors rhetorically ask, a committed 
Marxists refused to marry rich people or if an atheist refused to marry religious people. Here as 
well, it is not the equality of homosexuals alone, but equality in a general sense is at stake. As 
will be shown in chapter 8 this understanding of homosexual rights as a matter and symbol of 
equality in general has also been central to the struggle of a local progressive party in a small 
Bible belt-town in the Netherlands, where nonreligious and progressive people constitute a 
minority.  
With some of my informants, I spoke about the legislative initiative against conscientious 
objections to same-sex marriages and one of the interviews suggests that another motive aside 
from that of equality and state neutrality might also play a role, at least on a personal level. One 
of my informants who will be introduced in more detail in chapter 8, elaborated on the 
hypothetical situation of his own marriage and he stressed that even if he was not gay, he would 
object to being married by a civil servant with objections to same sex marriage.  
I think I would ask the ambtenaar [civil servant] if he was against or pro gay marriage, if he 
was against, I don't think I want him to do my wedding as well, […] because why if he thinks 
that it is so important, that special moment in my life, I do not want to to let it be ruled by an 
ambtenaar by who I disagree with his opinions (Interview Alwie 2013, 611-13).  
The interview does not make it clear whether this concerns the position on homosexuality as 
such, on same-sex marriage, or on the separation of state and church. Importantly, however, the 
civil servant is referred to as person—someone with an opinion—rather than a mere 
representative of the state and his core concern seems to be that of value congruence in a special 
moment. Here, thus, the dynamic of the original case is reversed in the sense that not only the 
civil servant but also the groom is seen to expect a minimal agreement on values. A similar 
concern showed in the interview with a young member of the party’s youth organization, who 
spoke about liberalism as something that had bearing beyond politics and on people’s private 
lives. She, e.g., referred to people who consciously chose homosexuals as godparents for their 
children and considered ways to make a wedding ceremony less traditional by, e.g., mocking 
its Christian tradition (Interview Eda 2013, 167-174, 191-196).  
The entire debate on same-sex marriage, as mentioned, has been interrelated with a debate about 
the status of marriage as such. While in the 1980s left-progressivists rejected marriage as a 
conservative institution, the bill on same-sex marriage claimed to also open (make public and 
generally accessible) the symbolic aspect of marriage. While the bill still understood marriage 
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as a traditional institution, these selective interview quotes point to forms of symbolically 
appropriating this institution as well as the symbolic importance of homosexuality for this 
cause. As shown in the quote by Alwie, marriage then gains its symbolic importance from being 
an important day in an individual’s life. This specialness of the wedding day can also dwarf the 
religious concern at stake, when the wedding is rendered “more important in somebody's life 
that one day in your job” (Interview Eda 2013, 296-302).  
4.2.2 Summary and Discussion 
This section sketched the political controversy surrounding the opening of civil marriage and 
discussed two political controversies linked to the matter of same-sex marriage: the horizontal 
application of the law with respect to religious institutions and the exemption rights for civil 
registrars, both of which concern the border between the state and its citizens. A first point was 
to show how with the legalization of same-sex marriages an individual liberty and equality 
frame was asserted against residuals of an institutionalized Christianity as well as a (worldview) 
or cultural pluralism. Both, the principle of individual liberty and a pluralist model are at odds 
with an institutionalization of Christianity—which at least in its orthodox interpretation objects 
to any formal recognition of same-sex partnerships. The pluralist model seeks to accommodate 
orthodox or “traditional” notions of marriage within a larger equal rights frame. This clearly 
differs from the orthodox notion of a state obligation towards God’s law as such, but it still 
gives a certain legitimacy to such claims by retaining marriage as a heterosexual institution tied 
to (at least the possibility of natural) reproduction, and by recognizing them as exemption 
grounds. From the perspective of an individual equality frame, however, such accommodation 
comes down to just another form of unequal treatment of homosexuals through excluding them 
from the symbolic aspects of the institution of marriage as well as through balancing their 
equality with the religious freedom of those rejecting them.  
The acceptance of religious objections is further seen to harm the (equality and liberty) of 
nonreligious or secular citizens by potentially subjecting them to a religious ritual through the 
state, and by further granting religious people exemption rights which others do not have in the 
same way. The individual equality frame by contrast implies the normative expectation and 
legal requirement to restructure one’s religious ideas and institution according to a private-
public divide.181  
 
181  Similar to the expectation that religious schools distinguish between profile and function (section 4.1.2). 
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A second point central to this section was to focus on references to the separation of church and 
state that were made in the course of the legislation process. Church-state separation does not 
constitute an explicit constitutional principle in the Netherlands but can be derived from the 
combination of other constitutional rights, such as the freedom of religion (Art. 6) and the 
principle of equal treatment (Art. 1) (Van Bijsterveld 2015, 502). Bijsterveld (2015, 4) states 
that the notion of church-state separation is mainly used in parliament debates and during the 
legislative process rather than in other official documents or in court rulings. The fact that it is 
used in political debates shows that it apparently has a meaning to people beyond its genuine 
legal relevance.  
For the case at hand, references to the separation of church and state were made in two different 
ways. First it was used in a conciliatory fashion, stressing the secular state’s respect towards 
the autonomy of churches. Here, it referenced the differentiation of civil and church marriage 
which had already been codified in Dutch law and this aimed at depoliticizing the opening of 
civil marriage as a mere execution of already existing legal regulations. Second, a reference to 
the principle of church-state separation was used to stress the obligation of civil servants as 
representatives of the state to execute their function in accordance with this principle. It thus 
functions as an assertion of certain limitations to religious freedom. This twofold restraint 
demarcates the individual equality focus from irreligious regimes that curb individual religious 
freedom as well as a pluralist model that institutionalizes worldview diversity at the level of the 
state of the public.  
Bijsterveld (2015, 4) contends that political references to the separation of church and state 
were either made to defend a Dutch model of including religion on equal footing or to achieve 
a greater separation of the state from religion in the sense of excluding religion from the state, 
that is, rendering the state “void” of religion. The latter of which Bijsterveld would assess is 
oriented on the French principle of laicité. The case at hand can generally be understood as an 
example of the latter type, but in my understanding the reference to a French model is not really 
helpful here as it suggests that secularity is rooted in a conflict between church and state rather 
than in a state’s governance of diversity. Here, by contrast, diversity is a crucial motive or 
reference problem to the claim for state neutrality. Importantly though, it does not only take 
religious diversity into account but a more complex form of diversity which includes 
nonreligious or secular orientations as well as sexual diversity and understands this diversity to 
be founded in the freedom of the individual, rather than the autonomy of groups. Against this 
background, the heterosexual definition of marriage as well as the recognition of (religious) 
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conscientious objections to same-sex marriages can be understood as a breach of the state’s 
neutrality given that it grants a special position to religious traditions and sentiments and 
compromises the individual equality rights of some people to the religious views of others. The 
claim for state neutrality is then a consequence of such greater and complex diversity rather 
than the expression of an antagonistic relation of church and state.182  
With his mentioned article on the religious rituals offered to same-sex coupled before the legal 
opening of civil marriage, Bos (2017, 199) aimed to challenge “a dominant narrative, that 
frames disagreements about same-sex relationships in terms of a—putatively ‘essential,’ 
‘eternal’—conflict between religious and secular institutions or ideologies.”183 Complementing 
his argument, this section pointed to a religious-secular conflict line which, even if not essential, 
totalistic, or encompassing, did shape the same-sex marriage legislation. In my understanding, 
his overall argument underestimates the tensions between the different models of emancipation. 
Even if a social-liberal ideal of equality is not in conflict with religion as such, it conflicted with 
a Christian democratic pluralist model. The secular dynamic of the political struggle further 
shows that beyond the equality of homosexuals that of nonreligious or secular people was also 
at stake. All in all, the opening of same-sex marriage was asserted against a, even a pluralist, 
institutionalization or recognition of religion even if such was not claimed by all religious 
people. The interview quotes of people’s subjective appropriations of marriage are selective 
examples of how the institution of marriage is symbolically secularized.  
The conceptual chapter introduced the notion of “cultures of secularity” and such culturality 
can be seen in the different value positions that guided the different policy approaches on 
homosexual emancipation. While the first bill placed social harmony central and thus opted for 
compromises, the second placed individual equality central and rejected the older compromises 
for that reason. Most clearly, the first can be associated with Christian Democrats and the latter 
with social liberals, while the role of social democrats has been more ambivalent. The selective 
interview quotes show that liberal value commitments can be personally relevant for people, 
that they are symbolically expressed, and that they guide peoples’ notions of, e.g., the scope of 
religious freedom.  
 
182  From the perspective of D66 thus, state neutrality thus implies the mutually respected autonomy of state 
and church as well as the organizational principle of individual equality rather than that of worldview pluralism. 
This notion of neutrality, again, is not rooted in the opposition to a single church but in an individualized notion 
of diversity.  




The next section briefly centers on another legislative change during the purple period, the legal 
regulation of euthanasia. Here as well, the motive of equal liberty was central to the debate. 
This case further complements the previous one in the sense that the social-liberal initiators did 
not stress the separation of church and state but the compatibility of their own position with 
religious-moral principles, as well as the legitimate diversity of religious-moral positions in 
general. While the reference to church-state separation functions to counter allegations of anti-
religiosity, the emphasis on individual morality and on the diversity of religious-moral views is 
placed against the notion of an antithetical divide between Christianity on the one hand and 
amorality and irreligion on the other, and it further claims legitimacy for the legal change in the 
name of (individual) religious and moral diversity.  
4.3 Self-Determination and Euthanasia  
No monopole on norms and values (Tuinstra 1994). 
Euthanasia in the sense of passive or active medical action that accelerates the death of someone 
terminally ill has been an object of medical and public-political debate since the mid-20th 
century (Kennedy 2002, Weyers 2010). Until the late 1970s, euthanasia was only discussed in 
public debate and by courts rather than by politics. From the 1980s onwards, D66 became the 
first and strongest supporter of a legal acceptance of euthanasia and this also strengthened the 
liberal focus on self-determination in the debate (Kennedy 2002, 94, 146).  
Generally speaking, the debate on euthanasia exhibited a similar dynamic to that of same-sex 
marriage in the sense that relevant changes happened within the religious field and through 
religious activities, while at the same time, the debate about the legalization of euthanasia 
retained a religious-secular conflict line. On the one hand, the growing acceptance and gradual 
legalization of euthanasia had a clear secular face: historically it correlated with the decline of 
church affiliation, the most prominent activists for a legalization were nonreligious 
organizations both in civil society and politics,184 among patients the support for euthanasia 
 
184  Aside from the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG), the Dutch Association for a Voluntary End 
of Life (NVVE) prominently called for a legalization of euthanasia (Kennedy 2002, 192). The NVVE was 
founded in 1973 and an over-proportional number of its members had no church-affiliation. Another core 
supporter of euthanasia was the Humanist Association (Ibid. 110f.). There were also important overlaps in 
membership between these civil society organizations and D66. The then-chair of the NVVE, Heleen Dupuis 
(1981-1985), was also a D66 member (Van Dam 2005). Since 1986, she was professor for medical ethics in 
Leiden and she joined the VVD in 1995 and became senator. Also, Jacob Kohnstamm who chaired the 
organization from 2000-2006 is a D66 member. In 1986, he had continued to promote the Wessel-Tuinstra bill. 
With respect to the Humanist association, I have already mentioned that many of its chairs were also D66 
members, examples being Max Rood (1969-1977), Jan Glastra van Loon (1987 – 1994), Liesbeth Mulder (1998-
2000), and Roger van Boxtel (2003-2005). 
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correlated with a disbelief in a hereafter, and the most fervent opposition to legalizing 
euthanasia came from the Christian parties as well as the Orthodox Protestant churches and the 
Catholic Church (Kennedy 2002, 105f.). At the same time, Christians and the (more liberal) 
Christian churches were also central contributors to the gradual acceptance of euthanasia (Ibid. 
106-109).185 Among Christian supporters for euthanasia, responsibility and philanthropy were 
central values—and these were also acceptable for liberals (Ibid. 114f.). The ideal of self-
determination in particular was met with religious opposition given that the CDA as well as the 
Catholic Church and the Orthodox Protestant churches rejected the principle of self-
determination at the end of life and stressed the sole authority of God when it came to life and 
death (Kennedy 2002, 147).  
As I mentioned, D66 was an early supporter for the legalization of euthanasia and in 1984 Elida 
Wessel-Tuinstra,186 a then-MP for D66 issued a first bill on the matter (TK 1984, Wessel-
Tuinstra 1985, 81).187 With respect to motives for the aspired legislative change, Wessel-
Tuinstra listed five starting points: the value of life, the humanization of dying, self-
determination under certain circumstances, careful support, and the controllability of life-
ending acts (TK 1984). In the party-magazine “idee” [idea],188 she positioned the matter of 
euthanasia in the debate on self-determination at the end of life in the party’s tradition of 
promoting further democratization and, for the sake of analytical coherence, this focus can be 
considered a particular form of an individual liberty frame (1985, 81). The focus on individual 
self-determination shows in several aspects of her bill. First, it stressed the freedom of the 
individual vis-à-vis medical possibilities and staff, the family, as well as the moral ideas of co-
citizens (TK 1984). Second, it limited legitimate euthanasia to responsive patients who could 
express their will. Importantly, and in contrast to the religious opposition to such individualism, 
Wessel-Tuinstra emphasized the compatibility of her bill with Christianity and further stressed 
 
185  Already at the end of the 1960s, theology shifted the focus on this (immanent) life rather than the next 
and contributed to the emergence of a new philosophy of death that framed it as a natural part of life (Kennedy 
2002, 40f). Prominent theologians also argued that the developments in the medical field made it necessary to 
also allow for euthanasia (Kennedy 2002, 69, 73). A theological support for euthanasia, though, did not 
necessarily imply a rejection of the idea of life being a gift of God but entailed a reformulation of man’s 
autonomy in relation to God (Ibid. 154). All in all, Kennedy (2002, 106f.) claims that the period was not only 
one of religious decline but also of the transformation of Christianity which gave way to a new moral energy.  
186  She changed her name to her birth name Tuinstra in 1986. 
187  The bill did not suggest the legalization of euthanasia but formulated justifications for conducting 
euthanasia with impunity.  
188  The journal exists since 1980 and was named “Idee’66” until 1991. It self-understands as scientific and 
has contributions by party delegates, other politicians, scholars, and other public intellectuals. Moreover, there 
also is the members’ magazine “Democraat.”  
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the legitimate diversity of non/religious-moral positions as that which made an individualist 
legal approach to end-of-life related matters necessary. 
In the mentioned party magazine article, by contrast, Wessel-Tuinstra (1985, 81) quotes a 
statement from a Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (Gereformeerde Kerken 
in Nederland189) from 1984 which states that “from the perspective of Christian faith a decision 
to end one’s own life can be justifiable.” Moreover, a recent documentary movie on the 
legalization process, Tuinstra, who is one of the interviewees, is depicted sitting in a room with 
a large bible being clearly visible on a shelf behind her (Rosens 2016). Wessel-Tuinstra was 
part of an internal party working group, “belief and political action,” which had contributed to 
preparing the bill.190 The workgroup, which brought together Catholics and Protestants of 
different churches, had existed since the end of the 1970s and at some point was turned into an 
official workgroup under the authority of the party’s scientific bureau (RD 2000a).191 An article 
in the party magazine describes the group as being “made up of members who test ethical 
criteria for societal action on their Christian belief” (Douma 1996a, 31). It was further “based 
on the idea that man himself is co-responsible for the developments of earth and in society” 
(Ibid.). This brief characterization not only fits an individualist notion of religious authority, it 
also bridges God’s authority and an immanent responsibility of man that resonates with the 
party’s general focus on responsibility. Another member of the working group as well, 
contributed to the debate with an opinion piece and an article in the party-magazine (Douma 
1996a, b). Here, the theological references were even more pronounced; the author offered a 
moral-theological interpretation of the Christian bible and tradition and referred to church 
positions on the matter. Ultimately, she concluded that the social-liberal focus on the individual 
autonomy of patients, which had guided the workgroup, did not conflict with Christian values.  
The bill itself also refers to a publication of the Synod of the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk as 
having contributed to breaching the taboo around euthanasia and it also referred to the internal 
party workgroup. Aside from that, however, it does not quote any substantive positions of 
churches (or other civil society actors) and only points to the legitimate diversity of 
 
189  It constitutes the merger of two orthodox Calvinist churches that split off from the Dutch Reformed 
Church (Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk) in late-19th century. 
190  The website, parlement en politiek, describes her worldview affiliation as liberal reformed. 
https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lli5ymzl/e_k_elida_tuinstra.  
191  Recently, the group was mentioned when one of the long-time members of both the group and the party 
left D66 to become a member of the ChristenUnie (ND 2011). 
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non/religious-moral positions on the matter.192 It states that “in a diverse society as ours, 
different ideas can luckily coexist next to each other. Respect for each other’s opinion and 
mutual tolerance offer good perspectives for responsibly dealing with the issue of euthanasia” 
(TK 1984, 7). In a legitimately diverse society, the state may not enforce a particularistic moral 
view on citizens and has to guarantee individual autonomy on a horizontal level as well (thus 
concerning the interrelations of citizens) (TK 1984). The bill stressed that euthanasia would not 
be enforced on anyone and that no one was obliged to commit acts of euthanasia, as the bill 
only aimed to create the legal conditions for responsible acts of help. Still, the bill gave primacy 
to a patient’s wishes over the possible conscientious objections of the doctor in the sense that it 
obliges doctors to at least refer patients to colleagues.  
I cannot say whether the religious references in the euthanasia bill were carried by a larger party 
consensus, but the relevance of moral and religious arguments and references can be understood 
from the relations in the political field and as an opposition to an orthodox claim and notion of 
Christianity: The orthodox Protestant parties opposed the bill on principled grounds and (at 
least partly) stressed God’s sole authority over life. Furthermore, they also criticized the bill for 
apparently lacking a principled base and moral foundation (TK 1985a).193 The religious 
arguments of the social-liberal initiators shifted the focus on the diversity of competing 
religious and moral arguments and in the ongoing debate, orthodox Protestants and social 
liberals have both made references to competing statements from the different churches (TK 
1985a, TK 1985b). The bill’s submitters further state that they prefer the Reformed Church’s 
interpretation that “the commandments were for man” above a claimed duty to live and they 
refer to the prominent reformed theologian of the time, Kuitert, to stress that “no man may force 
another to die against their will, and no man may force another to live against their will” (TK 
1985b). 
In the mid-1980s, when Wessel-Tuinstra tabled her bill on euthanasia, a parliamentary majority 
was considered possible (TK 1984, Wessel-Tuinstra 1985, 81). Eventually, the bill was blocked 
by the CDA and after a long parliamentary struggle, voted against in 1993, while a formal and 
more limited proposition of the government (Lubbers III) was accepted by both chambers 
 
192  Obviously, also the fact that the bill lists motives such as the humanization of dying, the worth of life, 
and self-determination can be seen as claiming a value position of its own.  
193  The SGP faction argued that rather than basing the law on a lived practice,193 it should be based on 
moral-ethical principles and that such moral principles were, in Western culture, strongly influenced by the bible 
and the centrality of the relation between God and men (TK 1985a). The RPF faction claimed that law should 
provide a society with fundamental norms and criticized the “unprincipled” approach of the bill on that basis. 
Similar arguments were made by the GPV faction. See also (TK 2000a, 16).  
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(Kennedy 2002, 94f., 192, Weyers 2010, 235f., 325, 327, NRC 1993).194 While the first bill 
required doctors to refer patients to colleagues if they themselves were not willing to partake in 
euthanasia (something the small orthodox parties in particular had criticized), the second bill 
explicitly stressed the right to conscientious objections (TK 1985c, TK 1986, Weyers 2010, 
236). Similar to the case of same-sex marriage, the social-liberal emphasis on individual equal 
liberty conflicted and subordinated the recognition of religious objections.195  
Liberals and especially the D66 parliamentarians scandalized the CDA’s efforts to hamper the 
liberal initiative (Weyers 2010, 271, Kennedy 2002, 94f.). The focus on an immaterial 
liberalization had incentivized the campaign for a secular government, and like the case of 
same-sex marriage the issue was reopened by the second purple cabinet. The D66 faction issued 
another bill to legalize euthanasia during the first purple cabinet and this bill was eventually 
taken over by the second purple government and in 2000 and 2001 the law was subsequently 
accepted by both chambers (Weyers 2010, 389f.).196 Within D66, Els Borst (1932-2014), as 
minister for public health in both purple cabinets, took the lead on regulating euthanasia, and 
the law was co-issued by VVD-minister of justice, Benk Korthals.  
In the party program from 1998 as well as the bill, individual self-determination once more 
constituted the core motive.197 Also the notion of how to deal with the retaining contestedness 
 
194  Rather than legalizing euthanasia, the government had formulated standards for its practice and a 
procedure for legal actions or their omission (Weyers 2010, 319). The cabinet suggestion also included medical 
actions that accelerated death without an explicit request from the patient (Ibid. 322). 
195  Furthermore, both bills gave importance to taking the relatives and close-ones of the patient into 
account. Yet while the first bill explicitly stressed that only patient and doctor were allowed to make a decision 
in that case, the second bill gave more weight to the family in the sense that doctor and patient should consider 
their integration in the decision-making process. The differences seem small, but they give expression to 
competing stances regarding the principle of self-determination. 
196  The first purple cabinet stated no intention of a further legalization of euthanasia but aimed at evaluating 
the existing practice and regulations (Weyers 2010, 352). In 1997, it introduced a so-called testing commissions 
that would mediate between doctors and the public prosecution office, the idea being that in cases where 
euthanasia was performed with due diligence and reported, no criminal charges should be filed—a measure that 
was meant to increase doctor’s willingness to report cases and thus make the practice factually controllable (Ibid. 
387f). The later D66 bill explicitly stated conditions under which euthanasia was not punishable and it included 
all measures in an extra law, thus giving a much more formal and prominent place to the regulation of euthanasia 
than the former CDA-PvdA bill had. The bill further grants the commissions a more important role in the sense 
that the public prosecutor would only then come into play when the commission found that regulations had been 
breached (Ibid. 391f).  
197  In the election program from 1998, individual liberty in end-of-life matters is seen to depend on the 
existence of good palliative care. At times it has been critically remarked that the legalization of euthanasia and 
the polarized debate about it slowed down the development of palliative care in the Netherlands (Gordijn and 
Janssens 2004, 198f., Oratovska 2015, 22). Some even claim that it was the association of palliative care with 
Christianity that it was regarded with hesitation by secular politicians (Schoots 2011). In the late-1980s and early 
1990s’ debates on euthanasia, it indeed seems that Christian parties indeed stressed the importance of palliative 
care. By the mid-1990s in any case, the importance of palliative care as a background condition for euthanasia 
was recognized across all parties (Gordijn and Janssens 2004, 199). While some critics of the legalization of 
euthanasia presented palliative care as an alternative, the purple minister of public health, Borst, stressed that 
136 
 
of euthanasia and possible moral objections from doctors remained the same.198 Later 
documents, however, at least at the level of rhetoric, no longer referred to self-determination as 
a motive or principle of legislation but speak of the need to create legal clarity.199 At the least, 
the official documents thus seem to have de-politicized (versachlicht) the debate by sidelining 
the value-motives behind the legislation.200  
During the parliamentary debate, the responsible ministers further expressed the hope that in its 
concreteness the bill might find the support of many regardless of their religious or worldview 
affiliations (TK 2000b, 75). The rhetorical depoliticization, however, did not prevent the 
subsequent parliamentary debate from addressing the competing value perspectives on the 
matter at hand (TK 2000a, 18, 24). Apparently, there had also been critical voices in the public 
debate; all factions in any case used the parliamentary debate to outline their motives and values 
(Ibid.). The Christian parties opposed the bill as it perceived it to breach the primacy of the 
worth and protection of life (TK 2000a, 7, 18, 20). While the SGP founded this position on the 
bible and referred to God’s sole authority over life (Ibid. 20), the CDA referred to the value of 
human life as a shared moral principle in both humanism and Christianity (Ibid. 7). The secular 
parties also stressed their support for the protection and worth of human life yet without placing 
this in opposition to the bill.201  
In the broader public debate on the matter and similar to the dynamics in the 1980s, social-
liberals emphasized the religious-moral foundation of the bill as well as the factual and 
 
palliative care might prevent euthanasia in some cases but it would not make it obsolete (Weyers 2010, 278, 
Gordijn and Janssens 2004, 201). Also in retrospect, Borst and the purple coalition were criticized for legalizing 
euthanasia too early rather than first guaranteeing palliative care, something that had been denied by Borst (NRC 
2009a, b). 
198  The bill only sets out by stating a broad consensus on the legitimacy of euthanasia while emphasizing 
that the views of those who opposed euthanasia should be respected (TK 1998b). It creates a legal scope in 
which euthanasia is legitimate, but frames it as a social and moral issue rather than an aspect of medical practice. 
Given that euthanasia was not part of the professionally required task-set of doctors, there was no need to include 
a paragraph on conscientious objections. At the same time, though, the bill pertains to the obligation for doctors 
to refer patients with euthanasia requests to colleagues without principled objections. The government later 
adapted this position.  
199  The coalition agreement for the second purple cabinet only mentioned the need to define the legal scope 
for doctors and other medical staff (TK 1998c). When the government took over the parliamentary bill it made 
brief reference to the aim of giving legal clarity to medical staff which was stated in the coalition agreement (TK 
1999c). 
200  This can be seen as a strategic move, but it also fits the liberal idea of a morally neutral state. In that 
understanding, it is suitable for a political party to express its value position but the state should refrain from 
enforcing one particularistic moral point of view (compare with (VMS 2016 [2009], 32). 
201  For the left parties (PvdA and especially the socialist SP), the relativization of the self-determination 
principle was based on a concern with the social-material preconditions and the situation of the care sector, that 
might impair the genuine freedom of end-of-life choices (TK 2000a, 15). The CDA also referred to another 
church position paper, which apparently criticized the euthanasia legalization at a time characterized by 
individualism and materialism, in which the notion of respect for the value of life of those impaired by 
weakness, sickness, and handicap tended to decline (TK 2000a, 7). 
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legitimate diversity of moral positions in defense against the notion of a renewed antithesis 
between religion and irreligion according to which the purple cabinet and its legislation were 
framed as a binary other of Christianity.202 In the case of Wessel-Tuinstra and Douma, religious 
arguments were central to their reasoning. Later contributors to the debate seem to have 
engaged in quasi-theological debates rather unintentionally. In a press interview, Borst (the 
minister responsible for the eventual legalization of euthanasia) commented on the orthodox 
Protestant critique that euthanasia would be against the will of God. She expressed her 
incomprehension of a “formalist” understanding of man’s freedom vis-à-vis God, which found 
it legitimate to prolong life for a week but not to end it a week earlier (Oostveen 2001). Asked 
about her own religious affiliation, she answered briefly, but also stated that, in her view, this 
was not a question she had to answer. As such, she appeared to be making a quasi-theological 
argument in order to counter orthodox claims of representing the religious voice as such.  
Both the engaged and reluctant quasi-theological contributions differ from a third kind of 
response, which centers on the diversity of moral positions rather than focusing on religion or 
expressing a personal moral conviction: Tuinstra, e.g., published an opinion piece in which she 
countered the suggestion of a new antithesis between confessional and non-confessional parties. 
In it, she characterized the post-pillarized presence by a diversification of religious positions 
and also referenced that parties like D66 had religious members (Tuinstra 1994). She also 
claimed a shared moral consensus based on a Judeo-Christian and humanist tradition in the 
Netherlands which should not be “monopolized” by either party (Ibid.). The article is entitled 
“no monopole on norms and values.”203 In a similar tone, Roger van Boxtel, then senator for 
D66 and a later chair of the Humanist Association, reflected on the legislation process in a 
recent documentary. He stated that during the election one could feel that everyone was making 
their own conscious choice (Rosens 2016). His statement thus claims a moral position for all 
participants in the political debate regardless of their religious affiliations.  
 
202  The orthodox Protestant parties framed the legislative change as a total reversal of the right moral order 
(TK 2000-01b, 4649). Faction members criticized a re-orientation of the health system towards the provision 
providing death rather than the service to life and placed the bill in opposition to the Christian eschatological 
hope in overcoming death. 
203  A more recent contribution on the matter carries an almost identical title: “The protection of life is no 
monopole of Christian politicians” is the header of an opinion piece written by the D66 parliamentarian Pia 
Dijkstra (*1954) and published in the newspaper, Volkskrant, as well as on the D66 party-website (Dijkstra 
2016). Here, too, an autonomous moral position is claimed against the notion of an anti-morality as well as that 
of a mere antagonistic, in-substantive position. The claims of these arguments go beyond stressing a legitimate 




Eventually, the final decision on the matter was made by a secular majority despite opposition 
from the Christian parties. While the motive of equal liberty was central to the debate, the 
legislative change did not realize the maximum of what was then publicly claimed in the name 
of individual liberty. In the broader public debate a “genuine tiredness of life” was also 
discussed as a legitimate reason for euthanasia but these claims found no legal recognition (the 
chamber still acknowledged this as an important social question and the issue is brought up 
recurrently) (Rosens 2016).204 The ministers responsible for the bill stressed that no right for 
euthanasia was established as doctors were only given the legal right to “to accommodate the 
explicit and well-considered death wish of a hopelessly and unbearably suffering patient” under 
certain conditions (TK 2000c, 17f.). What is so taken for granted is that it is not mentioned 
explicitly that—with the exception of the orthodox parties—the majority of the 
parliamentarians took it for granted that vis-à-vis God, man certainly was free to make end-of-
life decisions. Beyond that, the bill also stressed the respective horizontal autonomy vis-à-vis 
other people including family members.  
4.3.1 Summary and Discussion 
Complementing the first section on same-sex marriage, this section on the legalization of 
euthanasia gave a second example of the gradual assertion of an individual liberty and equality 
frame as the organizational principle for the role of religion in society (type 1). Compared to 
the case of same-sex marriage, in the debate on euthanasia the separation of church and state 
was not an overt motif. Especially in the early period of the struggle for legalization, religious 
arguments were central not the least because of the involvement of an internal party working 
group in the drafting of the bill. The defenders of the bill stressed the compatibility of euthanasia 
with certain forms of Christianity and further pointed to the legitimate diversity of end-of-life 
wishes. The religious tone was understood to be in line with the liberal ideal of religion as an 
individual source of inspiration and further functioned to undermine the exclusive claim on 
Christianity articulated by the orthodox parties.  
All in all, liberty/ self-determination and equality constituted two central and interrelated 
motives. On the one hand, the liberty of individuals was asserted against doctors with 
conscientious objections as well as family members or relatives. On the other hand, euthanasia 
 
204  Kennedy (2002, 201f.) stresses that the legislation primarily determined a communicative process 
during which a well-considered decision concerning the end of life could be made. In the explanation of the bill 
in 2000, Borst said the most important reasons for the law was that people should know that there was a legal 
scope for engaging in a debate about euthanasia, without legal threats for the doctor, and that such debate was 
not a one-time incident but should take some time (“niet alleen met elkaar in gesprek gaan, maar ook enige tijd 
in gesprek blijven” (Ibid.).  
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was not declared a genuine individual right. The theme of liberty/ self-determination 
nonetheless constituted the main point of contestation between the different parties. Equality 
once more constituted a core theme in the sense that the liberal initiators opposed the 
institutionalization of a single particularistic morality through the state. As such, the 
liberalization was interpreted as a further differentiation of state-law from (a particular 
interpretation of) Christianity.  
The communication of respect was crucial to the passing of the bill. The responsible ministers, 
e.g., emphasized that objections to euthanasia among patients and doctors were respected but 
that this respect could not go as far as to dis-acknowledge the ideas of a majority (TK 2000b, 
28f.). Later, Prime Minster Kok explained that democracy was based on the readiness of 
listening to each other, of showing respect for those with different ideas, but that eventually 
decisions were made by majority vote and that also those who lost were expected to respect the 
outcome of such vote (TK 2000-01b, 4646f.). The majority decision was thus defended by 
discussing the limits of respect. Complementing the previous sections, the next part of this 
chapter centers on a debate that accompanied the debate on euthanasia and concerned the 
neutrality––or religion-relatedness––of state and political public. As will be shown, here once 
more, social (religious and other diversity) is a core motive for notions of state secularity (in 
counter-distinction from an irreligious state-culture) as well as notions of the political public as 
a secular realm of human interrelations, in which God’s laws are at least bracketed and 
worldview differences is bridged by an ethic of mutual respect.  
4.4 Blasphemy, Demonization, and Secular Politics 
An almost iconic incident in the debate on euthanasia was an interview D66 Minister Els Borst 
gave to the liberal newspaper, NRC, after the First Chamber had accepted the euthanasia law. 
Asked whether her faction had celebrated the legislative success she is quoted to have 
laughingly replied in Dutch “het is volbracht” (it is finished/ it is done), words that work well 
in every-day Dutch language but also happen to be among the last words of Jesus before he 
died at the cross. The interview further happened to be published on Holy Saturday, which 
according to the Christian tradition is the day between the crucifixion and burial of Jesus and 
his resurrection on Easter Sunday. As such, her words were perceived as being highly 
blasphemous and insensitive among orthodox Christians (RD 2001a). The expression is quoted 
a second time at the beginning of the article, and then used as a rhetorical hint of a possible 
further liberalization in the future which might legitimize a self-chosen death for the elderly. 
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When asked about the opposition to the bill among orthodox Protestants, she stated that 
“unfortunately she had lost all contact with people who thought like that.”  
Her expression seems to have just been a carefree use of religious words, but the interview 
caused a genuine scandal and resulted in an (eventually unsuccessful) censure motion against 
the minister. The incident was discussed in an extraordinary parliament debate. A member of 
the ChristenUnie criticized the minister for using the words that Christ used to proclaim his 
overcoming of death for what he considered a capitulation to a culture of death (doodsdenken) 
(TK 2000-01b, 4649). Similarly, a member of the SGP criticized her alleged sneer at the words 
of Christ and he contrasted her triumph over the successful bill with the hope that the 
resurrection of Christ gave to “sinners, the suffering, sick, and the handicapped” (Ibid.). The 
same parliamentarian also refrained from repeating her words so as to not lower them even 
further. Here, thus, her careless and profane use of the words was not only perceived to be 
blasphemous, but in the context of the euthanasia debate and the Easter holiday they were 
rendered into an icon of a reversed moral order.  
Another member of the Christian Democrats spoke of a “wrong sort of triumphalism” (Ibid. 
4644), and a member of the Greens criticized her for giving expression to the apparent 
“hosanna-feelings” among D66, for celebrating a much contested political “victory” as well as 
for too easily setting aside the orthodox part of the population and further dialogue with them 
(Ibid. 4650f.).205 The word hosanna-feelings carries a similar opposition between life and death 
that was also stressed by the members of the Orthodox Protestant parties, but in the context at 
hand, it seems to be merely used as an expression of triumph without such further association.206 
Instead, a different concern was raised here: It was not the euthanasia law that was at stake as 
such but her apparent attitude towards (orthodox) religious minorities in the Netherlands. 
Already in the context of the equal treatment legislation in the late-1980s, orthodox Protestants 
had criticized the rise of blasphemous expressions and the growing social and political tolerance 
 
205  Reading the entire interview, the triumphant tone seems to have been brought in by the newspaper 
rather than being set by the minister. Also, in the first interview she actually seemed to have cared about 
maintaining a sense of graveness rather than celebration with respect to the topic at hand (she explicitly said it 
was nothing to celebrate but that they had been content (Oostveen 2001). Instead, it was the interviewer who was 
eager to portray her as power-focused and triumphant. Also, during the mentioned parliamentary debate, she 
emphasized that they had not celebrated the law. 
206  According to Meriam-Webster, the word hosanna means a cy of acclamation and adoration, and a cry of 
victory signaling something good according to the Dutch dictionary, Van Dale. The word is important in the 
Christian tradition and refers to the broader Easter holiday (RD 2014c, PKN). On Palm Sunday, a week before 
Easter, the phrase is meant to recall the entry of Jesus into Jerusalem where he was greeted with the exclamation 
“Hosanna, the Son of David! Blessed be He, Who comes in the name of the Lord!” Only a view days later, the 
local crowd asked for his crucifixion.  
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of religious criticism and satire. Against the background of the protection of women and 
especially homosexuals under the new equal treatment legislation, they felt that the balance 
between different population groups had shifted to the disadvantage of orthodox Protestants 
(PN 1989). In this case, the apparent harm of such blasphemous expressions was heightened by 
the fact that they were voiced by a representative of the state. Borst was reminded that, as a 
minister, she had to represent all citizens of the political community, including those who 
opposed the law and whose religious sensibilities were hurt by such expressions. Borst herself 
told the Second Chamber that she had not been aware of the words’ Christian meaning and that 
she had not intentionally meant to hurt Christians. If she had known their biblical origin, she 
would and should not have used them (TK 70, 4645f.).207 Here, too, a normative expectation of 
respecting the sensibilities of others came to the fore. 
Moreover, the scandal also concerned the norms and rules of the public political debate, and 
her apparent triumph seems to have violated something the debate previously had left intact: In 
the mentioned documentary, the much-respected former SGP leader Bas van der Vlies (*1942) 
recalls, that when the parliament was about to vote on the euthanasia bill, he asked the other 
chamber members to spare him the cheering that traditionally accompanied the successful 
passing of a draft bill, a wish that was recognized by the chamber (Rosens 2016). The emotional 
self-restraint of the political winners did not make the euthanasia-law more acceptable in 
substance, but it functioned as a way of re-constituting the public-political realm as an arena of 
co-existence and nurtured the conditions under which parties could commit to such pragmatism 
even if they lose.208 This example gives expression to a secular ethic of moderation, based in a 
genuine and pragmatic commitment to politics as a field of persistent diversity of views in 
which the persistence of actors with conflicting ideas must be endured and the denigration of a 
political opponent needs to be avoided (IESS).209 
 
207  Similarly, she stressed that she regretted that the party had lost contact and agreement with orthodox 
Christians, but that did not imply a compromise on the matter as such. Rather, Borst stated her regret that she had 
still not managed to convince the orthodox Protestants and offered to keep up the discussion. 
208  De Jong (2014, 143f.) gives a similar example. He mentions a speech held in 1960 by a social-
democratic expert in constitutional law. Referring to the recent abolishment of the official prayer in local 
councils, the speech urges Dutch humanists (who had apparently campaigned for the change) to not celebrate 
this as a victory. The minute of silence that replaced the prayer should not be rendered a triumph for only one 
side but an acceptable solution and neutral ground for all. In my understanding, both this admonition as well as 
the rhetorically stressed self-restraint carry a similar idea of neutrality as something fragile, which is not the least 
established and upheld in a communicative and inter-personal way in a situation of changing power and majority 
relations. 
209  Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (“politics”), see the distinction between utopian and pragmatist 
notions of politics. 
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The debate thereby reveals two competing notions of respect: the secular respect for others and 
their sensibilities on the one hand, and respect towards the moral-ontological world that informs 
these sensibilities. A second, less prominent interview from the same historic context helps to 
further distinguish between these two notions: Borst’s second interview with the D66 party-
paper, “idee,” on the occasion of the legislative initiative, which exhibits a more conscious form 
of religious-critical irony: When the interviewer told her that in orthodox circles she was seen 
as the “devil herself,” she replied in an apparently ironic tone: “interview with the devil, go 
make this the headline” (Andriessen 2001). The irony and the possible blasphemous tone of the 
interview derives from the obvious belittlement of the demonizing accusation and the figure of 
the devil, which creates an emotional and ontological distance from the seriousness of the 
notion of the devil as something real. While it is not possible to ascertain what motivated this 
statement, the rest of the interview is not about religion and she neither prides herself with 
debunking religious dogmas nor with cultivating death and being evil. Instead, she speaks of 
her political struggle for individual autonomy. Furthermore, while her alleged blasphemy 
seemed to be founded in a position of religious illiteracy or indifference in the first interview, 
in the second interview it is done in response to her denigration, or, rather, demonization.  
While distinct in their relation to religion, the notions of demonization and blasphemy are 
equivalent from the perspective of the outlined democratic ethic of moderating one’s passion 
given that both violate the legitimacy and sustainability of diversity. The focus on demonization 
bridges a recent and tragic postlude of the euthanasia case and the scandalized interview: the 
brutal murder of Borst in early 2014. Long before the case was solved, rumors suspected a 
religious motive for the murder. Eventually a preacher of an orthodox congregation publicly 
said what everyone seemed to have been waiting for, framing her unnatural death as a Godly 
judgement for her blasphemous acts (de Volkskrant 2014c).210 Both his church, and the main 
orthodox newspaper immediately distanced themselves from the statement. Apparently, 
though, similar statements were made on twitter, framing her death as a case of poetic justice 
for her support of euthanasia and her blasphemous expressions (Klei and Wijbenga 2016). The 
rumors seemed to be affirmed when her murderer turned out to be a psychotic man of an 
 
210  The church-board argued that God was responsible for her final judgement and not man and that for 
Christians the excuse she offered for her “hurtful” words should be sufficient enough to let the matter go. 
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orthodox Protestant background, who claimed to have killed her on behalf of God and because 
of the euthanasia bill (Trouw 2016a, 2015a).211  
In response, Dutch newspapers hosted a debate about whether orthodox reformed circles had 
demonized her. One opinion piece argued that orthodox Christians had set her and D66 aside 
as the devil and had thus contributed to a climate of hatred which again had made the murder 
possible (Klei and Wijbenga 2016). The second editor of the Reformatorisch Dagblad 
countered the accusations (RD 2016b).212 Still, the murder also stirred a debate about the 
dangers of unmoderated moral debates within the orthodox community, about the harm that 
could be done if political critiques became too personal and too absolute, setting aside people 
as the devil himself (Kranendonk 2016). Prominent SGP and CU politicians expressed their 
sympathy and respect for Borst as a person, politician, and expert and they distinguished this 
respect from the “non-bridgeable” divide in moral and political positions between the former 
minister and themselves (RD 2014a). These comments evoke the elaborated political morality 
by, e.g., differentiating between her as a person and her political positions, and they also 
describe her as someone deeply concerned about mutual respect and personal interrelations. 
Similarly, absolute condemnations had been criticized in the mentioned documentary movie 
about the euthanasia legislation. Here, an exchange between the former SGP faction leader Van 
der Vlies and the former D66-parliamentarian Van Boxtel is shown (Rosens 2016). The two 
men recall a particular a moment in the debate on euthanasia when Van Boxtel was condemned 
by a preacher affiliated with the SGP for his standpoint. The preacher had said that those 
supporting euthanasia would go “where the snakes lives forever and the fire burns forever.” 
The condemnation is not a form of demonization in a strict sense but operates in a binary 
opposition similar to that of good and evil: that of redemption and damnation. Both politicians 
in any case, criticized this condemning statement. 
From a god-centered perspective, blasphemous expressions gain their power from challenging 
a certain “sacred,” moral-ontological cosmos, a notion that echoes in the concern with using 
religious words in a belittling manner. Blasphemous expressions can further be understood to 
denigrate those who care about this cosmos. In this context, the minister was criticized from 
both perspectives. The debate also showed that from a god-centered perspective, a moral-
 
211  He also murdered his sister over a debate on similar matters. Apparently, her murderer had acquired a 
weapon after 9/11 as he feared Islam, something which anticipates the contestations about the place of Islam in 
the Netherlands which will be dealt with in chapter 5. 
212  People have repeatedly told me that in orthodox circles, D66 was partly referred to as D666, the three 
sixes referring to the devil. I was unable to find respective articles in the Reformatorisch Dagblad.  
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ontological cosmos might further be defended through demonizing diverging positions and 
orthodox Protestants were accused of having demonized the minister. The broader case further 
showed that demonization like the denigration of population groups through blasphemous 
speech could also be criticized from a perspective of a political ethic of diversity and moderation 
as well as (if expressed by a minister) the neutrality of the state and the equality of all (religious 
and nonreligious) citizens. This political ethic of moderation was shared across all parties and 
can be seen to assert a differentiation between church and a civil-political realm by treating 
diversity, from a genuinely immanent perspective and taking the individual and not a moral-
ontological cosmos as the starting point. Orthodox Protestants contributed to such a notion of 
differentiation by perceiving demonization as a transgression of the border between God (as the 
ultimate judge) and man.  
Beyond such a consensus, parties differed on whether blasphemous expressions in general 
should be seen to discriminate against religious people. Until recently, blasphemous speech 
constituted a criminal offense (Art. 147 Penal Law) but in 2004, a D66 member of parliament, 
Lousewies van der Laan, initiated a legislative campaign to abolish the respective law which 
ended successfully in 2014.213 During the parliament debate, the orthodox reformed members 
used equality arguments in support of keeping the blasphemy ban as a recognition of the special 
relationship between believers and God (TK 2004-05a).214 By contrast, Van der Laan expressed 
her feeling that even such an indirect protection of a moral-ontological religious cosmos as a 
special form of denigration would breach the principle of equal treatment given that secular 
relations were not equally subject to law, while laws on denigrating speech and hate speech 
(Art. 137c,d PL) included religious people on equal grounds. Aside from asserting the secular 
character of the law, the distinction between morality and legality was also emphasized in that 
context. In 2013, when the First Chamber was about to accept the abolition of blasphemy law, 
Boris van der Ham —a D66 member of parliament from 2002-2012, who had taken over the 
bill from Van der Laan—argued that this was not a license to insult each other but only ensured 
equal treatment of all (Van der Ham 2013). Here as well, an ethic of moderation and secular 
respect was emphasized at a moment in which the secularity and individualism of law was 
stressed against the opposition of Christian parties.  
 
213  At the time, the bill was motivated by a suggestion by the Christian-Democratic minister of justice to 
revive the blasphemy law to prevent a (further) polarization between Dutch Muslims and the autochthone 
majority society in the aftermath of the murder of filmmaker and publicist Theo van Gogh by a Dutch Muslim 
extremist (see also ch.5). Beyond that, the bill also realized a claim that had already been made in the first D66 
election program.  
214  Both interview quotes are condensed and shortened. 
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4.4.1 Summary and Discussion 
This section dealt with a scandal in the context of the euthanasia debate and linked this with a 
broader political contestation about blasphemy legislation. While the abolition of the 
blasphemy law concerns the secularity of state law, the earlier scandal concerned the secularity 
of politics as a realm in which religious-nonreligious differences had to be moderated. The 
dealings with both, the euthanasia legislation as well as the scandal, revealed a shared 
understanding of politics as a realm in of necessary tolerance and respect for the diversity of 
moral and epistemic views. Even where views were fundamentally apart, one was to respect 
the other as a person and political interlocutor: Beyond that; the section revealed a shared sense 
that the state is to treat everyone equally – even if disagreement remained about how equality 
was to be guaranteed. By focusing on the secularity of politics, the last section linked back to 
the first chapter of this thesis in which D66 campaigned for the deconfessionalization and 
secularization of politics. Back then, the concern was with the distorting effect of religious 
mobilization and arguments on the political discourse. In this analysis, a different aspect of 
political secularity was addressed: the inter-personal relations within the political field as an 
arena in which secularity is not only negotiated but in which religious-nonreligious diversity 
also needs to be dealt with.  
One might say that the described ethic of moderation resonates with a pluralist frame in the 
sense that it aims to harmonize competing sensibilities and moderates secular triumph as well 
as religious extremism. Importantly though, it does not moderate the secularizing legislations 
as such, it aims at the interrelations in politics in a moral rather than legal sense and is, at least 
from liberal side, not linked with aims to regulate free speech. Here, as demonstrated, the values 
of liberty and equality were placed above that of harmony and interpreted in a strictly immanent 
way. The ethic of moderation further addresses the functionality of politics as a realm in which 
differences must be dealt with. Eventually though, the presented material gives little 
information about the motives of the different actors involved.  
In what follows, I briefly sketch the shifting political power relations since the fall of the second 
purple cabinet in 2002. This section acts as a bridge to the next chapter as it briefly outlines the 
renewed political power of Christian parties in the Netherlands as well as the rise of an anti-
Islamic populist movement since that time. 
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4.5 The Contested Purple Heritage 
The secularizations and liberalizations of the purple cabinets alienated orthodox Christians from 
the purple Cabinets and this still echoes in the party’s perception among orthodox Christians 
(Timmermans and Breeman 2012, 56). The orthodox Protestant Reformatorisch Dagblad215 in 
particular provides a space for voices criticizing the party, which is portrayed as irreligious in 
various ways:216 Some articles argue that the party’s assertion of state- (and legal) secularity 
was motivated by an antireligious stance which considers religion a fanatic relic of the past. 
Such positions would be blind to the contemporary and positive aspects of religion and render 
the state as the opponent of the church rather than being neutral. Other articles frame the party’s 
liberal-secular agenda as a worldview or life-stance (or even as a sort of faith), a radical version 
of the enlightenment fueled by a missionary zeal rather than pragmatic necessities.217 By 
asserting a particularistic life stance on a nonconformist minority, the party would act both 
undemocratically as well as illiberally. A reverse line of critique accuses the party’s secular 
course and the purple cabinets of merely chasing public opinion rather than basing legislation 
on a moral foundation. In the mirror of the orthodox press, thus, D66 and the liberal secularity 
it promotes are framed as irreligious, non-democratic/ illiberal, or amoral. Against this 
background, the party’s described attempts to position its policies as in line with a differentiated 
state neutrality can be fully comprehended. Also outside the second chamber, D66 politicians 
seek to elaborate on and defend their politics. In particular the post-Protestant newspaper Trouw 
allows the D66 to provide counter-arguments to its critics. Here, party politicians argue that its 
 
215  Among its readers, D66 was voted the most anti-religious party in Dutch politics (83%) (RD 2013). At 
the same time, the paper also gives room to D66 politicians to explain and defend their political decisions (see 
also Trappenburg 2000, 54f., 56).  
216  Through lexis nexis I searched five Dutch newspapers for the following word-combinations: D66 + 
godsdienst/ christen/ Islam. The consulted newspapers included: the orthodox reformed Reformatorisch 
Dagblad; the once Protestant resistance paper Trouw, which used to be close to the ARP and still has a special 
focus on religion and philosophy; the once Catholic de Volkskrant; the liberal NRC Handelsblad, and the liberal 
weekly paper Elsevier. The search was limited to articles between 2013 and 2016, which resulted in 
approximately 500 hits and 1399 pages). LexisNexis provides the articles listed according to relevance. I read 
through the articles and took notes on whether the article presented D66 as irreligious in any way, refuted such 
accusations, or remained neutral on the matter. I also briefly noted the arguments made. I included articles where 
the author makes such a statement as well as those where respective evaluations were made by other people 
(politicians, intellectuals). I read though the articles until page 500 but after around 200 pages no new arguments 
emerged. From page 500 onwards I only scanned the headers.  
Digibron is an orthodox-protestant news-site. Here, I searched the newspaper Reformatorisch Dagblad for D66 + 
antireligious (antireligieuze) between 1990 and April 2018. This left me with 39 articles. While many of them 
refer to D66 as “antireligious” in a taken for granted manner, they did not give reasons for this assessment. For 
placing the different papers see: Politieke compendium: Het ontstaan van ontzuiling, Historische ontwikkeling 
van de pers, and: “Reformatorisch Dagblad” in: B.J. Spruyt uit: G. Harinck e.a. (red.), Christelijke Encyclopedie 
(Kampen 2005).  
217  Some stress the party’s worldview position as a counter-argument to its alleged anti-religiosity (in the 
sense that the party’s secularity was informed not by an enmity against religion but a fundamentalist ideal of 
equality and a secular public). 
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assertion of secularity was neither motivated by an aversion to Christianity or religion, nor is it 
void of any value standpoint as such. Instead, they contend, it was in a firm commitment to 
liberty and autonomy. They also point to the religious members of their party and stress that the 
assertion of state secularity would also protect existing liberties of religious people in a context 
of diversity. Moreover, the think tank related to the party, and especially a number of so called 
“richtingswijzer” (signposts) that outline the party’s ideological foundation, make a similar 
claim. Here, the party’s (social-)liberalism is described as an idealistic system or worldview 
(gedachtegoed)—not in the sense of a rivaling other or worldview equivalent to Christianity. 
Instead, social-liberalism is described as supra-confessional and secular (VMS 2015, 22, 34,50, 
VMS 2016 [2009], 15). Rather than positioning itself against Christianity therefore, it merely 
proclaims a struggle for a social order that would provide equal liberty to different religious 
and nonreligious people (VMS 2015). 
This being said, towards the end of its second term, the purple coalition was challenged by two 
counter-movements, with a religious, populist, anti-Islamic profile. The CDA followed an anti-
purple opposition path on ethical matters and in 2002 started its political comeback with a 
debate on public morality (P&P n.d.-m).218 Beyond that, with the ChristenUnie, a new Christian 
party entered the political stage in 2000. Like the SGP, the ChristenUnie (CU) also bases its 
politics on the bible, attributes ultimate authority to God, and understands the government to 
stand in the service of Christ (Lucardie 2002, 71). When compared to the SGP, it is 
economically more to the left and has a strong environmental profile. The CU represents 
between 2 and 4% of the electorate, but, different from the SGP, it has participated in two 
government coalitions already. The renewed political importance of Christian parties 
manifested in the four subsequent Christian-Democratic cabinets of Jan Peter Balkenende 
between 2002 and 2010 (Balkenende I-IV) and in 2006 the CU joined the fourth Christian-
Democratic cabinet of Balkenende together with the PvdA. According to Klei (2012a) the SGP 
also changed in response to the purple coalitions. While its politicians had traditionally used 
the parliament as a pulpit, the political game of seeking power and building respective 
collaborations was of lesser interest to them. Calls for the party to take on a more political 
profile had, nonetheless, been evident since the 1960s. The purple coalitions and the party’s 
 
218  During the purple coalitions the number of law proposals accepted with strongly diverging votes had 
already risen (Trappenburg 61f). Aside from the small reformed parties, the polarization with the CDA 
increased. The author discusses two possible explanations for that, either the law proposals were more secular or 
the CDA was more confessional when in opposition. 
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mostly ignored protest against the liberalizations motivated especially the party youth to take 
up the political struggle (partly in coalition with other conservatives).219  
As the previous sections detail, the purple cabinets’ legacy remains contested among secular 
and Christian parties. While the former treats it as an unfinished project and aim at further 
liberalizations, the latter (especially the small Christian parties) seek to undo or at the least hold 
such development and to secure certain exemption rights and the autonomy for religious 
individuals and institutions. Depending on the power relations at stake, policies can shift in 
either direction. In this section, I will briefly outline some of the back and forth in the struggle 
between secular-liberal and Christian parties in order to contextualize the changes mentioned 
in the previous sections.  
One example for an apparent moderation of the liberal course is the final coalition agreement 
for Balkenende’s second cabinet, formed as a coalition between CDA, VVD, and D66. It 
suggests emphasizing alternatives to abortion and euthanasia such as contraception, adoption, 
and palliative care, while not aiming to restrict the existing procedures. The agreement further 
states that conscientious objections to same-sex marriages can be accepted as long as the right 
to conduct of same-sex marriages is ensured (CDA 2003). The compromising tone in the section 
on immaterial matters is the consequence of prior (eventually unsuccessful) coalition talks 
between ChristenUnie (CU) and CDA that were upheld by the later coalition (CU 2003).220 
Secular parties, by contrast, have formed an extra-parliamentary coalition in order to counter 
the Christian influence on these matters and to further accelerate the liberalizations in gender 
and LGBT-related matters since 2012.221 Taken together, as the previous sections indicate, it 
seems that the shift towards an individual liberty and equality based form of secularity has been 
asserted vis-à-vis religious autonomy or exemption rights. The Christian parties have 
unsuccessfully opposed such legislation with the partial exemption of the CDA, which has 
supported some of the changes. Table 12 lists some core legislative changes that accelerated 
the course of the purple coalitions.  
The Balkenende cabinets have been succeeded by (until now) three cabinets under the lead of 
the right liberal VVD and Prime Minster Mark Rutte. The third and current cabinet (since 2017), 
as mentioned, consists of VVD, D66, CDA, and the ChristenUnie. The cooperation between 
 
219  In 2000, political journalist Bart Jan Spruyt of the Reformatorisch Dagblad founded an association to 
bring together Christian and Non-Christian conservatives (Klei 2012a).  
220  The CU in any case claims to have influenced the section. Generally speaking, the CDA was criticized 
for entering into a coalition with D66 from an orthodox protestant side (RD 2004, RD 2005b).  
221  Pink Coalition agreement 2012 (COC 2012). 
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CU and D66 also marks another trend towards bridging religious-secular divides. Party leader 
Pechtold had at first expressed his objections to such a cooperation given the parties’ differences 
on immaterial matters. While this already shows that his reservations were thematic rather than 
based on a principled religious-secular opposition, the cabinet eventually proved not only to be 
the only possible coalition at the time, cooperation with the CU offered the further advantage 
of shared views on asylum and climate politics (NOS 2017a). Eventually D66 and the CU 
reached a compromise which was central to the coalition. While D66 compromised on its plan 
to extend the existing euthanasia regulations, the CU accepted more stem cell research 
(deVolkskrant 2017d). The coalition agreement reads: “where ideas are dominated by 
worldview beliefs, ideals, and conscious, one cannot ask that they be renounced” (VVD et al. 
2017, 17). The press interpreted this in the sense that the cabinet would not make many changes 
to ethical matters (Trouw 2017c).222 
All in all thus, the purple coalitions’ heritage has been contested in two ways between religious 
and secular stakeholders: the cabinets’ push for an individualist and functionalist notion of 
secularity has been contested from orthodox side, and from this perspective, both D66 and their 
ideal of a secular state are seen as variants of irreligiosity. In particular orthodox Christians 
further aim to counter the trend towards individualization and the secularization of state and 
law. Against this, politicians of D66 content to only advance a neutral and differentiated notion 
of the state, which would guarantee the equal liberty of all individuals. 
 
Table 12: Legislative Changes After 2002. 
Year Bill 
2013 Giving municipalities the right to decide shop openings on Sundays  
2014 Registrars with conscientious objections (weigerambtenaren) (EK 33.344,A) 
2014 Abolishing the Blasphemy Law 
2015 Abolishing the ‘sole reason’ construction from the equal treatment law 
 
 




4.6 Summary and Discussion 
This chapter illustrated a shift in the dominant model of secularity from one centered on a 
pluralist balancing of religious-nonreligious diversity and heterogeneity (type 2) to one based 
on the principle of individual liberty and equality (type 1). This shift was carried by the rise of 
an individual liberty and equality frame in the Netherlands since the late-1960s, the emergence 
of new emancipation movements (most prominently that of women and homosexuals) and thus 
also the extension of the idea of diversity by new categories now placed on a par with religions 
and worldviews, and, last but not least, the rise of transnational equal treatment legislation. 
While the changing views regarding equality and autonomy with respect to matters like 
marriage and euthanasia were also carried—to a certain extent—from within the religious field, 
the political field was divided along a religious-secular divide (but not a divide between religion 
and irreligion). Conflict dynamics were shaped by that divide, also in the sense that the “secular 
character” of the bills was a matter of political contestation. At the beginning of the chapter I 
mentioned the constitutional recognition of nonreligious life-stances on par with religion. While 
controversial at the time, this still followed a model of confessional pluralism and even if it 
implies a certain disestablishment of religion, it upholds a frame of religious-nonreligious 
worldview pluralism (Van der Burg 2009, 15f.). The subordination of religious freedom under 
general equal treatment laws that understand religion as just one possible identity-marker by 
contrast has accelerated the de-specialization of religion.  
D66 is both a manifestation and catalyst of this change in the sense that the party had from its 
onset promoted individual liberty and equality rights and took a prominent position on many 
controversial issues in that respect. This focus constituted the party’s second primary aim aside 
from and interrelated with its aspirations to reform politics and the state. In the mid-1990s, the 
political field was no longer structured by confessional divides, but the different confessional 
parties of 19th century had merged into the broad Christian-Democratic party (CDA) which had 
dominated the political center until 1994. This position as well as the mutual polarization and 
exclusion of liberals and social-democrats gave the CDA the chance to determine the speed and 
form in which emancipation movements and cultural change was translated into law. D66 
criticized the CDA’s power position which allowed it to hamper changes apparently broadly 
supported in society. By contrast, the party’s ideology critique now mainly focused on 
liberals—especially social-democrats—whose ideological polarization was seen to prevent a 
reasonable economic position as well as a genuine secular government coalition. The 1994 
elections, CDA’s decline, and D66’s exceptional win brought an opportunity for a secular 
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coalition and the party leaders used it to claim the first of two purple cabinets. In the next eight 
years, several legislative changes were passed, which changed the place of religion 
(respectively Christianity) in Dutch society.  
A crucial step in the institutionalization of an individual liberty and equality frame was the 
constitutional amendment from 1983 and the equal treatment law from 1994. Both laws 
institutionalized different nonreligious (individual and collective) primordial categories as 
carriers of rights on a par with religion. Especially in the context of a horizontal application of 
the regulations, the freedoms and rights of traditional religious groups came to compete with 
those of other collectives. The chapter further centered first on the legislative change to open 
civil marriage for same-sex couples and, second, on the legal regulation of euthanasia as two 
crucial steps in the assertion of an individual liberty and equality model. In both cases, an 
individualist model is not only asserted against the established pluralism, but also against the 
notion of a Christian social order, which is still defended by the Orthodox Protestant parties 
and, integrated in a pluralist frame, also by Christian Democrats: The opposition between 
pluralism and individualism shows in the opposition to an equal but separate institution for the 
homosexuals as well as in the opposition to exemption rights from conducting same-sex 
marriages. From an individualist perspective, a pluralist frame overlaps with that of a Christian 
public order in the sense that it institutionalizes religion at a social-organizational level 
compromising the universality and of state law and individual liberties, something which shows 
in the opposition to exemption rights as a relativization of legal and state neutrality. 
Respectively, the opening of civil marriage has been framed as being in line with (or required 
by) the separation of church and state.  
In the case of euthanasia, the emphasis of individual autonomy and diversity in moral matters 
is in the first place positioned against a medical system that has lost touch with categories of 
the good life, and it is further placed against the notion of a Godly authority over life. Thus, 
there has been a shift from claims that the state is responsible to uphold a Christian moral order 
around life and death, to a claim that the state is responsible for guaranteeing (an at least 
relative) individual autonomy in these matters. While orthodox Protestants consider the 
individualization as a break with a Christian public order, prominent members of D66 have 
framed this individualization as being in line with Christianity; against the Christian-democratic 
accusation of a break with a moral commitment to the value of life professed by Christ, D66 
politicians claim the legitimate diversity of moral views. The tension between an individualist 
model and a pluralist one was less prominent in the debate but did manifest itself in contestation 
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about exemption rights for doctors with conscientious objections. Lastly, the break with a 
(pluralist recognition of a) Christian moral order was also evident in the recent abolition of 
blasphemy law. Beyond that, the debate about the use of blasphemous and demonizing speech 
in public political debates also reveals that an ethic of political moderation and tolerance, and 
thus also a basic sense of the state’s and political secularity in a context of diversity is shared 
across competing factions.  
Taken together, the two types of secularity—the pluralist and the individualist model—share 
certain commonalities and interrelations, given that they both respond to the problem of social 
diversity in a way that legitimizes such diversity on principle, and, in that sense, both center on 
values of liberty and equality. In 2014, Beckford (2014, 19f.) argued that it was still unclear 
whether equality and anti-discrimination laws would strengthen the case for legal pluralism or 
undermine it. In the Dutch case it seems that the introduction of equality rights has made room 
for a new kind of diversity based on new individual and collective rights with the consequence 
of curbing existing individual and collective religious freedoms. Still, there are also continuities 
with respect to the older pluralist model (and its value of social harmony and tolerance) when 
it comes to the general political culture. As mentioned before, Lijphart (2008 [1967], 118f.) 
considers “pragmatic toleration” one of the core rules of the political game, including the 
normative obligation to not take delight in the implementation of one’s own position. Weyers 
(2010, 347, 404) as well as Kennedy (2002, 201f.) respectively consider the process of 
regulating euthanasia as being in line with this tradition of accommodating minorities. In the 
conceptual frame of this thesis, I would contend that, on the one hand, the legislation implied a 
shift in the notion of secularity away from the pluralism of the earlier model, while, on the other 
hand, with respect to the political and parliamentary debate, an ideal of political moderation or 
pacification was still guiding decisions.  
In Kennedy’s analysis, the liberal change in Dutch history was in parts based on the notion of 
the inevitability of certain historical developments which rendered an opposition to them 
senseless and motivated a political and cultural shift (Kennedy 2007 [1995], 14f., 20, 178f.). 
He states that many assumed euthanasia to be an inevitable aspect of the future, maybe not in 
the sense of a Godly plan but certainly as part of a social, moral, and medical development that 
could not be halted (Kennedy 2002, 58). At least in D66’s (early) reasoning, however, another 
tone is evident: Here, a central argument for a liberalization of euthanasia is that political 
intervention is necessary in a context of a medical progress and disentanglement from the 
questions of the good life (TK 1984). In Wessel-Tuinstra’s article in the party-paper she speaks 
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of the “political goal” of humanizing society in a context of an increasing impersonal and 
technological character of society (Wessel-Tuinstra 1985). In my understanding, what is 
expressed here is not a passive idea of accommodating an inevitable coming of euthanasia, but 
the legal regulation of euthanasia is seen as a conscious political intervention to secure human 
autonomy in an otherwise uncontrollable process of technological progress. Again, this points 
to the interrelation of the ideas of functional autonomy (such as of politics) and individual 
liberty.  
With respect to the cultural changes in the second half of the 20th century, the question raised 
is whether it should be considered an emancipation from religion or, instead, a process to which 
“religion” was integral.223 Kennedy (2007 [1995]), e.g., stressed that before the 1960s, cultural 
conservativism was just as much carried by secular groups (pp. 87f.), while the 1960s’ ideal of 
renewal and reform was also shared among most religious leaders while conservative and 
orthodox oppositions to the renewal movement remained marginal (pp. 65, 82-86, 89f.). On the 
other hand, he stresses that religious leaders and the church-affiliated populations remained (at 
the least) ambivalent with respect to the liberalization of sexuality and gender relations even if 
the determination in fighting public immorality declined in the period (pp. 102-105). His work 
on the Dutch euthanasia debate also points to this ambivalence, that is, to the contributions from 
within the religious field on the one hand, and the secular conflict line in politics on the other 
hand (Kennedy 2002).224 Another recent publication, challenging an allegedly common 
narrative of a “triumph of emancipation and secularization” is that of Bos (2017, 188) who 
points to the religious contributions to the acceptance and equality of same-sex relations. Yet 
even if not in an essential, totalistic, or encompassing binary opposition, in the political field at 
least, the implementation of an individual liberty and equality based model of secularity divided 
parties along a religious-secular divide. The difference in scholarly evaluations, it seems, 
derives from different notions of the secular*. For some it seems, a certain social development 
 
223  This debate mainly seems to be independent of the discussion as to whether the concept of 
secularization is adequate to describe the decline of church affiliations and religious beliefs since the 1960s, or 
whether it would falsely conceal an ongoing (and merely transformed) relevance of religion in Dutch society, 
that is, that it would imply a counterfactual inevitability of secularization in the context of modernization (see, 
e.g., (Kennedy 2007 [1995], 86-90, Kennedy and Zwemer 2010, 263-267, Van Rooden 1996, 203, Van Dam and 
Van Trigt 2015, 14). A related debate concerns the question of, e.g., whether the moral tone of the euthanasia 
debate was a consequence of a religious and moral energy that flowed from the process of depillarization 
(Kennedy 2002, 107f.), or whether the legalization of abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage was the 
expression of a morality conceived “in emphatically secular terms” (Kennedy and Zwemer 2010, 266), whether 
it was the decline of religious beliefs which made room for a secular morality of expressive individualism (de 
Rooy 2003, 606), or whether the focus on self-expression pushed the former religious life to the background and 
rendered it irrelevant (Van Rooden 2004, 548). 
224  In his review of Kennedy’s work, De Rooy (2003) points to a lack of research in the religious-secular 
dynamics of the cultural and legal changes since the 1960s.  
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or change is only then about secularity or secularization if it clearly divides religious people 
from people without religious affiliations, while one could also argue that competing notions 
of secularity can be supported by people with and without religious affiliations. Not by chance, 
one finds religiously affiliated people in secular parties, and religious parties as well, can 
operate with different notions of secularity. The concept of secularity still captures a relevant 
aspect of conflicts like those described above in the sense that it points to different arrangements 
with respect to religion in relation to other social goods and realms.  
In what follows I focus on another policy field in which the model of secularity was contested: 
that of minority or integration policies. While also covering a time-span from the 1980s to the 
current presence, this chapters shows how secularity was discussed in relation to the integration 




5 Islam and the Renegotiation of Secularity 
I always miss in the public debate, I always miss, like the traditional arguments for 
secularism when debating the growing influence of Islam in Western society 
(Interview Frans 2013, 251-253) 
This analysis has yet to touch on the increased pluralization of the religious field since the mid-
20th century as the result of labor migration from Muslim majority countries as well as 
subsequent forms of immigration. Since 2002 in particular, the presence of Islam has become 
strongly contested and criticized by a populist political movement that has risen against the 
purple political elite and the alleged Islamization of the Netherlands as well as immigration in 
general. While individual liberty and equality have acted as guiding principles for integration 
policies under the purple cabinets, the new populism claims to defend an essentialized Dutch 
liberal culture, that is both Christian, irreligious and secular, in opposition to Islam. This chapter 
starts by briefly sketching the main shifts in Dutch integration policies in order to understand 
how the integration policies of the purple cabinets fit in with the general changes in secularity 
described so far, and how the liberal ideal of state secularity has been challenged by the new 
opposition to immigration. As such, the chapter sketches the rise of a competing model of 
secularity that centers on national unity and defense vis-à-vis Islam (type 3), and further how 
D66 has prominently positioned itself as a defender of a functionalist-individualist model of 
secularity (mainly based on types 1 & 4).  
The chapter then briefly sketches the rise of an anti-Islamization movement and points to its 
growing ideological and organizational condensation as part of a broader nationalist movement. 
Complementing the chapter on the party’s foundation, this chapter outlines how the anti-
Islamization movement draws on the genres of ideology critique and religious-/ church- 
criticism to frame Islam as a central political other and to attack the political establishment as 
being both dogmatic and deluded. By framing Islam as essentially a political ideology, it 
challenges the private-public divide on which liberal secularity is based. Proponents of an anti-
Islamization rhetoric further speak of a “multicultural ideology” to which the left elite allegedly 
adhere. Based on their ideologically deluded misjudgment of the real character of Islam, these 
liberal elites are accused of essentially smoothing the path for an alleged Islamization of the 
Netherlands. Like a church, this elite would further defend its dogmas and moral-epistemic 
authority. The genre of ideology critique and the changes in the language used to speak about 
immigration and integration demonstrate the revolutionary character of this movement. 
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D66 is not at the center of the notion of a leftist church—this label is retained for the genuine 
left parties, the PvdA and Green Left. Still, it is somewhat subsumed under the label. The 
essentializing notions of Islam and a national identity, as well as the proclaimed binary 
opposition between Islam-critique and a left multicultural pluralism, dwarfs the conceptual 
space for a liberal model of differentiation. Thus, the purple heritage finds its integration 
policies under contestation as well. Against this backdrop, the chapter outlines the party’s 
positioning in the contemporary political landscape marked by a populist claim on the nation 
as well as ongoing concerns about Islam and it briefly compares D66’s positioning with that of 
the other main parties, the right-liberal VVD, the Christian Democrats, and the labor party. In 
sketching the positioning of D66, focus is placed on the party’s opposition towards anti-Islamic 
populism and its assertion of state secularity as well as the principle of individual liberty and 
equality. The positioning of D66 is sketched in reference to existing literature, newspaper 
articles, and party publications.  
5.1 Shifting Integration Policies, Shifting Secularities  
Muslims constitute a little less than five percent—according to some around six percent—of 
the Dutch population (Huijnk 2018, 6, Schmeets 2018, 6, 20). About two thirds of them are 
migrants from Turkey or Morocco as well as their descendants and reversely a great majority 
of Dutch people who are of Turkish and Moroccan descent consider themselves to be Muslims, 
a number which has declined among Turkish-Dutch people in the last decade (Huijnk 2018, 
6).225 In big cities like Den Haag, Rotterdam, Amsterdam as well as several mid-range and 
smaller towns, Muslims constitute above 10% of the local population (Schmeets 2016). 
Compared to those who self-consider Christian (around 40% in 2015 according to Schmeets 
2018, 6), Muslims are a small share of the Dutch population; even in a city like Amsterdam, 
where Muslims constituted 13% of the population in 2012, the share of Christians was higher 
(18%) (Schippers and Wenneker 2014, 12f.). Still, the growth of Islam since the 1970s contrasts 
the rapid decline of Christianity over the course of 20th century (Ibid.).  
Debates about the integration of migrants also imply competing notions about the integrative 
factor in modern societies (Liedhegener 2014, 64), and, analogously, debates about the 
integration of Muslims led to a renegotiation of the existing form of secularity with different 
actors or actor groups having different interests and views. Generally speaking, an established 
model of secularity can be affirmed, challenged and/or modified in response to the integration 
 
225  Others come from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Somalia, and even smaller groups from Surinam, 
Indonesia, and the former Yugoslavia. 
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of a new religion, and, in this case, the policies with respect to Muslim migrants constituted an 
object and mirror of such renegotiations. In the course of the 1990s and similar to the general 
shift in the notion of secularity, the focus shifted from pluralism to individualism in this field 
as well (Scholten 2011, 38-42).226 Prior to the early-1980s, migrants from Turkey and Morocco 
had not been perceived as Muslims but this changed with the increasing public visibility of 
Islamic institutions in the Netherlands as well as in the course of international events such as 
the Iranian revolution (1978/ 79) and the Rushdie Affair (1989). In the 1980s and under the 
Christian Democratic cabinets of Ruud Lubbers (1982-1994), a pluralist frame was developed 
under the label of minority policies. Cultural preservation was perceived to be part of a 
collective autonomous emancipation, paired with measures of economic emancipation.227 The 
new minority policies were based on the idea that religion and worldviews (godsdienst en 
levensovertuiging) would have a special place in Dutch society and on the notion, that for many 
members of ethnic minorities as well, religion was of great importance personally and relevant 
in people’s social lives.228 By contributing to people’s self-worth, religion would also have an 
emancipatory value for minorities (TK 1983, 110, also 186). This notion of migrants’ collective 
identities was placed in relation to the tradition of the emancipation of historically suppressed 
Dutch (confessional) minorities and a pluralism of different identity groups (TK 1983, 107, 
110). The state’s task was to guarantee equal chances for all religious groups. The Christian 
Democratic ideal of collective emancipation was thereby placed against the notion of a closed-
up pillarization as well as of religious fundamentalism (Fermin 1997, 122-125). Instead, the 
ideal was to achieve intergroup contacts and for migrants to adapt to their new social context 
(Ibid.). At the same time, the Christian Democrats considered their own religious background 
a benefit that allowed it to convince Muslims of the advantages of church-state separation at 
the level of international relations (Oostlander 2011, 50).229 According to Fermin (1997, 151), 
the CDA was the sole party which, during the 1980s, explicitly propagated the ideal of a 
pillarized society, while the secular parties (VVD, PvdA, D66) supported cultural diversity in 
 
226  Until the 1970s, migrants were expected to eventually return to their countries of origin and policies 
mostly resembled a differentialist model in the sense of being directed at the preservation of their cultural 
identity and implying social segregation along ethnic-cultural lines.  
227  Several authors have associated the minority policies with pillarization (Entzinger 2006) (Maussen and 
Bogers 2010, 350, Koopmans 2005, 160). Others again have argued that despite the pluralist and culture-focused 
approach, there was no desire—neither among white Dutch politicians nor Dutch Muslims—to create an Islamic 
pillar and even if several Islamic institutions were founded, this institutionalization was far from reaching the 
extent of late 19th- and early 20th-century confessional organizations (Maussen and Bogers 2010, 342f.). 
228  See also Fermin (1997, 121f.). 
229  Currently as well, the CDA stresses its competence in matters of integration, as it understands the 
relevance of religion for minorities (Oostlander 2011, 50). Arie Oostlander is a former director of the ARP’s 
think tank and later of the CDA. 
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the sense of a state guarantee of rights. While the CDA was positive about religion and religious 
diversity, the small Christian parties objected to the presence of Islam in the Netherlands (Ibid.). 
A recurrent question with respect to the integration of Islam since the 1970s was whether the 
government could or should subsidize the institutionalization of Islamic facilities (Brand 2005, 
82-85, Rath et al. 1996, 34-40, Koolen 2010, 10, 13).230 In the early 1980s, the relationship 
between the church and the state had been renegotiated with a 1983 constitutional amendment 
which required the equal treatment of all religious and worldview affiliations, which extended 
the notion of religious freedom to also cover religious practices and which also cut all financial 
ties between government and churches (Brand 2005, 83). In the context of the minority policy 
framework, the challenge was seen to address the relatively (material) backlogged situation of 
migrants’ religious institutions without breaching the principle of church-state separation (TK 
1983, 110).231 The CDA supported giving financial support to migrant religious communities, 
but this position never found enough political support and was eventually sidelined in the early 
1990s (Rath 1996, 38-40). The positioning on the matter was thereby not only determined by 
the divide between religious and secular parties, both the labor party and D66 seem to have 
been ambivalent between, on the one hand, a rejection of subsidies for religious matters in the 
name of state-church separation, and, on the other hand, supporting such subsidies as long as 
they were given equally to all religious and worldview groups (Brand 2005, 80). They later 
opted for the assertion of church-state separation and also had the political power to assert this 
course (Brand 2005, 83-85, Rath 1996, 39). 
5.1.1 From Pluralism to Liberal Integration Policies 
Since the late 1980s, the minority policies were challenged in the name of a competing approach 
that centered on the concept of (individual) citizenship and focused on migrants’ socio-
economic and political participation.232 The new course was first sketched in a WRR report 
from 1989 and gained political dominance in the mid-1990s under Lubbers’ third cabinet (CDA, 
 
230  Since the 1970s, Dutch parliament has discussed whether the government should subsidize Islamic 
spiritual caregivers as well as prayer rooms for Muslims. The Christian parties in particular seem to have 
supported respective suggestions (Brand 2005, 82-85, Rath et al. 1996, 34-40, Koolen 2010, 10, 13). 
231  The policy note on minorities does not explicitly offer a position on the matter but outlines the 
challenge to be met by minority policies: the importance of religious institutions for the integration of minorities, 
the relative (material) backlog situation in that respect, and the principle of church-state separation (TK 1983, 
110). 
232  It was only in the 1980s that integration and immigration became genuine political matters (Scholten 
2011, 150f.). This means less that debates were left to the political arena, but rather that the issue became central 
to political competition. 
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PvdA) and the purple cabinets.233 Like the VVD, D66 had been a central critic of the minority 
policy approach since the late-1980s (Fermin 1997, 94-96).234 Since the late 1980s as well, the 
CDA had set its focus on economic factors and migrants’ participation in the labor market 
(Fermin 1997, 125). Different from the liberal parties, though, they defended the pluralist 
approach of the earlier minority policies. In the second purple cabinet, a special ministry for 
large cities and integration was created and Roger van Boxtel (D66) became the minister. The 
new integration policies meant to stimulate the participation of migrants in education and the 
labor market (and consequently also in sectors such as housing, justice, health, and social 
welfare) (WRR 11f.). The WRR replaced the notion of cultural or ethnic minorities with the 
single category of allochthones for all those who have settled in the Netherlands but come from 
outside the country as well as their descendants until the third generation if they wish to refer 
to themselves as such.235 It further distinguished between three different policy areas, 
addressing different population types: 1) foreigner policies would focus on regulating 
immigration; 2) integration policies should aim at bettering the participation of minorities in 
vital social sectors and institutions and target those “allochthone” populations that were in a 
stagnant socio-economic situation—a group for which it reserved the label minorities as a 
temporary category; 3) cultural policies focused on all allochthone groups that wish to give 
expression to their own culture (WRR 1989, 10).  
Generally speaking, the turn towards individualism, and, more specifically, individual 
responsibility further fits the overall neo-liberalization of the period (Schinkel and Van Houdt 
2010, Scholten 2011, 136-139, 153f., 162f.). Policy papers on integration also refer to the 
general economic liberalization as a background development to which integration policies 
should adapt (1994 integration policy paper, 24, see also 6, 17). In the context of declining state 
responsibility, “people from ethnic minorities are asked to realize the consequences of their 
permanent presence” and they are expected to “develop into discerning and mature citizens that 
 
233  The first policy paper that marked the new course—the so-called contour note on integration from 1994 
– was still issued under Lubbers’ third cabinet (CDA, PvdA) and under the authority of Minister Van Thijn 
(PvdA). According to Scholten (2011, 153-, 161-163, 170), the realization of this report had already been shaped 
by the possibilities of a purple government and the opportunity this would provide for changing the course of 
policies. The researchers involved in writing the report were affiliated with D66 (Entzinger) and the labor party 
(Van der Zwaan). Their authorship again was supported by leading politicians of the labor party and the right 
liberals. 
234  The party’s emphasis on the participation of migrants in the labor market in the 1990s already marks a 
shift away from an earlier focus on the equal rights of migrants (Ibid. 97).  
235  Currently, allochthones are considered all those who were either born in a country other than the 
Netherlands, or have at least one parent of non-Dutch origin. Dutch authorities further distinguished between 
Western and Non-Western allochthones, the latter including people with Turkish, African, Latin American, and 
Asian origins, with the exception of the former Dutch colonies and Japan. 
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know how to get along in the competitive Dutch society” (1994, 24f.). This included the 
“individual duty to participate in education and in the labor market, and thus also the duty to 
make the effort to learn the Dutch language and to acquire a basic knowledge of Dutch society” 
(p. 25). While in the late 1970s the welfare state was seen to further individualization and 
cultural assimilation (WRR 1979, XVII), in the 1990s the welfare state was seen to have 
hampered the economic emancipation of migrants and facilitate greater individual 
responsibility (WRR 1989, 17f., see also Entzinger 2006, 17).236 As part of the integration 
policies, civic integration programs were initiated in 1994, centering on language and civic 
skills (Scholten 2011, 149). 
Compared to the minority approach, the integration policies had a different focus on religion. 
The minority approach claimed an important role for religion, both for minority groups as well 
as Dutch society, and this claim had an empirical as well as a normative implication (TK 1983 
107, TK 1983, 110). Within the frame of minority policies, as mentioned, religion was not only 
seen as an important aspect of migrants’ cultures, also with respect to the Dutch society, religion 
and worldviews were seen to hold an important place (TK 1983, 110). The emphasis was to 
accommodate minorities in their collectively shared ideas and identities on equal terms with 
other identity groups in Dutch society (TK 1983, 107). Thus, the principle of church-state 
separation was interpreted in a way that encompassed support for minorities’ religious 
practices. Conversely, the integration policies also considered religion and worldviews to be 
important, but they were more ambivalent with respect to the contribution of religion migrants’ 
integration and further negotiated the empirical importance of religion with the normative ideal 
of a worldview-neutral state.  
The general importance given to religion in the field of integration policies manifests not only 
in the first policy note on integration issued by then-Minister Van Boxtel in 1998, but also in a 
letter through which he informed the parliament about his understanding about the role of 
religion and worldview in the frame of integration policies (TK 1998d, TK 1999a). Both policy 
documents from the second purple cabinet state that human life and human activities were 
inevitably value-bound and that basic values influenced the way in which people looked at each 
other and society as well as people’s appreciation of education, work, and social institutions, 
and, as such, they were of concern to policy makers (TK 1999a, 2, TK 1998d, 51). Religion and 
worldviews played a central role here as carriers of individual and collectively shared values 
 
236  Critics have argued by contrast that there might also have been too little multiculturalism in the sense of 
a particular focus on labor market policies (Engelen 2008). 
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(TK 1998d, 51, TK 1999a, 2). Beyond such philosophical-anthropological positioning, the 
policy papers are ambivalent with respect to the effect of religion on the integration of migrants. 
On the one hand, the active membership in religious and worldview organizations could be 
beneficial for people in reaching a particular social status (TK 1999a, 4f.). On the other hand, 
religion and worldviews could also constitute obstacles to integration such as when the basic 
values of new groups conflicted with those central to Dutch society, or when religious and 
worldview organizations worked towards the preservation of the values and norms of the 
countries of origin rather than being open towards the diverse society of the Netherlands (TK 
1999a, 4f.). Despite such value conflicts which were emphasized in the minister’s integration 
note, the state had to restrain itself in responding to such obstacles in order to avoid breaching 
the freedom of religion and worldviews as well as the separation of church and state.237 
Religious and worldview matters were considered private and the state was only permitted to 
legitimately intervene where religion conflicted with “Dutch norms as institutionalized in the 
basic law and in international treaties,” when movements challenged the fundaments of the 
democratic legal order (Ibid. 7). 
In the policy papers of the 1990s and early 2000s, this ambivalence with respect to the merits 
of religion also manifested in discussions of how religious functionaries could contribute to 
integration policies (TK 1998a, TK 1998d, 51, Boender 2014). The government was concerned 
about the fact that most imams were sent to the Netherlands from abroad and the possible 
negative effects that would have on the integration of migrants. Imams were meant to speak 
Dutch, know about religious and worldview strands in the Netherlands as well as about Dutch 
culture and history. Last but not least, they were meant to be loyal to Dutch society, which is 
defined as Western, multicultural, and multireligious, as well as characterized by the separation 
of church and state (TK 1998a, 16f.). Here, again, state policies with respect to the migrants’ 
religious practices were discussed against the principle of church-state separation, but the aim 
of such policies was to foster the emergence of religious organizations and functionaries that 
would contribute to the integration of migrants.  
 
237  The latter principle is defined via the state’s obligation to respect the autonomy of religious ideas and 
organizations and to treat all strands equally (Ibid. 6).  
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Entzinger (2006, 5), e.g., states that the integration policies declared culture a private matter 
and—in reference to the policy—focus on labor and education.238 Such privatization, however, 
seems to have been based on an underlying notion of a functionally differentiated society in the 
sense of its focus on people’s role with respect to different functional fields (such as the state, 
the market, as well as culture) rather than their collective identities of communal belongings. 
Thus, it also operated with a differentiated notion of culture. Precisely speaking it was culture 
in the sense of cultural identities that was privatized, while culture in the sense of high or 
popular culture was addressed as an area of policy making (distinct though from those focusing 
on integration) (Penninx 2016, 210). Moreover, the policy papers also address the notion of a 
state as well as a civic culture.239 The WRR report from 1989 states that the freedoms and rules 
institutionalized in the Dutch legal order had to be respected by all inhabitants and it explicitly 
argues that this did not mean that the views of a majority were imposed on a minority, but rather 
that these confines were the defense of the very pluralist order that guaranteed the freedom of 
all, including those of minorities (WRR 1989, 22). This emphasis can be understood as a 
counter-distinction from the minority policy frame. Despite its reference to the pillarized past, 
the minority approach was based on the dichotomy of a Dutch majority and cultural/ ethnic 
minorities. The confines of legitimate diversity were seen to be set by the Dutch majority culture 
and also the Dutch state of law, while providing a scope for diversity was seen to echo the 
parameters of the dominant culture (WRR 1979, XXII). Conversely, the subsequent WRR 
report differentiates the notion of privatized culture from legal norms (the norms of the state of 
law). The 1998 policy note also speaks of the state itself as setting certain standards that 
determine the scope of individual religious and worldview freedom and which citizens are 
expected to acknowledge (TK 1998d, 8, 51, see also TK 1999a, 2).240  
Aside from and interrelated with the notion of a state culture, the policy papers also address the 
aspect of what might be called a civic culture. The policy note on integration speaks of the 
social aspect of citizenship, an ideal of how individual citizens enact democracy at an everyday 
 
238  Similarly, Scholten (2011, 40f., 178) speaks of a policy shift towards general and “color-blind” 
concepts and sectors of integration. Penninx emphasizes a different shift when he states that the integration 
policies abandoned the broad anthropological notion of culture that had informed the earlier minority policies for 
the sake of a focus on culture with a capital C, such as art or other cultural expressions (Penninx (2016, 210). 
Wagenvoorde (2015, 64) summarizes the difference between minority and integration policies in the following 
way: while the first looked at culture as contributing to socio-economic participation, the latter considered socio-
economic participation a condition for cultural involvement. 
239  The party think tank’s later publications explicitly distinguish between the levels of person, society, and 
state. 
240  Accordingly, it is only legitimate if the state only subsidizes those organizations that contributed to its 
policy goals concerning integration, without that this should be considered breaching the principle of equal 
treatment (TK 1999a, 7f.). 
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level by interacting with each other on the conditions of mutual equality (TK 1998d, 7f., TK 
1983, 107f.). Generally speaking, the policy note stresses that it was a citizen’s personal choice 
which value system would give shape and content to their citizenship, as long as they tested 
their values in relation to the generally valid norms and that the democratic legal order and the 
constitutionally anchored basic rights should constitute the backbone of such norms (TK 1998d, 
8). This suggests that the constitution is also meant to be internalized as an aspect of civic 
culture. For D66, the ideal of a civil culture was further linked with that of a depillarized society, 
in which people cooperated across worldview, cultural, and ethnic divides (D66 1994).241  
According to Wagenvoorde (2015, 61), the 1990s’ integration policies give expression to a 
political philosophy of liberalism given that they emphasize individual freedom and equality 
and stress the importance of tolerance for social diversity. Further, their recurrent emphasis on 
the civil and non-legal aspect of citizens’ interrelations has been labeled neo-republican in the 
sense of emphasizing civic duties rather than liberty and equality rights (as is associated with 
liberalism) (Wagenvoorde 2015, 28, 63). While liberalism takes the individual identity of 
people as a central concept, neo-republicanism centers on the civic identity, expecting the good 
citizen to be politically and socially active and accepting the fate of his interdependence with 
others (pp. 43f.). Beyond that and in reference to Brubaker, Entzinger (2006, 17f.). argues that 
the integration policies were based on the hope that migrants would intransitively assimilate, 
which comprised the assumption that migrant cultures would be transformed in the process of 
integration and social interaction.242 Both autochthone and allochthone populations were 
expected to engage with and be tolerant of the norms and values of other population groups in 
order to give form to a “factually multicultural society” (TK 1998d, 7, Van Meeteren 2005, 15). 
The way in which existing cultures developed in relation to each other, however, depended on 
the individual choices of people themselves (TK 1998d, 7). The ambivalences with respect to 
religious organizations and functionaries as well as the ambitions to foster a national religious 
elite fit with such expectations in intransitive assimilation. 
As already indicated and noted by several authors, the privatization/ differentiation of culture 
was only one aspect of the 1990s’ integration policies. While rendered private and beyond the 
reach of the state, cultural norms and values including religion became central to notions of 
 
241  Similarly, the party also stated its preference for public schools over the foundation of Islamic ones 
(Ibid.) 
242  They were not made similar (transitive assimilation, in reference to Brubaker), but would become 
similar (intransitive assimilation) in consequence of a process where “newcomers and minority members [are 
encouraged] to participate on an equal footing in a society’s mainstream institutions and to facilitate them in 
doing so” (2006, 17f.). 
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social integration, something that has been labeled a culturalization of citizenship (Tonkens, 
Hurenkamp, and Duyvendak 2008, 7, Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010, 702, see also Ossewaarde 
2010).243 Different from the pluralist minority policies, cultural preservation and collective 
identities were now seen to have a negative rather than positive effect on integration (Fermin 
1997, 151f.). The purple coalitions’ policies, as mentioned, did not focus on culture because of 
the mentioned hope in intransitive assimilation and because of a normative idea of the private 
character of culture,244 the hope of intransitive assimilation, however, was dwarfed by the rise 
of an anti-Islamization movement, which challenged the purple coalition as well as the political 
and social establishment more generally and made room for more transitive assimilationist 
policies (Entzinger 2006, 17f.). Since the 1990s, integration policies and the privatization of 
culture has thus been contested by a problematizing discourse on the alleged multiculturalism 
of Dutch integration policies, the failures of integration, and the threats posed by Islam to the 
church-state separation as well as the institutionalization of individual liberty and equality rights 
(Shadid 2006, Prins 2002). By the turn of the millennium, as a direct consequence of the anti-
Islamization discourse, policies towards migrants shifted and took an assimilationist course. 
Wagenvoorde (Wagenvoorde 2015, 28, 47-49) speaks of a shift towards liberal nationalism in 
the sense of a concern with nationhood and shared national identity.  
5.1.2 Islam Critique and Liberal Nationalism 
The first individual to give expression to such a discourse was the former VVD faction leader, 
Frits Bolkestein, who claimed that Western civilization and its core values such as the 
separation of church and state, the freedom of expression, and the principle of non-
discrimination had to be defended against “’the world of Islam’” (Prins 2002, 4). Bolkestein 
had remained in the Second Chamber rather than joining the purple cabinets as a minster and it 
was from that position that he launched a critique of the purple integration policies and, at least 
within the VVD, his positioning also shaped the party’s stance towards immigrants in the sense 
that political morality was placed against Islam (Fermin 1997, 82, 90f., see also Van Meeteren 
2005, 23).245 By no surprise, the VVD was the first party to change its position towards cultural 
 
243  Penninx (2016, 212) accordingly states that culture in the broad anthropological sense has only 
appeared as an obstacle to integration in the policy papers since the mid-1990s.  
244  Similar with Entzinger’s notion of intransitive assimilation, Van Meeteren (2005, 15) speaks of a 
difference between the understanding of integration and the notion of what fell under the responsibility of the 
state. 
245  As Van Doorn (1997, 36f.) emphasizes one paradox with regards to the purple government was that 
while VVD and PvdA now depended on the same voters they could no longer position themselves against each 
other. Therefore, VVD leader Bolkenstein remained outside the cabinet and could thus give voice to a counter 
course. He linked his critique of Islam with communitarian ideals and Christian morals. 
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diversity and it was also one of the parties that carried a critical discourse on Islam and 
integration in the years to come, while it was increasingly also electorally challenged by right-
wing split-offs.  
In the broader public-political sphere, the legal department at the University of Leiden, led by 
Professor Paul Cliteur and Professor Afshin Ellian, was an early intellectual center of an anti-
Islamization discourse and both also gained public prominence beyond academic circles.246 
Further (and later) public figures contributing to a critical debate included Theo van Gogh and 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the former journalist, Carel Brendel, as well as, somewhat later, the Arabist 
Hans Jansen, who was acquainted with Van Gogh and later served as a witness for the defense 
in the trial against Wilder (next section) (NRC 2014).247 At the turn of the millennium, the 
university professor, labor politician, and publicist Paul Scheffer published the much-discussed 
article, “The Multicultural Tragedy,” in which he fused concerns about Islam with those about 
the left elite’s alleged indifference with respect to a growing class divide along ethnic-cultural 
lines (Prins 2002, 8-10). He called for a “a ‘civilization offensive’, which would include more 
coercive policy efforts to overcome deprivation as well as stronger appeals on the immigrants 
to adapt to the principles of liberal democracy” (Entzinger 2006, 7). Scheffer’s fusion of a 
cultural critique and his left concern about socio-economic divides allowed for diverse 
responses to his article (Prins 2002, 11f., Entzinger 2006, 7f.). While according to Entzinger, 
Scheffer was insufficiently informed about the dynamics of integration in the Netherlands, his 
article and the debate it sparked nonetheless attracted publicity and legitimacy to a latent 
dissatisfaction with immigration and integration, and more precisely the cultural differences 
that remained despite migrants’ increasing economic and institutional participation, a public 
sentiment the purple parties had been inattentive to (Entzinger 2006, 8, 14).  
The person who eventually shifted the political power relations with respect to integration and 
Islam was Pim Fortuyn, a former university teacher who, since the mid-1990s, published 
weekly newspaper columns against Islam, immigration and the alleged left establishment (Prins 
2002, 16f.). In columns and books, he expressed his concern about Islamic fundamentalism and 
Islam in general as well as about an alleged moral relativism of the Dutch left. Similar to 
Bolkestein, also his position was formulated under the impression of the fatwa against Rushdie, 
 
246  Ellian has written for Elsevier since 2007. Cliteur is affiliated with the VVD and the Humanist 
Association; he has also been a columnist for various Dutch newspapers. He has published on secularism and 
multiculturalism, among others, both academically as well as non-academically.  
247  Furthermore, by now there are several weblogs centering on immigrants, Islamism, and jihadism, 
examples being hoeiboei, GeenStijl, De Daagelijkse Standaard.  
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the rising fundamentalist movement in Turkey, the trial of Abu Zayd (1995), the rise of 
Islamism during the Balkan wars as well as the attacks on September 11th, 2001. While the rise 
of Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism are of immediate concern to Fortuyn, he also 
considered more liberal variants of Islam to be at odds with modernity’s core norms and values 
such as the centrality of individual responsibility, the separation of church and state, egalitarian 
gender and inter-generational relations alongside liberal views on homosexuality (Ibid. 8f., 
15).248  
Fortuyn turned against the concern with racism at the time and declared that Muslim 
immigration should cease (deVolkskrant 2002d). When his position proved too radical for all 
other parties, he eventually founded his own party, the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and by placing 
electoral pressure behind his critique of Islam and integration he thus turned these matters into 
objects of political competition and power struggles. Shortly before the 2002 elections, Fortuyn 
was assassinated by a left extremist and his murder clearly contributed to the polarization of the 
debate in the sense that his critics were—at least by some—seen to have contributed to a climate 
of hatred against him.249 Despite his death, his party gained 17% (26 seats) in the 2002 
parliamentary elections while the purple parties by contrast suffered an electoral decline 
(Kiesraad n.d.). Aside Fortuyn’s political success, the political dominance of the critique of 
Islam and multiculturalism was only possible as the CDA changed course, which had begun to 
criticize cultural diversity at the turn of the 21st century (Van Meeteren 2005, 18-25). The 
CDA’s new leader, Balkenende, also criticized the alleged individualization and found that the 
Dutch would insufficiently express norms and values and thus gave no orientation marks to 
migrants (Ibid.).250 Eventually, the LPF joined Balkenende’s first cabinet (CDA, VVD, LPF), 
which succeeded the second purple cabinet in 2002 and the ministry for integration was held 
by the LPF (P&P n.d.-b). The respective minister was linked to the Belgian right-wing party, 
Vlaams Belang, and he faced strong criticism even from within his faction but also considerable 
public support (P&P n.d.-f). Eventually, the cabinet fell after a short period of about three 
months due to internal struggles within the LPF.  
 
248  Complementing the previous section, Fortuyn’s culturalist claim to and assertion of “modern values” 
was also paired with an economic argument in the sense that “a well-functioning capitalism” is seen to depend 
on individual responsibility and strict economic rationality, something Islam did not foster (Prins 2002) 48.  
249  His murderer was an environmental activist who later stated that he had considered Fortuyn a great 
danger for vulnerable groups in society, such as Muslims and asylum seekers (deVolkskrant 2014b). Ultimately, 
however, they were unsuccessful in politics and dissolved. In 2002, though, the VVD and the PvdA lost voters to 
the new party (dnpp).  
250  He had, similar to Fortuyn, expressed his criticism of the purple cabinets and multicultural society via 
articles in Dutch newspapers (deVolkskrant 2003a).  
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The VVD remained a carrier of a stricter course on immigration and integration, as well as of a 
critique of Islam. Geert Wilders, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and, to a lesser extent, Rita Verdonk, have 
been prominent voices on the matter.251 Geert Wilders eventually left the VVD in 2004 and 
founded the Party of Liberty (PVV).252 The PVV has been considerably successful, gaining 
nine seats in 2006 and 24 in 2010, and, consequently, became the supporting party of Rutte’s 
first minority cabinet (VVD, CDA; 2010-2012).253 After falling back to 15 seats in 2012, the 
PVV again gained 20 seats in the 2017 elections. Since 2011, the party has also been represented 
in the First Chamber where it currently (2018) has nine seats. A central intellectual figure in the 
PVV is Martin Bosma, a former journalist who has chaired several of Wilders’ elections 
campaigns.254 Both Wilders and Bosma have considerably radicalized the debate on Islam and 
the critique of multiculturalism and this found expression in several radical claims such as that 
to ban the Quran (similar to Hitler’s Mein Kampf) (Maussen and Bogers 2010, 23).  
With the fall of the second purple cabinet in any case, the new critical views on Islam and 
integration became part of government coalitions: In Balkenende’s second cabinet (2003-2006), 
Rita Verdonk (VVD) became the Minister for Foreigners and Integration, and integration and 
immigration policies were made considerably stricter under her responsibility as well. The 
integration note published under her leadership (title: Integration Policies New Stile255) lists a 
number of “small and large national annoyances” related to the multicultural society and further 
announces a policy shift from the principled validation of cultural diversity to a focus on social 
unity and “shared citizenship” (TK 2003b, 6, 8).256 The notion of such annoyances thereby 
clearly goes beyond matters of legal concern, examples being the use of one’s own language in 
the presence of autochthones or leaving one’s yard uncared for or one’s curtains closed. Shared 
citizenship rather than active citizenship is the central issue, understood to imply speaking the 
 
251  Hirsi Ali had first been a member of the labor party but joined the right liberals in 2002 where she 
became a chamber member and spokesperson for matters of integration and emancipation. She was very verbal 
in criticizing the oppression of and violence against women among Muslims, partly in collaboration with Theo 
van Gogh (P&P n.d.-a). Verdonk had a leading position in the Dutch prison system and from that position 
became the Minister for Aliens and integration in Balkenende’s Second Cabinet where she stood for a stricter 
policy course on asylum (P&P n.d.-k).  
252  Wilders left the VVD in 2004, in opposition to its support for Turkey’s EU membership and in 2006 he 
established the PVV. On Wilders’ ideological development see also (Vossen 2011).  
253  In 2012 it fell back to 15 seats 
254  At first, Wilders had cooperated with Bart-Jan Spruyt, founder of a conservative think tank in the 
Netherlands. After 2006, Bosma became influential within the PVV (Lucardie 2013).  
255  Integratiebeleid nieuwe stijl. 
256  The note states that a majority of the autochthone population felt that ethnic minorities would 
insufficiently assimilate (Dutch: aanpassen). While the note also explains that members of ethnic minorities felt 
stigmatized and paternalized by the debate on integration, it mainly presents integration as something to be done 
by migrants.  
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Dutch language and observing Dutch basic norms, such as providing for one’s own living and 
the acceptance of the freedom of expression and sexuality as well as gender equality (pp. 8f.). 
The policy note further foresees a further shift in the (not the least financial) responsibility for 
such integration to migrants themselves and to prevent the immigration of people with little 
resources.257 These measures were formulated in the new integration law (wet inburgering) 
from 2006 (EK n.d.-f, g, Staatsblad 2006, EK 2006).258 According to Wagenvoorde (2015, 67), 
the policy paper “marked the end of the positive understanding of cultural diversity” and it 
“replaced the emphasis on socioeconomic participation as a requirement for good citizenship 
with a focus on socio-cultural adaptation.” Subsequent policy papers emphasized this course.259 
Wagenvoorde (2015, 47f., 71) labels the approach “liberal-nationalist” in the sense that it is 
concerned with nationhood and a shared national identity. With respect to the fusion of the 
debates on integration, citizenship, and immigration, Schinkel (2010, 265) speaks of a 
virtualization of citizenship, arguing that the fusion of the notion of citizenship with that of 
integration creates persons “that are formal citizens but supposedly lack ‘integration’” and thus 
shifts their citizenship “from an actual to a virtual possession.”  
The Integration Policies New Stile does not address the scope of religious freedom in detail and 
only generally speaks about a growing concern about Islam and further points to, e.g., wearing 
headscarves as an example of annoyances within the multicultural society (TK 2003b, 6). 
Generally speaking, though, Wagenvoorde suggests that Islam has been a central topic of 
integration policy papers since the 1990s. He states that the words Islam and Muslim were used 
148 times in the three policy papers between 2003 and 2011 (compared to being used only once 
in the documents of the 1990s)—and that the references are primarily negative (Wagenvoorde 
2015, 81). All in all, Wagenvoorde concludes that compared to the 1990s, the public scope for 
religion, and by name, Islam has become smaller and defined through compliance with liberal 
progressive values (p. 82). The critique of Islam found further resonance in legal restrictions to 
 
257  A first integration test is to be taken in the country of origin prior to the arrival in the Netherlands and 
migrants further have to pay for integration courses (to be partly reimbursed in the case that it is successfully 
passed), which were no longer organized by the state but left to the market (TK 2003b, 15f.). The provisions for 
migration in the context of trans-national marriages were made more restrictive as well (see also: 
(NationaalArchief 2016, 997). 
258  At first it also obliged certain groups of already naturalized migrants (those with Dutch citizenship) to 
pass such an integration exam, but this provision was later abolished for being discriminatory.  
259  According to Wagenvoorde (2015, 70), the next integration document issued by PvdA’s Minister of 
Housing, Neighborhoods, and Integration during Balkenende’s fourth cabinet, Ella Vogelaar, combined a focus 
on active citizenship in the sense of the 1990s with a focus on national identity. The integration policy document 
issued by the Rutte’s first cabinet in 2011, claims a historically grown Dutch culture which migrants are 
expected to adapt to and comply with (Wagenvoorde 2015, 72). Compared to a previous policy paper under 
labor’s lead, the note centers on a national culture rather than citizenship. 
169 
 
the freedom of religion of Muslims. Since 2005 and first claimed by Wilders, there has been 
various and eventually successful attempts to ban Islamic burqas (Post 2014, 212-220). The law 
that was eventually passed banned all face covering clothes in order to conform with the 
freedom of religion (Post 2014, 212-220, Rijksoverheid 2018).  
In the theory chapter I described type 4 of the multiple secularities typology with the heuristic 
possibility of the identification of the state or the social system as secular (or irreligious) and in 
opposition to religion––as a counter-concept to theocracies and religious establishments. Here 
however; the nation is identified with one and against another religion. While Islam is by 
tendency placed in binary opposition to the national culture, the latter is defined as religious, 
irreligious, and secular at the same time. Already Bolkestein and after him Fortuyn and Wilders 
proclaimed that the Dutch culture that they wanted to defend against Islam was a Judeo-
Christian and humanist culture (Van den Hemel 2014, 61-63). As Van den Hemel (2014) 
stresses, it is thus under the flag of a conservative resurgence that one religion has gained greater 
public importance while another religion is deprived of legitimate public scope; he speaks of a 
post-secular nationalism in that respect.260 With respect to its view on Islam, Wilders’ open and 
direct opposition to Islam might be considered an irreligious stance in the sense that the freedom 
of religion is questioned. On the other hand though, his framing of Islam as a political ideology 
rather than a religion however, defies this qualification as irreligious.  
5.1.3 The Response of VVD, PvdA, and CDA 
This critical focus on Islam, as mentioned, has been carried by different parties, among the first 
was the VVD which began to criticize the culture of migrants, and more specifically Islam, in 
the 1990s (Fermin 1997, 98f.). At the same time, the party has also been electorally challenged 
by the anti-Islamization movement – first by the rise of Fortuyn in 2002 and then, later, by 
Wilders’ split-off in 2004 and less so by the unsuccessful later split-off of Verdonk in 2008. At 
first, the VVD had responded to Wilders’ split-off by emphasizing its secular liberal tradition 
vis-à-vis Islam and thus counter-distinguishing itself from conservative references to a secular-
religious national culture. Its program of principles from 2005 points to liberty as the founding 
principle of the Dutch nation and to liberalism as the prime carrier of such liberty (VVD 2005, 
4) and further outlines the tensions between liberalism and Islam in a section on citizenship and 
religion as well as one about the state of law. The program states that the current state of law 
 
260  Also more generally, the new secular-religious nationalism conceals the religious-secular divides in its 
juxtaposition vis a vis Islam. While some, like Cliteur, place themselves in the tradition of the enlightenment, 
others like Baudet, are positive about Christianity (NRC 2017d). 
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had to be defended against Islamic fundamentalism and extremism (pp. 12f.) and that liberals 
had to be committed to the struggle against public expressions of religious intolerance (pp. 
24f.).261 These references are indicative of the relevance of the Islam debate within the right 
liberal party (or at least at the given time) and they also helped to steer its course.262 More 
recently, under Mark Rutte’s leadership, the VVD established a new program of principles in 
2008 (VVD 2008). Here, the explicit identification with a liberal history has been replaced with 
references to a supposed cultural base of Dutch society rooted in a Jewish-Christian tradition, 
humanism, and the enlightenment (p. 3). Islam is no longer explicitly mentioned, neither as an 
ideological competitor nor as part of the referenced Dutch tradition. Rutte, as mentioned, led a 
minority cabinet with the CDA and supported by the PVV (2010-2012). The integration policy 
document issued by this cabinet in 2011 claims a historically evolved Dutch culture to which 
migrants are expected to adapt to and comply with (Wagenvoorde 2015, 72). The claimed 
adaption to Dutch society is explicitly understood to go beyond the “key values that form the 
Dutch constitutional state” but also include “unwritten manners and codes of conduct” (Ibid.) 
All in all, these policies not only abandon a positive notion of cultural diversity but also, as 
Wagenvoorde (2015, 72) states, “the idea that citizens are free to maintain their own cultural or 
religious identity.” 
The labor party as well has taken different and changing positions in the debate on integration 
and Islam and it seems even more divided over the matter. On the one hand, it has also criticized 
integration and Islam—the mentioned publicist, Scheffer, had been a prominent labor 
politician. Labor politicians such as the former mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, by contrast, 
have pushed for a different course that would emphasize the possibly positive role of Islam for 
the integration of migrants but also would distinguish between integrated and nonintegrated 
forms of Islam (Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Rath 2014, 10). More specifically, it was moderate 
or liberal Muslims that were deemed necessary for such policies and it was a Muslim elite 
 
261  In a section on “the state of law,” it stresses that the state of law always needs to be defended and that it 
was currently being challenged by a broad fundamentalist movement referring to Islam, a theocratic and 
oppressive doctrine of salvation, threatening the state of law with terrorism (pp. 12f.). In a section on “religion,” 
placed in a chapter on “citizenship,” it emphasizes the liberal distinction between the private and public aspects 
of religion. It states that the theological values of Islam conflicted with some of the core values of the modern 
Dutch society, and further that Liberalism, as a historical response to the European religious wars, was and had 
to be committed to the struggle against public expressions of religious intolerance (pp. 24f.). It thus claims to 
monitor sermons and religious school classes and webpages for illegal content.  
262  When the program was published, the party was internally divided over whether or not the 
establishment of Muslim schools should be prevented through a modification of the freedom of education. The 
program nonetheless confirms that freedom (Hippe et al. 2006). Under Mark Rutte’s leadership, the VVD 
received a new program of principles in 2008 (VVD 2008). The explicit identification with a liberal, rather than 
Christian history has been replaced by a commitment to a cultural base of Dutch society rooted in a Judeo-
Christian tradition, humanism and the enlightenment (p. 3). Islam is not explicitly mentioned. 
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within the labor party that promoted this course (pp. 14-16). Different from the liberal frame, 
the civilizing frame propagates a substantive notion of Islam that is compatible with liberal 
individual liberty and equality rights, rather than asserting the state’s legitimacy of setting the 
boundaries to religious freedoms. Illustrative for this position is the municipality of Rotterdam, 
which in 2007 made the Swiss-Egyptian Islamic intellectual Tariq Ramadan a flagship of the 
city’s policies on integration and local citizenship. Ramadan was expected to reach out to his 
co-believers with an enlightened message, to foster both integration and build bridges between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in the city (Van Zessen 2010).263  
Some speak of different camps within the party: on the one hand, the former Minister for 
Housing and Integration Ella Voogelaar (2007-2008) who, like Cohen, is considered to have 
opposed the harsh public debate about minorities, while on the other hand former party leaders 
such as Wouter Bos (2002-2010) and the subsequent Minister for Housing and Integration 
Eberhardt van der Laan (2008-2010) have been considered to have proposed a more polarizing 
position in the debate on integration (deVolkskrant 2008c). A 2008 program of principles 
apparently integrated both camps (deVolkskrant 2008b).264 How clear cut such a binary divide 
is, is difficult to assess as Uitermark et al. (2014) show that Cohen’s course was not exclusively 
based on a count-distinction from the critiques of Islam but also entailed its own critical focus 
on certain forms of Islam.  
The CDA as well, seems to be ambivalent in its positioning (Ten Napel 2012): On the one hand 
and despite once being a core proponent of worldview and cultural pluralism, it had quite early 
expressed its critique of a multicultural society and integrated Fortuyn’s party in Balkenende’s 
first cabinet. Its coalition with the PVV, however, was much contested, and (alike the VVD) it 
explicitly opposed Wilders’ idea that Islam was not a religion but a political ideology 
(Wagenvoorde 2015). Generally, it seems that the party shifts between on the one hand asserting 
shared norms vis-à-vis Islam, and, on the other hand, integrating Muslims (alongside 
Protestants and Catholics) into its party on the basis of core values of Christian democracy 
 
263  Despite the project’s factual focus on Islam, the official policy papers denied such an explicit focus 
(Ibid.). After two public scandals his contract was terminated in 2009.  
264  According to the press, a draft version of Van der Laan’s vision on integration for the election program 
of 2002 was later modified towards a more balanced tone and a similar process took place in writing the party’s 
2009 integration paper. The latter emphasizes not only the state of law principle, but also a necessary active 
citizenship which includes a certain agreement on basic manners. The paper not only discuses legal measures but 
sees politicians as being in charge of confronting migrants with behavior that conflicts with fundamental values 
of the state of law and social democracy. The paper refers to the burka as something which was by principle 
protected as an expression of religious freedom, to be restricted in certain public and educational institutions, and 
– given its hindrance to social participation – to be confronted in debates with burqa wearers, both face to face as 
well as publicly. Sources: (deVolkskrant 2008c) (Trouw 2005, 2009a). 
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(CDA 2013). Partly it seems that CDA politicians have envisioned their own civilizational 
offensive vis-à-vis Islam in the sense of fostering an inter-religious dialogue with a guiding and 
civilizing role attributed to Christianity. Aside from the PVV, also the SGP is very critical about 
Islam and this has created a popular image of the PVV as an electoral threat to the SGP––
importantly though, they differ along a religious-secular divide in other respects. While Wilders 
refers to religion as part of a Dutch national tradition, the SGP’s idea of God’s authority is at 
odds with Wilders’ populism (Trouw 2018a). 
5.1.4 Entangled Polarizations  
The debate on Islam seems to be based in parts on factual cultural divides but has also, at the 
same time, contributed to socio-cultural polarization. In 2012, the SCP published a large study 
on the migrants’ socio-cultural position, focusing on their ideas on immaterial matters as well 
as the acceptance of migrants and tensions with the autochthone population (Huijnk and 
Dagevos 2012). The data shows that Dutch of Moroccan and Turkish origin are much more 
conservative than the general population. They were less likely to agree with the right to 
abortion (Turks 35%, Moroccans 24%, autochthone 74%), euthanasia (Turks 40%, Moroccans 
22%, autochthone 85%), same-sex marriage (Turks 28%, Moroccans 28%, autochthon 80%) 
and are more likely to reject the idea of their own child being homosexual (Turks 75%, 
Moroccans 76%, autochthon 17%) (Huijnk and Dagevos 2012, 15). A large share of Moroccan 
(35%) and Turkish (49%) Dutch further finds that Dutch women had too many freedoms (p. 
12). While education status lessens the cultural differences, it does not undo them (p. 14). A 
majority of Moroccan- (98%) and Turkish-Dutch (94%) consider themselves Muslims, 
although the authors do not focus on the role of religion with respect to these cultural 
differences. Religion would only have a relevant influence, they argue, on attitudes towards 
homosexuality however in relevant ways (pp. 21, 112). At the level of public opinion in any 
case, a considerable share of the population perceives the role of Islam in the Netherlands to be 
problematic: Twenty-two percent of Moroccan- and 24% of Turkish Dutch, compared to 40% 
of autochthones, perceive Muslim and Western lifestyles to be incompatible Huijnk, 2012 
44f.).265 
 
265  Similarly, 32% of Turkish- and 40% of Moroccan-Dutch strongly disagree with the sentence that “Most 
Dutch people respect Islamic culture” (Huijnk and Dagevos 2012, 44). Conversely, 46% of autochthone Dutch 
disagree with the statement that “Most Muslims respect Dutch culture” (p. 45). Interestingly, the authors mainly 
interpret this data with a focus on the acceptance of Muslims in Dutch society (pp. 45f). The conflation of 
Muslims and Islam as well as the singular and polarizing usage of the words Muslims/ West, Islam/ Dutch 
culture might thereby also contribute to a climate of cultural polarization and essentialization given that it dwarfs 
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Moreover, Vellenga et al. (2009, 7) speak of a polarization between those who consider Islam 
the main obstacle to integration, and those who focus on the dangers of anti-Muslim 
discrimination and stereotypes. They also underscore that this polarization manifests itself as a 
broad conflict over the dominance of a specific culture in various social fields. One example 
for such polarization are the two trials against Wilders, the first of which concerned his 
statements on Islam. For its critics, the process against him—a politician threatened by Islamic 
extremists for his critique of Islam—is seen as a reversion of the good and sane moral order in 
the sense that the political and legal institutions contribute to the silencing of Islam-critics and 
contribute to a climate of hatred placing their lives at risk (Bosma 2010, 227).266 Similarly, 
already the murder of Fortuyn in 2002 and Van Gogh’s murder by a Muslim extremist in 2004, 
had fueled the polarization.267 In the context of the trial against Wilders, e.g., judges’ political 
affiliations and their over-proportional preference for D66 as well as other left-liberal parties 
have become an object of media debates and fueled doubts about their neutrality as well as that 
of the Dutch state of law (RD 2010, GeenStijl 2010, deVolkskrant 2016b). This is one example 
of how a polarization with respect to Islam and integration extends beyond politics and affects 
the status of other realms such as law or science.268  
The anti-Islamization movement has thereby become part of a larger conservative-nationalist 
project that seeks to oust an apparent left-liberal establishment not only in politics but also in 
other social realms. Illustrative of this is the increasing formation and concentration of 
conservative networks and organizations with links to the anti-Islamization movement as well 
as new right parties like the PVV, the Belgian Vlaams Belang, as well as a new Dutch party, 
the Forum for Democracy (FVD).269 The latter was founded by Thierry Baudet, a former PhD 
 
the conceptual space for criticizing certain forms of Islam while recognizing religious freedom as an individual 
right. 
266  Already in the case of Fortuyn, his critics were later blamed for having contributed to a climate of 
hatred in which the murder could have happened. 
267  In the 1990s, an anti-immigration discourse had further been propagated by the right-wing Centrum 
Democratic party (CD) of Hans Janmaat. The CD (Centrumdemocraten) was a split-off from the Centrum party 
(founded in 1980), which held one and three parliament seats in the period of Lubbers III and the first purple 
cabinet, respectively. Janmaat now belongs to the heroes and martyrs of the current anti-Islamization movement. 
268  With respect to science, an article in NRC Handelsblad entitled “War in the Islamic Studies: haters 
against look-aways” –speaks about an inner-academic struggle between anthropologists of Islam in Amsterdam 
and Islam-critics from the legal philosophy (rechtsgeleerdheid) department in Leiden (NRC 2016c). 
Researchers are (or might potentially be) consulted as witnesses in court cases concerning anti-Islamic 
statements as well as Muslim extremism and conversely there seems to have started a political struggle about the 
control of scientific knowledge. A VVD parliamentarian recently initiated an official investigation into whether 
the Dutch academic landscape was dominated by the left and whether this led to self-censorship and hampered 
the freedom of science. Sources: KNAW (2018), TPO (2017b), Trouw (2018b). He also raised concerns about a 
certain naivety or sympathy within the academy with respect to radical Islam (NRC 2017a, NRC 2017b). 
269  Forum voor Demokratie 
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student of the mentioned Leiden-based professor of jurisprudence, Cliteur. He had founded the 
FVD as a think tank in 2015 and later turned it into a political party (FVD).270 Baudet’s party 
promotes stricter immigration and integration policies and focuses on national identity. The 
party asserts the necessity of defining core values of Dutch society against the backdrop of the 
immigration of “large groups of (Muslims) migrants” and it suggests the introduction of a “Law 
Protection of Dutch Values” which would require all institutions (schools, religious 
organizations, etc.) to subscribe to five values: the primacy of Dutch law over religious rules, 
the freedom of religion including the freedom to abandon one’s religion, the freedom to 
criticize, ridicule, analyze, and doubt religious ideas, the equality of all disregarding their 
gender, race, or sexual orientation, and the freedom to choose a partner (in opposition to 
arranged- and child marriages) (party website).271 The political newcomer is seen as a potential 
heir to Wilders in the political realm.  
Cliteur officially supports Baudet’s new party and, more generally, he also seems to play an 
important role in this gradual consolidation of a conservative and Islam-critical network. 
Another of his PhD students, Machteld Zee, worked on British sharia courts and recently gave 
a lecture about her PhD study at a colloquium on liberty hosted by the party, Vlaams Belang. 
Cliteur’s notion of Islam is not as essentializing as that of Wilders, but he criticizes an apparent 
hesitancy to face the challenge of radical Islam and defended Wilders during his second trial. 
He and Baudet have further authored a report on behalf of Wilders’ PVV about the democratic 
benefit of referenda.272 Moreover, Cliteur is the co-founded of “Reality in Perspective” 
(Werkelijkheid in Perspectief), a think tank which aims to support controversial thinkers in an 
allegedly conformist intellectual climate at Dutch universities, especially those who are aligned 
with conservative and anti-Islamization standpoints (SWP).273  
 
270  Baudet has received his title for a thesis on “The Significance of Borders,” a theoretical critique of 
supranationalism and multiculturalism as undermining the sovereignty of the nation state, a sovereignty which is 
deemed important for representative governments and the rule of law (Baudet 2012). 
271  At a party congress in 2017, he gave a speech in which he urged his listeners to defend the separation of 
state and church against its erosion in the name of the freedom of religion. https://youtu.be/jgLUpC4GUKY. 
272  In its claim for more measures of direct democracy and the critique against an allegedly outdated 
political system and the established party landscape the party echoes D66’s historic position (NRC 2016b, NRC 
2017d). 
273  The conservative tone is manifested in a recent essay-competition under the topic as to whether “the 
decline of Christianity in Europe has undermined the (self-)trust in the European culture.” The association 
further hosted a public debate about Islamist violence based on a collective volume titled “Why do they hate 
us?” (Waarom haten ze ons eigenlijk?). The event accompanied the publication of essays on the same theme and 
it gave room to several prominent people from the anti-Islamization movement—among them Wim van Rooy, a 
former Catholic and allegedly a current freemason, whose son is active in the party, Vlaams Belang—as well as 
Machteld Zee. The book aims to bring together authors with different views on Islam and according to a 
commentator divided over the question whether one could distinguish between Islamic teachings and Muslims, 
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Complementing the first chapter of this thesis, the next section centers on a particular aspect of 
the anti-Islamization movement: its notion and references to the concept of ideology. In a 
general sense, the Islam debate has given renewed importance to ideologies in politics. Fortuyn 
in particular propagated the idea of an ideological struggle with Islam, by framing the latter as 
an ideological appropriation of secular modernity. By contrast, Wilders and Fortuyn, use the 
genre of ideology critique in order to construe an essentialist opposition to Islam and to launch 
an attack on left-liberal politics.  
5.1.5 Propagating an Ideological Battle  
Central to Fortuyn’s prominence to this thesis’ analysis is that he propagated an ideological 
battle with Islam (Fortuyn 2002a, 9f.). In contrast to the integration policies of the 1990s, he 
thus politicized the culture of migrants and further called for the ideological appropriation and 
defense of secular modernity (Ibid.). Contrary to what D66 had propagated since its foundation, 
this gave renewed importance to ideologies in politics. Wilders and Bosma have radicalized his 
notion of Islam as an ideological other as well as his critique of an allegedly multicultural elite. 
In any case, the anti-Islamization movement draws on the genre of ideology critique and church 
criticism in its attacks on the political establishment. In the first place, this critique centers on 
the political left, but D66 is partly subsumed here and is also attacked while the intellectual and 
political scope for a liberal model is dwarfed. In what follows I refer first Fortuyn’s writings 
and then those of Wilders and Bosma. 
In 1997, Fortuyn published a book entitled, Against the Islamization of our Culture. Dutch 
Identity as a Foundation 274 in which he expressed his concern about Islamic fundamentalism 
and Islam in general, as well as about the Dutch left’s alleged moral relativism (Fortuyn 2002a). 
In his book, The Mess of Eight Purple Years275 in which he summarized his critique of the 
purple cabinets and which served as his election program in 2002, central arguments of Against 
the Islamization were taken up. Fortuyn’s concern with Islam is paired with a critique of an 
alleged cultural relativism and indifference in the Netherlands. Under cultural relativism, 
Fortuyn understands the disinterest or indifference for one’s national history and cultural 
 
respectively between Islamism and Islam, or whether Islam was essentially Islamist (TPO 2017a). Left-liberal 
members of the city council strongly criticized the debate as being discriminatory and racist (Parool 2017). 
http://www.werkelijkheidinperspectief.nl/ With respect to Wilders and the FVD’s links to right-wing and racist 
networks see: (Trouw 2017b, deVolkskrant 2017a). 
274  The Dutch title is: Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur. Nederlandse identiteit als fundament. The 
book was later republished under the name “The Islamization of our Culture. The Word as Weapon.” 
275  Translation taken from Wikipedia. The Dutch title “De puinhopen van acht jaar Paars” translates to 
“The Heap of Rubbles of Eight Years of Paars.”  
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identity, including its legal system and democracy (Fortuyn 2002a, 15). It manifested in the 
idea that “it was no longer necessary, to want something as a people, and to do something” 
(p.17). Cultural relativism, according to Fortuyn, was the consequence of a wrongly proclaimed 
end of ideology after the Cold War (pp. 17, 34). He goes on later in the book to state that the 
alleged amoral and indifferent presence was a consequence of the historic process of 
depillarization, given that it had been the pillars that gave the public domain a moral fundament 
(p. 57). Against this background, Fortuyn sketches two possible responses: first, to give up the 
principle of church-state separation and to embrace fundamentalism, or, second, to articulate 
and assert a modern, collectively shared system of core norms and values (p. 50). In the context 
of immigration, he felt, indifference and cultural relativism were a weak defense against 
stronger and more assertive cultures and this would lead to the situation in which “our original 
culture” was placed on the defensive (pp. 10f., 15). Particularly, Islam constituted such an 
assertive other, against which the values of modernity had to be defended.  
In our so-called multicultural society, the (fundamentalist) Islamic culture is in a daily 
confrontation with our traditional culture. In consequence of our disinterest in our own 
identity and in the nature (wezen) of our society, our original culture threatens to be placed 
on the defensive. This we have to prevent by all means. (Fortuyn 2002a, 15).  
He claimed the necessity of a political and public debate about the core norms and values that 
should underlie an otherwise multicultural society (Fortuyn 2002a,. 15, 42f.). In the first place, 
such a debate was meant to generate a self-consciously modern people (apparently mainly 
addressing Dutch autochthones). In that sense, such a debate would have to be a public political 
one in order to generate a people’s awareness of its own identity (p. 43). He also suggested 
what could comprise such underlying norms and values: individual responsibility, the 
separation of church and state, gender equality, the egalitarian relations between adults and 
children (pp. 15, 61, 79). Second, the debate he envisioned was meant to convince Muslims of 
the values of modernity (p. 10).  
The ideology concept as mentioned; concerned the question of political realism as well as that, 
whether politics needed a shared set of ideas. The positioning of D66 was sketched in relation 
to these two questions in chapter 3.2. Fortuyn positions in opposition to the historic position of 
D66 and advocates the necessity of an ideological foundation of politics and secular modernity 
more general. Similar to D66, he is thereby concerned with collective agency but while D66’ 
founders felt that such agency required to give up the outdated ideologies of the pillarized era, 
Fortuyn claims that a depillarized society needs a renewed sense of national identity and culture 
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is necessary. He as well thus, positions in a post-pillarized era but he does so in a reversed way 
than D66 and in the awareness of being beyond the temporary stage of insecurity and searching 
D66’s founders saw themselves in. Further, in a reversed sense, Fortuyn’s project has certain 
similarities with that of the 19th century leader, Kuyper: Both emphasize an antithesis between 
(secular) modernity and (a certain) religion in order to mobilize a yet-to-be-formed collective 
political agent. They do so from different positions and there are obvious differences with 
respect to the kinds and notions of religion they refer to. Kuyper deconstructed secular 
modernity as a particularistic perspective in order to politicize what liberals had declared 
“neutral” and to build up a competing position. In a different way, Fortuyn also asserts 
modernity as a particularistic position, yet with the aim to mobilize forces in its defense. He 
tried to challenge secular political indifference for religion by stressing the assertive ideological 
(encompassing) character of Islam and its consequential political relevance. As already 
mentioned and different from the antithesis of 19th century, Dutch culture of the 21st century 
had to be defended against Islam, a struggle that was described as being both religious and 
secular. Fortuyn had already offered a first systematic attempt to formulate the core norms and 
values of modernity in one of his earlier book, The Orphaned Society, in which he framed them 
as being rooted in Judaism, Christianity, and the Enlightenment/ humanism (Fortuyn 2002b).276 
Wilders and Bosma have nonetheless radicalized the debate on Islam.277 Wilders understands 
Islam as a political ideology rather than a religion, and sees it as being essentially imperialistic, 
totalitarian, and violent.278 In his account, Islam has become an essentialized and singular agent 
in the sense that it is not only certain Muslims who propagate and assert fundamentalist or 
extremist versions of Islam, but Islam itself that inevitably directs agency in a totalitarian and 
violent direction. Wilders, e.g., claimed that terror attacks like those in Brussel would be the 
immediate consequence of the Islamic ideology of the Quran, which dictated jihadist violence 
(Wilders 2016c). At another occasion, he used a quote from the Quran during a parliamentary 
speech to claim and explain why Muslims had already committed violence for centuries. The 
Quran would be “a license to kill” and “the constitution of the Islamic State [ISIS]” (Wilders 
2014). In his 2012 book, Marked for Death: Islam's War Against the West and Me, Wilders 
 
276  The Dutch title of the book is “De verweesde samenleving. Een religieus-sociologisch traktaat.” I here 
refer to the preface of the book, which he considered a “Religious-Sociological Treatise.” Despite his reference 
to Judaism and Christianity, he considered norms and morals something immanent and man-made—even if they 
were framed as religious (Fortuyn 2002a, 103). 
277  For a detailed account of Wilders ideological development see Vossen 2011 and De Ruiter 2012, for 
Bosma see his own book (Bosma 2010). 
278  Rutte’s first cabinet’s coalition agreement stated the parties’ diverging views on the character of Islam – 
as either a religion or a political Ideology (Wagenvoorde 2015, 81). 
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presents central chapters of early Islamic history such as the hijra from Mecca to Yathrib (later 
Medina) and the subsequent military conquest of Mecca, as proof of the inherently political, 
totalitarian, and violent nature of Islam. Analogous to the Islamic concept of hijra, 
contemporary migration is framed as a conscious strategy of conquest (Wilders 2013, Lucardie 
2013, Krause 2014). Similarly, Bosma also describes Islam as an unchangeable ideology mainly 
directed at immanent aims and domination. He, too, focuses on early Islamic history as well as 
the Quran to make his point (Bosma 2010, 173-178, ).279 Both Wilders and Bosma further refer 
to taqiyya—an old concept from Shia Islam, allowing Muslims to dissimulate in situations of 
danger—as a combat strategy and part of an Islamic invasion (PVV 2012). The notion of 
taqiyya then functions as a means to question the trustworthiness of apparently well-integrated 
Muslims (NU 2008). Eventually this notion of Islam as a political ideology renders Islam 
something from which Muslims also have to be freed, a claim which leaves little room for the 
freedom of religion (Wilders 2016b, a).280 As indicated, Wilders has, e.g., called for a ban on 
the Quran and burqas and to tax headscarves (Trouw 2009b, 2007).281 This essentialist and 
generalized distrust of Islam distinguishes Wilders and Bosma from Brendel as well as from 
Fortuyn. The particular focus on Islam also distinguishes Wilders from Cliteur, who integrates 
his critique of Islam into a more general critique of monotheist religions (Cliteur 2015, 11f.).282  
Like Fortuyn, but in more radicalized versions, Wilders and Bosma further position their 
struggle against a multiculturalist elite that allegedly supports the Islamization of the 
Netherlands. In line with his essentialist notion of Islam, Wilders positions the defeat of 
multiculturalism and pluralism at the hands of Islam as a historical constant which is 
reproducing itself over the course of history. In Wilders’ account, both the people of Mecca and 
Yathrib were ultimately defeated by Muhammad because of their multicultural and pluralist 
 
279  His book, “De schijnelite van de valsemunters” (The Sham-Elite of Forgers) has also been used as a 
core source for Jan Jaap de Ruiter’s book on the PVV’s ideology (Ruiter 2012, Bosma 2010.) 
280  In an article entitled “Muslims, free yourself and you can do everything,” Wilders states that he does not 
hate Muslims but rather feels sorry “for the fact that Islam is taking away their value/dignity (waardigheid)” 
(Wilders 2016a)  
281  Beyond that, Wilders’ radicalization of the anti-Islam discourse further echoes in positionings that do 
not directly focus on religious practices or items. He, e.g., supported the American war on terror after 9/11 
including the military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and the establishment of Guantanamo Bay (different 
from Fortuyn and Bolkestein) (Vossen 2011, 183). Different from Fortuyn who warned against the rise of 
fundamentalism in both Israel and Palestine, Wilders and Bosma give one-sided support to Israel and the 
extension of the Israeli state on the Palestinian West Bank territory (Wilders 2012, 44-46, Trouw 1998, Fortuyn 
2001). 
282  Different from Islam, though, this argument contends that the violent aspects of Christianity were tamed 
by the Enlightenment (see also (Brendel 2010b). The argument is made in the preface of a book by Wim van 




tolerance and readiness to include him and Islam (Wilders 2012, 34, also 36). For Bosma as 
well, it is the indifference towards historically achieved liberties that renders the current society 
vulnerable. He states that even a minority group could change the legal system and introduce 
sharia if the majority “did not know what it was about to lose” and took “no pride in what it has 
built” (Bosma 2010, 148). The main theme in Bosma’s book, however, is not that of a wrongly 
assumed end of ideologies, but the left’s adaption and assertion of a multicultural ideology since 
the 1970s (pp. 42-55, 66).283 Under multiculturalism, Bosma (2010, 117) understands the 
purpose “to level off the guiding culture for the sake of minority/ immigration cultures.” In the 
first place, thus, ideology is used to denote a coherent set of ideas that guides (political) 
perceptions and actions. This, by tendency value-neutral use of the concept of ideology is 
further fused with a genre of religious and church criticism through which multiculturalism is 
debunked as being a false but dogmatically imposed faith that is being asserted by a “left 
church.”  
Bosma (2010, 117f.) speaks of a “multiculturalist confession” in reference to the Christian 
Reformed confession (geloofsbelijdenis), listing different articles of faith associated with 
multiculturalism. Examples of such beliefs, which are rhetorically false frames, are the belief 
that multicultural societies would be better than monocultural ones, that mass immigration is 
unchangeable, that Islam will gradually liberalize and that there already was a moderate Islam, 
the belief that socio-economic issues and not Islam are the problem, and, finally, the belief that 
if the other points turned out to be wrong, the West and the Netherlands would get a second 
chance. In a variation of this theme and as a reference to the five pillars of Islam, Jansen speaks 
of the at least “six pillars of the Left Church” (Jansen 2014). Similar to Bosma, he also points 
to a distorted perception of other cultures and especially Islam as the foundation of the left 
church (Jansen 2014). Fortuyn coined the expression, “left church,” using it as a pejorative label 
for the PvdA, GL, and D66, and it has become a common label for the alleged carriers of a 
multiculturalism (Lucardie and Voerman 2002, Fortuyn 2009, 161). The rhetorical use of the 
genre of religious and church critique attacks multiculturalism at various levels: In the first 
place and as already indicated, it renders political support for a multicultural society (however 
defined) as being unrealistic and as being bound to faith rather than reality. Second, the 
epistemic distortion of multiculturalism is seen to be fueled by a normative motive: a moral 
 
283  According to this argument, the Marxist claim for economic equality was complemented with and 
tended to be replaced by a claim for cultural equality since around the mid-1970s. It is this ideal of equality that 
constitutes the foundation of multiculturalism and was institutionalized following the 1960s, manifesting itself in 
an openness towards immigration (pp. 67-77). 
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preference for the poor and marginal, aspiring towards their liberation and emancipation. As a 
normative power, it dictates a positive idea of a multicultural society (Fortuyn 2002a, 46), as a 
cognitive frame it would see weakness and marginality in places where it is not present (Bosma 
2010, 304-310). Thus, any violence and hatred Muslims commit or express against 
homosexuals would be explained as a consequence of their suppression and marginality (Bosma 
2010, 310). Consequently, the left church is seen as being distorted in its moral judgment in the 
sense that it is blind to the wrongs of other cultures while being very critical towards the West 
(Bosma 2010, 68).  
Third, the genre of religious and church criticism is further used to render the support for a 
multicultural society a particularistic perspective that should be confined to the private realm 
rather than be established via the state. Jansen respectively speaks of an insufficient separation 
between of state and the left church (Jansen 2014). Fourth and interrelated, the left church is 
depicted as an institution that guards its sacred principles by branding those who refuse 
deference as heretics (Fortuyn 2002, 46, see also Bosma 2010, 265, 286). Correspondingly, the 
anti-Islamization discourse draws on the figures of the infidel and the martyr, a theme which 
refers to the history of the Reformation and its assertion of liberty vis-à-vis Catholicism (Bosma 
2010, 104, DDS 2014). In the first trial, Wilders defended himself with an alleged quote from 
Luther “Here I stand; I can do no other” (Wilders 2011). In evoking the reference to freedom 
of conscious, Wilders thus refers to a strong value in Dutch history, and by framing the left as 
an inquisitive Church and its supporters as both infidels as well as martyrs for liberty, they also 
claim to stand on the morally right side of history.  
According to Prins’ (2002), the critics of integration have successfully introduced a new 
discursive genre she labels “New Realism.” This genre is based on the self-representation of 
the speaker as someone who dares to face the facts and to express uncomfortable truths that had 
been tabooed before (p. 5). While Bolkestein had introduced the new genre, Fortuyn radicalized 
it by rendering honesty and straight forwardness more important than non-discrimination and 
by disentangling it from the aim to ascertain the truth; radical speech became a demonstration 
of leadership rather than being part of a quest for truth and a debate on reality (Prins 2002, 17). 
With respect to the performative aspects of speech, Bosma and Wilders stand for yet another 
level of radicalization in the sense that they understand the transformation of language and 
styles of talking, and, more precisely, the introduction of new vocabularies as a conscious 
strategy and as part of an intellectual and political power struggle. In their view, a 
multiculturalist ideology has operated though a particular web of words and concepts, with 
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which the positive idea of integration and Islamization was forced upon people (Bosma 2010, 
237f.).284 Against this background, the anti-Islamization movement has developed its own 
disruptive vocabulary based on radically pejorative neologisms such as Wilders’ suggestion of 
a “head-rag tax” (kopvoddentaks)—a tax on wearing headscarves—his notion of a “tsunami of 
Islamization,” as well as Jansen’s notion of “professional Muslims” (beroepsmoslims), 
introduced to mean radical Muslims but also used for the spokesmen of Muslim organizations. 
These neologisms can be considered a verbal assault on that what is perceived to be the 
epistemic and emotional pillars of multicultural society. Moreover, this new vocabulary seems 
to pave the path for a radicalized form of political action.  
Complementing Prins’ observations with respect to the relation of language and reality, in my 
understanding, the primary goal of Bosma’s (and Wilders’) rhetorical strategy is not some quest 
for truth. At the same time, however, it is neither completely disentangled from matters of truth 
and reality. For example, Bosma emphasizes their endeavors to engage with and genuinely 
understand the Islamic ideology they seek to counter (Bosma 2010, 32).285 More generally, 
Bosma’s book and its historical and sociological focus also clearly aims at developing and 
demonstrating an alternative understanding of the (historic and present) reality. His main focus, 
however, is not truth or reality in an epistemic sense, but rather moral adequacy or validity. His 
book is introduced with a Hebrew quotation from Isaiah 5:20, which translates to in English: 
“Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for 
darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!” Radical speech and the breaking of 
taboos about what to say and how to say it might not stand in direct relation to a quest for truth 
or reality, but it takes a certain reality for granted, assuming that it is ignored for moral reasons, 
and thus seeks to break with these sentiments and establish an alternative moral culture. This 
new moral culture is a more aggressive and is thereby in line with the assumed struggle with 
Islam.  
Further complementing Prins’ study, the new realism also confronts and counters a previous 
and different discursive genre of realism that was manifested in the policy papers since the late 
1980s, and especially during the purple period, where the reality of a multicultural society is 
 
284  Words he considers to comprise such a concealment of reality include among others: diversity, 
islamophobia, fundamentalism, solidarity, and, especially, integration which had come to stand for anything 
Muslims did. With respect to the last point, he possibly refers to the non-normative usage of what it means to be 
Dutch, which is also implied in the observation that the Islamic extremist murderer of Theo van Gogh was 
cycling to the place where he committed the crime.  
285  An earlier PVV program of principles also centered on the alleged weaknesses of liberal democracy and 
propagates a new conservative order was entitled: “A New-Realistic Vision.” 
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placed against the limitations of the state in shaping people’s cultural expressions (TK 1998d, 
7).286 Autochthone populations are expected to develop the “realism” that “they had to share 
our society with migrants and their descendants” (TK 1998d, 10).287 Against this background, 
Bosma and other anti-Islamization activists’ ideology critiques prepare the ground for a 
different understanding of national and the state’s agency and different kinds of political action. 
For instance, as I previously described, Bosma (2010, 117f.) considered it one of the false 
beliefs of the left church that immigration was unstoppable. His list of left beliefs is directed 
against both a normative support for integrating foreigners as well as the notion of the 
inevitability of migration which was central to the purple integration policies. As such, the list 
provides both a motive and a road towards an anti-immigration and anti-integration course. At 
a debate hosted by Cliteur’s think tank, someone from the audience expressed the idea of 
expelling people, while those at the podium did not condemn such rhetoric.  
By criticizing the apparent inadequate ideology of the political establishment, the PVV has 
followed D66’s path. Now, however, D66 is criticized as part of a multicultural establishment 
(Bosma 2010, 87-116). In a chapter on “the multicultural elite” in which he claims that central 
social- and state-institutions in the Netherlands were dominated by multiculturalists, he also 
points to the over-proportional representation of D66 members among leading civil servants, in 
education (p. 91), employers’ associations, and as judges and prosecutors (pp. 92f.). Although 
the critique is primarily directed against the political left—specifically the labor party and 
GreenLeft, as well as former Marxist and communist groups— D66 is also included in the 
 
286  An earlier paper from 1989 stresses that pluralism was a fact and starting point of policies, rather than a 
political aim (allochtonenbeleid 1989, 24). This already implies a counter-distinction from a normative 
pluralism; under the purple cabinets however the realism-argument seems to imply a liberal understanding of a 
limited state and a private realm of culture. 
287  In a public response to Scheffer, D66 minister Van Boxtel also affirmed the reality of an inevitability of 
immigration and the limited role of the state and politics in shaping society and achieving socio-economic 
equality (NRC Feb 12th 2000).  
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group of targeted parties.288 As I previously explained, Fortuyn’s political rise was directed 
against the purple cabinets, a coalition D66 had aspired and profiled with (Van der Land 2012). 
Fortuyn (Fortuyn 2002a, 160, 162) also assigned the left-church label to PvdA, GL, and D66. 
In Bosma’s chapter “from Marx to Mohammad,” he focuses on the PvdA, GL, and former 
Marxist and communist groups, while D66 is mentioned only once (Bosma 2010, 276-283). At 
the same time and in a more general sense, D66 also seems to be counted as one of the left 
parties or at least as an advocate of multiculturalism (pp. 54, 61, 84f.). With respect to D66 in 
any case, Bosma criticizes the party and its members for condemning critics of integration 
policies (pp. 84f., also 227, 240, and 124), for compromising individual liberties vis-à-vis Islam 
(p. 127), for a partially clientelist dependence on a Muslim electorate (pp. 135f.), and for 
rejecting the idea of a national identity and patriotism (p. 143).  
Another contributor to the anti-Islamization discourse, the mentioned former journalist, 
Brendel, who in 2007 published a book about the relations of socialism and religion entitled 
The Betrayal of the Left (Het verraad van links), considers D66 a possible heir of the left in 
accommodating Islam. In his second book, The Invisible Ayatollah (De Onzichtbare Ayatollah), 
he claims that while the PvdA might change its course towards the assertion of secularity, D66 
might take the opposite direction and, despite its historical commitment to secularity, might fail 
to uphold it when it comes to Islam (Brendel, Jansen, and Selim 2010, Brendel 2009). Brendel’s 
book suggest that the criticism of D66 refers to the party’s more recent response to the anti-
Islamization debate (next section), as well as its gradual success in attracting allochthone voters 
and the gradual diversification of its candidate lists and delegates (see also ch.7).  
 
288  While a critique of the multicultural left is central to the anti-Islamization movement, this critique has 
not exclusively been voiced from a conservative position. Some contributors have rather been motivated by 
“left” concerns over a growing and ignored ethnic underclass, which is being overlooked under the frame of 
multiculturalism (Scheffer 2000, Prins 2002). Others still criticized an apparent “Betrayal of the Left,” which is 
also the title of a book published by Brendel in 2007 as a critique of the PvdA for having abandoned its 
traditional left-secular profile in dealing with Islam. Despite this critique, Brendel still positioned as left in the 
introduction to his second book on the alleged Islamization of the Netherlands entitled, “The Invisible 
Ayatollah” (Brendel, Jansen, and Selim 2010, Brendel 2007). He still considered voting for the labor party 
(Brendel 2012a). Brendel has distanced himself from the PVV, but still there is an overall interrelatedness 
between the different criticism of Islam, which allows speaking of a singular movement. Brendel’s second book, 
e.g., is co-written by Jansen, who not only served as a witness for Wilders’ defense but also advised him for his 
film “fitna” and joined the European Parliament on behalf of the PVV (P&P n.d.-g, NOS 2016b). For Bosma 
though, his deconversion away from the left is central and bound to a stay in the USA. In an interview with 
Trouw, Bosma tells about studying sociology at the left University of Amsterdam and of only discovering that 
there were non-left intellectuals and writers in the US (Trouw 2015b). Possibly as a result of the general 
polarization though, it seems that at least by now the different anti-Islamization critics constitute one movement 
in which conservative-nationalist voices have become dominant.  
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The previous sections showed the rise of an anti-Islamization movement. This movement 
challenged D66 in three ways: First, the notion of and focus on Islam as an assertive ideology 
politicizes migrants’ culture and religion and challenges the liberal ideal of integration, its 
privatization of culture and focus on socio-economic participation as well as its hope for a 
gradual, transitive assimilation (previous section). The essentialist notion of Islam promoted by 
Wilders and Bosma even challenges the very possibility of integrating Islam along the lines of 
church-state separation, political secularity, and individual liberty and equality rights.289 Central 
to this notion of a necessary ideological struggle with Islam was the new tone introduced by 
Fortuyn, which challenged a prior consensus on the danger of racism (Van Meeteren 2005, 22, 
64-71). Fortuyn felt that the concern with racism hindered an open debate about the 
multicultural society in the sense that it prevented debate and an understanding of the 
experiences of those confronted with its factual, partially problematic, consequences (Fortuyn 
2002a, 43f., 46).  
The focus on Islam further conflicts with the notion of equal treatment, which as mentioned is 
not only central to D66 but also a core constitutional principle. In a controversial interview, 
Fortuyn declared that the concern with racism impaired the freedom of expression (and the 
freedom to criticize others in their way of life) and how this was understood (deVolkskrant 
2012[2002]). This was understood, wrongly according to some, as questioning the Dutch 
constitution’s equal treatment article and Fortuyn was strongly criticized in response 
(deVolkskrant 2002d).290 In the same interview, however, he also declared that immigration 
should be stopped in its entirety, including the existing asylum provisions and the immigration 
of Muslims in particular (deVolkskrant 2012[2002]). Wilders and Bosma are even more explicit 
in claiming distinct liberties for Christians and Jews on the one hand, and Muslims on the other 
hand (deVolkskrant 2008d, deVolkskrant 2005b). Where respective claims found their way into 
law, they were revised in advance so they would conform with principles of state neutrality and 
 
289  It should be mentioned, that neither Fortuyn nor Wilders and Bosma refer to ideology in the sense of 
Napoleon, in order to negate the political relevance of certain ideas (in a normative sense); rather they use it to 
refer to a coherent set of ideas that factually guide the actions of its adherents in a politically relevant way. When 
they speak of an Islamic ideology, the term is further used with the implication of a totalitarian tendency of such 
set of ideas. Bosma (2010, 132) also refers to the end of ideology theme and agrees with its promoters of the 
time (Shils in that case) about the failure and foreseeable decline of the old ideologies such as liberalism and 
socialism, which were perceived to fail as a consequence of the rise of an assertive Islam and immigration-driven 
competition for low-skilled jobs and social welfare. 
290  In his “Against the Islamization” in any case, he positively refers to the anti-discrimination principle 
(Fortuyn 2002a 52, 73, 77).  
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equal treatment, an example being the ban on face-covering clothes that was issued instead of 
a mere burqa ban.  
Second, renewed importance given to ideologies in politics and particularly, the focus on the 
ideological character of Islam has created the expectation of an ideological answer, the 
readiness to (verbally) stand up for and defend liberal values (rather than merely trusting the 
legal system to guard society against breaches of existing law and the constitution). At the same 
time, the 1990s liberal answer to the challenges of a factually (rather than ideally) multicultural 
society—that is, the focus on socio-economic participation, the hope of transitive assimilation, 
and the ideal of freedom of religion and consequently legitimate cultural diversity—are 
declared to be part of a distorted, ideological, world-perception rooted in an ideal of cultural 
equality. While the dominant story line is that multiculturalism is derived from cultural 
Marxism (and thus an ideology of the left), Bosma also seems to criticize the expectation of 
transitive assimilation. His insistence that Islam should not be considered a religion but a 
political ideology opposes an idea of religion as something reformable and the (allegedly 
wrong) expectation that Islam, like all religions, would eventually and quasi-automatically 
liberalize or secularize (Bosma 2010, 172f.).291 According to Bosma, left intellectuals are 
unable to imagine that Islam shaped the actions of its adherents and consequently looked for 
cultural-Marxist ways to explain nonconformist behaviors by way of their marginalized status 
(p. 173). Thus, the anti-Islamization movement’s propagandists tend to subordinate different 
models of approaching cultural diversity under the label of multiculturalism, propagating an 
antithesis between multiculturalism and themselves. This antithesis and the classification of the 
integration policies of the 1990s are, to my knowledge, not adequate; their focus was not the 
equality of cultures but the equal cultural rights of individuals. For Bosma, however, 
“integration” is the “most successful” example of a list of politically correct words the 
multicultural elite uses to assert its way of thinking on society at large (Bosma 2010, 237f.). 
The third point is that the ideal of cultural diversity is criticized for preventing the ideational 
realization and defense of one’s own culture. As elaborated before, the previous policy 
approaches on minorities and integration also did not proclaim an absolute ideal of cultural 
equality. Instead, the two approaches were guided by an ideal of collective and, respectively, 
individual freedoms, and both approaches clearly defined confines to legitimate diversity, with 
 
291  According to Joshua Livestro, the leading editor of the right online blog “Jalta” states that the “theory” 
of Cultural Marxism gained prominence through the Norwegian right-wing mass murder Andre Breivik and was 
popularized by a historian and VVD member in the Netherlands (deVolkskrant 2017b). 
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both at least partly also referring to liberty and equality rights (see also Van Meeteren 2005, 
15). In particular, the frame of integration policies operated with a differentiated notion of 
culture located at the realms of private citizens, (civil) society, and that of the state. In that 
sense, it seems that the main shift that happened with the rise of an anti-Islamization movement 
seems to be the social category, in which restrictions on the freedom of migrants and legitimate 
cultural diversity are formulated. Beyond that, the new liberal nationalism is centrally 
concerned with “nationhood as based on common citizenship” and thus distinct from ethnic 
nationalism (Wagenvoorde 2015, 47), or, in other words, it is about shared national identity as 
a precondition to realizing fundamental virtues (pp. 48f.).  
Collective identity is thereby seen as a precondition of collective agency and, in comparison to 
the minority approach, it is not the emancipation of migrants but that of an autochthone people 
that has become programmatic. In its focus on (imagined or actual) commonalities as a 
precondition of agency, national liberalism resonates with the value-neutral concept of 
ideologies as a shared (epistemic and moral) world-perspective and potential base for collective 
agency (ch. 1.5).292 In comparison to the debates related to the concepts of worldviews and 
ideologies, liberal nationalism is less about world-perception than about a national culture 
(Wagenvoorde 2015, 50). The two foci, however, are also not completely distinct, given that 
notions of a collective history or shared values are also similarly formulated from a specific 
perspective; that is, it is not by chance that national history and its normative interpretation is a 
key issue in Bosma’s book. In theory, liberal nationalism does not oppose cultural or religious 
sub-groups as long as people also (and as citizens primarily) identify with the public culture 
central to the national identity. While, as Wagenvoorde (2015, 52) stresses, national liberalism 
does not necessarily conflict with religion, it can when, e.g., the national identity is construed 
in reference to certain religious traditions or—as one might add—forms of nonreligion. This, 
as this section has shown, had been the case in the Dutch debate on integration since the turn 
of the millennium.  
5.1.6 Summary and Discussion 
The previous sections centered on the field of integration policies as a specific arena for 
negotiating secularity under the conditions of a new religious diversity that had resulted in 
consequence of different processes of immigration. More specifically, the chapter dealt with 
 
292  The focus on the nation and nationalism is key to another conflict line between the purple period/ D66 
and the new national populist parties: the relevance and legitimacy of trans-national political bodies, foremost 
the European Union.  
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competing political visions of integrating Muslim migrants. Reaching back to the 1980s, the 
chapter first demonstrated how, also integration policies shifted from a focus on worldview and 
cultural diversity to be organized in a pluralist way to a functionalist-individualist focus on 
migrants’ integration as individuals. Complementing the previous chapter 4, I showed how the 
functionalist-individualist approach was implemented under the purple coalitions. It is here 
further, that the interrelatedness of individualism with a functional integration293 of society, 
something with the previous chapter indicated (with respect to the ideal of state neutrality as a 
guarantor of individual liberty and equality rights) but which is now also discernable with 
respect to the functional spheres such as the (labor-)market, the field of popular and high 
culture, and last but not least the civil sphere of citizens’ interrelations. A functionalist-
individualist frame conceives migrants’ religiosity as something private, falling under the scope 
of individual liberty rights, and respectively claims political relevance for migrants’ legal 
integration as well as the indirect facilitation of their economic integration. With respect to the 
multiple secularities typology a functionalist-individualist approach resonates with the types 1 
and 3, while also carrying features of type 4. Types 1 and 4 are linked in the understanding of 
individual liberty and equality rights as compatible with the role expectations of autonomous 
spheres (rather than operating with a romantic notion of complete individual self-expression). 
Type 4 resonates in the fact that it is not so much the autonomy of spheres that is stressed in the 
first place, but a specific kind of social integration that is based on the interrelation of different 
spheres and roles as well as on the ideal of a shared public. After thus bridging to the previous 
chapter 4 and the argument of a shift from a pluralist to an individualist notion of secularity, I 
have described the rise of an anti-Islamization movement that challenges this functionalist-
individualist focus on integration by placing a liberal Dutch culture against Islam as its other. I 
focused on Fortuyn as well as Wilders and Bosma as core figures who founded new parties and 
put electoral pressure behind the new discourse. Concludingly, I pointed to three ways in which 
the anti-Islamization movement challenges the functionalist-individualist model of secularity 
and integration as well as, more particularly D66. Central to this challenge is the renewed 
importance given to ideologies in politics. On the one hand, the depiction of Islam as a political 
ideology rather than a religion defies the validity of a functionalist-individualist frame with 
respect to Islam. The claim for an ideological answer to Islam further challenges D66’s historic 
positioning as a non-ideological party. A third point is that the ideal of cultural diversity is 
criticized as an obstacle to a genuine identification with and defense of Dutch culture.  
 
293  In the sense of Durkheim’s “organic solidarity” (see section 1.2). 
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The rise of Fortuyn, as mentioned, resulted in electoral losses for the purple parties (Kiesraad 
n.d.) and accelerated the of D66, which had already set in before he came on the scene. By 
contrast, Wilders’ emergence provided the party with an opportunity to rearticulate its 
standpoint on integration and religion as well as its general profile and to successfully position 
itself as the PVV’s counter-pole. The subsequent sections will sketch D66’s positioning in the 
political field after the fall of the purple cabinets. I thereby illustrate how D66 prominently 
positioned itself as a defender of a functionalist-individualist model of secularity, first vis-à-vis 
the new culturalist nationalism, and subsequently vis-à-vis Islam.  
5.2 Searching for A Positioning in the Debate on Islam 
D66’s position with respect to Islam was not given much attention in Van der Land’s book 
(2012). In the 1990s, D66 seems to have taken a different road than the right liberals. According 
to Fermin (Fermin 1997, 98f.), the Democrats did not follow the right-liberal critique of migrant 
cultures prominent during that time but continued to assert that culture and identity (and thus 
also religion) were personal matters and questions of freedom despite their critique of the 
minority policy frame. Thus, they primarily withheld from commenting on immigration and 
focused instead on the economic aspects of integration. The party’s response to the rising 
critiques of integration and Islam at the turn of the millennium, however, has been evaluated 
more ambivalently, particularly in terms of the Minister of Large Cities and Integration Van 
Boxtel’s role in the discussion. On one hand, he is described as the counterpart to nationalist 
and culturalist policies. According to Verkaaik (2010, 73), he envisioned a more open 
immigration policy oriented at economic needs and similar to that of other countries of 
immigration, such as Canada and the United States. Measures like integration ceremonies, that 
he had suggested in that context, were later realized by Verdonk under a more assertive and 
culturalist frame (P&P n.d.-k). At least at the beginning, Van Boxtel is said to have defended 
integration policies against its critics (Scholten 2011, 196). According to some, he later shifted 
in the direction of the new discourse (Wansink 2004, 163f., Prins 2002, 13f.). Van Boxtel 
indicated a shift in his position himself when he stated to the press that in the last year of his 
position as a minister, he began to worry about radicalization among Muslim youth 
(deVolkskrant 2004). While authors are not very detailed on the matter, a few points can be 
discussed.  
One point is that, as I already mentioned, the policy papers of the purple period are ambivalent 
about the merit of religion with respect to integration, and they were to a certain extent focused 
on religion/ Islam. This holds not only for Van Boxtel, but also other D66 politicians engaged 
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in measures that were working towards integration through Islamic organizations. Already in 
the mid-1990s, the D66 Minister of Justice, Winnie Sorgdrager, facilitated the formation of an 
Islamic umbrella organization as a contact organization for the state. The “Steering group for 
Islam and Citizenship (Stuurgroep Islam en burgerschap)” was meant to foster a debate among 
Dutch Muslims about norms and values and the relationship between Islam and the Dutch 
notion of citizenship (Musch 2011, 274). The initiative received state subsidies until 2007 
(Ibid.), and the group apparently chaired debates about homosexuality and gender equality 
(deVolkskrant 2003b). The interest in an Islamic contact organ for the government was also 
based on the hope that Dutch institutions for imam-training could be reached, and that such 
imams could help to foster new migrants’ integration. In later years, Minister Van Boxtel also 
stimulated the formation of such a representative body (see also Boender 2007, 73f., Musch 
2011, 275).294 Accordingly, special integration courses were prepared for imams (TK 1998a, 
29, Boender 2007, 96f.).  
A policy paper from 2002 (entitled, Integration from the Perspective of Immigration) further 
considers the facilitation of dialogue between citizens and different ethnic groups a state task, 
which should clarify the shared values of society and create mutual solidarity among citizens 
of the same country (TK 2001-02). The note stresses that all inhabitants had to accept the basic 
values of “this society” as being anchored in the constitution, the legal order, and generally 
accepted ideas, but it also emphasizes that these basic values were neither the sole possession 
of an allochthone population, nor were they static and unchanging (p. 54). While the note invites 
religious organizations to contribute to integration (pp. 55f.), it also warns against letting the 
debate on Islam determine integration policies as a whole (p. 4).295 Overall, the note seems to 
equally object to cultural and value relativism as well as to an essentialist definition of a national 
culture (p. 55).  
Generally speaking, such focus on Islam might be not so much a break with the purple policies 
but might complement them in the sense that it fits the (neo-republican) ideal of social 
interrelations and active citizenship as well as the hope for migrants’ transitive assimilation. 
Boender (2007, 93f.) e.g. refers to one of Van Boxtel’s public statements, in which he spoke 
about Islam not as “backward” but “behind,” as its current manifestation still echoed the rural 
 
294  Eventually two organizations emerged from this process, the Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid 
(CMO) Contactgroep Islm (CGI). 
295  Fermin (1997, 152) stresses that it was characteristic for the Christian parties to understand men as 
essentially a “homo religiosus” and that this view also shaped their views on migrants. Van Boxtel, it seems, 
stressed a similar notion of man (yet in the secular framing of man’s value-boundness). 
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traditions of the countries of origin, while there was not a European Islamic elite that could 
participate in public debates. Reading Prins, it seems that the notion of a shift in the position of 
minister Van Boxtel might be based on his response to the so-called el-Moumni affair 
concerning a Dutch imam who had made disparaging comments about homosexuality (Prins 
2002, 13f.). Van Boxtel publicly criticized him and organized a meeting with a group of 
Muslims, among them the imam in question, in order to stress the need for a dialogue and in 
order to explain to the imam the norms to which he was expected to conform (Prins 2002, 13f. 
(Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010, 967, NOVA 2001b). He also apparently called 
upon mayors to counter fundamentalist imams (DeVolkskrant 2002c). According to Prins 
(2002, 14), the government thus gave in to Scheffer’s claims.296 The difference would then be 
that the minister had shifted from facilitating a dialogue to participating in it in the role of a 
Minister and thus shifted the state’s position in respect to religion. Moreover, during the 2002 
election campaign, Van Boxtel also expressed concerns over the disintegrative effects of 
Muslim schools and claimed that religious education ought to be abolished (deVolkskrant 
2002e, Meijer 2002, 356f.).  
Finally, the perception of Van Boxtel seems to also derive from the contrast with the then-party 
leader, Thom de Graaf, under whose leadership (1997-2003) the party positioned itself in 
opposition to the rising populism and the claim for a harsher and blunt tone in the debate on 
integration (Van der Land 2012, 27f.).297 After he was elected party leader, he prominently 
spoke out against Fortuyn, quoting from the diary of Anne Frank in an apparent warning of a 
new fascist period (Wansink 2004, 135, NOVA 2001a, deVolkskrant 2008a).298 For the 
parliamentary elections in 2003, the party published a rather short eight-page pamphlet in which 
it addresses popular criticism of the multicultural society and outlines a counter-position in line 
with the purple idea of integration and an ideal of civilized, respectful social interrelations based 
on tolerance and the freedom of worldviews, backed by fundamental human rights (Van der 
Land 2012, 27f.). Beyond that, the text centers on the importance of education—a point which 
 
296  Several scholars of Islam criticized the focus on Islam in integration policies in general as well as the 
minister’s interference with a preacher’s religious competence (GA 2001). Several Muslim organizations further 
pressed charges against the minister (deVolkskrant 2002b). After the electoral decline of the purple parties and 
D66 in particular, Van Boxtel left politics, but even then he remained active in the matter in his later role as the 
chair of the Humanist Association (2003 – 2005). Between 2002 and 2004, the Dutch government funded a 
dialog between different Muslim organizations, the Dutch LBGT interest-group, COC, and the Dutch Humanist 
Association (COC 2004). 
297  Among the established political leaders, D66 faction leader Tom de Graaf had been the first to ask 
Fortuyn for a debate (Wansink 2004, 133f.). 
298  After Fortuyn was murdered, De Graaf was legally charged for inciting hatred against Fortuyn (Hippe, 




would become a key to the party’s profile. When the first Balkenende cabinet (CDA, VVD, 
LPF) was formed, D66 publicly declared its opposition to this cabinet and its immigration 
policies alongside to criticizing the cabinet’s allegedly outdated notion of families, its 
environmental policies, and apparent belief in the market (Van der Land 2012, 54).  
Despite the party’s positioning against the rising culturalism and nationalism, though, its overall 
positioning has also been determined by other factors. Despite its critique of Balkenende I, the 
party joined Balkenende’s subsequent second cabinet (with CDA and VVD). According to Van 
der Land (2012), D66’s participation had been much contested. Aside from immigration being 
a point of contestation, Balkenende, as mentioned, had profiled with a, Christian reformed as 
well as communitarian focus on norms and values, and D66 had previously criticized his norms 
and values project as being in conflict with privacy and individual autonomy (Boer 2010, 
Ossewaarde 2010).299 According to Van der Land, (2012, 74, 158), D66 also struggled with the 
cabinet’s views on drugs, privacy, and security. The decisive motive for joining the coalition 
was the hope that it would allow them to realize investments in education, democratic reforms, 
as well as stronger sustainability policies (Van der Land 2012, 54, 103).300 In particular though, 
the participation in an economic-liberal leaning cabinet enabled further economic 
liberalizations, which was also a D66 goal, and which would not have been possible in coalition 
with the labor party (pp. 73, 104f).301 The party leaders further hoped that a center-right 
coalition would allow the party to gain publicity for its progressive profile.302  
 
299  At the time, Balkenende’s first cabinet was formed, Thom de Graaf, who was D66’s faction leader from 
1997 to 2003 published a press article, criticizing the focus on norms and values as a moralistic intrusion of the 
government into the private lives of people and the assertion of a particularistic Christian morality via the state 
(De Graaf 2002). According to De Graaf, the purple cabinets had broken with such moralism and liberal parties 
should oppose such an attempt to assert a particularistic morality via the state. In a related debate in the Second 
Chamber, he stressed the importance of keeping the confines of state vis-á-vis citizen’s private lives and moral 
choices in mind and accepting the reality of a post-pillarized society. He also stressed the liberties rather than the 
weaknesses of an individualized society. According to some, D66 later supported the theme when it formed a 
coalition with CDA and VVD, yet it is not clear in what sense. In a parliament debate, Dittrich, e.g., self-
considered a “late convert” to the debate on norms and values, used this frame to assert the purple approach to 
integration and to criticize Verdonk (TK 2004-05b). 
300  The party even accepted the Christian parties’ call for a moratorium on ethical matters in order to gain 
greater flexibility with respect to these new decisive points (Ibid. 46). Prior to forming a cabinet with VVD and 
D66, the Christian Democrats had negotiated a respective agreement with the VVD and the small Christian 
parties. The fact that D66 accepted the agreement, secured ongoing support from the small Christian parties for 
the cabinet (Ibid. 46). Eventually, the existence of alternative majorities between CDA and VVD, the small 
Christian parties (as well as the LPF) in the Chamber proved to be a disadvantage for the Democrats. 
301  The government participation polarized the party members and caused some to leave the party, among 
them one of the party founders, Baehr.  
302  According to Van der Land (2012, 158), the coalition partners only agreed on the economic reforms; 
generally speaking, D66 voted differently from its coalition partners in about a fifth to a third of all cases. 
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Party members criticized and opposed the minister of integration as well as the different 
religion-centered policies of the Christian Democrats. According to Van der Land (2012, 158), 
the party voted differently than its coalition partners 18-27% of the times (depending on the 
year and coalition partner). In particular, the party voted against the integration law (wet 
inburgering) from 2006, which had been prepared under Verdonk’s oversight (EK n.d.-f, 
2006).303  
Ultimately, though, such a counter-distinction proved difficult for D66 with the consequence 
that the party was increasingly perceived as being right of the political center and that there was 
increasing dissatisfaction with the taken course (including, and not the least, its economic 
policies) (Van der Land 2012, 72, 103, 209). As such, participation in Balkenende’s second 
cabinet harmed D66’s reputation as a left-leaning party and it further contributed to the party’s 
decline (Van der Land 2012, 209f.). From 15.4 % in 1994, and 8.9 % in 1998, the party fell to 
2 % in 2006 (P&P n.d.-j). It was only after 2006 that the party gradually stabilized itself, 
increasing its share of the electorate to 6.9 % in 2010 and 12.2 % in the most recent elections 
in 2017 (P&P n.d.-j). This stabilization is commonly linked to Alexander Pechtold’s leadership, 
and, at least initially, a great part of this successful stabilization was a consequence of the 
party’s opposition to the anti-Islamization debate.  
Pechtold had succeeded De Graaf as the Minister of Administrative Renewal and Kingdom 
Relations (2005-2006) during Balkenende’s second cabinet. Already then, he was rather 
successful in building up a prominent opposition role, using his role to seek publicity by 
opposing CDA and VVD’s positions in the debate on Islam and integration (Van der Land 2012, 
171). Pechtold was elected as the party’s frontrunner for the parliamentary elections in 2006 
(Van der Land 2012, 75, 229). His speech implied a counter-distinction from the nationalist 
tone of the integration debate and the symbolic exclusion of Dutch Muslims from the Dutch 
nation and this would also shape the following election campaign (Van der Land 2012, 219 
253).304  
 
303  In the second chamber the law was accepted, also by D66, with only one party MP voting against the 
law. In the First Chamber, D66 questioned the obligatory character and the focus on allegedly Dutch norms and 
advocated a more two-sided notion of integration and voted against the law. 
304  At the time he ran for the position as a frontrunner, he announced his commitment to the still ongoing 
government coalition, while still seeking to distinguish the party via new and distinct key issues (the individual, 
education and innovation, the environment). Eventually, D66 broke with the coalition over Minister Verdonk’s 
much-criticized decision to withdraw the Dutch passport of VVD member and prominent Islam-critic Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali because she had apparently lied when applying for asylum in the Netherlands (Van der Land 2012, 
231-233). When Pechtold was elected the new leader of D66, he claimed that D66 should be the party of 
integration rather than simplifying Islam (deVolkskrant 2006b). 
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At the time of the leadership-elections, Pechtold’s main competitor, Lousewies van der Laan, 
had taken a competing position in the debate on Islam, using her candidacy to criticize Islamic 
schools as an obstacle to integration and claim an abolition of the constitutional principle of the 
freedom of education (Trouw 2006d, c, see also deVolkskrant 2006c). Pechtold, by contrast, 
defended the rights of parents to choose what form of education their children would receive 
and stated that religion could also play a positive role in allochthone integration (Ibid.). While 
Van der Laan had led political campaigns on matters of secularity (see ch.4.4), Pechtold 
criticized her for playing into Wilders’ hands (deVolkskrant 2006c). Whether the two 
candidates were indeed differed in their notion of secularity is difficult to say, but, in any case, 
they differed with respect to the political course at that given moment.  
The opposition to Wilders’, in any case, became central to Pechtold’s positioning in the political 
field (Van der Land 2012, 299-304, 331f., 337, 345).305 At the time of his early leadership, the 
labor party had suggested that Wilders be isolated and others also feared that such opposition 
would only increase Wilders’ publicity (Pechtold 2014, NOS 2014, CPG 2014). In that sense, 
Wilders’ unchallenged position constituted an opportunity for a counter-position and Pechtold 
proved very successful in this position. Moreover, the party further invested in an organizational 
professionalization and placed renewed focus on its “ideological” profile (Van der Land 2012, 
265-315, 331f.). As such, the party was able to transform its stabilization into electoral gains 
between 2006 and 2017 (P&P n.d.-j).  
5.2.1 Accepting the Ideological Challenge 
The rise of Fortuyn and later that of Wilders’ PVV renewed—as depicted previously—the 
importance of ideology in politics. As argued above, Fortuyn had already called for the 
appropriation of ideology and the defense of secular modernity in a necessary ideological battle 
with Islam. Wilders and Bosma have radicalized his notion of Islam as an ideological other, 
dwarfing the legitimate scope for a liberal model based on the freedom of privatized religion. 
Not only by challenging liberalism, but also by the importance given to ideologies, the new 
national liberalism constitutes a challenge to D66. As a consequence of the party’s electoral 
decline at the turn of the millennium, internal party evaluations claimed a renewed focus on 
articulating the party’s core points and genuine course (Van der Land 2012, 270-274, 289-299). 
One aspect of this renewed emphasis on an ideological profile in the context of the party’s 
general re-organization from 2006 onwards was that the scientific bureau affiliated with the 
 
305  He was both D66 faction leader and political leader between 2006 and 2018. 
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party was revived (Van der Land 2012, 293-296, Interview Frans 2013).306 Since 2007, the Mr. 
Hans Van Mierlo Foundation (VMS) has been tasked with articulating and detailing the party’s 
social-liberal profile and raising its ideological awareness.307 In that period, it also adapted its 
current name with the addendum “D66 Scientific Bureau for Social-Liberal Ideas 
[gedachtegoed].”308 Additionally, a Permanent Program Commission was established around 
the same time, and was also charged with rearticulating the party’s basic ideas (Van der Land 
2012, 296-299). The foundation thereby functions as the secretary of the program commission, 
developing content without making actual political choices (Interview Frans 2013, 65-71).  
In 2013, I had the chance to speak with Frans, who was then still the foundation’s director. He 
told me about his participation in building up the foundation, initially without linking this to 
the rise of populist parties or the debate on Islam, but by contrasting their “ideological” work 
with D66’s former anti-ideological tradition.  
And that is what we have been working on since 2007 with () the mission that we stated for 
ourselves, to () strengthen eh D66’s ideological awareness, because we have traditionally 
been a party that always said we don't have an ideology, which I think virtually impossible if 
you want to be a stable political party (Interview Frans 2013, 36-39) 
When I asked him about the rise of populist parties in the Netherlands and D66’s response, 
though, he explicated the ideological challenge posed by Fortuyn.309 He contended that Fortuyn, 
had confronted D66 and progressivists more generally with the fact that they had lost their 
ideological foundations, “that they didn’t really have a fundamental answer to his most 
fundamental arguments” (Interview Frans 2013, 287-289). He felt that the way in which 
Fortuyn was set off as a fascist by leading politicians only demonstrated their insufficient 
ideological equipment.  
 
306  In the period of crisis between 2002 and 2006, the scientific bureau also lay idle, but it was revived after 
2007 with the aim to elaborate and detail the party’s social-liberal profile. 
307  The scientific bureau had long been an advocate of a more consistent and elaborate intellectual backing 
for the party (Varkevisser 1998). Allan Varkevisser, had been working for the think tank from 1991 to 1998 and 
was senior editor for its journal “Idee.”  
308  Most recently the addendum was changed to “Scientific bureau for social liberalism.” 
309  Previously, I had asked him about the anti-confessional tradition of the party and our talk moved to the 
party’s notion of secularity and secular profile. He explained that there was not much internal discussion about 
secularism, but again without referring to the debate on Islam and integration. When I explicitly asked about the 
debate on Islam, he stated that in his perception in the debate on Islam, “the traditional arguments about 
secularism” were hardly made. He thereby referred to the freedom of education but unfortunately I interrupted 
him at this point and asked about the rise of populism.  
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So they didn't know anymore why they were individualists, and why it is good to have a 
separation of church and state, and why it is good to not, ehm () eh for instance to not give a 
state too much of a grip on the identity or religion a person should have. And they just said, 
well remember the holocaust, but that didn't work, didn't work anymore. () (Interview Frans 
2013, 291-294) 
For him personally, the rise of Fortuyn was also a confrontation with his own lack of ideological 
preparedness and the experience of not being able “to come up with the argument” to oppose 
Fortuyn acted as a strong motivation to engage with political philosophy and to “start going 
back to the source” (Interview Frans 2013, 295-300). While D66 had been unprepared to 
counter Fortuyn, Wilders offered them an opportunity to position the party in opposition to him 
and Pechtold was the first to seize that chance and develop such opposition. Still, he felt that 
D66 supporters were also insufficiently prepared for that challenge (ll. 308-310).  
At a later stage in the interview this notion of an alleged progressive relativism was more 
strongly expressed, and he came to speak about what he perceived to be a misconstrued 
liberalism and postmodernism, misleading many D66 members and progressives who confused 
state neutrality with a relativism of values.310 Consequently, people withdrew from society and 
public moral debates, leaving the floor to those who claimed the state and aimed to increase its 
powers over the individual. Their withdrawal into a private realm, however, endangered the 
publicly guaranteed liberties of an open society because of the bottom-up logic of politics.  
because on the other hand, you see many more groups saying we are gonna organize 
ourselves and we are gonna impose our morals on others. And you have to resist that, I really 
believe that, you have to resist that if you want to maintain an open society. And you can't just 
say well it is up to the state, because the state is nothing if it is not us. Or, even worse, the 
state is awful if it’s not us. (Interview Frans 2013, 415-419) 
Taken together, Frans’ elaborations are based on the notion of politics as a battlefield of ideas, 
or, better, of ideals and values. In such a context, the lack of a concise and formulated standpoint 
constitutes a weakness. Accordingly, this makes it necessary for parties to articulate and 
promote their worldview. To a certain extent, his elaboration about an allegedly relativistic 
progressive middle class resonates with the elite-criticism that has accompanied the anti-
Islamization debate as well as the Christian Democratic critique of the purple period. Despite 
 
310  I also addressed cultural critiques of individualized modernity as lacking a moral base. He objected to 
that idea, but then came to speak about what he perceived as a misconstrued liberalism and postmodernism. 
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this commonality with the critics of a left-liberal elite, here, the critical diagnosis is 
motivational, an attempt to mobilize and equip people in an ideological and political struggle 
against nationalist populism. Nationalism is not, however, the only “other” against whom 
social-liberal principles need to be asserted. Instead, Frans (interview 2013) spoke of the 
necessity to counter “the totalitarianism of both Wilders and Islamic-fundamentalists” (ll. 
311f.), and later he also referred to certain Christian organizations that would illiberally claim 
the state.311  
I really also think that () still many progressives, many D66-supporters () still not really ehm 
actively master the fundamental arguments, of what is wrong with what he [Wilders; C.S.] is 
saying. And also not with what is wrong with Islamic fundamentalists; because to me they 
really look alike, the fundamentalism, the totalitarianism of both Wilders and Islam-
fundamentalists. (Interview Frans 2013, 308-312) 
At the time of the party foundation, the call for pragmatism (rather than ideological politics) 
worked well in the political field, but, as chapter one underscores, it did not imply a rejection 
of idea-based politics as such. Thus, the party gradually defined itself in the social-liberal 
tradition. At the turn of the millennium, this foundation has appeared to be weakly founded and 
in need of a rearticulating and internalization. The aim to articulate the party’s ideology—or its 
“starting points”— resulted in numerous publications.312 Aside from several thematic books, 
the HVM-foundation worked out five “richtingwijzers” (in English: signposts/ route indicators) 
for social-liberal politics that the party’s program committee had formulated in 2006. Each 
signpost has been worked out in a little booklet. The five route indicators are: 1) trust in the 
capability of humans; 2) reward performance and share welfare; 3) think and trade 
internationally; 4) aim for a sustainable and harmonious society; 5) cherish the basic rights and 
shared values. These indicators were first introduced in the 2006 election program. The five 
booklets are entitled: Trust in people’s own power, Reward performance and share wealth, 
Think and act internationally, Work toward a sustainable and harmonious society, and Cherish 
our civil rights and shared values.313 Relevant in this context, the signposts also give expression 
to the notion of politics as a battle of ideas and ideals.  
 
311  I had asked Frans who he had in mind when speaking about these other more assertive political powers 
that claimed the state, he pointed to Christian and Muslim organizations, as well as the populist movements.  
312  According to the think tank, its work only addresses those ideas that have already manifested within the 
party and have been expressed in a variety of internal documents and party members’ texts Most texts that are at 
the base of this chapter are part of this “historical canon of D66,” which the think tank publishes on its website. 
313 The English formulation of the signposts are taken from the party’s international website while the booklet 
titles are my own translation of the Dutch titles (D66International n.d.). 
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The authors frame politics as an essentially moral enterprise in the sense that it is concerned 
questions of what is good, just, and legitimate, and constituted a mediating sphere between 
citizens/ society and state (VMS, 2015, 34, 50). With respect to the moral competition implied 
in politics, liberals might feel a tension between the desire to grant everyone their own vision 
on the one hand, and the need to defend social liberal ideals vis-à-vis competing concepts of 
political rule on the other hand (VMS 2016 [2009], 28). In a context where liberal democracy 
was being challenged by different illiberal alternatives, nationally as well as globally, it was, 
however, indispensable that liberals internalized and publicly expressed their commitment to 
liberal democracy (VMS 2015, 12).314 Similarly, the fifth booklet elaborates how the civil realm 
functions as a place in which competing (personal) moralities are negotiated and public morals 
are established (VMS 2015, 22f., 27, 45). While all individuals are seen as capable and morally 
required to distinguish and negotiate these different moral realms, liberals in particular are 
expected to participate in societal (horizontal) exchanges about competing values (VMS 2015, 
28), and to provide the arguments for the universality of absolute basic rights in public debates 
(pp. 58f.). 
Apparently, the ideological challenge posed by the Fortuyn revolution and the subsequent rise 
of populism has not only been felt by party leaders: In the preface of the first richtingwijzer, 
Frans writes that the first issue sold out in a few months (VMS 2016 [2009]). Apparently, the 
members of the just-revitalized party were in need of inspiration and were interested in the 
intellectual examination of what ought to constitute the party’s—and their own—starting 
points. Importantly, central to this notion of politics is not so much the idea of competing 
worldviews or visions of the world, but rather that of competing ideals and values—the 
epistemic level is present but the authors clearly object to epistemic relativism and point to the 
difference between facts and opinions and the moral responsibility to analyze one’s views and 
assess the factuality of things (VMS 2015, 30).  
Complementing the apparent necessity of an ideological position, the notion of politics as a 
battle of ideas and ideals is also linked with the normative obligation to engage in debate with 
political opponents. This aspect was made central in Pechtold’s opposition to Wilders. At a time 
when the labor party had suggested that Wilders ought to be isolated, Pechtold used the tool of 
parliamentary appeals to oppose him, arguing that Wilders and especially his voters had a 
 
314  Examples named are an illiberal democracy in Russia and Hungary, authoritarian capitalism in China, 




democratic responsibility to take part in the debate, and it was through arguments that his ideas 
had to be countered (Pechtold 2014, NOS 2014). A similar message was expressed in a book 
that Pechtold published in 2012 and which documents his meetings with different people who 
had voted for Wilders’ PVV (Pechtold 2012). With respect to the purpose and guiding idea 
behind these meetings he writes:  
I would like to convince as many people as possible, but I do not compromise my ideals for 
that. […] Wilders is on his way to Hamelin but not with rats. I take the people who have voted 
for him serious, because I know for sure that I can win them over with my ideals and convince 
them with my arguments. My idea of democracy thus is primarily an idea of how we must 
debate, how we must talk to each other (Pechtold 2012, 51, see also: 173)  
Moreover, like Frans, Pechtold also refers to the ideological requirements of political 
competition: he stresses the importance of political leadership, of being clear about the values 
one stands for, the future one envisions (Pechtold 2012, 195f.), and he encourages “others to 
revive their quenched ideals” (p. 202). In his understanding, it was “only by entering into a 
democratic debate with all sharpness and courage, with respect for each other’s ideas and ideals, 
[that] we can escape the grip of populism” (p. 205).  
5.2.2 Positioning vis-à-vis Islam? 
While the opposition between Pechtold and Wilders strongly determined the public perception 
of the party, this positioning has also been criticized from different sides: By those who warn 
against an Islamic threat, D66 has unsurprisingly been criticized for its alleged naïveté with 
respect to Islam and Islamic radicalism (Elsevier 2015a, b, Brendel 2010a). To a certain extent, 
the prime focus on countering nationalist populism seems to have been criticized from within 
the party itself, accompanied by claims to develop an adequate position vis-à-vis Islam.  
A prominent voice in that respect is Boris van der Ham, a former D66 parliamentarian (2002-
2012), who initiated and supported several secularizing legislations– including some 
concerning Islam.315 Since 2012, he is  the chair of the Dutch Humanist Association (HV) and 
in his function he has increased his activism with respect to Islam by, e.g., creating public 
attention of the threats and oppression faced by people who de-convert from Islam, or express 
nonconformist or critical views of Islam (PlatformNieuweVrijdenkers). At the least, since he 
left active politics, he has been critical of both the party and Islam—a critique he also brought 
 
315  Examples being the abolition of the “sole reason construction” and the blasphemy ban (section 4.4).  
He co-issued the bill to abolish the “sole reason construction” (section 4.2). 
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into the party. At different occasions, he has criticized (parts of) D66 as well as left-liberals 
more generally for shying away from confronting Jewish and Muslim organizations about 
practices that violated liberal or more generally ethical principles (Van der Ham 2014, RD 
2016a) and for avoiding a serious discussion of the radical elements in Islam (HP/DeTijd 2017, 
AD 2016). During a fringe meeting at a party congress, he pointed to global attempts by 
Muslims to make “terrible” claims and urged his party not to leave the debate on Islam to 
Wilders but to be as sharp as they have been with respect to Christian organizations (RD 2016a). 
To give another example: In 2017, a local chapter of the party hosted a debate evening entitled 
“social-liberalism and Islam” (D66 2017b), which was motivated by the idea that the party 
should not limit itself to opposing Wilders, but also develop and articulate a genuine social-
liberal position with respect to the debate on Islam. Van der Ham was invited to give a lecture 
on the tension between liberty and religion and, especially, Islam.  
Even after his genuine political career, Van der Ham is someone with weight and reputation 
within the party; it is not clear, however, the degree to which his criticism is shared by a broader 
strand within D66. I did not come across other prominent party members who have publicly 
expressed a similar critique, but he is not the only Islam-critical voice that has been invited to 
party events. As Aalberts (2016) observes, Paul Cliteur, the Islam-critical professor from 
Leiden (and not a member of D66), was invited to attend a session on diversity at a party 
congress in 2016. According to Aalberts, this session gave room to very carefully expressed 
concerns about Islamic fundamentalism, while at the center stage the party’s opposition to 
populism was hailed.316 The fact that Islam-critical voices are invited to party events shows that 
the debate has some resonance within the party.317 This could be interpreted in different ways, 
as a conservative or nationalist turn or strand within D66 or a diversification of the critical 
debate on Islam.  
If one looks at party publications, it seems that both the protection and confinement of Islam 
are represented as two sides of the same notion of secularity, rather than competing positions. 
With respect to the party’s programs, still, the emphasis on the principles of the separation of 
church and state, functional differentiation, as well as individual liberty and equality has 
increased over time and become increasingly explicit. Beyond the party’s election programs, 
 
316  Aalberts claims that the word “Islam” was not mentioned and that D66 did not dare to say was that 
Dutch values should be uphold. My own understanding of the party’s positioning, however, differs from his. In 
my understanding, it is precisely the nationalization of liberal values vis-à-vis Muslim immigrants that the party 
objects to, as it asserts the universality of these values. 
317  In the party’s magazine, authors have also called for a secular course vis-à-vis Islam (Roode 2017).  
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these principles are also expressed in the five booklets about the party’s core ideological starting 
points.  
The next section points to the main aspects of the party’s positioning in the debate on integration 
and Islam, drawing on both the think tank’s publications as well as the party’s positioning in 
parliament.  
5.3 Defending the Liberal Model 
D66’s positioning with respect to the debate on Islam and integration centers on three main 
points. First, they oppose a collectivizing focus on Muslims as a group with an individualistic 
perspective on agency as well as with a functional notion of integration. From this perspective, 
the problematizing and collectivizing focus on Islam and the culturalization of migrants is 
framed as an obstacle to integration and a cause of radicalization. Second, the party proposes 
an individual liberty and equality approach to religion, which both protects and confines it. 
Third and interrelated with the previous two points, the party has placed greater emphasis on 
its notion of secularity.  
5.3.1 Individualism and Functional Integration 
D66 politicians have recurrently opposed the collectivizing and generalizing notions of Islam 
and Muslims as a form of stigmatization and exclusion, which conflicts the equal status of all 
citizens and is, accordingly, an obstacle to integration. They had already assumed this position 
as part of Balkenende’s second cabinet, when, e.g., Boris Dittrich, the faction leader at the time, 
criticized Minister Verdonk for a public statement on Muslims’ alleged lower readiness to 
accept criticism (TK 2004-05b). According to this line of reasoning, by ignoring existing 
prejudice against migrants that minister would further betray the principle of equal treatment. 
Similarly, Pechtold, then the Minister for Administrative Renewal and Kingdom Relations 
(from 2005 to 2006), claimed that the public political response to the threat of terrorism created 
obstacles for successful integration given that it linked an entire religion with crime and thus 
symbolically excluded a large part of the Dutch population (Van der Land 2012, 171). Using a 
rather recent example—also in the aftermath of the attacks against the staff of the French 
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and the customers of a Jewish supermarket—party leader 
Pechtold rhetorically differentiated the attacks from Islam by stressing the sole responsibility 
of the perpetrators (TK 2014-15): 
While Wilders criticized the other parties for failing to recognize Islam as the cause of the 
attacks and as an ideology rather than a religion, Pechtold stressed that only the terrorists 
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themselves were responsible for the attacks and that no political ideals, ideologies, or religions 
could justify them. He further pointed to terrorism as a global threat, which was happening in 
France, Canada, Australia, Syria, Iraq, and Nigeria, and thus implicitly pointed to Muslims as 
being among the victims of Islamist terrorism as well. Eventually, he concluded his address by 
pointing his listeners to the fact that so far, he had not mentioned the word “Islam,” as 
referencing the word was only necessary because the terrorists had claimed a relation with Islam 
while they alone were responsible. Therefore, he contended, there was no reason to expect one’s 
allochthone neighbors to distance themselves from the attacks or to suddenly speak about 
moderate Islam.318 While individual terrorists had abused Islam, for the great majority it was 
merely a religion.319  
The proposed individualism and the opposition to collectivizing and culturalizing perspectives 
on Muslim immigrants/ citizens, is linked with a re-articulation of the ‘purple’ focus on 
integration. In an interview, Ingrid van Engelshoven—party chair from 2007-2013 and a close 
political associate of Pechtold—explained her party’s standpoint on Islam by stating that, just 
as any other religion, Islam was mainly considered a private matter and that citizens should be 
approached via their action rather than their religiosity (Pers 2009). Thus, while Islam is 
declared to be private, the party has responded to the debate on integration (as well as that on 
norms and values) by placing education as the focal point. The coalition agreement with the 
CDA and VVD, e.g., states that education was an important medium by which Dutch norms 
and values could be transmitted, a necessity for successful integration (TK 2003a, 4 see also 
Van der Land 2012, 30). The 2006 program points to language as a key to integration and 
integration is once more defined, among others, via socio-economic participation and oriented 
towards the ideal of transitive assimilation (D66 2006). In the mentioned opinion piece, e.g., 
Pechtold speaks of integration as going to school, having a job, paying taxes, and observing the 
law (NRC 2015). He further speaks of the factual integration debate as having negative effects 
on actual integration processes (Ibid). Once more, the emphasis on socio-economic 
participation seems to be linked with the hope for intransitive integration. Van der Land (2012, 
 
318  Spokesmen from other parties also spoke out against generalized critiques of Islam. They emphasized 
that Dutch Muslims were not to be blamed for the attacks, underscored the value of the freedom of religion, and 
criticized Wilders for contributing to social radicalization and polarization. 
319  Pechtold thus seems to have taken over Wilders’ distinction between religion and ideology, yet with a 
different empirical claim regarding the reality of Islam in the Netherlands. The emphasis on Islam as a religion is 
thereby used to claim its potential compatibility with liberal democracy (and basic security) and, conversely, its 
protection under the freedom of religion (as a personal liberty right). 
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301) quotes Pechtold saying that he wanted to let Islam come to an enlightenment by entering 
the struggle with Dutch basic rights and democracy.  
On the one hand, thus, the purple notion of integration is placed in opposition to the discursive 
construction of a Dutch culture vis-à-vis Islam. At other occasions, a singular concept of 
integration is avoided in order to make the same point. Similar to the rhetorical move of “not 
speaking about Islam” in the grammatical singular, the party has assumed a stance of “not 
speaking about integration.” As Van der Land (2012, 344) quotes, the 2010 election program 
does not have a specific chapter on integration, and this is emphasized and explained in the 
introduction with the program writers clarifying that integration was not an “isolated issue” for 
D66, but integral to its agenda for education, work, housing, and security. Respective policy 
suggestions, as the introduction frames it, were thus presented in the program “without 
discrimination (onderscheid).” Accordingly, the 2010 party program also elaborates the 
interrelatedness of integration and individualism: While the program criticizes political rhetoric 
that excludes people and sets groups against each other, it also stresses its individualism as a 
foundation for diversity: “We start with individuals. And humans belong to several groups and 
have several identities. Tolerance is key.” (Ibid.). As such, the program replaces a single 
concept of integration with a focus on policies with respect to the different functionally divided 
spheres in which integration is meant to be realized. Once more, this shows the interrelation 
between individualism and functional differentiation.  
The notion of functional differentiation is not only used to counter a collectivizing and 
culturalist frame on integration, but it also places confines on the freedom of religion. The 2010 
program states that people were free to choose their clothing with the exception that in 
professional contexts such freedom might be confined by functional requirements as well as by 
the need to visibly express state neutrality (Van der Land 2012, 76, see also D66 2012). Last 
but not least, it stresses that people themselves were responsible for any disadvantages their 
choice of clothing might present for the labor market. As such, individual freedom is framed as 
a negative liberty guaranteed by the state, but it is not a positive freedom to be asserted (and 
financed) by the state, which serves to underscore the autonomy of the (job-)market. This 
positioning resonates with the party’s opposition to the various burqa-bans proposed in the 
Dutch parliament since 2007, which it sees as a breach of fundamental liberty rights, as well as 
its support for a 2013 reform of the social security law which exempts people from being 
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entitled to unemployment aid if their clothes prevent them from finding work (EK n.d.-j).320 In 
a similar tone, the 2017 program, speaks out against discrimination in the job market but only 
refers to the ethnic background of discriminated groups and not their religious attire (D66 
2017a, 52. 
A core motive behind the party’s opposition to the collectivizing and culturalizing frame of the 
anti-Islamization debate is the possibility of integration and the concern with radicalization as 
one possible consequence of disintegration. In the sense that integration is understood as a two-
sided process, the generalizing debate on Muslims /migrants is seen to hamper integration and 
contribute to radicalization. In the mentioned parliamentary debate, Pechtold pointed to the 
necessity of countering discrimination as a long-term strategy to prevent radicalization. In a 
related opinion piece in the NRC newspaper, this was even more explicit: In the article Pechtold 
stresses that while liberty had to be defended by politicians, he was most concerned about the 
value of equality (NRC 2015). Inequality, he contends, is the breeding ground for radicalization, 
and repressive measures such as headscarves bans in public schools only increase Muslims’ 
social isolation. Moreover, he continues, if all Muslims are asked to take responsibility for the 
terrorism of “radicalized Muslim individuals,” an entire community of faith is being 
stigmatized. For him, radicalization would be better prevented though education by 
encouraging social interrelations and cohesion. Conversely, the relational perspective is also 
expressed in the idea that extremism was to be countered by remaining in dialogue with Salafi 
groups rather than outlawing them (D66 2017a, 154); Muslims should also be judged by their 
acts alone.  
This relational and secular perspective on Islamic radicalism already manifested itself in the 
first election program published under Pechtold’s leadership in 2006 (D66 2006).321 While not 
yet framed as an explicit rhetorical strategy, the program makes no reference to “Islam” as such 
and seeks to undermine a close association between Islam with Islamist extremism as well as a 
binary divide between the West and Islam: It criticizes “Western hypocrisy” and its 
interventionism leading to wars in places such as Iraq, human rights violations in Guantanamo 
 
320  In 2007, the Wilders’ faction suggested a general burqa ban in public. While the D66 faction also 
considered the burqa to be problematic, it felt a ban would be disproportional and would conflict with 
fundamental liberty rights (TK 2008). Later bills suggested a ban of face-covering clothes in public or at least in 
certain institutions (EK 2018, TK 2012a). In both cases, D66 objected to the propositions.  
321  Among the big parties (at the time VVD, PvdA, CDA), integration and immigration had not been a core 
election topic, but among the small parties (at the time including D66) integration was a core theme (Lucardie et 
al. 2008). Around 2006, Wilders began to adopt an increasingly populist and nationalist profile (after an early 
rather conservative orientation) and in the election campaign, Wilders focused on an allegedly threatening 
Islamization (Lucardie 2013). One year earlier, the VVD had published the mentioned manifesto (VVD 2005). 
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Bay, and the Israeli wall around Palestine (D66 2006, 7f.).322 The same paragraph speaks of a 
threat to our liberties posed by people with “fundamentalist worldviews, often concealed in 
religion.” Religion might be the cover of fundamentalism but not its root. Further on, the 
program claims that a lack of chances, exclusion, and discrimination were factors contributing 
to processes of radicalization (p. 81). The 2006 D66 program thus relativizes the notion of a 
fundamental cultural divide stressed by the anti-Islamization movement. Its relativism can be 
found in the position of neither the West as being good, nor Islam as the problem; instead, it 
emphasizes that liberty and equality need to be gained and asserted within and against both. 
Epistemically, thus, the position is directed against essentialist notions of Islam and the West. 
Its social understanding centers on the relational co-constitution and mutual polarization of 
different positions. While at least in 2005, the VVD had articulated Islamic fundamentalism as 
a core other (like the PVV but in a less essentialist and clearly liberal way), the D66 program 
from the same period does not reference Islam. Given the party’s concern with social 
polarization, exclusion, and inequality as the roots of radicalization and obstacles to integration, 
“not speaking about Islam” can be understood as a rhetorical strategy based on the idea that any 
polarizing and generalizing reference to Islam contributes to the problem rather than solving 
it.323  
From its focus on individualism and functional integration, cultural diversity is not problematic 
(D66 2006), but the mentioned neo-republican concern for social interrelations is also evident 
and is placed against a pluralist model of social organization, particularly in education. The 
party has traditionally been critical of towards the pluralist educational system, but in the 
context of the anti-Islamization debate, when some claimed a moratorium on the establishment 
of Islamic schools in particular (PVV 2006), party leader Pechtold refrained from such claims 
(deVolkskrant 2006d). Most recently, the freedom of education has once more been placed on 
the agenda. The 2017 election program calls for a reform of Art. 23 on educational freedom for 
the sake of overcoming segregation in education and as a means to foster a shared sense of 
 
322  While the VVD’s 2005 program speaks in mainly positive terms about the West (with notions like 
Western democracies, Western civilization), this contrasts the notion of non-Western immigrants. The D66 
program sketches a much more negative picture of the West. 
323  Obviously one could also compare D66’s positioning with that of other parties such as the CDA or the 
PvdA. Also, the CDA had quite early on expressed its critique of multicultural societies and integrated Fortuyn’s 
party in Balkenende’s first cabinet. Its coalition with the PVV, though, was much contested and generally it 
seems that the party shifts between on the one hand asserting shared norms vis-à-vis Islam, and, on the other 
hand, integrating Muslims as a third confession (alongside Protestantism and Catholicism) into its party (Ten 
Napel 2012). The PvdA also has been internally divided over its positioning in the new political context (Van 
Praag 2018). See also section 5.1.3. 
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citizenship (D66 2017a, 18).324 Here, it seems that the neo-republican idea of citizenship limits 
religious freedom. 
All in all, religion is not only emphasized as a private affair, it is also understood as an immanent 
phenomenon. Such an immanent understanding of religion (and Islam), however, distinguishes 
D66 from Wilders and Bosma’s notion of Islam. When Wilders and Bosma speak of Islam as a 
political ideology. this implies that it is directed towards the immanent realm of politics. By 
contrast, D66 speaks of religion as an aspect of (an immanent) human culture (even if it is 
oriented towards a transcendent realm), which objects re-interpretations and adaptions. 
Religious radicalism is thus not the inevitable result of an Islamic ideology but has both secular 
causes and equivalents. This echoes Engelshoven who has, e.g., spoken about religious 
radicalism as a functional equivalent of other forms of deviance and the formation of counter-
communities among certain marginalized youth groups (Engelshoven 2015).  
5.3.2 Individual Liberty and Equality 
A second core aspect in the party’s positioning in the debate on Islam and integration is its 
emphasis on individual liberty and equality rights. As indicated before, Pechtold responds to 
Wilders’ distinction between religion and ideology, and the emphasis of “Islam as a religion” 
is thereby used to claim its potential compatibility with liberal democracy (and basic security) 
and, conversely, its protection under the freedom of religion (as a personal liberty right). With 
respect to D66, their positioning on the contested issue of Islamic face covers has been core to 
its assertion of Muslims’ freedom of religion. In this debate, the party opted for a different 
position than the VVD while both parties use their respective positioning to demarcate their 
position.  
In 2005, Wilders had motioned for a burqa ban and this initial claim was later taken up by VVD, 
CDA, and PvdA in the form of a more general ban on face-covering clothes (at least in certain 
places).325 On the VVD,’s website the matter of “religious clothing” is addressed under a 
broader section on immigration and with a focus on the nation state and security (VVD n.d.). 
Face-covering clothing items are said to impair mutual recognizability and thus public safety.326 
D66 not only opposed the diverse bills, the party’s website also explicitly refers to the burqa 
and stresses people’s freedom to give expression to their religion including through their 
 
324  In 2009, the current party leader, then-leader of the youth organization associated with the party, had 
spoken out against religious education in a press article (Jetten and Kleinpaste 2009).  
325  For an overview of the different bills see: (EK n.d.-j).  
326  By contrast, the website also has a section on “religion,” subordinated to a broader section on “the 
Netherlands.” Here the focus is on state neutrality. 
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clothes.327 The passage is part of a section on “religion” which again is subordinated under the 
point “state of law and democracy” (D66 n.d.)328 In a parliament debate in 2012, the D66 faction 
opposed the ban in the name of the more general liberty of wearing what one wants including 
things that might disturb or confuse others (TK 2012a).329 This liberty was still limited by the 
above-mentioned functional autonomy of the market and other spheres as well as the principle 
of state neutrality.  
While in this case the individual freedom of religion is confined by functional requirements and 
the principle of state neutrality, in a more general sense, individual liberties are also stated to 
confine religious freedom and legitimate diversity. Already in its 2000 program of principles 
(uitgangspunten), D66 stated that tolerance ends where “the fundamental equality of people is 
denied, and violence and force take the place of liberty and law” (D66 2000). The 2006 election 
program speaks out against “human rights violations” such as genital mutilation, honor crimes, 
and forced marriages (D66 2006, 84). While all issues had been discussed within the broader 
debate on Islam, they are referred to as human rights violations rather than cultural practices 
linked to Islam. More recent election programs have further explicated the principle of 
individual liberty and equality and stress its (confining) implications for the role of religion in 
society. When D66 parliamentarian Boris van der Ham co-issued a bill to abolish the blasphemy 
law in 2009, the bill’s explanation refers to a national and global debate about Islam and the 
freedom of speech which started with the Rushdie affair (TK 2009). In a related press article, 
Van der Ham further elaborated how blasphemy laws are used to suppress and prosecute 
humanists and atheists in many Islamic countries and pointed to the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation as a strong advocate of blasphemy bans (Van der Ham 2013). He further 
underscored that a diverse group of Western countries, secular worldview organizations as well 
as churches that had attempted to counter such pressure and urged parliament to close its ranks 
(Van der Ham 2013). Meanwhile, the 2010 election program stresses the importance of free 
speech for public debate and emphasizes that religious ideas should not be protected more than 
others (D66 2010, 75). 
 
327  Furthermore, opposition to the burqa bans do not imply that the burqa as such is not problematized; but 
different from, e.g., the VVD or the PVV, D66 views the burqa not so much as an expression of a competing 
ideology or intolerance, but a lack of emancipation, thus to be best countered with education (TK 29754, nr. 88). 
328  With respect to religion generally, D66 speaks of the separation of church and state and names two 
central pillars thereof: religious freedom, including nondiscrimination, and disestablishment in the sense of not 
granting privileges to religion. 
329  Ironically, the current D66 Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Kasja Ollongren, has 
defended the ban which had been agreed on by the previous cabinet and opposed by D66 in both chambers.  
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The 2017 program is the most important in terms of the individual liberty principle. One 
paragraph is even captioned: “freedom of religion, religion with freedom.” It claims the 
principled freedom of belief as long as the freedom of others is not impaired and the paragraph 
speaks out against discrimination, homophobia, antisemitism, and hatred of Muslims, as well 
as further against honor crimes, women’s circumcision, child marriages, forced marriages, the 
incitement of hatred or violence against those with different ideas, apostates, or minorities. This 
would go beyond the legitimate freedom of religion (D66 2017a, 123). Accordingly, Islam is 
not framed as a singular other to the principle of individual liberty and equality in the liberal 
value system, and Muslims are named as a population group vulnerable to a special form of 
targeted hatred or violence, which offers a rhetorical strategy for stressing the universality of 
the principle of individual liberty and equality.  
A variant of the cases concerning individual liberty and equality was the political debate on 
Jewish and Islamic un-stunned slaughtering in 2012 as, here, animal welfare was at stake which 
while not the same as recognized liberty rights of people is arguably related. The debate is 
particularly interesting because, it shows how the idea of “universal” values implies that such 
values not only can be used to protect or confine religious freedom, but that they can also be 
achieved through religious reform. In 2011, e.g., the Dutch Animal Party (PvdD, Partij van de 
Dieren) had introduced a bill to abolish existing exemption rights for Jewish and Muslim 
butchers from the general ban on the un-stunned slaughter of animals. The bill argued that this 
would not breach the freedom of religion as this freedom was from onset confined by existing 
law (TK 2011-12). The Second Chamber had accepted the bill and, in the first instance and the 
D66 faction also supported the bill. Later, though, the party congress was asked to vote against 
it, as it was believed that the bill would breach the freedom of religion (deVolkskrant 2011a).330 
Eventually the First Chamber, including the D66 faction, voting against the bill (EK 2011a). 
Several factions in the First Chamber required a political solution that better protected animal 
welfare in cooperation with Muslim and Jewish organizations without generally banning the 
religious practices (EK 2011b). Similar to legislative initiatives with respect to Christian norms, 
the reformability of religion was core to the party’s position; that is, it was positioned not as 
something the state should actively foster, but as something that showed the principled 
compatibility of universal values with religion and thus the secular—and not the irreligious—
character of the respective policies.  
 
330  At first instance, the faction had not voted against but added an amendment that butchers could retain 
their exemption rights if they could prove that no unnecessary harm was done to the animals (EK 2011b). 
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The debate about un-stunned slaughtering further constitutes a prime example of the apparent 
differences within the party concerning an adequate course with respect to Islam. Apparently, 
a party-internal working group on religion and worldviews—or, possibly only one of its 
members—issued a motion at the party congress which asked the faction to vote against the un-
stunned slaughtering ban (NIW 2011, also ch.6). Conversely, Van der Ham, who was in the 
Second Chamber at the time, criticized the D66’s First Chamber faction for blocking a ban on 
un-stunned (Islamic and Jewish) slaughtering, arguing that the left-liberal factions had cowed 
to their fear of Jewish and Muslim organizations’ anger and accusations and thus failed to press 
for the reforms they would assert vis-à-vis orthodox Christianity (Van der Ham 2014). At the 
same time, this example also shows that Pechtold cannot be exclusively described via his 
opposition to national populism—in the Second Chamber, he also supported legislative 
measures that clearly curbed Muslims’ freedom of religion vis-à-vis his support for the ban of 
un-stunned slaughtering (EK 2011a). 
Whether the party will also challenge other exemption rights of non-Christian minorities in the 
Netherlands remains to be seen. The party’s youth organization has recently published a 
statement against male circumcision for non-medical purposes, drawing on medical arguments 
as well as the individual notion of religious liberty (JD 2017).331 Similarly, Van der Ham had 
expressed a critical views of boys’ circumcision (Trouw 2013b, Van der Ham 2014).  
5.3.3 Secularity and State Neutrality 
Over time, thus, the party programs have placed increasing emphasis on the principles that 
define and confine the place of religion in society. In that context, the party frequently refers 
back to the separation of church and state. As already mentioned, e.g., the principle of state 
neutrality—that is, the need to give visible expression to such a principle—is named as a 
possible confining criteria for the freedom of religious clothing (D66 2010, 76; see also D66 
2012). Beyond that, the mentioned signpost-booklets ascribe secularity a central importance. 
With respect to the party’s secular self-understanding, the first signpost, which deals with D66’s 
basic “idea of man” and society, is of particular importance (VMS 2016 [2009]); the party’s 
notion of secularity is especially expressed in the fifth signpost about basic rights and shared 
values (VMS 2015). Generally speaking, the focus on secularity is particularly evident in the 
first signpost book, which, while it does not prominently focus on religion, features a section 
on secularity right at its beginning. Given its placement, the secular outlook must have therefore 
 




been important to the authors, and this is also evident in the similar and recurrent remarks on 
secularity throughout the different booklets. Taken together, there are four key points for this 
notion of secularity. 
First and in a very general sense, the authors state the ontological primacy of an immanent 
realm. In the first booklet, the authors outline a genuinely immanent understanding of the world 
and religion.332 The party’s set of ideas is characterized as “humanist and secular,” which also 
leaves space for religion. “After all,” the authors argue, “our outlook is also influenced by 
someone like Baruch de Spinoza, who held the view that religion was part of our world, based 
on the nature of things, and thus nothing transcendent” (VMS 2016 [2009], 16). As an immanent 
phenomenon, the validity of religion is confined to the individual realm, and, thus, no universal 
claims can be based on the freedom of other people on the grounds of ethical or spiritual 
convictions (Ibid.). In that sense, the principle of individual liberty and equality is founded on 
the notion of immanence.  
Second, the authors claim the autonomy of human intellect and morality from the church or 
religion. They draw their inspiration for this point on the ideas of the Enlightenment and the 
central role attributed to human reason. While reason is not without boundaries, its limits ought 
not to be confined by the church (VMS 2016 [2009], 16). Complementing this, the fifth signpost 
booklet states that values should not be imposed on a person by their social surroundings, 
family, or church (VMS 2015, 22). Conversely, Liberalism is distinguished from assertive 
religious or worldview positions. The authors claim that liberalism does not dictate an 
individual’s personal values but refrained from outlining those values that guaranteed the 
individual liberty of every person in society. At the level of social debates, the principle of 
individual liberty and equality should be defended while forms of intolerance based on some 
“higher truth” should be countered (p. 29). 
Third and complementary, the fifth signpost booklet dedicates one paragraph to the principle 
of the separation of church and state, based on two principles: first, the protection of churches 
and religions from state interventions into the content of religious matters, and, second, the 
recognition of the immanent law as the highest authority above religious law (VMS 2015, 48f.). 
 
332  Taylor sees this immanent frame to have resulted from the disenchantment of the medieval Christian 
cosmos and its notion of a porous self, its hierarchically structured social order, legitimized by a higher order and 
embedded in a history of salvation. It was based on the notion of a mechanic universe, a buffered self, and 
implies the idea of society as one of direct and equal access, in which identities are categorically determined 
(via, e.g., national belonging) rather than relational and of history happening in an open and homogenous time 
(Koenig 2011, 654f.). 
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Similarly, the authors claim a superior authority for basic rights and democracy as such. Both 
are counter-distinguished from religion and thus placed beyond (and above) its claimed 
relativity and mere personal validity. The emphasis on basic rights, as the booklet insinuates, is 
not itself a religious dogma or truth claim but rather a necessary consequence and precondition 
for the diversity of competing truth claims and notions of good (VMS 2015, 45, 48). In a similar 
tone, democracy is on the one hand declared to be a culture that had to be lived, but on the other 
hand is said to be more than a worldview—as it is both deeper as well as more important—as 
it guarantees respect for minorities (VMS 2015, 52, VMS 2016 [2009], 15).  
Fourth and finally, the various points come down to a normative privatization of religion in the 
sense of confining its validity to the individual realm. Generally speaking, all booklets draw on 
the distinction between three levels of social reality: that of the individual human being, that of 
civil society and social interrelations, and that of the state. Correspondingly, the authors also 
distinguish between different moral realms and faculties (VMS 2015, 22f.): Morality is thus a 
personal matter, except in instances of “role morality” and, more importantly, “public 
morality.” The latter would manifest in democratic decisions and could stand in conflict with 
personal morality. Still, such confinement of the validity of religion is not identical to banning 
it from the public-political realm, which constitutes a different idea of privatization. The 
separation of church and state is distinguished from such a complete privatization of religion 
(VMS 2015, 49f.). Per this argument, liberals should tolerate a certain influence of religion on 
society as long as religious arguments did not dominate the political debate (VMS 2015, 49f.). 
Despite this emphasis of secularity, liberalism and liberal democracy are not defined as 
“primarily” secular in the sense of Lee (2015, 32). Rather, liberal democracy is contrasted with 
various forms of illiberal regimes, examples being the illiberal democracies in Russia and 
Hungary, authoritarian capitalism in China, and a caliphate in the Middle East (possibly a 
reference to the jihadist caliphate claimed by the Islamic State) (VMS 2015, 12, also 58f.). In 
another of the five booklets, xenophobic tendencies in the Netherlands are listed alongside 
religious fundamentalism as challenges for liberals (VMS 2014, 28). In the conceptual language 
of this thesis, these examples, as well as the frequent references to the freedom of religion, can 
also be understood as an implicit counter-distinction from an irreligious (rather than secular 
differentiated) position. Accordingly, liberalism, as a supporter of a secular state of law, is said 




The signpost booklets do not explicitly refer to the debate on Islam and integration, yet recurrent 
remarks clearly link the statements to this context. Here, a few examples suffice to make the 
point: First, the principle of individual liberty and equality and the universality of basic rights 
is stressed in a twofold counter-distinction from culturalist nationalism and cultural relativism 
and thus reclaims the liberal position in the debate on integration. An example is that the authors 
emphasize that basic rights are a precondition rather than an aspect of inter-cultural debates 
about values (VMS 2015, 30f.); somewhat later, they emphasize that the promotion of human 
rights is not a form of cultural imperialism (p. 45). Similarly, the emphasis on politics as a battle 
of ideas and ideals is counter-distinguished from the notion of a global battle of cultures or 
civilizations as proposed by Huntington (1993) and is positioned as underlying the anti-
Islamization debate. The authors therefore contend that the battle is between competing ideas 
(VMS 2015, 12). Second, the booklets relate to several themes that have been prominent in the 
debate on Islam, such as the situation of apostates or the tension between Islam and 
homosexuality. In all these cases, they assert the principle of individual liberty and equality as 
protecting the individual vis-à-vis the state as well as other individuals or groups/ organizations 
(VMS 2015, 22, 31f.). The authors then emphasize the private character of culture, respectively 
declare that people’s identities are something that might be the object of interpersonal 
negotiations but not an object of state policies. Here, the reference to the debate is maybe most 
explicit: “A sustainable society is also a harmonious society, in which everyone has their place. 
[…] The government should not have an opinion about the identity people have or feel. The 
integration of minorities is respectively a social phenomenon that primarily happens among 
humans (“tussen mensen onderling”) (VMS 2016 [2009], 63).  
5.3.4 Different Others  
As section 5.1.3 indicates, the anti-Islamization movement is not the only strand in the discourse 
on integration that is primarily focused on Islam. As such, D66’s positioning should also not be 
exclusively understood from its countering of Islam-critical frames. At least selectively, though, 
there is evidence of how D66 politicians have opposed collectivizing frames of Muslim citizens 
that used religion as a civilizing force in the process of integration. A D66 member of the 
European parliament, e.g., criticized Tariq Ramadan’s employment with the city of Rotterdam 
as being emblematic of an inadequate collectivization of Muslims while also breaching the 
separation of church and state by making religion a central aspect of integration policies 
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(Schaake 2009).333 While selective, this example points to the structural tension between an 
individualist and differentiated approach on the one hand, and policies working through 
religious and worldview divides on the other.334  
In several cases, the Christian Democrats have responded to the contested role of Islam in ways 
that were oriented at a model of worldview pluralism and inter-religious dialogue or in other 
ways attributed a central role to religion. An exemplary case in this respect is the scandalized 
suggestion of the Christian Democratic Minister of Education during Balkenende’s second 
cabinet, in which he sought to initiate a dialogue between scientists with different religious 
backgrounds about faith and science as a way of fostering integration (deVolkskrant 2005a).335 
Her apparent concern were Muslims’ objections to science (more specifically the theory of 
evolution) and she felt that Christianity and Christian scientists could acts as role-models for a 
successful acceptance of science (TK 2005, TK 2004-05c). A leading role in such a dialogue 
was designed for a Dutch physicist and author on intelligent design. By no surprise, her 
suggestion was seen to compromise scientific autonomy (Trouw 2006a). D66 politicians 
(among others) sharply opposed her suggestions (TK 2004-05c).  
A second example in that respect is the mentioned debate about the freedom of expression after 
Van Gogh’s murder by a Muslim extremist in 2004. The Christian-Democratic Minister of 
Justice of the time, Donner, suggested that the blasphemy ban ought to be revived in the Dutch 
penal code in response to the murder as well as subsequent anti-Islamic assaults. D66 
parliamentarian Van der Laan (unsuccessfully, at the time) issued a motion to abolish the 
respective paragraph see section 4.4, see also (Van der Land 2012, 107). She was not only 
concerned about the apparent relativization of the freedom of speech, but also about the special 
role attributed to religious people by the law in question.336 At later stages in this political 
 
333  It is difficult to assess the representativeness of this position. Salima Belhaj, who has been a D66 
council member since 2008, also questioned the benefits of his chair for the city (RVM 2009). Entzinger, who is 
affiliated with the university of Rotterdam as a professor for integration and migration studies, apparently 
supported the project and the engagement of Ramadan—nonetheless, not as a D66 representative (VN 2009). 
334  I cannot assess though how this relates to the mentioned ambitions of D66 politicians to facilitate the 
formation of Islamic representative organizations—the difference possibly indeed lies in whether someone is 
installed as a representative or whether a bottom up process of representation is stimulated. 
335  Her text itself is no longer available but in the parliament debates that followed the public notice of the 
talk, she quoted a longer part of it. According to that speech, she had described Dekker as a person who had 
successfully combined science with personal faith. She further said that the notion of a creator was common to 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and that this shared idea was thus something that could enhance the mutual 
connectedness of different groups, connections that could be made especially in academic debates. If scientists 
with different religious backgrounds could be brought together, this could also be integrated into education. 
Dekker was meant to be consulted about shaping such a dialogue (TK 2004-05c).  
336  In other cases, the party also objected to restrictions on the freedom of expression in the name of 
security and countering terrorism (Van der Land 2012, 158). 
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struggle, Van der Ham linked the matter more closely to the threat of illiberal Islam and the 
threat it posed to free speech (TK 2009, Van der Ham 2013). 
Orthodox Christians have criticized D66 for being silent vis-à-vis Islam while at the same time 
countering Christian symbols (RD 2016d). Other observers understand the party’s recent push 
for state secularity as being motivated by the new presence of Islam, even if the measures were 
oriented towards Christianity. That is, as a means to avoid Muslims’ parity claims, Christian 
residuals in law had to be removed (Bosman 2016). This observation seems to be confirmed by 
the 2010 election program, which states that in a context of increasing diversity, the state should 
be as neutral as possible and stand for shared values (D66 2010, 76). 
5.3.5 A Renewed Focus on Functional Integration? 
Since 2017, D66 is once more part of a government coalition and the coalition is remarkable in 
several ways: First, the cabinet bridges the secular-religious divide in Dutch politics by bringing 
VVD, D66, the CDA, and the CU together. The coalition agreement entails a compromise 
clause on medical-ethical matters, stating the fundamental differences of the coalition parties 
with respect to matters such as euthanasia (VVD et al. 2017, 17). In regard to integration as 
well, the coalition agreement brings together different notions of integration. On the one hand, 
it places an emphasis on functional integration and individual equality by, e.g., a commitment 
to counter discrimination in the labor market, while, on the other hand, it states that Dutch 
citizenship was something one could be proud of and had to earn and that migrants should 
“embrace” Dutch liberties and equalities (VVD et al. 2017, 54). Second, D66 holds the ministry 
of social affairs and work opportunities. The minister in charge, Wouter Koolmees, has 
suggested a new system of integration according to which immigrants start working 
immediately while the state pays for integration courses. Aside from language skills, integration 
tests are to retain a section on “knowledge about Dutch society,” yet in a revised and “less 
stereo-typical” form (TK 2018b, TK 2018a).  
In 2018, Pechtold stepped back from his position as the faction and party leader and Rob Jetten 
(*1987) was elected the new faction leader.337 In his maiden speech in the Second Chamber, he 
recalls his personal way of becoming politically active and links that with the rising tensions 
concerning the status of migrants in Dutch society (Jetten 2017). More specifically, he points 
to the 9/ 11 attacks and the murders of both Fortuyn and Van Gogh, which he places as the 
central events that influenced his view on the world when he began to be interested in politics. 
 
337  The election of the party leader would follow at a later date (NOS 2018). 
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He tells about an incident in his hometown after Van Gogh’s murder, when a primary school 
with many Turkish-Dutch children was set on fire. Together with other students he organized 
solidarity events for the students of that school stating their wish to live together “with mutual 
respect, irrespective of background, faith, or color” (Ibid.). Consequently, he joined the youth 
organization, JD, and later D66. With Jetten, thus, a new generation in the cultural sense has 
taken the lead, given that—at least in his account—his political coming of age took place at the 
height of the debate on Islam, a time during which Pechtold positioned the party as the opposing 
pole to the anti-Islamization movement.  
5.4 Summary and Discussion 
The first chapters of this thesis centered on the party’s positioning vis-à-vis Christian parties 
and how its politics of secularity rearranged the place of Christianity and especially Christian 
minorities in Dutch society. Accordingly, I sketched the party’s history in its political context 
from the mid-1960s to the early 21st century. Complementing this perspective, this chapter 
focused on the renegotiation of secularity in the context of policies and public-political debates 
with respect to Muslim immigrants and their integration in Dutch society. The first part thereby 
centered on the shifts in the political and public debate on migrants and integration since the 
1980s. It first sketched the shift from minority to integration policies in the 1990s, and the later 
shift towards a nationalist and culturalist notion of integration in the early 21st century. It depicts 
D66 as a core carrier of the 1990s integration model. The focus on individual liberty and 
equality echoes the policies of the 1990s more generally; beyond that, D66’s positioning in the 
field of integration policies further allows to discern the interrelation of this individualism with 
functional differentiation, respectively the functional integration of society, two core aspects of 
D66’s positioning. I then sketch the rise of culturalist ideas of the nation and integration. It 
thereby points to the essentializing understanding of Islam as a totalitarian ideology, inevitably 
directing the action of its adherence towards illiberal ends. Both the individualist and the 
nationalist model have gone hand in hand with a certain problematization of collective cultural 
identities. But while the 1990s-integration policies privatized culture and focused on individual 
and functional integration, the more recent nationalism positions a, simultaneously secular and 
Christian, Dutch national culture against Islam and challenges the possibility of a privatized 
Islam.  
The first part of the chapter entails a brief overview of how different parties contributed and 
responded to the rising nationalist populism by making Islam a central focus of their political 
discourse. It concludes by pointing to the renewed importance given to ideologies in politics 
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since the debate on Islam and outlines the challenges this poses to the functionalist-individualist 
model of integration, as well as the positioning of D66 more generally. It argues that the notion 
of Islam as in essence a political (and totalitarian) ideology, challenges a liberal model of 
integration by declaring Islam incapable of privatization. The propagated notion of a necessary 
ideological battle against Islam and a respective ideological appropriation of secular modernity 
further challenges D66’s historical positioning in the political field. Eventually, the propagated 
antithesis between Islam and a multiculturalist relativism diminished the intellectual scope for 
a liberal model of differentiation and individualization.  
Against that background, the second part outlined D66’s early positioning in the debate on 
Islam. Based on existing literature, it briefly shows how after an initially ambivalent response, 
the party developed itself as the central counter-pole to Wilders, especially under Alexander 
Pechtold’s leadership. Subsequently, I returned to the ideological challenge posed by the 
populist rise and depicted how this challenge was perceived and accepted by party leaders 
through an explicit assertion of social-liberalism as a values standpoint, which was placed 
against both populism as well as religious fundamentalism. Here, the focus was on how the 
party think tank in particular emphasized politics as a struggle of ideas and ideals for which 
liberals needed to be prepared, a call which not only fulfills the function of an intellectual 
organization but also echoes Fortuyn’s claims about politics. Different from the almost 
exclusive focus on Islam that characterizes the nationalist Islam debate though, liberal values 
are said to be defended against different illiberal positions—including both nationalist populism 
as well as Islamic (and Christian) fundamentalism. In particular, the opposition between 
Pechtold and Wilders strongly determined the public perception of the party, but this 
positioning has also been criticized from different sides. The second part closes by very briefly 
pointing to a party-internal critique or undercurrent which claims that the party should develop 
its own liberal and secular standpoint vis-à-vis Islam.  
The third part elaborated three core aspects of the party’s positioning in the debate on Islam and 
integration: First, there is the assertion of individualism and functional integration, which is in 
essence a rearticulating of the liberal approach to integration that had gained prominence in the 
1990s; Second, there is the emphasis on individual liberty and equality rights with respect to 
religion; and, third, there is a more general elaboration of the party’s notion of secular politics 
and state neutrality. With respect to the articulated commitment to secularity, party publications 
stress the ontological primacy of an immanent realm, the moral and intellectual autonomy of 
humans from the church or religion, and the separation of church and state, understood as their 
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mutual autonomy and the mundane primacy of state-law. Religion is, in consequence, restricted 
in its validity to the individual realm. While thus, religion is confined by different universal 
values and principles, this is legitimized by the notion of religion as reformable and as, possibly, 
in accordance with so-called universal values. This notion of the reformability of religion is 
central to claiming the secular—and not the irreligious—character of the party’s positioning, as 
is the emphasis of the normative autonomy of liberalism, which is contrasted with all forms of 
illiberalism rather than only religious ones. Linking to a previous sketch of the positionings of 
VVD, PvdA, and CDA, the section briefly shows that the party’s three core ideals are not only 
emphasized in counter-distinction to Wilders, but also to the Islam-related politics of other 
parties, as well as Islamic fundamentalism and other illiberal notions of governance. Last but 
not least, the section closes with a short update on the most recent developments in the political 
field where D66 has once more joined a government coalition and further holds the ministry 
for integration.  
The positioning of D66 with respect to the integration of Muslim migrants gives expression to 
a functionalist-individualist notion of secularity resonating mainly with types 1 and 4 of the 
multiple secularities typology and it has replaced an earlier approach on Islam resonating 
mainly with type 2. The earlier chapters had already analyzed the party’s positioning in 
reference to these types, this chapter complements this analysis by pointing to the 
interrelatedness of individualism and functional differentiation/ integration in the sense that it 
is the emphasis on functional roles that counters pluralist forms of social organization as well 
as claims on a single national culture. I have further analyzed D66’s positioning in reference to 
the notion of neo-republicanism (adapted from existing literature). From the multiple 
secularities perspective, such neo-republicanism and its focus on migrants’ role as citizens of 
political community and the claim to internalize the normative expectations that come with this 
role can be seen to fit a notion of functional integration and autonomy (type 4). The anti-
Islamization movement, in its binary frontline against Islam and its claim for an appropriation 
of a Dutch or Western culture, can be seen to has given rise to such a notion of secularity in the 
sense of type 3 in the sense of representing an irreligious position in politics. This labeling is 
helpful to describe the tensions with all other positions in the political field—the pluralist and 
the functionalist-individualist stance.  
The theory chapter heuristically outlined, how the distinction between irreligion links with each 
type of the multiple secularities typology. While type 3 conceives society/ the state in irreligious 
terms and construes it in an antagonistic relationship vis-à-vis religion, types1 and 2, conceive 
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the state to be distinct from religion and irreligion while treating irreligion as a legitimate aspect 
of diversity to be privatized or balanced with other positions. From their perspective thus, an 
irreligious definition of nation or state constitutes a democratic problem. Still, the anti-
Islamization movement also differs from the heuristic construction of type 3 in the sense that it 
is centrally based on the distinction between Christianity and Islam while defining the nation in 
both, irreligious and religious terms. Beyond that, Wilders’ framing of Islam as a political 
ideology rather than a religion, further defies his qualification as irreligious.  
This chapter closes the historic part of the thesis. Three subsequent chapters will each present 
a case study to explore specific aspects of the general dynamics outlined so far. The next, 
relatively short chapter, centers on an internal party working group on religion and worldviews, 
which became an arena of secularity itself in the sense that here, two complementing aspects of 
the party’s secular positioning––the defense of religious freedom and the assertion of 
secularity––have been placed against each other. Frontlines between religious and non-religious 




6 A Party Working Group on Religion and Worldviews 
State secularity both entails and confines religious freedom. As amply demonstrated throughout 
this thesis, notions of the adequate balance between these two aspects differ in Dutch society 
and between competing political parties. Importantly, and as indicated before, such notions can 
also differ within parties and render them arenas of secularity in the sense that competing 
factions seek to determine the party’s course on secularity. This chapter presents a small case 
study about an internal party working group on religion and worldviews, which became the site 
of contestations between members of different religious and nonreligious backgrounds about 
defining the party’s notion of secularity. In what follows, I first briefly elaborate on this group 
in the context of different ways in which parties organize their internal religious-nonreligious 
diversity. I then describe the conflict within the group, emphasizing how it interlinked 
competing positions on the question of Islam with broader tensions concerning the party’s 
secularity.  
Generally speaking, there have been different ways in which Dutch secular parties have 
internally institutionalized religion and religious-nonreligious diversity and these 
institutionalizations give expression to the parties’ notions of secularity. The post-pillarized 
PvdA, e.g., had internal thematic chapters on Protestant, Catholic, and Humanist base, which 
to a certain extent reproduced the pillarized pluralism within the party. Currently, the PvdA and 
the GreenLeft party both have an internal religious working group. With respect to D66, I have 
briefly mentioned the “working group on belief and political action,” which has existed since 
the end of the 1970s and was involved in the legalization of euthanasia (see ch.4.3). At the time 
I started my research, another working group on religion and worldviews existed and I had been 
in contact with some of its members. Soon, however, it became clear that the members were 
dealing with some internal tensions concerning the group’s course and profile, which further 
received some unfortunate press coverage. Thus, after my initial contact with the group, it 
ceased to function in its official capacity. I was, nonetheless, able to maintain my conversations 
with some of its members. At least in parts, the internal tensions concerned the matter of 
secularity, and thus these debates are relevant to the analysis here.  
To my understanding, two distinct initiatives to establish a working group on religion had 
emerged in 2010. Somewhat overlapping with these two initiatives, there were also (at least) 
two distinct ideas about what the group should be about. Still, for at least some time, they tried 
to form a single joint group: The initiator and founding members of the (possibly first) group 
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were centrally concerned about the freedom of religion and with emphasizing the compatibility 
and like-mindedness of liberal Protestantism/ religion with political liberalism. The initiators 
of the second group, by contrast, were interested in secularism and at least in part felt that the 
party should develop a more concise and apparently stricter profile in that respect. In other 
words, the first group of members meant to defend the freedom of religion and the legitimacy 
of its public role, while the others aimed at asserting secularity. The difference between the 
competing positions was broader than the question of Islam and was linked to the religious-
nonreligious biographical backgrounds of the different members.  
The first group’s initiator, Aad, and another founding member of the group, Aernout, were not 
only long-time D66 members but were also active members of the remonstrant brotherhood, an 
early 17th-century split off from the mainline Reformed Church, which asserts man’s free will 
over the orthodox Calvinistic notion of predestination. They knew each other from church. I 
also spoke with a third remonstrant party member—Joeri—who had witnessed the group’s 
emergence without taking active part in it. They all emphasized the like-mindedness of liberal 
Protestantism with the ideals of D66: the shared ideal of freedom and autonomy (Interview Aad 
2014, 49-51, 159), the values of reform and renewal (Interview Aernout 2013, 58-62), as well 
as the ideals of liberty and responsibility (Interview Joeri 2014, 48-51). Aad (Interview 2014, 
150-158) further contended that it was not only that political liberalism and liberal 
Protestantism were compatibility and like-minded, but that the ideologies were also historically 
linked in the sense that one of D66’s historical predecessors had been deeply rooted in liberal 
Protestantism.338 Aernout emphasized that religion and churches had been central to Dutch 
history, in both good and bad ways, and that political activities should show respect to church 
activities (Interview Aernout 2013, 47-58). According to Aad (Interview 2014, 85f.), the 
working group was meant to constitute a setting to discuss “the relation of politics and religion 
and worldviews” and that, in the long run, the group was also meant to prepare policy advice 
on religion-related matters (Aad 2014, 131-139). He felt that people in the group generally had 
a positive sense of religion and wanted to stress the legitimacy of religious voices in the party 
and the public-political debate: 
No, generally, the people who supported that group had a positive view on religion and were 
convinced that religion had a role to play in the debates, and that there was a place for 
 
338  He thereby refers to the VDB. With respect to the comparison between D66 and the historic VDB, Van 
der Land (2003, 411-413) stresses the ideal of democratization and pragmatism as well as their economic-
political positioning, but he makes no reference to religion. Klijnsma (1987) by contrast points to the links 
between liberal Protestantism and the VDB. 
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people who were religiously motivated in this, eh, in, eh, D66. And also wanted to, eh, to 
communicate, also to the outside, that, eh, D66 is a party where Christians are welcome. 
(Interview Aad 2014, 114-117)339  
Both Aad and Aernout were critical of tendencies in the party to assert a principled secularity 
and felt that some party members would easily turn into a binary opposition to religion by 
ignoring its progressive public contributions while criticizing its conservative ones, and further 
by failing to recognize the legitimacy and value of religion as one of those things that influenced 
people’s views on society (Interviews Aernout 2013, 443-464, Aad 2014, 161-217). Aad also 
looked unfavorably on political decisions that limited religious freedom and, e.g., felt that the 
abolition of exemption rights for marriage registrars who objected to same-sex marriages 
conflicted with the freedom of religion (ll. 97-103).  
Similarly, Aad also expressed his criticism of the current debate on Islam and claims of cultural 
assimilation (ll. 307-321), while positively referring to the party’s opposition to Wilders (ll. 54-
60). He was also critical of the party’s Second Chamber vote against un-stunned slaughtering 
(Interview Aad 2014, 66-75). For Aernout (Interview 2013, 79-92), the debate about ritual 
slaughtering showed the oft-overlooked fact that churches and religious groups had their own 
internal debates about matters of social relevance and also had ethical foundations of general 
relevance. He spoke in positive terms about the ethical principles that shaped Jewish and—
presumably as well—Islamic slaughter practices (Ibid.) and also, more generally, about how he 
felt that political views were very naturally rooted in views on society and were, as such, 
entangled with beliefs and that this perspective also relativized concerns about the political 
dimension of Islam (ll. 375-386). While the group never got to the point of formulating policy 
advice, from the interviews it seems that it would have gone in the direction of giving a voice 
to religious people and groups and of defending the freedom of religion. As such, their aims 
stood in tension with the aspired focus of the second group which sought to assert and possibly 
sharpen the party’s secular profile, that is, to complete the separation of church and state in the 
Netherlands.  
This other initiative was started by Eerik and Tom, both rather young party members at the 
time. Their interest in secularism was founded in different religion-related biographical 
backgrounds and was also of a slightly different character. According to a press article, Tom 
 
339  Aernout spoke about their aim “to promote as a matter of fact the position of religious interested people 
within D66“—something which can be read to mean that the views of these people should be made visible and 
acknowledged or that their interests and concerns be made topical (Interview Aernout 2013, 216f.)  
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comes from a religiously non-affiliated family that is rooted in the social-democratic milieu, 
and he is introduced as someone who had always been eager to “understand” religion (Trouw 
2012c). He had co-authored an article in the Dutch newspaper, de Volkskrant, that spoke in 
favor of a principled secularity (Duyvestijn and Kleinpaste 2011).340 For him, the core aim 
behind establishing a working group was to revive the debate on secularism and, more 
specifically, sharpen the party’s positioning with respect to Islam (Interview Tom 2013, 
Buitenhof 2013). He felt that D66 was inconsistent in its secularism and failed to translate its 
traditional and ingrained anti-clericalism to Islam, and inappropriately retained an exclusive 
focus on Christian churches and remaining Christian influences in law. For him, the party 
should apply the “same principles for every kind of religion,” both fairly and consistently, and 
thus develop a critical perspective on Islam that was independent of the racist positions of 
Wilders and other right-wing populists, who would single out Islam.  
We used to be fairly, ehm, secular, fairly anti-clerical as well, […] but that was in generally 
that was directed against the Christian churches; and my observation at that time was that we 
didn't have the same strict norms or the same strict principled position towards Islam […] 
and I am not, I am not very enthusiastic about the PVV to say the least, but I think that a 
secular party, eh, a party that had secularism very much ascribed in its founding principles, 
or in its DNA, ehm, should take the same principled stand against the influence of Islam in the 
public sphere, as we had done all these years against Christianity.  
(Interview Tom 2013, 62-73). 
Referring to principles of inter-religious and religious-nonreligious equal treatment as well as 
individual liberty, he questioned subsidies for, e.g., public Muslim events like iftar dinners, 
considered supporting a burka ban, and, at least on principled grounds, found a ban on un-
stunned (religious) slaughtering worthy of consideration. During the interview it seemed that 
he was overthinking and potentially moderating some of the ideas he had supported when in 
the group. He further claimed that he had lost interest in the matter and felt the debate on Islam, 
secularism, and religion had lost their momentum, while Europe and economic matters were 
more important. By the time I contacted him about the interview quotes I would use, he had 
changed his views and stated that he regretted his earlier positions.341 
 
340  In a television interview, he self-presented as part of a generation that became aware of politics through 
the emergence of Fortuyn (Buitenhof 2013).  
341  He stated to hold his own views at the time as an attempt to discern something reasonable in the 
growing national hostility towards the Dutch Muslim population, supposing that there was a problem of 
"fairness,” and that a principled stance on secularism would help address criticisms from the political right that 
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Eerik grew up in an orthodox Reformed family—his parents belong to the Reformed Churches 
in the Netherlands (Liberated), which is part of the orthodox Christian pillar—but he de-
converted from this tradition, and during the interview spoke of himself as humanist.342 Against 
his background, it would be expected that he would vote for the ChristenUnie, but he defied 
this expectation and looked for another party, eventually choosing D66. The point that he chose 
a party at the opposite pole of the small Christian parties, and recurrently referred to as anti-
religious or secularist within these circles seems to have constituted an inner point of 
contention, in which his choosing D66 has the characteristics of a conversion and tends to place 
his liberal political commitment in a binary opposition to his earlier Christian commitment.343  
and then D66 and it was also interesting that D66 was a very secular party and because of my 
religious background I think I’m starting the themaafdeling [thematic chapter], dus [thus] as 
an identity group or something to eh research eh the political ideas of D66 about that topic, 
dus [thus] eh the separation of church and state, also the discussion about Islam in the 
Netherlands (Interview Eerik 2013, 69-73) 
The quote points to this identity-related motive by referring to the group as an identity group, 
which could be interpreted to frame a secular commitment as an equivalent to religious ones; 
at the same time, the group’s declared aim is to “to research the political ideas of D66” rather 
than, e.g., to give expression to secular voices in the party. Similarly, the name of the group 
“religion and worldviews” could imply that the group members have some affiliation to or that 
the group focuses on religion and worldviews as topics. All in all, there seems to have been a 
certain ambivalence in how the group was conceived, particularly in terms of whether the group 
wanted to further establish the party’s secular profile or if it wanted to be a secular worldview 
group, and this ambivalence seems to have also been relevant for others and further resonates 
with the notion of secularism among members of the first group.  
 
Islam was not treated with the same anti-clerical and secular scrutiny as Christianity had received, from the 
1960s onwards well into the 1990s. He added that since the time of the interview, he had come to understand that 
criticism from the political right as being motivated by bad-faith and anti-immigrant sentiment, and evaluates his 
own position at the time as a fundamentally misguided attempt at even-handedness. More generally, he stated to 
have come to see the rhetoric about secularism as a Dutch exponent of the bigoted forms of the New Atheïsm in 
the trans-Atlantic public sphere. At the time of writing, he is no longer a member of D66.  
342  In an earlier newspaper interview, he had stated visiting a remonstrant group. 
343  At another point during the interview, he framed his choice for D66 as being analogous to a homosexual 
“coming out”—as “liberated” and “openly D66” and “out of the closet”—and thus as a binary opposition to 
orthodox Christianity. This identity-related focus and the symbolic “coming out” inherently places his 
commitment to a secular party in a binary opposition to his earlier Christian commitment. To some extent, this 
frame might also be one obtruded by orthodox Christians, who construe liberalism as a direct worldview 
competitor, and who, at least in his perception, still negatively react to his change of position and seek to 
discredit him. Still, he continues to position himself in a direct relation with religion. 
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More important, however, was the focus on secularism as such and the apparent aim to complete 
secularization in the Netherlands. Eerik’s notion that the group should research the party 
position about the separation of church and state does not suggest a specific positioning on the 
matter. Like Tom, he also upholds the party line with respect to marriage registrars who might 
object to same-sex marriages; Different from the first group’s initiators, Eerik and Tom 
supported this course as an expression of the constitutional principle of equal rights (Trouw 
2012c, Interview Eerik 2013, 399-409, 891-895). In a speech at a European conference of 
liberals in 2012, titled “The French Revolution and Freedom of Religion the Netherlands,” 
Eerik outlined the party’s individual rights-based secularism and positively referred to the 
party’s aim to abolish the remaining theocratic elements of the Dutch political system (Klei 
2012b).  
This brief sketch already shows that the initiators had different ideas about the group’s purpose 
and position on matters of secularity, ranging from expressions of religious voices within the 
party versus systematizing and possibly sharpening a secular course. With respect to concrete 
cases as well, members had different ideas on the adequate scope of religious freedom in 
relation to other rights. Importantly, these divides were not clear cut between the religious and 
the secular but also manifested therein. Joeri (2014, 231-239), for instance, supported the 
party’s position on conscientious objections as well as on other secularizing measures, but he 
found that the matter had been poorly communicated as an issue of the religious-secular divide, 
rather than one between liberals and conservatives. Moreover, those involved with the second 
initiative differed in terms of background and views and some people were particularly 
concerned about the freedom of religion (Interview Eerik 2013, 77-85, 343-355, 219-222, 397-
403). The religion/ secularism divide further did not completely correspond to whether or not 
people felt that an assertion of secularity vis-à-vis Islam was necessary. According to Tom, 
even members with a prime interest in secularism were divided over whether to focus on Islam 
or Christianity, given that some felt that Islam was not powerful in the sense of being 
represented in parliament, and that, thus, particularly at the European level, the party should 
focus on the persistent influence of Christianity (Interview Tom 2013, 149-165)344  
 
344  As mentioned, Tom (Interview 2013) himself felt that the urgent necessity was to focus and develop a 
position on Islam, first in order to develop an independent position in the debate rather than only battling the 
PVV (ll. 157-165), and, second he also felt that certain issues, such as antisemitism and hatred of the LGBT 




The example of un-stunned slaughtering finally shows that the divides were not clear-cut or 
unbridgeable. A leading members of the second group, Ada, had presented the motion at the 
party congress in which the faction was asked to change its course on the matter of un-stunned 
slaughtering (NIW 2011).345 She argued that the prevalent meat consumption in the Netherlands 
made it implausible to claim that a fundamental value was harmed by the slaughtering practices 
of Muslims and Jews (Van Rootselaar 2011).346 Despite the internal differences, however, it 
seems that the different group members could agree on a position in the debate on un-stunned 
slaughtering. A second aspect of how the matter was addressed was by engaging with religious 
ethics and reform. Aernout and Joeri had stressed this point, principally, by placing the liberal-
conservative divide above a distinction between religious and nonreligion. This frame gives 
visibility to liberal religious positions and their compatibility with secular principles. In the case 
at hand, the engagement with the religious ethics on slaughtering practices resolved the existing 
reservations. Tom, e.g., elaborated that for principled reasons he objected to compromising 
animal rights in the name of religion, but that when the group looked at kosher butchering 
practices and the general meat industry, the religious regulations seemed sufficiently humane 
to resolve his objections.347 
Eventually, the tensions in the group mounted when it seemed to have been claimed in the name 
of an irreligious secularism. Generally speaking, the secular focus was strengthened when some 
members tried to bring the emerging group in contact with a group in the European Parliament 
that worked on secularism: the European Parliament Platform for Secularism in Politics 
(EPPSP348). This platform, which is co-chaired by a prominent MEP Stientje (D66), brings 
together various secular NGOs349 and liberal religious voices350 and seeks to counter the 
influence of conservative and fundamentalist religious organizations on European and national 
 
345  While the Second Chamber D66 faction had supported a respective ban, it later changed course change 
following a party congress and the First Chamber faction rejected the bill. The group also organized a fringe 
meeting at one of the party congresses concerning the role and limits of the freedom of religion as well as some 
public debates: such as one on “the religious roots of liberalism,” a “grand religion debate” on the freedom of 
religion in relation to other basic rights, and a debate on the relationship between secular-liberal politics and 
humanism. 
346  Ada succeeded Paul as the group’s chair. Unfortunately, I was unable to speak with her personally. 
347  In a more general way, Tom also noted that understanding religion as “culture” challenged traditional 
notions of secularism because it relativizes the distinction between religion and other forms of culture, a position 
which resonates especially with Aernout’s defense of public religion. 
348  Formerly the Working Group on the Separation of Religion and Politics.  
349  Examples being the British National Secular Society, the European Humanist Federation, the European 
Freethinker Association, as well as Human Rights without Frontiers. 
350  Mainly the Catholics for Choice. 
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policy-making and legislation.351 Several of the secular NGOs have further claimed 
participation in the institutionalized dialogue between EU institutions and European churches, 
religious associations, and philosophical and non-confessional organizations under 
Art. 17 TFEU.352  
At the European level as well, a different group exists that centers on religious freedom.353 The 
contact between both secular groups and their apparent idea to link the national and the 
European groups thereby strengthened the secular focus. Moreover, it gave further weight to 
the notion of worldview secularism which had already been implicit to the Eerik’s identitarian 
focus. Thus, while Aad (Interview 2014, 86-94) perceived the new group to be radically 
secularist, Eerik (Interview 2013, 399-499) opposed the conservative positions the first group 
seemed to represent. To a certain extent the differences seem to have been accepted as a part of 
legitimate and interesting internal discussions, but the differences seemed too big to be bridged 
at some point. At least for Aad, the tensions climaxed when the group suggested that one of its 
general meeting be held on a Sunday morning, a time when he had to preach, which he 
perceived to be a systematic exclusion of people with a religious convictions and he was 
bothered by the decision so much that he filed an official complaint with the party headquarters. 
The Facebook conversations on the matter by contrast suggest that the dates were picked for 
mere pragmatic time reasons.354 Beyond that, the group’s focus seemed to have ultimately 
shifted towards a secular course, when one member changed the group’s twitter account name 
from “@D66religion” into “@D66secularism” with secularism being perceived as the 
separation of church and state, but also evoking an antagonistic position with regard to 
religion.355  
 
351  Its field of action are free speech, reproductive health and rights, development aid, research, as well as 
the freedom of religion.  
352  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union based on the Lisbon Treaty.  
353  The European Parliament Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance, co-
chaired by the Dutch socialist MEP Dennis de Jong.  
354  From the group’s respective Facebook conversations, it seems that the dates were picked for mere 
pragmatic time reasons, but they apparently stepped into established conflict lines. This incident can also be 
placed in a broader historical context, given that the question of whether meetings would be held at Sunday 
already divided late-19th century Christian and socialist workers and contributed to the foundation of separate 
organizations (De Rooy 2007, 139, Van Dam 2011). Beyond that, the debate also has its history within D66. The 
1980s working group, mentioned in section 4.3, had first been founded with the aim of re-scheduling a party 
congress that had been set to take place on a Sunday and thus conflicted with church service (RD 2000a). A 
similar controversy happened another time when a debate on ritual slaughtering was scheduled for a Jewish 
holiday, which again was portrayed by the strict Christian press as an act of excluding Jews from the debate 
(Interview Eerik 2013, 86-97). 
355  According to the press, the name-change happened at the advice of MEP Stientje, who found that they 
were not a religious group but a working group for secularism (Trouw 2012a). This statement importantly does 
not qualify the religion-related character of secularism, as Eerik explained—and this also echoes in the published 
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At the time of my research, the working group was not considered an important player but, the 
tensions within the group seem to have given expression to a divide that was also relevant in 
the party at large. This, at least, was the perception of the remonstrant members I spoke with, 
and it also resonates Bredenoord’s (2003) study on D66 members’ religious and worldview 
affiliations. The study shows that D66 members with worldview affiliations were more likely 
to find D66 anti-religious, and much less in favor of a stricter separation of church and state 
beyond the current state (34% compared to 67%); members with no worldview sympathies, by 
contrast, were more likely to consider religion as “dangerous” (Bredenoord 2003, 10f.).356  
At the time of my research, the group had already ceased functioning; it was apparently 
dissolved at the end of 2014 or early 2015. In any case, a successor of the dissolved group was 
founded in 2015—a “working group worldviews,” subordinated to the “thematic chapter on 
social liberalism.” All in all it seems that with this renewed foundation of the group, two moves 
happened: First, both competing foci (on religious freedom and the public role of religion versus 
the assertion of secularism) were integrated in the new group, and, second, the (more or less 
explicit) focus on representing the religious and secular worldview commitments of members 
was neutralized in an overarching frame of social liberalism. The website introduces the 
working group with the following questions:  
How do we as social liberals interpret the notion of worldviews? What role do worldviews 
play in our party and how has that happened? Are there blind spots with respect to 
worldviews in our social-liberal thinking and, if so, how do we approach this as modern 
social liberals? An example for the latter are ways of addressing the issue of loneliness. (D66 
WG L&R 2016a)  
 
Twitter comments, as secularism was not perceived as the separation of church and state, but as an antagonistic 
position with regard to religion. This carries a certain irony, given that the concept of secularism was used in a 
very different connotation within the European platform EPPSP. The platform had also faced the challenge of 
bringing together several groups, some religious some atheist, some liberal and some conservative, all of which 
shared support for secularism and concern about the increasing influence of ultra-orthodox groups in the EU. At 
the beginning the group was named “platform for the separation of religion and politics,” but after a while they 
agreed that religion as an aspect of people’s convictions could not be disentangled from politics, while the 
purpose of the platform was defined via the idea that the institutions should represent all European citizens, the 
name change to “platform for secularism” was meant to give expression to this goal (Interview Stientje 2013, 55-
73). Among the remonstrant members I spoke with the platform was perceived differently. Aad referred to the 
European platform as anti-religious while Joeri was highly enthusiastic. 
356  She distinguishes three categories of members: those without worldview affiliations and sympathies 
(A), those with sympathies for religious or nonreligious worldviews (B), and those with worldview affiliations 
(C). The three categories each make up approximately a third of the members in her poll. Among those 




Here, it seems that the focus of the first group has been taken up more broadly, but the group 
also includes nonreligious worldviews. The reference to loneliness further suggests a positive 
notion of worldviews as a resource for people in the sense of providing comfort or social 
networks. The question about the role of worldviews in the party has not yet been answered, 
but already the question resonates with the focus of the first group. 
A related site chooses a slightly different frame to introduce the group. Here, the working group 
is described as being open for all those “with interest and passion for matters of religion and 
worldviews,” with a stated goal to advise the party on “issues that concern the relation of 
politics, society, religion, and worldviews” (D66 WG L&R 2016c). Furthermore, the site states 
that “religion and worldview were topics that also still mattered in a secularized society such 
as the Netherlands.” The text continues as follows:  
The majority of the Dutch does not consider itself part of a religious or worldview strand, 
while among parts of some religious minorities, religiosity is increasing. This can conflict in 
the public domain.[…] It is of importance to aspire for knowledge within the party about 
religion and worldviews and pay attention to these matters. (D66 WG L&R 2016c) 
Here, the second group’s focus seems to be taken up in the sense of sketching religion as a 
minority issue and emphasizing the possible conflicts between a secular majority and an 
increasing religious minority. Different from the first quote, here the relation of religion and 
worldviews with respect to the party is defined in the sense that they constitute factors or topics 
of relevance for social-liberal policy making rather than positions eventually influencing social 
liberal positions.  
The reference to increasingly religious minorities suggests that aside from Christian minorities, 
the debate on integration and Islam is also at stake. This impression is further strengthened by 
the fact that the current chair of the group is Gert Jan Geling, currently a PhD student at the 
university of Leiden. He has studied Arabic and Middle East Studies, a.o., and is writing a thesis 
about ex-Muslims that is co-supervised by Paul Cliteur. He has recently co-written a book on 
“political correctness” for which Boris van der Ham wrote the introduction and Cliteur the 
epilogue (Bakker and Geling 2018). He also works on radicalization and extremism for the 
European Commission (EC n.d.). Geling has further contributed to a recent issue of the party’s 
magazine, “Idee” with the title “Oh my God! The Discomfort about religion among social-
liberals” (VMS 2018). The issue itself was edited by Joeri, who has become the editor in chief 
of the magazine.  
228 
 
So far, the group has organized fringe meetings at the party congress in 2016, entitled “The role 
of religion in society” (D66 WG L&R 2016b) and apparently one in 2017 entitled “The 
relationship between D66 and Christian Netherlands” (D66 WG L&R 2017). A summary of the 
first session shows that it gave room to speakers to problematize the global influence of certain 
religious groups on reproductive health policies, medical research as well as the liberty rights 
of religious dissidents and minorities, but also to speakers who valued the public role of religion 
and focused on countering anti-Islamic prejudices (D66 WG L&R 2016b). The debate showed 
similar divides as those that had manifested in the previous work group: While some were 
concerned about the ongoing or increasing power of religious institutions and their 
compromising influence on individual rights and liberties, others feared that the freedom of 
religion was being placed under increasing pressure (Ibid.). This also indicates that the group 
still includes both “camps.” Now, however, it has been integrated in the group on social-
liberalism and thus in the party’s general “ideological” framework and this seems to pacify the 
opposite identity-pulls.  
In sum, this brief case study gave an impression on how competing notions of secularity, 
interrelated with different religious and nonreligious positions, can be played out against each 
other within the party and compete about determining the party’s course. The case shows the 
interrelation of three conflict lines: First, the tension between religious members, seeking 
greater recognition and visibility within the party on the one hand, and the association of the 
party with forms of worldview secularism on the other hand. Second, the tension between those 
who were concerned about the freedom of religion on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
people who supported the party’s secular course and, at least in parts, felt that such secularism 
should also be emphasized. Third, the tension between those, who felt that a secular course 
should be emphasized vis-à-vis Islam, and those who considered Christianity the main other of 
the party. While the case study itself is only very small, there are indicators of its broader 
resonance within the party.  
All in all, this chapter complements the previous ones by focusing on D66 as an arena of 
secularity, rather than a collective agent that shapes a national arrangement of secularity. The 
next chapter builds on this with a second case study from the election campaign in a secular 
city and, more precisely, the political integration of Muslims into the party and its electorate. 
More precisely, it centers on an electoral campaign to target allochthone and Muslims voters as 
well as on a Muslim party member’s recent candidacy. These examples show how the party 
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discovers Muslims as possible liberals and how a young Muslim discovers her own liberalism 




7 The Political Integration of Muslims: A Case Study from a Secular 
City 
To begin with, a few words need to be said about what I mean with the political integration of 
Muslims. In a very general sense, political integration means that people who have yet to have 
a part in the political system gain access to formal politics as, e.g., voters, party members, 
candidates, representatives, etc. It is possible to speak, e.g., of the political integration of 
children/ juveniles into the political system. In the first place, the gradual political integration 
of Muslims refers to the situation of Muslim immigrants through the granting of voting rights 
and nationalizations. In the Netherlands, all non-nationals who have lived (legally) in the 
country for at least five years are allowed to participate in local elections (both as voters and 
candidates) (Michon, Tillie, and van Heelsum 2007).357 There have been political debates since 
the 1970s with respect to whether foreign workers should be granted voting rights at the local 
level—a position which was supported by the political left such as the PvdA, the PPR, and D66 
(Jacobs 1998, 101-111). In the context of the minority policy approach, the matter of voting 
rights was renegotiated with respect to the aspired integration of minority groups (Jacobs 1998, 
114-120). Nowadays, Christian parties and the right liberals also support legislative change as 
a means to facilitate integration (Jacobs 1998, 117, 120f., see also Michon, Tillie, and van 
Heelsum 2007). It seems that the religious background of migrants was only relevant for the 
small reformed parties, as they opposed the legislative change because it implied granting Islam 
a permanent role in Dutch society (Jacobs 1998, 119f., 123).  
Another way of looking at political integration is to focus on the party system of a country both 
in terms of the opportunity structures provided by already existing parties as well as the 
requirements for the foundation of new parties. In this respect, the notion of political integration 
can also be perceived as a concern of migrants with Dutch citizenship in the sense that here 
integration depends at least in parts on non-formal criteria. Generally speaking, parties are 
associations in the legal sense and the freedom of associations constitutes a basic right 
according to Art. 8 of the Dutch constitution. Religious parties have been core to the emergence 
of modern politics in the Netherlands (see ch.3.1) but, so far, there has not been a sizeable party 
with an Islamic or migrant base. There have nonetheless always been recurrent, primarily local 
initiatives, and currently Islamic parties have participated in the local elections in different cities 
 
357  An alternative way for political integration is via the foundation or recognition of representative 
political bodies on a cultural or ethnic base (Koopmans 2005, 52, 63-66). 
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in the Netherlands (Rath et al. 1996, 5, 70, 80).358 Existing parties constitute gate keepers to the 
political field in the sense that they nominate candidates for elections. Candidates are thereby 
placed in a hierarchical order on the party list and their chance of being appointed to a local 
council or the Second Chamber depends on their list-placement and the number of seats the 
party has won. Beyond that, candidates with a low list ranking might still be voted into 
parliament or councils if they can mobilize a certain number of direct votes for their 
candidates.359 In such cases, they can replace candidates with higher list rankings. Given that 
direct mandates come at the expense of list mandates, they are a factor in party-internal 
competition.360  
The question of whether and how existing parties are open to Muslims depends on their 
religious and secular self-understanding while obviously also Muslims identify with different 
political strands and position in different religious and nonreligious ways in politics. For the 
Christian Democrats, the integration of Muslims, like that of members of other religions as well 
as nonreligious people, has been a long-time controversial issue and it was only in 2013 that an 
inner-party working group of the CDA (“CDA & Islam”) published a report about the place of 
Muslims in the party (Rath et al. 1996, 70, Ensel, 169). The labor party was the first party to 
attract the greatest share of migrant voters and it is also the party that has the greatest number 
of candidates and representatives with an immigration background (Michon, Tillie, and Van 
Heelsum 2007, Forum 2010). Here, however it seems that migrants were perceived via their 
ethnicity rather than their religion (Ensel, 159). In the 1980s, the PvdA received almost all 
migrant votes but since the 1990s, the electoral preference of migrant voters have diversified 
(Michon, Tillie, and Van Heelsum 2007).361 Among people with Turkish and especially 
Moroccan origins the Green Party is very prominent.362 Among people of Turkish origin, the 
 
358  Current examples being NIDA in The Hague and Rotterdam as well as the Islam Democrats, and the 
Party of Unity in The Hague.  
359  Until 1997, the threshold for direct votes was 50% of the number of votes equivalent to one seat; 
thereafter it was lowered to only 25% (P&P n.d.-h). The change was supported by all factions except the SGP. 
Between 1959 and 2012, 12 members of the second chamber were elected via direct vote. There are different 
reasons why people might choose candidates with lower ranks. The website parlement & politiek points to 
female voters recurrently voting for the highest-ranked female candidate as well as to those who vote for locally 
known candidates. 
360  Repeatedly, direct candidates have relinquished positions for the sake of upholding the list’s hierarchy 
(P&P n.d.-h). Sometimes parties also make use of prominent candidates who, while ranked low on the list, are 
likely to gain many direct votes. If that person relinquishes his/her spot, it can support the party as such. 
361  There is no directly available data concerning the electoral choices of Muslims in the Netherlands and 
also here thus the focus is on ethnic groups more generally.  
362  At the national level, a man of Moroccan origin was the front runner of the Green party. 
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CDA and the VVD have been important depending on the year (Michon, Tillie, and Van 
Heelsum 2007). 
Michon Tillie and Van Heelsum (2007) state that a high migrant turnout at elections is 
commonly seen as an indicator of their integration given that a minimum knowledge of the 
competing parties is necessary in order to vote.363 Furthermore, migrant turnout is considered 
necessary for the legitimacy of an elected government in multi-ethnic cities (Ibid.). The 
integration policy note from 1998 is indeed very positive about attempts to strengthen the legal 
position and the equal rights of members of ethnic minorities (TK 1998d, 7).364 The note further 
compliments the parties that have successfully attracted members from ethnic minorities and 
put them on their candidate lists. At least since the turn of the century, however, migrants’ 
political participation has been viewed with suspicion and this has also affected the image of 
the labor party and led to tensions within the party itself.  
According to Cadat and Fennema (1996, 656), in the 1980s the left parties developed the idea 
that migrants should be represented by “their own people” rather than autochthone politicians. 
The political identity of migrant politicians was thus confined by both the existing party 
programs and profiles and their ascribed identity as a migrant (Ibid.). This basic construction 
seems to create tensions and places double pressures on migrant politicians. On the one hand, 
migrant candidates are less often placed on electable positions on party lists (Voerman et al. 
2014, 25); On the other hand, they are frequently and much more often than autochthone 
candidates voted into office via direct votes (42% compared to 5%) (Forum 2010, 6).365 They 
are moreover expected to mobilize “their constituency” while also being accused of clientelism 
(Michon, Tillie, and van Heelsum 2007). Islam-critics also speak of religious clientelism and 
claim that the party have built up networks in Muslim migrant communities and have begun to 
mobilize voters through religious networks and organizations (Brendel 2012b). While losing 
the autochthone working class, the party became increasingly dependent on Muslim and 
migrant voters and thus compromised its secular principles (Brendel 2012a, Elsevier 2017, LR 
2012, Bosma 2010, 133f., 135).366 From within the party as well, concerns over an increasing 
 
363  Conversely, at least the Moroccan king had discouraged Dutch Moroccans form voting throughout the 
1980s (NRC 1994).  
364  It states that this would enable minorities to identify with the relevant democratic institutions and grant 
them access to such institutions. The “noteworthy number of members from ethnic minorities” that have been 
elected or confirmed was an important signal in that respect. 
365  At the same time, at least with respect to national elections, only one out of ten allochthone voters also 
voted for a candidate with the same national background (BOS 2013, 1). 




presence of conservative Muslims among the party’s representatives have been raised 
(deVolkskrant 2011b). In 2006, then party leader, Bos, publicly expressed his concern about 
directly elected migrant candidates, assuming they might have less political experience and 
might be less loyal to the faction; he also feared the party might lose autochthone voters (Trouw 
2006b).367 
Most recently, the tensions between Turkey and the European Union have placed further 
pressure on migrant candidates and, in this context, D66 had its own political scandal: Prior to 
the 2006 parliamentary elections, the Armenian genocide (and the Turkish government’s 
official denial of it) had become an issue in Dutch politics and several parties had required their 
Turkish candidates to publicly acknowledge the genocide or withdraw their candidacy. D66 did 
nothing of the like, arguing that this would constitute a form of unequal treatment in comparison 
to Dutch autochthone politicians who did not have to take a public position on the Dutch 
colonial war in Indonesia (TN 2006). Without going into the details of the case, the decision 
resulted in D66 being supported by Turkish nationalists and gaining an extra seat in the Second 
Chamber.368 What further added to the scandal was that the Turkish government was suspected 
of having recommended voters of Turkish origin to vote for D66 (Trouw 2006e).369 This 
vulnerability, importantly, is not exclusively related to ethnic candidates but also accompanies 
the polarized debate and thus relates to parties in a more general way. According to the Dutch 
secret service, AIVD, radical Salafi preachers had also recommended that voters vote for D66, 
arguing that Pechtold was the least anti-Islamic politician (AIVD 2007, 66).370  
 
367  According to Trouw, an internal party paper showed that directly elected candidates were more likely to 
split off from the party faction and retain on an independent mandate (Trouw 2010). Apparently, though, the 
general tone of the interview had been very positive with regard to both voters and candidates with migration 
backgrounds—the newspaper had given a particular emphasis to this problematization. He was strongly 
criticized from within the party and accused of polarizing and denigrating migrants, or, more accurately, 
positioning non-white Dutch as second class citizens (deVolkskrant 2006a, HetParool 2006, deVolkskrant 
2006e).  
Also within the party, commentators questioned the representativeness of factions with a majority of allochthone 
candidates. Some local boards have accordingly limited the number of candidates with a migration background 
on their lists. 
368  Koşer Kaya, the candidate in question, stated that many Armenians were killed but that it should be left 
to historians to decide how it is classified—a statement which can be read to refrain from a debate about 
historical/ juridical evaluations but also resonates with Turkish state’s official version (ND 2006).She was voted 
into parliament via direct votes, jumping three list-seats 
369  D66’s party line is obviously not to question the genocide—the party is one of the factions in Dutch 
parliament that supports a stronger recognition of the genocide. 
370  Brendel (2009) criticized the party’s “move” on the Armenia-issue as fostering Islamization and 
critically pointed to the support the party receives in Salafist circles. The AIVD sees this as a conscious attempt 
by Salafists to increase social and political polarization  
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All in all, the debate and contestations about the political representation of migrants seems as 
old as their formal political integration and it not only concerns PvdA but also other parties. 
(Cadat and Fennema 1996, deVolkskrant 1998, NRC 1994). To a certain extent, they seem to 
also be based in the shift away from a pluralist policy frame: The diversification of a party list 
can be motivated by particularist-pluralist or functional (that is: universalist) ideas: First, it can 
be based on the idea that migrants can be represented best by “their own kind,” an idea which 
follows a pluralist logic and comes with the outlined tensions and difficulties. Second, it can be 
based on the ideal of generally accessible institutions and the privatization of ethnic and 
religious diversity (a perspective from which diversification matters and is declared irrelevant 
at the same time).371 Both motives can stand in tension such as when migrant candidates find it 
difficult not to be seen as a migrant candidate and their electability among non-migrants is 
questioned; or conversely, when a party seems to need a migrant candidate to reach migrant 
voters (Cadat and Fennema 1996, deVolkskrant 1998, NRC 1994). With respect to the latter 
point, political observers have spoken of the struggle for the ethnic vote since at least the mid-
1990s, and closely observe party strategies in placing and presenting “ethnic” candidates (Cadat 
and Fennema 1996, deVolkskrant 1998, NRC 1994).  
The apparent competition was also felt at the time of my research during the municipal elections 
of 2014. In what follows, I will first briefly describe the city’s religious-secular landscape. I 
will then turn to the 2014 municipal election campaign and, more specifically, the development 
of a campaign for migrant voters. Finally, I will focus on a young Muslim woman’s candidacy 
and her gradual adoption of an individual liberty and equality frame as well as her integration 
within the party along the lines of such a frame. The tension between universalism and 
particularism constitutes a specific aspect of the tensions between pluralism with individualism 
and functional differentiation. Both latter types place the universality of their principles (that of 
individual liberty and equality and that of functional autonomy) against the recognition of 
diverse particularistic collective perspectives. The tensions between particularism and 
universalism has always been co-present in the thesis, such as in the discussed case of same-
sex marriage. Here, the pluralist option entailed a particularistic solution for same-sex couples 
and thus emphasized their distinctness from heterosexual couples, while the opening of civil 
marriage aimed to make marriage as a single institution, generally accessible and thus treated 
 
371  While according to Cadat and Fennema (1996, 656), left parties were convinced of its necessity; in the 
mentioned policy note from the 1990s, by contrast, the argument is not so much a separate representation but 
rather that social diversity should be represented in the democratic institutions of a country in order for members 
of minority groups to also identify with them (TK 1998d).  
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both marriage as well as couples in a universalized fashion. D66’s call for deconfessionalizing 
politics, to pick another example, placed a universalist notion of political problems and 
solutions against the idea of a political representation of competing particularistic positions. 
The tension between particularism and universalism has been central to the competing ideas 
about integration as well, and more specifically the tensions between the pluralist and 
nationalist models of integration on the one hand, and the model focused on individual rights 
and functional integration on the other hand. This chapter and its focus on the political 
integration of Muslim migrants takes this tension between particularism and universalism 
central in the sense that it shows how a pluralist pull, derived from the national debate on Islam 
and multiculturalism, challenges D66’s universalist ideal (in terms of an individual rights and 
equality approach as well as a focus on functional integration).  
7.1 Religion in a Secular City  
The city could be described as very secular, or as a city that has a strong religious-secular divide 
that corresponds to its ethnic divides. In 2012, 62% of the local population considered itself as 
being unrelated to any religion or worldview (GA 2013, 96). By contrast, only thirteen percent 
of the populations reported that it was related to Christianity (Catholicism 7%, Protestantism 
2%, and Christianity in general 4%) while another 13 % of the population related itself with 
Islam (Ibid.). According to Schippers and Wenneker (2014, 7f.), the low affiliation numbers 
with Christianity are the long-term result of a secularization process that set in in the late-19th 
century and continues until today.372 From Second World War to the early-1970s, the 
discrepancy with respect to the national situation had expanded, since then, however, the local 
trend of secularization has slowed down (pp. 8-10). Depending on the data, the local picture 
compares differently to the national, but the authors conclude that the numbers from the turn of 
the millennium were also significantly below the national average (Schippers and Wenneker 
2014, 9f.).  
In contrast to the comparably low share of Christians, the number of Muslims in the city is 
above national average (Schmeets 2016, 10). The presentation of statistical data suggests that 
since the 1970s Islam is not only the only rising religion in the city, but also the single largest 
one since the late-1990s (Schippers and Wenneker 2014, 12). This, however, seems mainly to 
be the result of the separate listing of different Christian affiliations; if they were combined, the 
 
372  They provide data until 2012. A more recent study gives an overview on the developments with respect 
to religious affiliations between 2006 and 2016. Also since 2012, the number of Christians has further declined 
(GA 2017, 113).  
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overall affiliation with Christianity is assessed as being equally strong (GA 2013, 96) or even 
stronger than Islam (Schippers and Wenneker 2014, 12f.). Furthermore, also with respect to 
Islam, the city is relatively secular by national comparison. The share of Muslims among people 
with Moroccan origins is below national average (85% (in 2010) compared to 97% (in 2011), 
and the same can be said with respect to people of Turkish origin (79% in 2008 compared to 
94% in 2011) (OIS 2012). With respect to religious activities, there are diverging trends: On 
the one hand, mosque visits among young second-generation Muslims has increased both 
nationally as well as locally (OIS 2012). On the other hand, this trend manifests in the respective 
city to a much lesser extent than nationally and the share of religiously non-active people is 
larger. Four out of ten Moroccan or Turkish Muslims in the city never go to the mosque, while 
the respective share at national level is one out of five (OIS 2012). There are, moreover, 
competing explanations for the rise of religious activism, and they might be different in 
different places. The OIS-website points to possible processes of cultural defense as well as to 
the emergence of more attractive “urban” forms of Islamic mosques, an example being the local 
“poldermoskee,” which existed between 2008 and 2010 (Ibid.).  
Similar to the national situation, cultural differences between autochthone Dutch and 
Moroccan- and Turkish-Dutch are evident (and have been documented), particularly with 
respect to the acceptance of homosexuality. While 11% of local autochthones state they would 
find the idea of their child being in a hypothetical homosexual relationship, the respective share 
among parents with Turkish or Moroccan roots is 58% (OIS 2014). Conversely and as 
demonstrated by studies focusing on group-based prejudice, negative ideas about Muslims are 
still frequent, despite having declined since 2007 (GA 2013, 98).373 The mentioned Polder 
Mosque had aimed to reach young people and self-positioned in the center of Dutch society and 
as a bridge builder. The main language was Dutch, the mosque addressed allegedly tabooed 
issues such as emancipation and sexuality; women and men could pray in the same room 
(HetParool 2010). Ultimately, however, the mosque project ran out of money and had to close 
its doors. 
With respect to migrants’ electoral preferences, the picture is similar to other large cities in the 
Netherlands. Between 1994 and 2010, the great majority of Moroccans have voted for either 
 
373  Negative ideas on Muslims are less frequent than negative ideas about people from the Antilles and 
especially Moroccans (OIS 2014). The percentage of people with negative ideas about Muslims has declined 
from 20 % in 2007 to about 13 % 2011 (Ibid.). Additionally, the rates of perceived discrimination among people 
with Moroccan and Turkish roots have declined from 32/26% in 2010 to 18/23% in 2013, respectively (OIS 
2014, 31). Race or skin-color as well as nationality are thereby ore common reasons for discrimination beyond 
religion (Ibid. 33). 
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the PvdA or the Green Party, while Turkish votes have, at least in some years, also gone to the 
CDA, the VVD, and D66 (Michon, Tillie, and van Heelsum 2007, Van der Heijden and 
Heelsum 2010, 32f.). In comparison to the PvdA, D66 has always been a small party. In 1994, 
a high point in the party’s success, it gained 13% of the Turkish vote (PvdA 35%) and 6% of 
the Moroccan vote (PvdA 39%) (Michon, Tillie, and van Heelsum 2007). After that, the support 
for the party declined, reaching a low point in 2006, but, again similar to the national situation, 
the support has since increased. In 2010, D66 received 14% of the Turkish vote and 10% of the 
Moroccan vote (Michon, Tillie, and van Heelsum 2007, Van der Heijden and Heelsum 2010, 
33, Forum 2010). In 2010, D66 was also one of only three parties with an over-proportional 
number of candidates with migrant backgrounds: 4.4% compared to the PvdA with 6.9% and 
the Green Party with 8.3% (Forum 2010, 6). Different from the PvdA, however, its primary 
support comes from autochthone people (18%); the PvdA’s support among Moroccans (74%) 
and Turks (58%) by contrast was much higher than among autochthone voters (28%) (Van der 
Heijden and Heelsum 2010, 22).  
Since 1946, the PvdA had been the biggest party in the city and has also determined the local 
policies on integration. The shift from pluralist to individualist policies were similar to those 
on the national level (Uitermark, Rossi, and Van Houtum 2005, 629). The rising concerns about 
Islam and integration at the national level though were met differently by the local labor party: 
The former mayor but also other labor politicians pursued a course to work “through religion” 
and that Uitermark labels “civil differentialism” (Uitermark 2012, 177-192). Central to this new 
course was the notion of religion as a potential positive contribution to integration see also: 
(Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Rath 2014, Uitermark 2012). Local Muslims were categorized 
according to their compatibility with an aspired modern civic culture and while liberal Muslims 
were actively supported, disciplining measures were introduced against groups of Muslims 
perceived as problematic by Dutch media and politicians, framing their behaviors as ethnic 
culture rather than Islamic, thus using Islam as a civilizing force in integration and minority 
policies (Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Rath 2014).374 This initiative’s most controversial project 
was the aspired building of a mosque in one of city’s Western neighborhoods with a large 
Muslim population (Ibid.).375  
 
374  This course was backed by the introduction of the concept of “compensating neutrality,” which 
redefined established notions of church-state separation to allow for supporting religious groups which were in a 
historical backlog. 
375  After the mayor ended his terms, this course was left and already the long-time leader of the interim 
mayor distanced himself publicly from his predecessor and the previous municipality’s support for the 
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My research took place at a time when the PvdA lost its historic dominant position to D66. 
Already in 2010, D66 was considered the “big winner” of the elections and the subsequent 
elections of 2014 were a neck-and-neck race between the PvdA and D66 (OIS 2010). 376 
Eventually, the PvdA lost and D66 became the largest party in town. One factor in their electoral 
success was that they succeeded in attracting a substantial number of votes from migrant voters. 
This strategic necessity put the liberal ideal of an individualist and culture-blind approach to 
integration to test in the sense that Muslim migrants had to be approached and perceived as 
potential liberal voters. Similarly, the case of D66’s first “visibly” Muslim candidate exhibits 
the gradual experience of a compatibility of Islam and liberalism.  
In what follows, I will first briefly introduce the local interview partners to which this chapter 
refers. I will then describe the campaign in general terms in order to then focus on a special 
campaign strategy developed to target migrant voters.  
7.2 A Liberal Campaign in a Secular City 
At the beginning of my research I found it difficult to make sense of my topic in the city given 
that, different from the Bible Belt town to which I recurrently traveled, religion and secularity 
seemed not to be of great political concern. In the secular city, it seemed as though no major 
player in the local political field genuinely politicized religion. There is no relevant Christian 
party and conservative and right-wing parties have also been unable to gain footing in the city 
(Uitermark, Rossi, and Van Houtum 2005, 628). D66’s main competitor in the city is the labor 
party, while VVD, the Greens, and the Socialists also play a relevant role in the elections. 
Additionally, in recent years, some parties that center on Islam and multiculturalism have been 
established and compete for the migrant vote.377  
For the municipal election in 2013/14, D66 had staged a long-lasting campaign, stretching 
several months prior during which the party organized public events on different themes that 
were central to its profile in the city. The election program378 had four main chapters: 
 
Westermoskee (years before, though, he had also favored an explicit support for a Dutch liberal Islam) and also 
the eventual successive new mayor (PvdA, 2010-2017) is said to disagree with this notion of secularity.  
376  In spring 2013 according to the precast, the PvdA had already lost and D66 had won a considerable 
share of the vote, so that from then on D66 was seen to have the possibility to catch up with labor. Around 
February 2014, D66 had been the biggest according to precast (HetParool 2014, deVolkskrant 2014a). 
377  First there was an Islamic party, “Partij van de Eenheid” (Party of Unity), which is mainly based in The 
Hague but also participated in the local elections. Second, there was the party “Multicultureel Plus” which 
explicitly propagated the reality and value of a multicultural society and mainly comprised people of Turkish 
origin (Kranendonk et al. 2014, 31). 
378  Aside from the general election program for the city as a whole, the different districts each developed 
and published their own programs, partly based on the central one yet not identical therewith. The focus on 
239 
 
development (education, arts and culture), income and participation, care and sport, work and 
housing, sustainability, and, finally, liberty. The subthemes of the chapters also oriented the 
campaign. I began by attending campaign events that centered on the themes of liberty and 
human rights to see whether and in what ways references to religion—in particular Islam—
would be made. More generally, I attended campaign events that were staged in neighborhoods 
with a high percentage of citizens with migration backgrounds. I also analyzed the election 
program with a focus on references to religion, secularity, integration, and Islam. While religion 
and secularity were not discussed on their own, I did encounter a small campaign team 
specifically targeting migrant voters. Later, I also interviewed party members from 
neighborhoods with a high share of Muslims immigrants and members involved with diversity 
and human rights issues. Moreover, I also spoke with some people centrally involved in the 
campaign, including one that targeted migrant voters. Although I did not systematically ask 
about people’s religious upbringing, it became topical in most interviews. In what follows, I 
start by briefly introducing the party members referred to in this section, focusing on how they 
became active in D66 as well as their religious/ nonreligious background if known.  
The local D66 faction’s leader at that time was Job, who had been chair of the youth 
organization associated with D66 (JD) at the age of 19 and has been a member of the city 
council since 2010. According to his own account, he grew up in a nonreligious family where 
secularism and the Dutch liberal-progressive ideals were just natural. Still, he had attended a 
Christian primary school, which he recalls as being somewhat uncomfortable.  
Gerjan grew up in a protestant Christian family that he refers to as “non-pillarized” and of which 
his critical-believing grandmother had a particular important influence on him. He had also 
been active in the liberal youth organization (JOVD) from an early age onwards and became a 
member of D66 in the 1990s. He has been active for the party in the city’s West since then, and 
he had preceded Job as a faction leader.379 At the time of my research, he was the party-
spokesman for integration, diversity, and citizenship.  
Petrie was the city’s West’s faction leader at the time of my research. He had been active in 
D66 in different functions since 2009 after an earlier membership in the GreenLeft. He grew 
up in southwest Netherlands, in a region known for its high share of pietist reformed Christians, 
 
liberty and human rights was strongest in the Nieuw West district, given that the district chapter strongly 
overlaps with the thematic group on human rights.  
379  He was a council member in the city’s Western district from 1998 to 2002 and from 2005 until 2010, as 




but his parents were Catholic. We did not speak about his religious upbringing in greater detail. 
It was only at a later stage of the interview he told me that he had taken the religious oath rather 
than the secular pledge when he was inaugurated as a city councilor. He claimed to be rather 
indifferent on the matter but assumed that it would please his parents.  
Enno was also raised a Catholic, but his parents had already distanced themselves from religious 
authorities and had more or less cut links with the Church while he was still a teenager. He felt 
that through his parents’ example he had learned that religion was something an individual 
could live and relate to in liberty and that was different from the powerful institution of 
churches. He had only been active in D66 since the 2012 parliamentary elections, although he 
had been a party member much longer. At the time of my research, he was part of the program 
committee of the city’s New-West district for the municipal elections and had founded a party-
internal group for homosexuals within D66.  
Peer in fact chose D66 because it is a secular party. He had been Christian and a CDA member 
since his student years but eventually became nonreligious and thus felt the need to find another 
party. He joined D66 in the late 1990s and began to be active during Fortuyn’s rise. He also 
spoke in positive terms about his grandmother’s liberal religiosity. At the time of my research, 
he was on the party board and further chaired the program committee that had prepared the 
election program.  
Meinte had been the campaign manager for the elections in the city at the time of my research 
and he had held other positions within the party since 2006. We did not speak about his personal 
religious affiliations or non-affiliations during our interview. Instead, we discussed his motives 
for joining and becoming politically active in D66. He had joined the party after Fortuyn’s rise 
in 2002 as a means to support the political position he felt he was close to. His activism as a 
campaign manager was motivated by his perception that D66 had failed to publicly 
communicate its liberal achievements from the 1990s and 2000s, and this was something he 
wanted to change.  
Jarik had been a long-term passive party member but had also been supportive of the right-
liberals. We did not speak about his personal relations with religion, but he told me that he 
ended his support for the VVD in response to the latter’s decision for a burqa ban while the 
freedom of religion seemed to be better- protected within D66. He spoke in positive terms about 
the role religion could play in people’s lives but, different from the others, he did not refer to 
his family or growing up but to his experiences during a year abroad in the US. This might 
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indicate that religion did not play a central role in his family. At the time of my research, he 
had initiated and organized a campaign to target migrant voters during the municipal elections.  
Yalda had been on the board of a local mosque committed to bridging the divides between 
Dutch Muslims and non-Muslim society as well as between liberal and conservative Muslims. 
She had mainly been part of left-leaning network. Gradually, she discovered herself to be rather 
liberal in many ways, particularly with respect to her religiosity and political ideals, and she 
further found in D66 a party whose secular profile offered protection to Muslims as citizens.  
With respect to their party related positioning, my interview partners were either active in the 
West parts of town characterized by a high share of Muslims with migration backgrounds, or 
they were active in the campaign or in a field placed in discursive relation to that of religion, 
Islam, and integration. With respect to religion, they all had different backgrounds. What they 
shared was their secular notion of politics and state.  
7.2.1 Secular Politics, Functional Integration, and Human Rights  
According to my interview partners, the issue that had the most immediate relevance for my 
interest in religion and secularism were the recurrent decisions about subsidies given to 
religious organizations. In reference to the separation of church and state, they, e.g., emphasized 
that the municipality could subsidize the nonreligious but not the religious activities of religious 
organizations, a line that was not always easy to draw but—at least to some—clearly mattered 
(Interviews Gerjan 2014, 176-179, Petrie 2014, 98-121). A second way in which interview 
partners expressed a commitment to secularity was by stressing that religion should neither be 
supported nor countered by politics. Some, e.g., criticized policies that distinguished between 
different religions or different strands therein (Interviews Gerjan 2014, 187-190, Petrie 2014, 
157-19). A third way in which my interview partners expressed a secular notion of politics was 
by approaching religion as an immanent phenomenon and comparable to other nonreligious 
aspects of human culture. As such, with the exemption of subsidies, citizens’ religious concerns 
were to be treated like secular equivalents, that is, Islamic burying facilities or mosques ought 
to be treated like secular burying facilities or buildings (Interviews Gerjan 2014, 190-233, 498-
508, Petrie 2014, 143-153). Implicitly at least, this implies a counter-distinction from the civil 
differentialism practiced by the city’s mentioned former mayor. Furthermore, some of the 
interview partners also underscored that the principled equality and the pragmatism of treating 
religion as secular was also a counter-distinction from the VVD (Interview Gerjan 2014, 255-
270). Implicitly, though, policies could very well affect religious traditions differently, 
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particularly those that support dialogue-oriented programs of, by tendency, liberal strands of a 
religious tradition or by requiring subsidized programs to adhere to values of sexual diversity 
(Interview Petrie 2014, 271-278). 
With respect to the party’s program and campaign, neither religion, multiculturalism, nor 
integration were overt themes. In the early stages of writing the program, it had been suggested 
that a chapter on these topics be included, but eventually the party’s city congress decided 
against it. Party members felt that the term “integration” already sounded rather right-wing 
(Interview Petrie 2014, 251-261) and that “multiculturalism” evoked the notion of groups rather 
than a focus on individuals and networks that fit their idea of the social (Interview Peer 2014, 
304-312). Thus, the functional language of housing, education, work policies as well as safety, 
and, further, the individualist language of human rights provided frames to address issues 
discussed in the debate on integration and multiculturalism in line with the party profile. 
Integration was, at its core, about people—irrespective of their background or religion—being 
able to live in a normal house, having access a job and a good education and a clean and green 
surrounding, and being accepted and safe in living their religious and sexual identities 
(Interviews Gerjan 2014, 435-442, Petrie 2014, 179-184, 264-278). In the following quote, Peer 
who had coordinated the program’s development, elaborated how the functional language of 
safety and the individualist language of human rights provided frames to address issues 
discussed in the debate on integration and multiculturalism in line with the party profile.  
the message we wanted to get across that [our city] is a city where each and every individual 
can develop him- or herself […]. […] plus thanks to the human rights group, and we also had 
[…] a public safety group, […] and these two groups addressed just the issues that are often 
entangled in the multicultural society discussions, like discrimination, safety of LGBT in the 
neighborhoods, but also people from diverse culturally diverse background being refused 
entrance into bars; about respect in schools towards students and teachers from different 
cultural and sexual backgrounds. […], and the human rights groups had the exact way of, 
sort of idea-basis on which we could base those points and that is, we are pro-human rights 
city where everybody is free to be him or herself and a city where everybody is safe to be him 
or herself. and human rights was for us the better wording for that issue (Interview Peer 
2014, 312-323).380  
 
380  Again, this might similarly refer to the concept of integration.  
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In the final program, references to culture are not completely avoided—the program speaks of 
the necessity of freedom and tolerance in a multicultural city, and it claims to defend young 
homosexuals with multicultural background against the threats their social backgrounds might 
impose (D66 2014, 70). Mainly, however, the program refers to terms that place people’s 
actions rather than their identities as the focal point. The program speaks, for example, of 
people’s families and communities which can assert pressure on their free development (Ibid.). 
Religion is not an issue in the program. In some interviews, the relationship between Islam and 
homosexuality was discussed, partly because I had asked about it but also partly without a 
respective question from my side. Some felt that Islam being positioned as the cause of a non-
acceptance of homosexuality was a fallacy and that this could be best understood as an 
expression of rural-traditional cultures (Interview Petrie 2014, 287-297). Others, by contrast, 
considered such non-acceptance something that was commonly carried by orthodox religion, 
be it Islam or Christianity (Interview Gerjan 2014, 293-299). The interview with Enno shows 
how even if Islam was seen as “part of the problem,” it did not have to be part of the solution. 
He felt that politics “should be addressing the norms and values of a culture and of a people, 
rather than of a church,” a claim which seeks to push politics to focus less on doctrines or 
religious institutions but on what people really believe and live (Interview Enno 2014, 268f.). 
As an example, Enno referred to a project to increase social acceptance of homosexuals, which 
set out by trying to make mothers realize that their children could actually really be gay 
(Interview Enno 2014, 268-280). Here, thus, the starting point is not Islam but factual relations 
and possible identities. In the light of the overall profile of the party one might say that such 
programs aim to provide an understanding for the social diversity in the name of which the 
freedom of religion is confined.381  
In other instances, events worked through religion by creating a stage for, e.g., liberal Islamic 
positions that had no objections towards homosexuality. Enno told me about a public debate 
D66 had hosted under the theme of free speech and among the guest speakers were the initiators 
of the Turkish and Moroccan float at the gay-pride parade. One of the speakers explicitly 
addressed her struggle being both a lesbian and religious, recounting discussions she had with 
liberal religious people. This example exhibits a similar position that has been elaborated with 
respect to the liberalizing changes in the 1990s when liberalizations were propagated though 
 
381  Other programs centered on religion, such as programs to counter radicalization, which worked with the 
distinction between orthodoxy and radicalism (Interview Gerjan 2014, 354-370). Theoretically, such programs 
would work through theology or by placing civil demands of social peace above religious truths.  
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differentiations between religion and other social realities or spheres, or by pointing to liberal 
religious positions that supported such liberalizations from their own moral cosmos.  
Thus, with respect to Islam and integration, D66 positioned itself similarly at the local level as 
it had nationally, emphasizing a socio-economic focus on integration, an individual liberty and 
equality approach to diversity, and an emphasis on the separation of church and state. Aside 
from these positionings, local politics also provide some insight into how such principles are 
implied in pedagogical projects on diversity. The projects seem to either deconstruct or sideline 
religious categories in order to focus on complex social diversities in relation to which an ethic 
of liberty and tolerance claims its necessity and legitimacy.  
The following two sections shifts from D66’s focus on Muslims as objects of politics to 
Muslims as political agents. More precisely the next section centers on D66’s, strategically 
necessary, discovery of Muslim voters as possible liberals. Thereafter, I focus on the candidacy 
of a female Muslim D66 member, which became a token for the possible compatibility of Islam 
and liberalism.  
7.3 A Campaign for Migrant Voters  
The campaign team had defined target groups for the campaign along two axes, one 
geographical and the other thematic. Based on data from the previous elections and local 
politicians’ experiences, they developed a map of three kinds of areas: areas where people 
typically leaned towards the party, areas where changing populations promised new electoral 
chances, and the areas where people did not typically support D66 but might do so with respect 
to certain topics (Interview Meinte 2014, 71-96). With respect to the thematic target groups, the 
campaign team centered on groups that were likely to support and carry the party’s core theme 
of liberty and internationalism.  
At first, there was no special campaign for migrant votes planned but at some point it became 
clear that reaching their electoral goal required that D66 reach those voters who did not typically 
support the party and this motivated the party to specifically target migrant voters (Interview 
Meinte 2014, 99-103, 232-241). While the focus on migrants does not equate a focus on specific 
religious minorities, religion is part of how migrants are perceived. This also manifests in how 
Meinte elaborated the matter:  
And we originally thought we would leave any rel- any link to religion out of the whole 
campaign; eh, we ended up creating, eh, a specific target group for, eh, let's say what is 
unofficially called the non-western, eh, immigrants (Interview Meinte 2014, 99-101).  
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The strategic motive was not the only factor in the decision, at least not for Jarik, the person 
who had come up with the idea of such a campaign and also worked out its details: For him, 
the focus on migrant voters was linked to a desire to defend the freedom of religion. Jarik had 
traditionally voted for the VVD but had distanced himself from the party after it had supported 
calls for a burqa ban, something that fundamentally conflicted with his ideal of a liberal society 
and party. While the CDA, despite being a religious party, also started to question the freedom 
of religion of Muslims, the secular party D66 was paradoxically left to defend the freedom of 
religion. He further pointed to a longer stay in the USA, where he became convinced of the 
importance of the freedom of religion and how religion could help people “to get the most out 
of themselves” (Interview Jarik 2014, 40-48). In the interview, he then explained the apparent 
paradox, that of all Dutch parties it was D66 that had defended the freedom of religion by 
pointing to the party’s constitutionalism and its ideal that the constitution would “be upheld for 
everyone in the same degree and manner” (Interview Jarik 2014, 48-51). Currently, he 
expressed that he felt that this standard of equality was being taken for granted given that, e.g., 
the freedom of education, which Protestants and Catholics had fought for, was now only 
reluctantly granted to Muslims (ll. 51-58). Somewhat later, he emphasized the legitimacy of 
local religious groups to “be a group,” to “stick together and have their own schools and their 
own churches, or mosques, and their own societies,” and to be accepted even if they did not 
“want to spend time with other people outside their group” (ll. 83-90). 
Aside from the apparent paradox that a secular party had come to the defense of the freedom of 
religion, the interview section also points to an at least implicit tension between universalism 
and pluralism. While the party has traditionally opposed the ideal of pillarization and collective 
pluralism, its constitutional egalitarianism implies granting established rights to all citizens, 
including those who allow for pluralist institutions. Jarik did not address this tension and, at 
times, his statements seem communicatively ambivalent with respect to a pluralist frame.382 
Possibly, the distinction between universalism and pluralism was not of central importance to 
him, possibly he considered this tension to be resolved by a sequential hierarchy in the sense 
that equality rights should be guaranteed and could thus be communicatively emphasized as 
long as the general framework existed. Somewhat later in the interview, when I asked him about 
the sole reason construction as one example of how D66 curbed collective freedoms of religion, 
 
382  He, for example, recalled a campaign meeting with the board of a local mosque during which they 
discussed their perceived freedom to form a “pillar” (zuil) in the Netherlands and it is not clear whether he 
objects to state interventions into the private realm of citizens, which would be an individualist perspective 
compatible with universalism, or whether he also looks favorably on a pluralist model of integration.  
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he expressed that he felt that Muslims might in the first place care about being treated equally 
with other religious groups and only in a later step be concerned about autonomy rights more 
generally.383  
and I think maybe only after that they will start worrying about you know, (breathes) if they 
can fire, if they have a school, if they can fire gay teachers, I think […] So I think it is in their 
hierarchy of needs, D66 becomes blocking maybe at the top of the hierarchy, but at the basis 
it gives them what they eh need. (Interview Jarik 2014, 296-300). 
Eventually such a hierarchical understanding also seems to have been convincing for Meinte 
and possibly might have informed the campaign more generally. With respect to Islamic 
schools, he argued that while as a party they would oppose the pluralist education system, as 
long as it was in place, its rules should count for everyone, equally (Interview Meinte 2014, 
209-217). This reasoning resonates with the position traditionally taken by secular parties. 
According to Rath (1996, 85f.), Dutch secular parties have frequently defended the equal rights 
of religious minorities against the remains of institutionalized Christianity.  
Strategically and communicatively, though, a campaign for migrant voters also entailed risks 
for the party given that it could easily be scandalized. Jarik (Interview 2014, 99-107) 
emphasized that in the current political climate in the Netherlands, one was easily attacked for 
favoring Islam or Turkish or Moroccan people and that practices like having Turkish or Arabic 
flyers, which had long been a normal practice, were looked at with suspicion and were 
scandalized by the media. In what follows, I show how pluralism and universalism as well as 
the secular message of the campaign were at least implicitly negotiated to fit the party line 
during the campaign’s planning and development.  
7.3.1 Between Pluralism and Universalism  
When the campaign strategy was first presented, it did not yet foresee a special campaign for 
migrant voters. The LGBTs by contrast, were considered one of the thematic target groups. 
They were thought to carry the party’s core themes, as Meinte’s quote exemplifies:  
 
383  Somewhat later in the interview he and in response to a question by me, Jarik elaborates that if religious 
or orthodox religious schools in particular were obliged to provide education on sexual diversity, this would 
breach the equal treatment principle; if, however, there was a general rule to educate school children about 
homosexuality—both empirically as well as normatively—this was fine (Interview 2014, 327-342). This 
sequence shows that for him as well, religious freedom is not given primacy over individual equality but the 
focus is on a principled implementation of equality also with respect to religion.  
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Ehm, we, ehm, identified targets over two axes, one was geographical; […] And we identified 
a number of thematic target groups, so some of them are let's say rather traditional, that 
really fit our core message, like, eh, liberty and internationalism, and things like that, which 
are easily translatable to groups like LGBT, or expats, students, or entrepreneurs, or … 
(Interview Meinte 2014, 72-77). 
By contrast, Jarik criticized this exclusive focus on LGBTs and suggested that the party also 
develop a campaign for locals who were of Turkish and Moroccan descent. According to Jarik, 
Meinte first opposed this, arguing that they had decided not to focus on any specific groups. 
Based on the interviews, it seems that the underlying question was whether Muslim migrants 
could be seen as thematic target groups and carriers of the party’s core message, similar to 
LGBTs, or whether such a focus would imply a pluralist logic with respect to different 
population groups and potentially different value systems as well.384  
In the first place, the campaign team was convinced of the strategic importance of a special 
campaign for migrant votes, but Meinte’s interview suggests that during the subsequent debate 
the party members expressed that such s campaign could very well be done without 
compromising the party’s core message and principles. To understand this transformation, the 
following sequence is worth being quoted in (almost) full length:  
and there was a lot of debate about it, like should we do that? Don't we become too much like 
the PvdA, but we decided, no we gonna do that, we gonna stay close to our own () ehm core 
being, eh core message, we are not gonna pander to voters, we are not gonna say, o come 
with us, because we are fantastic and we gonna promise you everything, because we won't. 
But we will underscore the fact that we're a very secular party in the sense that we are not 
against religion, we just want to treat each religion equally, we want to treat every person 
equal. so it doesn't really matter, if you are atheist or Christian, or Muslim, or Buddhist, or 
flying spaghetti monster, Rastafarian, doesn't really matter. and you can () you can believe 
that. because we are like that; we are not against religion, we just don't think it is an issue in 
the public space. And we decided to eh focus on that aspect, and certain aspects that matter 
for that group. Because education is important, eh equality is important, non-discrimination 
 
384  By placing LGBTs on the same level as expats, students, and entrepreneurs, this suggests a more 
situational and role-related like-mindedness, than an identity group or a culturally distinct subgroup of the 
nation. It should be mentioned, though, that all parties had particular points for LBGT voters, and that there were 
several events in the city that particularly targeted this group of voters. Beyond that, it is possible to hypothesize 
that migrants are not centrally associated with liberty rights and that they are further mainly negatively 
associated with internationalism, given that the debate on integration recurrently problematizes cross-country 
marriages, mosques built with foreign money as well as speaking languages other than Dutch. 
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is important, eh giving the people the room and the trust eh to actually make something of 
their life, is important for everyone, but especially for these groups.  
(Interview Meinte 2014, 120-131). 
Thus, this quote not only reproduces the pros and cons debated within the group but also seems 
to reflect a process of collective realization that the core ideas of the party might indeed be of 
interest to this group of voters. After listing a view of these points, Meinte emphasizes that this 
really was what the party stood for (“you can believe that. because we are like that”). Stressing 
the party’s secular profile is presented as an alternative but also not a negation of “promising 
everything”; it is speaking the truth about legitimate freedom and its confines.385 In the same 
way, the promise of equal treatment renders religion equal to nonreligious equivalents (neither 
more than less).  
The campaign was thus meant to communicate a message that would be of special importance 
for migrant populations but would also fit the general party line. A small group prepared the 
campaign, consisting of Jarik, Yalda, and some candidates of Turkish origins, and an 
autochthone member with expertise in integration policies. In coordination with Meinte and the 
party frontrunner Job they developed flyers based on the party program.386  
During the process of developing the flyers, once more, a universalist focus on individual liberty 
and equality was at least implicitly placed against the pluralist frame. According to Jarik, a first 
version of the flyer reads, “every religion is equal,” a phrase which centrally places religion as 
a symbolic system without determining or confining its public scope or relativizing it in relation 
to nonreligious convictions. Internally and in exchange with Job the flyer was revised to read 
“free to believe,” a frame which locates the respective freedom at the level of the individual 
believer rather than the level of symbolic universes and further suggests a more private or 
personal role of religion in the sense of a freedom of conscious rather than a base for social 
institutions. As such, the wording suggests a liberal approach to fundamental rights more clearly 
than the former which might also fit a frame of worldview pluralism. The backside adds: 
Everybody is equal and free before the law to practice his/ her beliefs; We treat all worldviews 
equal; We adopt the freedom of education equally to all beliefs. The last point hereby gives 
 
385  The word “but” indicates to somewhat compensate the negated content of the first sentence. We won’t 
do that but we will do that. If it was meant to imply a total negation, it would have to say “We won’t do that. On 
the contrary, we will even do that.” 
386  According to Jarik, the themes were at least in parts developed in comparison with the party programs 
of the newly emerging Islamic parties that, e.g., placed discrimination central—a point that is also integral to the 




expression to the apparent paradox outlined before: While the pluralizing consequences of the 
freedom of education is not supported by the party, the equal granting of existing rights is. Still, 
even in its final form, the flyer was met with reservations from the party members who felt that 
while the flyer listed party themes, these were not its core themes (Interview Yalda 2014, 453-
461). Yalda’s response to this critique points to another paradox with respect to the dichotomy 
of universalism and pluralism:  
yea yea, and actually when I had the flyer at the beginning people were like eh, is it good eh 
the, and I was like yea, these are points too people, D66 eh, because a lot of people was like, 
yes these are our themes but not our main themes, and I was like yes it is not your main theme 
because you are not feeling it but for m:e discrimination is like very important, the freedom of 
religion is very important, and D66 believes in that so why don't you put it on a flyer and I 
think that, because a lot of discussion was like, we need to have one flyer and it needs to work 
for whole [city name] (Interview Yalda 2014, 453-460). 
At stake in this exchange is the question whether a limited number of core points should be 
used for the whole city or whether certain electoral groups could also be addressed with points 
that did not express the main interests of the traditional voters although they were in line with 
the party’s profile. As such the exchange indicates that with respect to empirical cases, the 
divide between universalism and pluralism is hard to explicitly define. Aside from that, there 
might also be the factor that people identify to varying degrees with different groups and their 
equal status. Given that the acceptance of homosexuality has become central to culturalized 
notions of Dutchness (Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010), they are not as likely to be 
seen as cultural others by heterosexual autochthones as migrants are by autochthones in general. 
That is, pointing to their equal status might be perceived as less particularistic. This, however, 
given the data on which it is based, can only be hypothesized. It is possible, however, that it 
was not so much particularism as such that other party members were concerned about, but a 
more genuine pluralism or relativism of values. According to Jarik (Interview 2014, 206-209), 
some members apparently felt that the flyer should also mention that people should be gay-
friendly.387 Eventually, the inner-party debate about the campaign was only resolved through 
an executive decision by the party’s frontrunner Jan. The flyer was eventually printed and 
 
387  The suggestion was declined. Jarik stressed that the flyers were meant to stress those points that were in 
the interest of potential voters rather than telling “people who are not from Dutch origin how life should be 
lived.” At other occasions, as mentioned, he stated his agreement with obliging all schools to teach about sexual 
diversity. Possibly, he objected to putting this specifically on a flyer for migrants as this appeared to single out 
and stigmatize the group.  
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handed out together with flyers centered on, e.g., education, or particularly addressing local 
entrepreneurs. As such the focus on equal liberty was linked to functional domains of society. 
According to my interview partners, the flyer proved more successful than expected and a 
second batch had to be printed during the campaign.388  
A further aspect of the campaign in which an implicit tension between universalism and 
pluralism was expressed pertained to the role and position attributed to Turkish and Moroccan 
candidates. Previously, I have pointed to the contested tradition that candidates with migration 
backgrounds are recurrently framed as migrant-candidates responsible but also criticized for 
attracting their kind. My interview partners also acknowledged the relevance of candidate’s 
ethnic background in reaching different people. When Meinte explained the decision to develop 
a particular campaign, he referred to an episode from the previous elections when a D66 
member with Moroccan origins joined them in the campaign in a neighborhood with many 
people of Moroccan heritage. According to him, their campaign in the area was not going overly 
well until she arrived “with her face and her name” and immediately began to connect with a 
lot of people living there. He concluded:  
So, it does matter, who you are and what you () ehm () who brings the message, that that 
influences if people hear the message or not (Interview Meinte 2014, 118f.).389 
Here, thus, it is the messenger and not the message that is diversified. Similarly, Peer also 
stressed the need to counter a certain pluralist pull with respect to the integration and 
representation of citizens with migration backgrounds. He told me that many election events 
had been organized by Turkish or Moroccan groups and that these groups specifically asked for 
candidates that shared their ethnic-cultural background in order to hear their motives for joining 
the party and the respective implications for people from that cultural background (Interview 
 
388  At the beginning of my research, I had as mentioned that I planned to compare the election campaign in 
the secular city with that in another secular city, especially with a focus on the political integration of migrant 
voters and candidates. In the second city, different from the first one, the PVV was expected to become the 
biggest party prior to the elections and D66 self-presented as the counter pole to the PVV and warned against a 
rise in hatred of (Muslim) migrants and their descendants was central to the election campaign. In the second city 
as well, the party clearly opposed the idea of basing a campaign on cultural groups. My attempt to interview 
candidates with—by name—migration backgrounds raised understandable concerns in the local party board. One 
of my contact persons explained that my request framed these candidates as migrants meant to generate an ethnic 
vote and ignored their actual motives and qualifications for their political activism. One of the candidates, she 
stressed, had a high position with Amnesty International, another had been the young civil servant of the year. 
She also stressed that the party did not specifically target migrant voters, and that only one individual member, 
out of a personal motivation, campaigned in a neighborhood with many migrants. Ultimately, D66 became the 
first party with 15.5%, the PVV second (14%), followed by the labor party (12.4%) (Kiesraad n.d.).  
389  With respect to what about her made the difference, he points out that “with her face and her name and 
() she immediately connected to most the people living there, to a lot of people living there” (Interview Meinte 
2014, 116f.).  
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Peer 2014, 384-394). From the interview with Meinte it seems that Yalda would go to events 
organized by Moroccan organizations while another candidate of Turkish origin covered those 
organized by Turkish organizations (ll. 605f.).390 Commenting on this, Peer emphasized that it 
was unproblematic to diversify the messenger as long as no inner-party pluralism (or 
corporatism) emerged that challenged the party’s course:  
it is a good way to communicate your program, your ideas as a party, to those groups, as 
long as they [migrant candidates] don't become a representative of the group as a lobby 
group in your party, it should still be an individual exchange of ideas (Interview Peer 2014, 
389-391).  
In Yalda’s case, the negotiations over her role once more evolved in relation to the design of 
her own campaign. In the context of talking about making the flyer, Yalda also told me that the 
party had discouraged her from developing a personal flyer with her picture on it, as she 
explained: “We didn't want to have like a flyer with like my face on it […], to say like here is 
your type@” (Interview Yalda 2014, 460f.).391 In Yalda’s view however, the picture would 
have personalized rather than ethnicized her campaign. She had expected that people would 
vote for her because they know her. For her, therefore, it seems to be about her person and not 
her ethnic background. Although the interview does not explicate this, it does seem that the 
matter at stake is the concern that an individualized campaign would have increased her chances 
of being directly elected rather than via the party list, a matter which, as mentioned, is sensitive 
and could lead to inner-party competition.392 When we spoke, she looked back at the decision 
with some regret because she assumed that it would have guaranteed her a place on the council. 
After the tension between pluralism and universalism were recurrently discussed in preparing 
the campaign among migrant voters, for some party members at least, it almost surprisingly 
confirmed the party’s individualist and functional universalism. Petrie, e.g., told me about one 
day during the campaign when the party had visited a neighborhood in which many migrants 
live. He felt that suddenly they could reach people who they generally felt were unreachable, 
and that on this day a lot of Turkish entrepreneurs had made the decision to become party 
 
390  From my own experience, however, this seems to have at least not been the only criteria because I 
attended a debate organized by Milli Görüs at which Petrie represented D66.  
391  Conversely, she also questioned whether she’d been seen as a genuine representative of D66 by 
potential voters (ll. 389f.). 
392  In the interview, she only elaborates the competing views concerning the flyer design. She wanted to 
diversify the design (Interview Yalda 2014, 464-479). The interview and my data in general does not allow for a 
reconstruction of the debate in more detail but what matters here is that from Yalda’s perspective, the suggested 
diversification of communicative styles and foci did not compromise the party’s general profile. This, however, 
seems to have been perceived differently by some other members. 
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members (Interview Petrie 2014,. 437-443). Furthermore, the potential voters seemed less 
interested in religious self-organization in the educational field than about educational and 
social opportunities for their children. During the campaign event, the Moroccan parents who 
approached them wanted their children to go to schools in other “white” neighborhoods in the 
city.393  
that is right, I thought that they want to send their children to religious schools but it was the 
other way around, people […] said well, […] we want to send our children to Oud West or 
Zuid and some of them even want to send their kids to schools with a special educational 
system like Montessori. And I didn't even know that existed, Moroccan people who want to 
send their kids to a Montessori school, but they exist and [it] will be possible in a couple of 
months ago when the coalition in the city is done (Interview Petrie 2014, 466-472). 
Eventually, the election was rather successful for D66. The party gained 14 seats, compared to 
ten for the labor party and six for the right liberals, the Green party, and the Socialists. While 
the PvdA remained the strongest party among allochthone voters, D66 won 11% of the Turkish 
vote and 21% of the Moroccan vote (Kranendonk et al. 2014,12). Similar to 2010, however, 
support among those with migration backgrounds remained below that of Western migrants 
(20%) and non-migrants (30%) (Kranendonk et al. 2014, 12f.).394 Moreover, D66’s share of 
migrant voters who had also opted for a candidate with the same ethnic-national background 
was below average—in terms of voting for candidates that shared their ethnic background, 50% 
of Turkish voters compared to the 63% average and 23% of Moroccan voters compared to 28% 
average indicated they had done so (Kranendonk 2014, 32-44).395 One possible explanation for 
this is that the party’s and party leader Pechtold’s opposition to Wilders were greater pull factors 
than an ethnically diversified candidate list.  
In the introduction to this section, I stated that a campaign focus on migrant voters could be 
motivated by a pluralist or universalist logic and how a particularistic and pluralist logic has 
 
393  There is a recurrent debate on school segregation in the Netherlands and while the labor party 
introduced a system where students are allocated to schools according to postal codes, D66 wanted to provide 
parents the choice of where to send their children. Apparently, the party’s focus on school choice found support 
among these parents. 
394  The support among Moroccans doubled when compared to the previous elections (Ibid. 22). The trend 
towards mobilizing and integrating ethnic-religious minorities continued in the subsequent elections. In 2018, 
according to the newspaper, Trouw, the party had seven candidates on electable list positions in all four big cities 
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht) – (the PvdA had six respectively) (Trouw 2018c). 
395  The Islamic and the New Multiculturalist parties received 1.3 and 1.4% of the vote, respectively – 
insufficient for a seat on the city council, but especially Multicultureel Plus was very popular among voters of 
Turkish origin, receiving around a third of the Turkish vote (Kranendonk et al. 2014, 20f., 31). Kranendonk et al. 
speak of 19% (p.20) and of 22% (p.31), respectively. 
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been criticized in recent years. I then showed how in the party’s debate about whether or not to 
develop a special campaign strategy for migrant voters these competing motives were placed 
against each other. The tensions between universalism and particularism manifested with 
respect to the campaign as such as well as Yalda’s campaign strategy. Beyond that, this section 
has illustrated a shift of focus from Islam and Muslims as a topic in a debate on integration to 
a focus on communicatively offering a secular-liberal position towards both Muslim and 
migrant voters. This turn towards the political integration of Muslims within a social-liberal 
frame follows a universalist logic and implies that the new voters are framed and understood as 
genuine or at least potential liberals. In what follows, this theme is elaborated in more detail 
with respect to Yalda’s campaign.  
 
Figure 1: Campaign Poster "Modern Family." 
 
Figure 2: "Really does something for emancipation." D66 flyer.396 
 
396  The bullet points state: education about sexual diversity at schools, lesbian parenthood, recognition of 





Figure 3: “Multicultural Flyer” D66397 
 
7.3.2 A Muslim-Moroccan and Liberal Candidate 
Yalda is a young D66 party member, a Muslim woman, born in in the city as the child of 
Moroccan immigrants. From 2008-2010 she had chaired the board of the mentioned local 
“poldermoskee.” After studying economics, she worked as a social worker, which had provided 
her with a broad left-leaning network. Still, she “never felt home” in the left parties and she 
ultimately opted for the individualism of D66 rather than the collective focus of the left parties 
(Interview Yalda 2014, 10-22). Within D66, though, it also took her a while to feel at home in 
D66, not because of the party’s ideas but because she at least felt like being one a few 
allochthones and probably the first member who wore a headscarf in the local party chapter (ll. 
82-84). She also relates that some party members apparently had uneasy feelings with respect 
to her knowledge and use of the Arabic language and her Arabic-speaking networks—an 
uneasiness, which in her view, stood in contrast to the party’s general international attitudes (ll. 
329-382). While D66 people were positive about Islam, they simply did not know too many 
Muslims. Similarly, her headscarf seems to have attracted attention, for different reasons. 
Episodically and at the margins of the party, people felt that a headscarf as well—more 
 
397  Translation frontside: “Good education in every neighborhood, free to believe, security without 
discrimination, less rules for entrepreneurs.” The backside lists four main bullet points, each with different 
subpoints (placed in brackets in the following): Good education in every neighborhood (We invest in the quality 
of teachers and buildings, We judge students based on talent not only their CITO-score, We care for more 
internship positions for MBO and HBO students, We make room for multi-lingual teachings); Free to believe 
(Everybody is equal and free before the law to practice his/ her belief, We treat all worldviews equal, We adapt 
the freedom of education equally to all beliefs); Security without discrimination (Only preventive checks in strictly 
limited cases, the police acts against criminal facts, We care for a better relation between inhabitants and the 
police); Less rules for entrepreneurs (We work for less rules for entrepreneurs, We care about faster bureaucratic 
procedures for permits, We want more chances for small businesses in, e.g., hiring care). 
255 
 
generally—her being a Muslim was incompatibility with the party’s profile.398 Those in key 
positions, however, seem to have considered the headscarf an expression of personal religiosity 
and an individual right. Still, at least some noted its exceptionality. According to Yalda, one 
person had rephrased a prominent expression attributed to Voltaire to emphasize her right to 
wear the headscarf during one of their early accouters (Interview Yalda 2014, 721-726). For 
some, the headscarf also seemed to function like a token to prove the adequacy of liberal notions 
of integration. Gerjan (Interview 2014, 447), e.g., felt that the fact that a woman “can be a 
liberal with a headscarf” demonstrated that integration was mainly about education rather than 
background.  
Beyond that, her candidacy was initially contested because in the context of her function in the 
Polder Mosque, she had made an apparently critical statement about homosexuality during a 
press interview. The Polder Mosque project, as mentioned, had aimed to function as a bridge-
builder, and this aim also made them vulnerable to critique from orthodox and secular-liberal 
perspectives alike (DG 2010). In the respective press interview, according to the weekly paper 
Elsevier, she had called homosexuality a sin, but emphasized that it was a personal choice how 
people dealt with this sin, and that she would not object to their choices (Elsevier 2018). In her 
function as a chair of a mosque, however, she could not invite someone to express their sin 
within the mosque (Ibid.). 
In the light of her latter statement, this could be perceived as one might see this as a rudimental 
elaboration on the differentiation between a religious and a secular-civil or human rights 
discourse on the matter, but the sources are too scarce for a more definite interpretation. In a 
current statement, she explained that back then her aim was to build an integrative mosque in 
which sexual orientation was irrelevant and that she also wanted to convince the conservative 
constituencies of such a position. Now, however, she said, she would have formulated it 
differently (El Ks. 2018). When promoting her candidacy in front of the party members in any 
case, she was confronted with these statements. According to Jarik, he spoke in her defense, 
arguing that her views in the past were less important than her current and future positions 
(Interview Jarik 2014, 161-165).  
 
398  I hereby refer to comments I overheard during non-official party meetups as well as to an internal 
internet-forum of the party (plein66), which for a while had been accessible to non-members as well. 
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Ultimately, as Jarik recalls, the party members believed that she had changed her views and 
accepted her candidacy.399 Petrie hereby distinguished between three kinds of responses to her 
former statements: “there were people who believed her, people who didn't believe her, and 
there were people who said well you said that then, and you are a person and a human and you 
are developing, well join our party and go ahead with your development, and see where it ends.” 
With respect to the third response type, he added that if the party really wanted Muslims and 
religious people to join, it would also have to accept that these might only gradually become 
accustomed to the party’s secular and progressive views. He recalls that at a younger age, 
growing up in a rural area, he would have also not known how to respond to questions about 
LGBT issues. It was only after moving to the city and making gay friends that he developed a 
position on these matters.400 The fact that party members found it plausible that she had and 
possibly would change her views exhibits a notion of individual development, which—as banal 
as this sounds—opposes the notion of Islam as an unchangeable ideology and a singular cause 
for the ideas and behaviors of Muslims (section 5.1). Furthermore, it echoes the notion of 
transitive assimilation that, according to Entzinger (2006, 17f.), had also guided the purple 
integration policies (section 5.1.1). According to Meinte (Interview 2014, 583-605), the initial 
doubt as to whether “she would actually say things that the rest of the party would stand 
behind,” she proved that she would and gained the trust of a lot of people in the party. In what 
follows, I engage with Yalda’s own account of deciding to run for D66 and her interrelated 
adaption of an individual liberty and equality frame.  
7.3.3 Individual Liberty and Equality as a Common Ground 
In the context of another question about local debates on religion, Yalda mentioned the national 
debate on Islam and Wilders and how positively she had experienced Pechtold as someone who 
cared for all citizens and had an international outlook on the Netherlands (ll. 167-176). She 
especially stated that she appreciated the fact that he was not just defending one group or one 
religion. This emphasis on the value of equality, then led her to speak about her earlier 
membership in the Christian Democratic Party and the reasons why she eventually decided to 
join D66 instead. Her account entails a frameshift from an ideal of inter-religious solidarity to 
 
399  Within D66, a committee prepares a hierarchical list of candidates which is then voted on in a general 
member meeting which gives members the chance to change the list order. In Yalda’s case, she was voted down 
one seat in comparison to what the committee had suggested. Different from conspiracists like Wilders or 
Bosma, thus, they did not assume that she simply disguise her actual views in an application of taqiya.  
400  The interview does not make clear as to whether one should accept such a gradual development as part 
of members’ past, or whether it also entails an acceptance for a certain temporary party-internal pluralism on 
these matters. In the light of the interview as a whole, though, the latter interpretation seems rather unlikely.  
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one based on (individual and secular) human rights which is mediated via the decline of 
religiously based politics. A longer (though shortened) section from her interview demonstrates 
this frameshift and presents it as a gradual self-realization of her own liberalism.  
Cause I was actually a member of the CDA, and () I was never active there, but I had the 
idea, that if you like have a religious political party, even if it was like Christian, it would like 
defend on all religious people; […] but when I was a member, I was like, do I really believe 
that, do I really want like to have a balance, and to politics to give an opinion on some faiths, 
and I think one of the things that I had is, that I went on a meeting and it was about abortion 
and they were like, eh they were like eh I know God says abortion is not allowed […] and they 
wanted to be like the opinion of the party to be like against abortion and I was like are we 
going 50 years back in time, […] and for me it was like, what is the opinion of God and what 
is the opinion of other people, I don't care, I want to give, the person needs to give to make 
the solution to make the decision for themselves, (Interview Yalda 2014, 176-185) 
The quote as mentioned, immediately follows upon her emphasis that she liked Pechtold for 
defending not only one group or one religion, and the elaboration thus functions to explain how 
she arrived at this stance—something she does by introducing a competing frame of inter-
religious solidarity. Her membership in the CDA was apparently motivated by her expectation 
that a religious party, even if it was Christian, would defend all religious people (ll. 176-178). 
At first instance, she does not state whether this expectation has been fulfilled but shifts to 
discuss another aspect this inter-religious model: a possible value-conservative cooperation 
between Muslims and Christians. She discards this option, which she rhetorically presents as 
an internal dialogue in which she self-identifies as a religious person but still subordinates the 
will of God, like that of other people, to the choice of the individual (this subordination is also 
rhetorically done by merely ascribing an opinion to God rather than an absolute command or 
authority).401 The religious perspective is thus privatized in the sense that its validity is confined 
to the individual. It is further remarkable that she relates to the history of liberalizations in the 
second half of 20th century, a tradition that is frequently held against Muslims in the national 
debate on integration.  
While this section discards the possibility of religious-value conservative political course in the 
name of individual liberty, it is followed by a sequence that links this stance to her experiences 
 
401  The quote thereby leaves it open for cases where the relation to God might be seen differently than that 
with other people. His authority in any case is confined in the sense that she derives at her normative (political) 
position independently from him.  
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of inter-Islamic diversity and positioning vis-à-vis Islamic orthodoxy, and further concludes the 
theme of inter-religious solidarity, which opened the beginning of her longer elaboration. 
and I am a Muslima, but even in my religion we have a lot of discussions and I don't want that 
my brother or sister in the Islam is going to tell me what to do or not to do, even if it is clear 
what God is saying about it, because I want to have to choose for myself. And that was the 
first time that I was really like, ok I am more liberal than I thought, and […] I think that 
especially, especially from the political side you need to defend all your citizens, and I had 
problems because, after that they went and worked together with the PVV in gedoogbeleid,402 
and that was for me like now I know for sure that you are not defending @ all of us, 
(Interview Yalda 2014, 188-195) 
A first point to note here is that once more, the will of God is not theologically discussed or less 
conservatively re-interpreted, but simply rendered indifferent for an immanent realm of human 
and individual autonomy. One possible explanation for this genuine secular framing would be 
that she has no theological or other frame available with which to challenge Christian and 
Islamic orthodoxy. At later stages of the interview and with respect to the issue of 
homosexuality, however, she explicates a theological frame, centered on the love of God as the 
basis of human equality (Interview Yalda 2014, 697-702). Having said this, in her past inner 
dialogue, she does nonetheless recall a moment of self-realization, of discovering her own 
liberalism, and she concludes this by elaborating a more universal and individualist idea of 
equality based on the relation of state and citizens. After describing her discovered liberalism 
she also tells how the expectation that Muslims could be protected by a Christian party was 
undermined when the CDA collaborated with Wilders’ PVV.  
This section thus compared the frame of individual equality with that of inter-religious 
solidarity and discards the latter on two grounds: A first motive for changing party preferences 
from the CDA to D66 is the discovered importance of liberty; a second motive is the apparently 
necessary generalization and extension of the equality given the failure of religion to offer some 
form of protection. The elaboration of her own commitment to liberalism closes with a 
summary of the lesson learned from this “aha moment”:  
and I think that was the most for me, one of the most important things, that like, if you want 
the people to defending you and your issues, then you need to defend other human rights too, 
 
402  This refers to the fact that Rutte’s first cabinet (VVD, CDA) was a minority cabinet that depended on the 
support of the PVV in the Second Chamber. 
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so if there is a demonstration of homosexuality or something, I will stand there too. And I 
found that in D66. (Interview Yalda 2014, 198-200) 
It is noteworthy that the generalized frame of individual equality is then exemplified by a more 
concrete frame of a mutual solidarity with Muslims on the one hand, and homosexuals on the 
other hand. According to Meinte (Interview 2014, 582-604), she made use of the equal rights 
discourse when being confronted with questions about homosexuality during debates in 
dominantly Moroccan neighborhoods.  
the subject came up ones, but she just held her ground, she just said, yea well, that's what I 
think, I think people should be free and if you want to be free as as Muslim in this country, or 
as a Moroccan in this country, then you should also award the same kind of freedom to 
people who are gay and who live in this country, or who are transgender or whatever. 
(Interview Meinte 2014, 612-617)403 
This new form of inter-group solidarity was further part of her gradual acceptance within D66 
given that the homosexual members of the local party chapter were the first to back her, helping 
her find her ground within the party (Interview Yalda 2014, 273-291). The parity logic with 
LGBT rights further allowed her to anchor liberty and equality claims for religious people in 
the party program. During the writing process, she would make use of the frequent references 
to LGBT rights and interests by adding the rights and interests of religious people in a logic of 
parity (Interview Yalda 2014, 620-625). Thus, here as well, the individual liberty and equality 
frame and its concrete form of solidarity between Muslims and LGBTs seemed to work. 
As mentioned before, she had already apparently aimed at differentiating religious and civil 
discourses on homosexuality and the human rights frame in her past role on the board of the 
Polder Mosque, and this clearly correlates with the civil discourse. Importantly and different 
from what the earlier quotes suggest, the two discourses seem to be of importance for her. She 
found it important that religious voices were not merely silenced or put off as homophobic but 
rather that they were given the chance to contribute by stressing the universal love of God for 
all people that was essential to all religions (Interview Yalda 2014, 672-702). Similar arguments 
had been made by Peer, who had already during his activism within the CDA also worked for 
 
403  It is noteworthy that with respect to this positioning she has had prominent predecessors. Haci Kracaer, 
labor member, former director of the Dutch branch of Milli Görüs, and in that function prominently involved 
with the mentioned Westermoskee, e.g., participated in a public demonstration at a local monument dedicated to 
commemorate the persecution and emancipation struggle of homosexuals. According to Ham and Uitermark 
(2006), he declared that one could not expect him to promote homosexuality, but that he would promote the 
acceptance of other people’s choices.  
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the rights of homosexuals, and who felt that “true compassionate religious people should fight 
shoulder to shoulder with for LGBT rights” (Interview Peer 2014, 79f.). He found his position 
confirmed by the observation that now also in his city the “true Islamic people” were those 
“open and tolerant towards other people” (ll. 91-94). 
In previous sections, I have shown how liberalizations were asserted through the simultaneous 
emphasis on state-church separation and individual equality and the demarcation of a religious-
theological position, which supported the values of individual equality (sections 4.2 and 4.3). I 
have also elaborated how secular politicians valued respective positions but expect the state to 
refrain from intervening in the religious field for their benefit. In this case, such a religious 
liberal discourse is spelled out from the “inner” engaged position of someone rooted in the 
religious field. It backs the differentiation of religious and civil evaluations of homosexuality, 
made in other situations (as sin or right), through the somewhat parallel distinction between 
human/ sinner and love/ rules, and it thus also backs the solidarity-pact between Muslims and 
LGBTs as one compatible with religiosity.  
For Yalda in any case, her entry into the party seems to have worked out well and also as a 
candidate she has received remarkable electoral support. In the 2014 elections, she had received 
a great number of direct votes and only closely missed being voted into the council, still joining 
the faction as a duo-raadslid404 in the city’s Northern district aside from also being on the board 
there. Since 2017, she is one of D66’s eight council members. The party as a whole lost six of 
its 14 seats (it had seven in 2010).  
While Yalda’s case is certainly specific given her pre-political activism in the Polder Mosque 
and her prominent focus on the compatibility of Islam and homosexuality, it would be 
interesting to compare her case with that of other allochthone and Muslim candidates in the 
party. For want of respective interview material, to situate her experience alongside other 
similar experiences, I briefly refer to a press article which was published in the context of the 
most recent local elections and introduced some of the Muslims that “felt great and at home in 
the progressive D66” (Trouw 2018c). Yalda’s story is also mentioned in the article alongside 
that of other party members. The article thereby tells how for some the overt (and symbolically 
expressed) support for gay and LGBT matters (such as a rainbow flag present at unofficial party 
meetups) as well as the common consumption of alcohol during such meetups constituted a 
 
404  This is a political position for representatives who were not voted into the council but still have the right 
to speak and can take over tasks for their respective faction.  
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sense of alienation at first, before they found their place within the party. Similar to Yalda’s 
initial statement, other Muslim party members expressed that the distinction between accepting 
homosexuality and endorsing it religiously was important for them in finding their place within 
the party.  
These stories contrast that of others, for whom such cultural alienation and gradual 
approximation had never been an issue in the first place, including those for whom an Islamic 
identity is far less central than it is for Yalda. Some of those interviewed for the article, refer to 
ethnic and cultural diversity in countries like Turkey as a motive for supporting the separation 
of church and state as well as individual liberty. For a third candidate type, the affiliation with 
D66 was not at all linked with matters of diversity and liberty, but with narratives of a trans-
generational social upward mobility—this obviously resonates with a functional idea of 
integration. On a different level, all three member types can be contrasted with yet another type, 
that of the avowedly secular Muslim or ex-Muslim. Jarik (2014, 89-95) had told me that his 
interest in religion initially did not find much resonance because most allochthone members in 
the party were “very convinced secular, because they made this move from a religious 
environment, very eh let's say knowingly, to a secular environment.”  
 




Table 13:Elections City Council Secular City.405 
 
7.4 Summary and Discussion  
This chapter entails the second, somewhat longer case study that centered on the political 
integration of Muslims during municipal elections in a secular city in the Netherlands. This case 
study complements the previous one (ch.6) in focusing on the party as an arena of secularity 
and more specifically on the place of religious people in a secular party. Beyond that it is the 
first of two case studies on local arenas of secularity. As mentioned, religious-nonreligious 
diversity has a strong geographical pattern in the Netherlands, and this offers the chance to 
explore arenas of secularity that are both distinct from as well as related to the national one. 
While this chapter inquires how secularity is negotiated in the context of D66’s local election 
campaign, the subsequent one centers on the elections in a small town in the Dutch Bible Belt.  
This first case study’s local focus can be seen as the city in which the secularization and 
liberalization of the past decades are manifested and lived. At the same time, it is—like other 
urban centers in the Netherlands—also strongly characterized by the post-war labor 
immigration and thus a place in which ethnic, religious, and cultural differences are an 
important aspect of social diversity. Politically, the city is a place in which a secular 
understanding of politics is somewhat taken for granted—religious parties are marginal and 
populist and anti-Islamic parties have so far remained marginal. The most important political 
conflicts in the 2014 elections were unrelated to religion and secularity and the somewhat 
shared perspective of my interview partners was that matters of religion and secularity would 
only emerge once in a while and often in respect to subsidies. This, however, does not imply 
that they would have considered religion as being unimportant within their city. Instead, the 
different interviews underscore a shared concern to not make religion an issue of politics. This 
notion of secular politics is placed against competing political positions, both nationally and 
 
405  All percentages rounded to the first digit; data from (Kiesraad n.d.). 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 
D66 % (seats) 7.2% 4.6% (2)  14.8% (7)  26.8% (14) 
CDA % (seats) 7.9% 4.2% (2) 3.3% (2) 2.8% (1) 
PvdA % (seats) 28.6% 39.4% (20) 29.3% (15) 18.4% (10) 
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locally, which allegedly violate the principle of equality as well as the autonomy of the religious 
field, by distinguishing between different religions or religious strands.  
The chapter complements the historic account of the party’s struggle for individual liberty and 
equality—a struggle that is locally presented as history and achievement---as well as of its 
functionalist-individualist positioning in the debate on Islam. This chapter further points to an 
aspect of the functionalist-liberalist model’s tensions with pluralism that has so far been 
neglected. This is the idea of the universality or singularity of its principles which is placed 
against the idea of a pluralism of religious, worldview, or cultural positions. As argued before, 
the tension between universalism and particularism has been central to the described tensions 
between an individualist and a pluralist model. A notion of universality also played into D66’s 
opposition to confessional politics as an apparent obstacle to political rationality. With respect 
to the integration of religious members the tension between universalism and pluralism is 
expressed in the idea that the motives for the party membership transcend individual religious 
and nonreligious affiliations, which might constitute individual sources of inspiration but are 
not an overt aspect of the party’s profile. As argued, the PvdA had historically opted for a 
different model and set up internal party working groups with confessional and humanist base. 
While the last chapter showed that such privatization of religious-nonreligious differences is 
fragile at best, and that people’s religious-nonreligious background might also determine their 
sense of secularity, this chapter engages with the party’s relatively new appeal to Muslim voters 
and members. With respect to the political integration of Muslims, this tension between 
particularism and universalism manifests in a pluralist pull, derived from the national debate on 
Islam and multiculturalism, and challenging D66’s universalist ideal (in terms of an individual 
rights and equality approach as well as a focus on functional integration).  
After sketching the general thrust of D66’s election campaign and their individualist and 
functional approach to matters of Islam and integration, the chapter showed how the local 
demographic conditions creates a strategic necessity to mobilize allochthone voters, including 
the Muslim minority of mainly Moroccan and Turkish origins. Here, the labor party is both the 
main competitor as well while also providing a negative example of the strategic risks involved 
in such project of political integration in times of cultural and political polarizations. Especially 
in the case of a social-liberal party like D66, the mobilization of allochthones can be seen to 
compromise its claim for universality as well as its principled defense of individual liberty and 
equality, LGBT rights in particular. I subsequently sketched the contested decision within the 
local party chapter to design a special campaign for Moroccan and Turkish voters, as well as 
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the related candidacy of a young Muslim candidate of Moroccan origin. I show how in both 
cases the tension between a universalist and a pluralist frame is constantly at stake while the 
party discovers its secularity and individualism as a selling point to Muslim voters. I illustrate 
how the party discovers its focus on functional integration and individual liberty and equality 
as something that could be beneficial to Muslim and migrant voters and thus as something that 
could be used as an electoral message to win over a new electorate. This strategy had to be 
implicitly guarded against a pluralist frame from which the attraction of new voters would be 
seen to compromise the party’s course. Moreover, as the case study showed, the party tried use 
different methods to assert a universal focus in the sense of discovering Muslim voters as 
genuine carriers of its message. The tensions between universalism and pluralism also 
manifested in the candidacy of a young Muslim party member, Yalda. The case study presented 
her gradual integration within the party as well as her own development and more specifically 
her shift from a frame of inter-religious solidarity to a frame of individual liberty and equality. 
This not only made D66 “her party” but could further be exemplified by mutual solidarity 
between Muslim and LGBTs. The case of Yalda, as an exemplary case of one Muslim 
candidate, thus underscores how the notion of individual liberty and equality rights can become 
the base of a solidarity pact between Moroccan Muslims and LGBTs both personally as well as 
in the sense of a claimed civil ethic which transcends possible religious reservations against 
homosexuality by focusing on the demands of living together under conditions of diversity. 
Both ideologically and practically this case demonstrates a reversion of the culturalist contrast-
distinction of a liberal Dutch culture that is positive towards homosexuality and positions Islam 
as its intolerant other. 
So far, this thesis has centered on shifts in and contestations about the dominant notion of 
secularity. It has shown how collective autonomy rights of religious minorities are increasingly 
reorganized along and subordinated to a principle of individual liberty and equality. The focus 
has primarily been on parliamentary and party-related documents and thus on the motives used 
in the political field both in relation to other professional politicians as well as to members and 
voters. This part of the thesis does not allow to understand how such political motives resonate 
with people’s lifeworld related concerns; it does not answer why and how the value of 
individual liberty and equality matters to people. The two recent case studies have already 
somewhat complemented this perspective: The first did so by pointing out how perceptions of 
and positions on secularity might relate to people’s religious and nonreligious biographical 
backgrounds even if there is no singular causal link while the second further gave selective 
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insight into how the individual liberty and equality principle can become of personal importance 
and used with respect to inter-personal relations as well as relations in the religious field. The 
next (rather large) chapter further adds to this understanding by presenting the case of a local 
struggle for secularity in a small town in the Dutch Bible Belt – a setting with a strong presence 
of orthodox-reformed Christianity. The previous chapter showed how the secular liberal 
heritage of the 1960s and the “purple period” was renegotiated with respect to a new religious 
minority; the next chapter shows how secularity is negotiated in a context where secular 
progressives constitute only a minority group among others. As such, this chapter also serves 
as an example of the diversity of secular settings beyond the national level, nonetheless, with a 




8 Politics of Secularity in the Bible Belt 
“Of course, you can contact me for an interview. For your information and as an introduction 
I live in [town name], a place in a part of the Netherlands known as the Bible Belt. […] The 
conservative Protestants have an increasing influence on our local politics and society. One 
of the reasons I became politically active was that I found that there was a need for a counter-
balance in the local government…” (Marieke, Email 2013) 
As briefly elaborated in chapter 4, the general trends of religious decline and depillarization 
were contrasted with a renewed rise of orthodoxy as well as an orthodox pillarization. Orthodox 
reformed Christians in the Netherlands are commonly differentiated into two groups. The first 
group has a more rational relation to its faith and emphasizes subscribing to the tenets of the 
faith, they are referred to as orthodox reformed (orthodox gereformeerd) (Bernts, de Jong, and 
Yar 2006, 99) or as liberated Calvinist (vrijgemaakt-Gereformeerde) (Knippenberg 2018, 392). 
The second group places greater emphasis on the existential experience of God’s intervention 
in one’s personal life and are referred to as pietist reformed (bevindelijk Gereformeerde) 
(Bernts, de Jong, and Yar 2006, 99), or experiential Calvinist (Knippenberg 2018, 392), or 
“refos” in colloquial Dutch. The former group is culturally more modern and constitutes the 
ChristenUnie’s political constituency (Ibid.).406 The latter are culturally conservative and 
constitute SGP’s political constituency (Ibid.).407 Both groups constitute minorities at the 
national level but are sizeable parts of certain local populations (Snel 2007, 60). The two groups 
constitute the small pillars that were formed in the aftermath of the 1960s cultural revolution. 
Generally speaking, religious diversity, as mentioned, has quite a distinctive geographical 
pattern in the Netherlands. Knippenberg (1992) speaks of three basic zones: the Catholic south, 
an orthodox Protestant strip stretching from the South-West to the North, and a liberal-
Protestant and nonreligious rest.408 The orthodox reformed are located in the north of the 
Protestant strip and the pietist reformed in the south, with both overlapping in the middle 
(Knippenberg 2018, 403, Snel 2007).  
 
406  Bernts et al. (2006, 99) consider the following churches orthodox reformed: Christelijke Gereformeerde 
Kerken in Nederland, Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (vrijgemaakt), Nederlands Gereformeerde Kerken, 
De Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (hersteld), Voortgezette Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland.  
407  Bernts et al. (2006, 103) consider the following churches pietist reformed: Gereformeerde Gemeenten 
(in the Netherlands and in North America), Gereformeerde Gemeenten in Nederland, Gereformeerde Gemeenten 
(buiten verband), Oud Gereformeerde Gemeenten in Nederland, Vrije Oud Gereformeerde Gemeenten in 
Nederland, Hersteld Hervormde Kerk. 
408  According to Snel (2007, 62) the broader Protestant stripe already manifested itself in the early 19th 
century. Since 1920, Dutch Protestantism had diversified along liberal-orthodox as well as religious-nonreligious 
divides, and since then a distinct orthodox Protestant area became discernable (Ibid. 64).  
267 
 
In everyday Dutch society, the southern Protestant strip with its high share of pietist reformed 
Christians is frequently referred to as the “Bible Belt” and people often told me about the region 
when I introduced my research topic at member-meetings and party events. It was as if the Bible 
Belt was the “other” to secular cities in the Netherlands, a place of relevance for someone 
interested in religion. People spoke about having visited the region and their tone (and my 
response) marked it as a different world. At the beginning of my research, I concentrated on 
two towns in the Bible Belt, and it was in these places that my research topic was received with 
the greatest interest, a place where the people I approached for interviews did not have to think 
very long about whether they had something to tell me. The quote above is part of an email I 
received from the leader of a party merger in a small town in the Bible Belt, which I visited 
during the municipal election campaign in 2014, during which I interviewed some of the party 
members, as well as other actors in the political field. Furthermore, I also attended several 
election events. Secularity was a core issue in the political relations in town as well as the 
election campaign, but in many ways, the dynamic was reversed when compared to that at 
national level. Rather than asserting an individual liberty and equality frame against traditional 
autonomy rights of religious minorities, here the secular, progressively minded population 
found itself in a minority position and struggled for equal rights and a pluralist logic that 
resonates with type 2 of the multiple secularities’ typology. At the same time this pluralism is 
challenged in various ways, and a theocratic model is placed against one centered on individual 
liberty and equality as two competing alternatives.  
In what follows, I first briefly introduce the area and the role of religion there to provide local 
context. Second, I show how the communal self-organization of Christians dwarfs the public 
space with the consequence that Protestant organizations take the place of secular public ones. 
Complementing this, I thirdly point to a more direct way in which local Christianity influences 
the public order: I thereby focus in particular on the contestations of Sunday rest. I conclude 
the chapter with an analysis of the election campaign of the party opposing the political 
establishment in the region.  
8.1 A Small Town in the Bible Belt 
The municipality has about 57,000 citizens and consists of the town itself and eight surrounding 
villages. It is located in the center of the Netherlands, in an agrarian and relatively green region 
called the Veluwe. The town is big in transport and is also a center for the livestock industry. 
Generally speaking, pietist reformed Christians are concentrated in a relatively small number 
of municipalities; Knippenberg (2018, 404), states that almost 57 percent of the members of the 
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Gereformeerde Gemeenten live in 30 municipalities in which they make up more than five 
percent of the local population (see also Snel 2007, 59). According to an article published by 
the reformed newspaper, Reformatorisch Dagblad, in 2000 the Veluwe was responsible for 
60% of the growth in these congregations in that year, and it had in increasing ways become a 
center of pietist reformed Christianity (RD 2000b). While in the 1960s, 10.7% of Dutch pietist 
reformed lived in the Veluwe, in 2000 the number had risen to 17.3%. The number of churches 
and ministers also mirrors this trend. The town of this research is among those with the highest 
concentration of pietist reformed Christians in the province of Gelderland (Knippenberg 2018, 
404). This local concentration has been referred to as the “Refoisering” in the local context and 
beyond (RD 2009c).  
With respect to the local development, the growth of the reformed community, at least 
according to my interview partners, started with the success of the local Baan company in the 
1990s, a software company which was founded and owned by someone from the pietist church. 
While the company long ago outlived its success, my interview partners claim that the share of 
experiential Calvinists Christians in the town is still growing because of an ongoing influx of 
new inhabitants.409 Accordingly, the orthodox reformed Christians are numerous. Moreover, 
there is a growing evangelical congregation and other smaller Christian denominations as well 
as very small numbers of non-Christian religions that hardly play a role in the town’s discourse. 
The number of regular church goers is among the highest in the country, being one of 11 towns 
where more than half of the population goes to church on a regular basis (Schmeets 2012).  
The strength of Christianity can be seen in the institutional and political landscape of the town 
as well as in the organization of public space and time—both factors of political contestations 
and power struggles. A core example of the strong religious imprint on the town is its education 
sector. Of the 16 normal local elementary schools, three are public, one is Catholic and 16 are 
Protestant (among them four are strict). Of the three high schools (middelbare school), two are 
Protestant and one is orthodox reformed (SK n.d.);410 there is no public high school in town. 
With respect to politics, the power relations in the local political field are almost reversed of 
those at national level with Christian parties, especially both orthodox Protestant parties, being 
important players. Until 2002, the Christian Democrats (CDA) had been the largest party in 
 
409  The very notion of a growth in the number of experiential Calvinists is both sensitive and contested as it 
is frequently mentioned in interrelation with secular concerns about an orthodox Protestant dominance. My 
interview partners all stressed that they had no secure data that proved the apparent growth, and I did not pursue 
the exact data myself. For the case at hand, though, a verification of such a trend is not of central importance in 
understanding the contestations of secularity and local power relations. 
410  The presence of schools is a core factor for local concentration (Knippenberg 2018, 404). 
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town. At the time of my research, this place had been taken by the orthodox reformed SGP, 
having gained 23/ 24% and 7/ 8 seats in the previous two elections (Table 14).  
In the Bible Belt town, D66 is part of a party collaboration called Pro, which was founded in 
the late 1990s by members of the labor party, D66, and a local party. Prior to its foundation 
there were four secular parties, a local party, the PvdA, the VVD, and D66, which had only 
been founded a few years earlier. The merger was meant to increase their total electoral share 
and political influence. The new party kept the abbreviation “pro” to indicate that it represented 
the “progressive people” in town (Interview Marieke 2013, 70f.).411 The foundation of a 
progressive union thereby echoes the ambitions for a progressive alliance between mainly the 
labor party and D66 in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see section 3.2.1)—an aspiration which 
never materialized at the national level. Thus, the party name bears witness to a once broadly 
shared cultural struggle for liberalization, which in the late 1990s had been won in most 
places.412 The merger was a success. In their first election, they were the second party in town 
and consequently part of a government coalition with the CDA and the SGP from 1998 to 2006. 
In the course of their political existence, the party struggled for a number of liberalizations. In 
2006, a coalition of SGP, CDA, CU, and VVD came into power and Pro has been in the 
opposition since then. At the time of my research, the strength of the SGP, and a perceived 
ongoing growth in their electorate, stirred concerns about an eventual loss of existing freedoms 
and political influence. Before I continue, I will briefly introduce the other members of Pro that 
I interviewed, referring both to their religious background as well as their political activism.  
My first contact was with Marieke, the faction leader at the time. She grew up413 in the town 
and became politically active in the context of the large peace demonstrations in the late 1970s 
and 80s. Since 1993, she had been a D66 member and became active in local politics a few 
years later. She had been leading the local faction since 2003, a position she conceded towards 
the end of my research period. Marieke referred to her childhood family experiences with 
religion in positive terms. Her father had distanced himself from the strict religiosity of his own 
 
411  The local party had already carried the label “progressive” in its name.  
412  At the same time, both Mack and Filip suggest that the party merger might have profited from the name 
change, as it softened the anti-religious image of both PvdA and D66 among orthodox Protestants and distanced 
the new party from the secular legislation at the national level. 
413  Even if not made central in the analysis presented here, the theme of “belonging” to the place, respectively 
the distinction between local insiders and newcomers was central to the positioning of most of my interview 
partners. While Marieke thus stresses her original belonging to the place, Filip and Alwie self-positioned as 
newcomers, given that their parents had come from outside the town. As will be briefly indicated, the theme of 
belonging clearly matters for the religious-nonreligious relations in the town, but realized this too late to 
systematically integrate it in the sampling and analysis.  
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parents, but her mother was Lutheran and liked going to church and Marieke accompanied her. 
She stopped being religious when she was confronted with the more sinister Protestantism of 
the local high school (Interview Marieke 2014, 8). At a later stage in her life she had resumed 
ties with local churches through her husband, and towards the end of my research period she 
was invited to be a lay preacher at one of the local Protestant churches. She further self-
positioned as a humanist (Interview Marieke 2014, 11-15, 47-55).  
Alwie was also born in the town, but his parents had moved there from elsewhere in the 
Netherlands and he thus felt that his family was not genuinely rooted in the town. He grew up 
in a Protestant Christian family, and his parents had been affiliated with the CDA. Unlike 
Marieke, despite the fact that he also attended a Christian primary school, he repeatedly stressed 
that the religious factor had not been important in his educational choices, presumably to 
emphasize that these choices had not followed a motive of pillarization. During the interview, 
he recalled having stopped going to church with his parents as a teenager and he did not consider 
himself Christian. Still, he referred to himself as having “kind of a Calvinistic or Protestant or 
way of living” in himself and as practically living up to Christian principles while not going to 
church (Interview Alwie 2013, 234-241). A defining moment for him seemed to be a 
disappointing experience with the Free University where he had studied, which had, in his 
perception, failed to live up to Christian principles when he needed its support (Interview Alwie 
2013, 384f). Prior to becoming politically active, he had co-hosted a website, publishing about 
local matters, and he was also involved with a local debate center. It was through this activism 
that he eventually joined Pro. He has been an elected member of the municipal council since 
2012, and at the time of my research he coordinated the election campaign.  
Marie had grown up as part of the local Catholic community, in fact she spoke positively about 
the religious activities of her childhood and she had been active in the Catholic community. At 
the time of my research she supported the faction and was on the party board. When we spoke, 
she still considered herself close to the local Catholic community but had more specifically 
increased her distance to the Catholic Church itself.  
Mack had previously been active for D66 in a different town as well as at the provincial level 
before becoming active in Pro. At the time of my research, he was supporting the faction in the 
municipal council and was on the party board. He was born and had lived in different places in 
the region before moving to the municipality. He also recalls going to church during his 
childhood, but states to have somewhat naturally lost the religiosity he grew up with, having 
gradually become more secular. He explained that he was not an atheist in the sense of not 
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liking religious people or taking an explicit position on metaphysical questions, but that he 
simply did not have anything to do with religion (Interview Mack 2013, 28-34, 640-650). He 
referred to himself as agnostic.  
Filip had moved to the town as a child from a close-by village and therefore also considered 
himself not originally from the town. He became active in Pro in 2004 or 5, and was the only 
interview partner who is a member of the labor party at the national level. Since 2010 he has 
been a member of the city council. Filip speaks of his parents as “not Christian,” despite the 
fact that he points to his mother’s Christianity, and later tells that he used to accompany her to 
church once a while. Still, he understands religion as something that has mainly entered his own 
life though the Christian character of the town. Both he and Mack seem in a somewhat 
sympathizing way indifferent to religion in the sense that in their personal lives there is not 
much need to either commit or distance themselves from it.  
Following this short introduction of my interview partners, I will briefly present how they 
described the town’s religious setup.  
8.1.1 Grades of Strictness 
In the Bible Belt town, religion and notions of secularity matter for how people position 
themselves in relation to other people in town, as well as for the positioning of the political 
parties. One of my interview partners, Marie, reflected that:  
I think all the people in [town name] I know, I know, what their religious background is, so, 
eh, if they are from, are they nonreligious, or what church do they go to, and if they go a lot. 
It is, it influences everything actually, yea, I can't really say, why and how, but I feel it does, 
because I know it about everybody, so why is it interesting? Apparently, it is, because 
otherwise I wouldn't know (Interview Marie 2013, 377-398) 
My interview partners commonly described the town’s religious setup in terms of different 
grades of strictness, that is, along the binary pair of strict (Dutch: zwaar, literally: heavy/ strong) 
and easy (Dutch: licht; literally: light).414 Interrelatedly, they perceived the local situation 
through the notion of pillarization (or confessionalization) and in terms of adjusting to a 
Protestant Christian public order. The pole position on the strictness scale is held by those pietist 
Christians who also constitute SGP’s electorate, and the label of strict religion is often even 
 
414  Only the interview with Filip was in Dutch and he used these terms similar to how my other interview 
partners spoke of strict and easy religion (Interview Filip 2014, 466). 
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used as a synonym for this population group.415 The concept of strictness is associated with 
religious orthodoxy and biblical literacy, a certain sinister or even dark awareness of sin and 
punishment, a particularly recognizable appearance (with, e.g., women not wearing pants), and, 
more importantly, with confessionalism and a segregated form of communalism as well as a 
somewhat politically theocratic notion of governance. The aspect of confessionalism and self-
segregation is, to a certain extent, illustrated by the existence of institutions with a (strict) 
religious profile—aside from schools there is the mentioned elderly home, and a reformed 
fitness center, which opened in 2016 and gained media attention for being associated with a 
lack of personal inter-relations with strict Christians. Several of my interview partners referred 
to the Dutch pillarized past in order to characterize the local situation, but different from the 
pluralism indicated by the concept of pillarization, the orthodox reformed are perceived as the 
only group that is respectively pillarized, entangling the rest of the local population in a dynamic 
of mutual segregation. Interview partners referred to this using terms such as “them and the 
rest” (Interviews Filip 2014, 184f., Interview Marieke 2013, 450f) and with the very strict, “it 
never mixes” (Interview Marie 2013, 384f).  
While this group of orthodox reformed constitutes a distinct part of the religious landscape, 
other positions are assessed via their grade of strictness. Here, the demarcations and labels are 
vaguer, relational, and seem to depend on the other positions they are compared with. With 
respect to the local Protestant high school she attended as a child, Marieke elaborates: “So this 
is () conservative protestant but not that conservative […] they are more like ChristenUnie, you 
can wear pants as a girl but they are still pretty conservative.”416 Additionally, the 
ChristenUnie’s faction leader, Henk, referred to those reformed Christians voting for the SGP 
as “strict,” but stated that his party has also attracted some of the strict as voters. With respect 
to the present relations in town, several of my interview partners stressed that there were no 
interrelations with the strict religious people, while the semi-strict would meet and share 
facilities with them. The previously mentioned local Protestant high school that most of my 
interview partners had attended, and which Marieke and Marie’s children also attended, is a 
case in point here. While Marieke and Marie both speak in positive terms about their children’s 
 
415  While in my understanding, my interview partners meant the pietist Christians and SGP voters when 
speaking about strict religion, I cannot be complete sure. I mainly use the notion of strict Christians to speak of 
orthodox reformed Christians more generally.  
416  It is not clear, if those religious people Marie speaks about belong to the voters of the ChristenUnie as 
well, or whether the field is factioned in a more complex way. 
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school experiences, they describe their own experiences in the school in slightly different terms, 
pointing to a lack of interrelations and tensions with children from the stricter Christian strands.  
Moreover, it generally seems that with the group of semi-strict religious people there were 
certain conflict issues, given that they are part of a collective and self-conscious “we” that 
demands public behavior to be in line with Protestant Christian norms of Sunday rest. Several 
of my interview partners explained they had grown up with these religious norms and 
expectations, and had thus gotten used to respecting them and adjusting to the local norms. 
They also make it clear that the expectation to conform with Sunday rest was not only expressed 
by the group of strict Protestants, but also a broader group of local people. For my interview 
partners, life in town was centrally understood through the notion of adjustment in the sense of 
conforming to a social norm that was not their own, and which remained somewhat 
incomprehensible for them. In sum, my interview partners thus positioned themselves in 
contradistinction from two religious others: a segregated group of strict religious people who 
are described as secluded and alien, and a broader group that includes also semi-strict religious 
people who make claims to defining the local ways of living, and which tends to be perceived 
as hegemonic.  
The counter-term to strict religion is “easy” religion, and my interview partners used this label 
in a positive way, referring to certain churches and religious people in town, and seldom with 
respect to their parents’ religiosity. For many, this easy religion had been part of growing up, 
and some of them still have (more or less loose) ties to it. Easy religion is associated with a 
more lighthearted and cheerful form of religiosity, it is practiced by maintaining a larger 
separation between their lives, the church, and its doctrines, with a non-pillarized way of living 
as well as with a positive notion of individual liberty and equality. Only for Marie, who had 
been active in maintaining the local Catholic primary school in the context of a stagnant 
Catholic population, easiness was more ambivalent; a label for the cheerfulness of local 
Catholicism, but in its reluctance to maintain a pillar, also putting the preservation of a distinct 
Catholic community at risk (Interview Marie 2013, 178-193). Accordingly, my interview 
partners differed with respect to their personal religious and nonreligious affiliations.  
To a certain extent, the positions in the party-political field are also understood in terms of 
strictness, and the term is used with respect to both religious and secular perspectives. With 
respect to the Christian parties, the SGP is the strictest party, followed by the CU and with some 
distance the CDA. The latter is not exclusively classified as a Christian party (Interview Henk 
2014, 51-58) and can go in an either Christian or secular direction (Interview Marieke 2013, 
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792-799). The three parties’ positions can be understood to range from an almost theocratic 
position to different forms of pluralism and accommodation. Similarly, the secular parties can 
be understood as being strict to differing degrees in the sense that Pro is seen as more principled 
on matters of secularity as well as individual liberty and equality when compared to the VVD. 
In addition to these mentioned parties, there is also a local party called Citizens’ Initiative 
(Burger Initiatief, BI).417  
Aside from different grades of strictness, as mentioned, two interrelated themes were central in 
how my interview partners described life in town: that of pillarization/ confessionalization and 
that of adjustment. The theme of pillarization/ confessionalization refers to the (at least 
perceived) self-seclusion of pietist Calvinists and the establishment of special organizations and 
institutions. Pillarization and the factual dominance of Christian institutions within a pluralist 
institutional setting renders secular minded people a minority and leads to a situation where 
they have to play along with orthodox Christian ideas. In that sense, the theme of pillarization 
links with that of adjustment, which more generally refers to the perceived Christian imprint on 
public life on the town. The theme of adjustment points to the influence of Christianity on local 
policies and the local administration.  
In the next section, I address the interrelation of confessionalization and dominance using the 
example of the educational field, and more precisely Pro’s struggle to establish a local public 
high school. This is compared with a brief description of the related dynamics in other social 
realms. The subsequent section then centers on contestations concerning Sunday rest, which I 
compare to similar struggles about the scope of Christian influence on the political culture. As 
both points make clear, the confessionalization of the public and the Protestant Christian imprint 
on the public order have been accelerated by a recently strengthened position of orthodox 
reformed Christians. Finally, these more detailed discussions reveal the core motives in the 
party’s struggle for secularity and also highlight the differences when compared with national 
dynamics of secularity. 
8.2 Confessionalizing the Public 
When I first visited the town, Marieke picked me up by car and we took an extensive ride 
through the town, during which she showed me the various manifestations of reformed life 
there: the two large new churches (giving room to 1400 to 2500 people at minimum), the 
 
417  Unfortunately, I never really focused on this party during my research although they were not irrelevant 
and constituted something like another secular rival of Pro. In the elections of 2010 and 2014, they received 
roughly half of the votes Pro mobilized (Kiesraad n.d.).  
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orthodox Protestant school her children could not attend because she wore jeans and had a 
television, the Christian home for the elderly where the residents could not even install 
televisions because the necessary cables were lacking, as well as the shops that sold festive and 
somewhat conservative clothes, catering to the reformed community (Van Beijnum n.d.). 
Marieke would go there as well whenever she needed something special. She told me about the 
one day, that she wanted to have her bike repaired, but the mechanic refused to serve her 
because she was wearing jeans. Her story expresses both a fascination for the cultural other, as 
well as a feeling of alienation and exclusion—a mix that I also sensed in the conversations with 
other local interview partners, and one that relates to the self-seclusion of pietist Calvinists.  
Given that constitutional and national law enables a plurality of institutions, foremost through 
the freedom of education, and given the strength of local Christianity, Christian organizations 
have a relevant role in different social spheres. This confessionalization of local institutions 
dwarfs the scope for public ones and renders “special” Protestant institutions in the position of 
public ones. Consequently, slightly or nonreligious people have to use Protestant institutions 
and to adjust to their rules. In that sense, pluralism adds to their minority position. In what 
follows, I first focus on the Pro party’s struggle for a local—secular—public high school, and, 
second, on a renegotiation of the social welfare services as two examples of this dynamic. 
8.2.1 A Local School Struggle and the Freedom to Choose 
As mentioned before, the pluralist school system in the Netherlands is probably the most 
prominent institutional heritage of the 19th-century confessional movements. Art. 23 of the 
Dutch constitution placed education as the state’s principle responsibility, but declares that the 
offering of education should be free within a certain state-defined framework (see also 
ch.3.1.5).418 Historically, the introduction of Art. 23 led to a growth of special schools while 
the number of students attending public schools stagnated. According to data from the central 
statistical office more than 70% of students currently attend “special” schools, which all differ 
in the extent and way in which a religious profile is expressed (CBS 2017).419  
 
418  It further states that public education ought to be offered with respect to everyone’s religion and 
worldview, and that the state offers public education in all municipalities. Non-state provided, so called “special” 
primary education is granted equal funding on par with public education. Special schools can be based on a 
certain religious or worldview profile as well as on a certain pedagogical profile, the latter being labeled “general 
special” as to indicate that they are not based on any specific religious or worldview position. While the 
constitution only addresses primary education, the principle of equal financial funding has also been applied to 
secondary and higher education through further legislation (NederlandRechtsstaat n.d., WVO n.d.). 
419  At the time of writing, the Dutch government planned to liberalize or, better, depillarize the conditions 
for establishing new schools (Rijksoverheid 2016). 
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In the Bible Belt town, most schools have a Christian (mainly Protestant, with one Catholic 
exception) profile, and there is no public high school. Given the national average, and the 
town’s religious setup, the share of Christian schools is not surprising. According to a press 
article, the town is one of the few blank spots on the Dutch landscape with respect to the 
accessibility of public education, with the next public high school being 15 km away 
(Gelderlander 2011). The already mentioned Protestant high school more or less serves as a 
public school, given that most students with a secular preference go there. At the same time, 
my interview partners perceived it to lack the qualities of a public school and Pro has engaged 
in a struggle to establish a public high school in town.420  
In what follows, I first outline the party’s struggle for a public high school. I present some 
interview material concerning the Protestant dominance in the educational field to explore the 
reference problems and motifs that orient the struggle for public education. The chapter seeks 
to show that the party’s aim is not to secularize education, but to further pluralize the existing 
educational field by integrating secular-public education as an additional choice. In that sense, 
the struggle for a local public school serves as a prime example of how the secular is integrated 
into a confessional logic rather than constituting a general public frame for religion.  
The large Protestant school in town functions as a public school in the sense that it is not only 
attended by students of selective Christian congregation, but also by all those students who 
would prefer to go to a public (nonreligious) high school but do not have that opportunity in the 
town itself. At the same time, this school is seen to harm the principles of equality and neutrality 
central to the idea of public institutions. In a local public debate, a former public education 
activist criticized the school for being ambivalent in its policy of accepting students. While it 
accepted many students without religious affiliations, their parents could not be part of the 
school board and accordingly had no say in the school. Thus, he suggested that they were treated 
as second-class parents (RD 2009b). The school is criticized for failing to treat its members 
equally, independent of their religious affiliation and by making parents (and thus students) 
adhere to rules they cannot themselves influence. Marieke had also raised a similar point, 
underscoring the ideal of the public school was that it was generally accessible and based on 
 
420  As far as I can tell, based on press articles, the struggle for public education precedes the foundation of 
Pro and dates back to the 1980s at the least. Furthermore, Pro is not the only party struggling for public education, 
both the VVD and the BI have made such claims; however, at the time of my research and since then though Pro 
has been the most vocal (RD 2009b). 
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the principle of individual equality. In the interviews with Marieke and Marie, this ideal of the 
public is further linked with that of a diverse society.  
In my first discussion with Marieke, she told me about her struggle to establish a public high 
school and her efforts in mobilizing parents to express their support for such a school. I asked 
her what she perceived to be problematic about the Christian schools and about respective issues 
of conflict. As such, I verbally invited her to criticize the schools and religious education in 
general. She first responds by elaborating a pluralist frame, a perspective from which the respect 
for religious education and a school’s autonomy is tied a to the freedom of choosing a school 
of one’s liking. Second, she expresses a personal critique of the school for failing to teach 
students about religious diversity from an individual equality viewpoint. The quote below is her 
immediate response and shows how she replaces the frame of critique which I had introduced 
with the pluralist frame.  
well they, well a big problem no I wouldn't call it a problem; the only thing is that they () of 
course, well I tell my children, () I told my children, I'd rather have you go to a public high 
school which is 15 kilometers from here, but the high school they go to, or they went to, is like 
a five minute walk from here, … (Interview Marieke 2013, 147-150) 
At first, she first seems to take over my framing but then declines it and interrupts her initial 
response to exemplify how she discussed school choice with her daughters.421 In a staged 
dialogue, she speaks of the public school as her actual preference. The quote is unclear as to 
whether she had really suggested this to her daughters or only stated it as a hypothetical 
preference; but the difference in proximity renders the choice hypothetical anyways, and also 
her children’s friends attend the Protestant high school. Still, the theme of free choice, however 
hypothetical it may be, is linked to a normative obligation to respect the school’s rules, which 
includes regular praying as well as partaking in “religion” as one of the required classes 
necessary for passing a class level (Interview Marieke 2013, 155-159). She then elaborates how 
this sometimes requires her children to study what she perceives to be “nonsense” because 
neither she nor her children believe in it (ll. 162-164). Yet, she also stresses that they liked being 
in the school (ll. 164f.). A little later the theme of religious education is taken up again and she 
stresses wanting her children to “see () what people believe and how they live, and learn about 
God” and she differentiates between her own notion of people’s belief and God as “something 
 
421  The opening obviously makes one assume that a critique would have also been plausible and might still 
come in the course of the interview.  
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cultural,” on the one hand, and the school’s teaching of this as “the only truth” (ll. 170-176), on 
the other hand. This, she concludes “is very difficult, if you don’t believe it,” and she elaborates 
further that this at least had been difficult for her when going to school (ll. 176-179). It is not 
entirely clear what this difficulty refers to—an intellectual alienation or a sense of not 
belonging—in any case, though, this demonstrates a certain discomfort with the school choice 
she had to make.  
On the one hand thus, the frame of critique is replaced by a frame of legitimate pluralism 
through which she not only distances herself from, e.g., rationalist or universalist critiques of 
religious education––her notion of “nonsense” also gives expression to a personal unbelief 
rather than criticizing religious truth claims from an absolute perspective––on the other hand, 
this pluralist frame allows her to point to the (not explicitly mentioned) lack of a viable choice 
for a public school. In the context of choice, adhering to the school rules would not constitute 
a breach of individual liberty because the choice was based on a free decision, but this freedom 
of choice as the core aspect of the pluralist model is seen to be unfulfilled, which renders 
accommodating the school’s rules as something inevitable rather than part of a conscious and 
free choice. 
Coming back to the interview, the theme of having to learn nonsense is interrupted by an 
account of how the school would refer negatively to Islam and Catholics, something which 
Marieke explains as being a consequence of them being “very, very Protestant.” She positions 
the ideal of respecting everyone and every religion against that and expresses her desire for a 
school in which children could learn about all religions, which would teach them to be a person 
that lives in the world and not in a church. This ideal of diversity draws on a secular position 
from which diversity in religious matters is not only legitimate (also a church can accept 
religious diversity), but from which but from which all religious perspectives are equal––
something which resonates with the mentioned idea of religion as something cultural. This 
claim for an openness towards the world stands in tension with the autonomy of religious 
schools to form secluded communities based on a specific religious perspective. Still, this 
critique is framed as a personal preference rather than an absolute critique (that would have 
been possible here as well, e.g. in the name of tolerance, for example).  
but the problem is that they learn some things that I think well, but they also say like Islam is 
is ehm well backward people, […] but they say that about the Catholics too, […]. And that is 
what I don't like, just I want respect for everyone, I want respect every religion, I want my 
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kids to go schools I want them to learn about all the religions in the world and to be eh a ci- a 
() person that lives in the world and not only on that Protestant church, right, …  
(Interview Marieke 2013, 166-172).  
Based on her account, the lack of alternatives factually renders the Protestant school a public 
school, while at the same time it is seen to fail in its public function in two ways: first, it does 
not provide equal chances to all as it makes subjective knowledge (something that depends on 
one’s belief) part of generally required exams, and, second, it does not transmit knowledge 
about, and acceptance for, the social diversity of the public world. For Marieke personally, the 
school has fulfilled parts of the function of a public in the sense that it offered an intellectual 
confrontation, albeit without the chance to influence one’s interlocutors:  
…; and I soon found out that I really liked that, because I had something to debate about, I 
loved debating and I never agreed because say eighty percent of the people didn't agree with 
me, so that was fun ^^  
(Interview Marieke 2014, 15-19) 
The notion that the intellectual confrontation was fun seems to contradict her later statement 
that the school’s truth claims were difficult to take. Possibly, though, fun and difficulty are two 
different aspects of dissent in the sense that it allows for individuation without being able to 
change the dominant rules. The quote indicates that aside from accommodation, also liberty (of 
conscious and speech) guides how Marieke positions herself with respect to the Protestant 
schools. Following the rules, then, does not imply an inner adaptation or refraining from 
expressing one’s views. This notion of the legitimacy of dissent, and the consequential and 
natural diversity of society, is also part of her message to her daughters:  
So that's what I tell my kids, that you can you can disagree, but just be tell it nicely that you 
don't believe that, or that you disagree, and tell them why you disagree, because you have 
another opinion (Interview Marieke 2013, 179-181)  
The legitimacy of dissent and the right to express a dissenting or provocative view in a civilized 
manner was a recurrent theme in my conversations with Marieke and continued throughout the 
election campaign (ch.8.4). Some might argue that her biographical self-presentation was 
already part of an election campaign in which the legitimacy of the decent expression of one’s 
principles and views became a core claim towards the dominant orthodox party leading the 
coalition formation. However, I tend towards a more dialectic interpretation in the sense that 
the tension between respect and dissent are biographically rooted, and while political strategies 
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might to a certain extent orient the way she tells her life, it is also possible to assume that her 
political positioning is oriented by her perceived marginal position in the town.  
In conclusion, the interview with Marieke shows that liberty and equality are core values and 
motives in the struggle for public education in a threefold sense: first, the struggle for public 
education is a struggle for liberty in that it creates a viable choice for parents; second, the 
struggle is embedded in principled recognition of the freedom of education and the 
consequential autonomy of schools; and, third, it is fundamentally rooted in a positive notion 
of the legitimacy and naturalness of dissent and individuals’ freedom to live a (religious) life 
as they see fit, something which implies a positive notion of diversity as a natural consequence 
of such liberty. This basic notion of individual liberty offers normative guidance for how to 
behave in the school as well as for the ideal of a public school––both in the sense that one 
should respect the religiosity of others and is free to express nonconformist views. In the sense 
that it concerns the freedom of a minority, and given that many of my interview partners 
described themselves as outsiders in the town, the struggle for a public school is also a struggle 
for recognition and belonging. Marieke, for instance, placed her desire to reform the town in 
the biographical context of settling down in the town and starting a family there (Interview 
Marieke 2013, 29-39).422 In its focus on liberty and equality in any case, the interview data 
coincides with the motifs used by a local citizens’ initiative for public education (Initiatifgroep 
OVO B.), which has urged local and national politicians to grant the freedom of education 
locally as it exists in other parts of the country (IGOVO 2010). 
The importance of liberty, equality, and diversity, when compared to alternative reference 
problems, is even more articulated in interview sections that address the relationship between 
religion and science in school education. When I started my research, I assumed that those 
issues that are problematized with respect to Christian education at the national level, like 
sexual and gender diversity (chs.4.2.1, 7.2.1), as well as the relationship between religion and 
science (ch.5.3.4), would resonate in a place with a relatively strong presence of orthodox 
Protestantism but this seemed not the case. In my understanding, this shows that the dominant 
dynamic in town is the pluralist integration of the secular into a dominant religious setting. 
While debates about science and religion, and more specifically about evolution theory and 
ideas of creation, are mainly associated with the United States, they are also recurrent issues in 
 
422  I don’t mean to indicate that this constitutes a motive in the sense of a causal biographical factor but it is 
used as a motive and claims a legitimate place in the town. 
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the Netherlands (chs.3.1.4, 5.3.4). Overall, I have little information on how evolution and 
creation are dealt with in the local schools.423 From my conversation with Marieke and her 
daughter, it seems that the local Protestant school makes no clear distinction between science 
and religion. After I had raised the issue with her, Marieke (Interview 2013, 292-298) asked her 
daughter what they learned about evolution and Darwin. She stated that their biology book had 
few pictures that suggested an evolutionary development of men from apes, but teachers would 
tell them that this was not what they believed in. For the students, this meant that the respective 
issues did not have to be studied because it was both false and wrong. This demonstrates that 
the scientific perspective is rendered a matter of belief and morality, and this suggests that a 
desire for the distinction between science and religion could possibly gain local traction. 
However, in the interview with Marieke this seemed not to be a major concern. Also a 
principled individualism with respect to sexual diversity was not her most utmost concern. 
When I asked about how homosexuality was dealt with in the Protestant school, she told me 
that her daughter’s class had discussed being respectful to other people including homosexuals. 
More detailed questions, such as the distinction between general respect and the 
acknowledgment of the principled equality of homosexuals through, is not made topical here, 
while these matters resonate at national level.424 This somewhat pragmatic dealing with 
conservative Christianity, that suffices with reaching a basic awareness for existing diversity 
thereby resonates with similar positionings of local D66-politicians in the secular city with 
respect to Muslim communities. In the election campaign, however, these issues were expressed 
in a much more principled way as will be shown in section 5.4.425  
The issue of creation was also briefly addressed during my interview with Marie when it was 
used as an example to demonstrate the school’s increasingly strict profile. She told me that the 
 
423  The online sources which were available to me after the field research do not give much information on 
this issue. There are hardly any press articles or political statements on the matter and I only found a short 
statement from a biology teacher at the local high school published in the local newspaper. The teacher claimed 
that evolution and creation could be combined without any issue and that faith and science were not in conflict 
with each other. This might refer to a notion of functional differentiation or to a frame that perceives secular 
science as being worldview based (BK 2016). 
424  A recent example is the case of an orthodox Christian organizations offering support for orthodox 
Christian homosexual youth. The organization thereby distinguishes between a homosexual identity and the 
practice of sexuality with a partner of the same sex and states to illustrate ways of living a fulfilled life as a 
homosexual without sexual relationships (HVH n.d.). The question whether this organization should receive 
government subsidies for its school program on sexual diversity was strongly contested among secular parties 
(Trouw 2016b). Also previously, Christian organizations had lost subsidies when their support aimed at helping 
clients with alleviating their homosexual feelings (deVolkskrant 2009). 
425  While there are both motivational and strategic explanations for this choice, I also wonder whether my 
somewhat probing questions also pushed the actors towards a more principled stance. 
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high school had become stricter since her time in school, providing different examples including 
the way children were taught about God’s creation of the world. 
and in their first year of school when they have their explanation of how the earth was 
created, well they learn that God created the world, they don't learn that there are more 
opinions, so I think that the school should tell the children there are a few opinions, this is an 
opinion and this is an opinion and this; no, they learn God created the world. (Interview 
Marie 2013, 91-107) 
In the quote above, Marie contrasts the Christian truth claim with the diversity of opinions. The 
notion of “opinion” thereby relativizes the Protestant truth claim (something which is also 
apparent in later sequences), but it does not counter it with a competing truth claim, be it 
religious or scientific. The interview does not tell whether she refers to religious or biology 
class, and thus the notion of “opinions” does not necessarily imply a relativization of science. 
Still, matters of diversity and equality seem more important to her than rationality, progress, or 
sphere autonomy.426 This fits their minority situation, as well as the principled commitment to 
legitimate pluralism which Marie also holds. In a later sequence, when I asked how being at the 
Protestant school was for her children, Marie talked about how the school’s truth claims are 
relativized within family conversations but are also met with a pragmatic attitude that places 
school success above questions of truth. This pragmatism is similar to Marieke’s description of 
what it means to adapt to the school’s rules.  
well they [her children] tell me these things and they are very ehm I think they are more 
surprised, like, they teach us this, but isn't this just an opinion mum? ^^yes it is. but when you 
have a test, just write it down because it gives you a better mark.eh (Interview Marie 2013, 
118-120) 
The interview with Marie further shows how the focus on liberty and equality/ diversity is not 
merely an echo of the dominance of Protestantism in the town, but also of the religious diversity 
within her family and immediate social relations. School already makes religion an issue of 
 
426  Later in the interview, Marie compared the current situation at the school with her own school time and 
she recalls having had to write an essay in bible study class and writing about the (Catholic-)Christian figure 
Maria with the consequence of receiving the best possible grade without further checking because her Protestant 
teacher did not want to read it (Interview Marie 2013, 109-112). This example might suggest that also the 
teaching of creation took place in religious education, but it is equally possible that also in her account the 
difference between subjects is not overly important. If religion class is at stake, or the distinction between 
religion and science is drawn otherwise, her complaint might merely refer to the neglect of alternative religious 
or worldview positions without even addressing science as an other to religion. In that sense, the critique is that 
the school teaches the view of a church rather than preparing the students for mundane diversity. 
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family conversations and enables friendships with children from semi-strict families. Moreover, 
her former husband and his new wife have a more orthodox Protestant affiliation and her two 
children differ in how they positioned towards the Christian teachings.  
and what I see is that my daughter, she is more into the image of a God that her friends have 
and her father's new wife. […] and my son is more obstinate, […] and he always asks me and 
I always say, there is no one truth, so I am not very strict in it, so I try to make them have 
them make their own opinion, […] and every opinion is good, … (Interviews Marie 2013, 
226-233) 
Thus, her way of speaking about Protestant education is in line with her general focus on 
diversity. She explains her political activism with the aim to make the town a place in which 
“everybody can be happy” (Interview Marie 2013, 88-91). While this motive somewhat 
ironically contrasts her personal plans to move away once her children have grown up, the 
struggle in the name of principles like liberty and equality seems to give meaning to the time 
that she will continue to live there and introduces a cosmopolitism to the small town that she 
would miss otherwise. 
With respect to the multiple secularity typology, the themes of liberty and equality resonate 
with types 1 and 2 in the sense that they can imply either an individual or a collective right for 
liberty and equality, while also individual liberty rights can be used to realize collective aims 
and foster recognition through the realization of a pluralist structure of society. In the 
interviews, individual equality is associated with the notion of the public (as a general 
accessibility and equal status) which resonates with type 1, but it is also associated with a 
pluralist logic of parity which is more in line with type 2. At the national level, the notion of 
secularity as a pluralist arrangement that grants equal autonomy to different worldviews 
(type 2) is increasingly challenged in the name of an individual liberty and equality frame 
(type 1) as well as notions of functional differentiation and autonomy (type 4). This general 
dynamic also shows in the field of education policies such as in the recent decision to oblige 
schools, including religious ones, to teach about sexual diversity (Trouw 2017a). Also the 
question of whether schools have to teach evolution theory, respectively may teach an idea of 
creation in biology classes have been object of ongoing contestations with secular parties 
frequently pushing to make science the general standard (RD 2005a). Such a principled stance, 
however, was not the position my interview partners in the Bible Belt town took, but this does 
not mean that the principles of individual liberty and equality and functional autonomy did not 
matter to them. Quite the contrary, individual liberty and equality are perceived as 
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characteristics of the public in a universalist manner and, as shown later, also arguments of 
functional autonomy resonated among them. With respect to schools though and due to their 
local minority position, it seems that the national dynamic is reversed. The ideal of liberty and 
equality as characteristics of the public is position is integrated in a pluralist system as a 
personal value commitment and in that sense, the local struggle for public education seems to 
be determined by a dynamic similar to type 2 of the multiple secularities typology. Beyond that, 
references to sphere autonomy (type 4) or a totalizing notion of rationality (type 3) seem less 
relevant than a focus on diversity and equality. As the next section shows, my interview partners 
seek to realize public education as a particular offer in a pluralist setting.  
8.2.2 Confessionalizing Public Education  
Overall, the party has attempted to achieve public higher education through calls for the 
establishment of an independent public high school or a branch.427 Here, it is not the precise 
organizational arrangements that are important, but the practical necessity to mobilize and 
prove the existence of sufficient demand for such a school as a means to gain financial support 
from the state as well as the municipality.428 The law on secondary education requires that the 
state provides a sufficient number of public schools at the provincial level (WVO n.d.), Art. 
66). Still, one of the conditions that needs to be met in order to establish a new school (both 
public and special), there needs to be a minimum number of students and the funds a school 
receives are also based on the number of students (WVO n.d., Art. 64, see also MOCW n.d.). 
This necessity of proving sufficient demand creates an at least implicit competition between 
schools for students and the establishment of a new school is thus likely to have bearing on 
competing interests. In the local context, this gives way to a debate about a perceived deficiency 
of secular and non-pillarized positions in a pluralist context.  
Given that the local Protestant high school factually functions as a public high school, the a 
public high school would compete with it for students and as evident from a motion issued by 
Pro, the proposed public school has been consciously placed against the planned expansion of 
the large Protestant high school and the respective stabilization of its factual position as a public 
school. The party motioned the municipal council in 2008 to request that the local government 
investigate the demand for a public high school, pointing to several factors in support of this 
claim: the size and planned expansion of the large Protestant high school in town, which my 
 
427  They also tried to establish a local branch of another high school but this was considered non-profitable 
(VOS/ABB 2010).  




interview partners had attended, a national government plan to support splitting large schools 
into smaller ones and making the establishment of high schools easier (Rijksoverheid 2016), 
The town’s expected growth, and the lack of choice in matters of education (Pro 2008). Thus, 
the plans for a public high school may challenge the Protestant school’s ambition of opening 
another location for a growing number of students. The actual consequences of inter-school 
competition are hard to assess but it seems to be an issue of concern at least. Alwie (Interview 
2013, 317-323) mentioned that Protestant schoolboard members would raise concerns about 
inter-school competition during debates about public education, and when the municipal 
council debated the claimed investigation in the demand for public education, a CU council 
member responded that such research should also focus on the consequences for other local 
schools (extending the research focus was, however, rejected by the council) (BK 2009). For 
the orthodox reformed schools, a public school obviously does not constitute a competitor. 
Conversely, though, they compete with the larger Protestant school and, as Filip explained, this 
competition changed the school climate in the sense that the large Protestant school became 
stricter (Interview Filip 2014, 191-201).  
My interview partners, by contrast, felt that the dominance of Christian education at the primary 
level distorted the conventional method of investigating demand for school types, and thus 
limited the options for public education. An earlier investigation from 2005 had assessed the 
demand for a public high school via the number of students at public primary schools, but in 
many of the quite far-spread villages there was no public primary school and parents already 
lacked a genuine choice (Interviews Filip 2014, 265-269, Marieke 2013, 118-125, Pro n.d.-
b).429 Accordingly, the investigation would only inadequately display the actual demand for 
public education at either level. Pro pressured for a renewed investigation which confirmed that 
there was considerable demand for a public high school among parents whose children attended 
 
429  A second possible factor that renders the demand for public primary education below that of secondary 
education is ethnic segregation at the primary school level. Educational segregation as mentioned is a national 
problem. With respect to the Bible Belt town, the Foundation Eem Vallei documents a growing educational 
segregation. Apparently, autochthone parents tend to choose another school, mainly special education, because 
they could not identify with the composition of students. The authors of the report express the idea that a public 
high school might improve the situation for the public primary education and keep secular autochthone parents 
from fleeing to Christian schools (EVE 2011). Conversely, a SGP council member claimed that a local public 
high school would also soon turn into a “black school” (BV 2011). According to the SCP, educational 
segregation at the level of secondary education is mainly a consequence of an early separation of schools 
according to the level of education, but also here “white flight” is a factor (Herweijer 2008 219-221). How the 
situation will be in the town of this case study is difficult for me to assess, but is also of lesser importance for the 
dynamics of the debate.  
SGP and CU in any case, fear pressures on the autonomy of special schools in choosing students based on 
religious affiliation (BV 2011). 
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a religious primary school.430 This group made up about half of the total number of those 
demanding public education (Van Kessel and Wester 2009, 10). Nonetheless, the research also 
showed that the demand for public education was considerably lower than that for Christian 
education. Among the 4,504 parents asked (the total population with children of 10-11 years), 
the greatest demand was for Protestant Christian education (45.3%), followed those who wanted 
orthodox reformed education (25%), and, then, public education (15.9%) (Ibid. 9). The research 
also showed that orthodox reformed parents were more determined or willing to make greater 
compromises for the sake of sending their children to a school of their religious background. 
They were much more likely to accept long journeys (more than half an hour cycling or public 
transport) compared to the parents who preferred Protestant Christian, and even more so than 
those opting for public education (Ibid. 11). Furthermore, they were much more likely to state 
their firm intention to actually send their children to such a school (Ibid. 12f.). Obviously, those 
parents preferring public education were also the only ones for whom the answers were really 
hypothetical, as no respective school actual exists and this might have influenced their answers. 
In any case, given that only slightly less than 50% of the parents interested in public education 
also stated a firm intent to send their children to such a school once founded, the demand was 
determined to be insufficient to claim that the state was responsible to build a non-
denominational public school (RD 2011). 
This finding touches upon a theme of a somewhat deficient post-pillarized society that has 
reoccurred with respect to different issues, which resonates with a more general critique of the 
liberal and individualized heritage of the purple period. This theme sees strict Christians as 
having a systematic advantage over the easy going and nonreligious because of their collective 
self-organization. In a press article covering a public debate about public education, different 
people are quoted, pointing to the alleged insufficient political activism and determination of 
those wanting public education. In the context of this debate, a former Pro council member is 
quoted saying: “nonbelievers are not as organized as believers because they have no shared 
associations and churches” (RD 2009b).431 This theme will be taken up in more detail with 
respect to the election campaign (ch.8.4).  
 
430  After Pro collected 400 signatures from parents who wanted a local public high school, a quarter of 
whom having children in one of the local Christian primary school, the motion for a renewed investigation was 
accepted by the council (RD 2009a). 
431  Another participant considered the idea that parents who wanted to send their children to a public 
school were maybe not as principled as Christian parents, and rather chose an easy way earlier. Others by 
contrast argue that there had never been enough political support for the issue (RD 2009b).  
287 
 
To reiterate, the struggle for public education is not a struggle to make education public or 
secular, but a minority claim for public education as one of several options. In comparison with 
the historic school struggle, its local contemporary variant has a reversed logic in the sense that 
now Protestant schools are the normal option while a secular minority claims a space for itself 
but failed to mobilize a sizable and decisive minority. The irony of this result is that a public 
school is drawn into a confessional logic and claimed as one option among others. At the same 
time, the struggle reproduced and accelerated the national situation after the 19th century school 
reform in which public education is part of a pluralist school system. So far, the attempt to 
mobilize and prove sufficient demand for a public high school seems to have failed, but the 
most recent developments in the struggle for public education highlight the ironies of this 
tendency to confessionalize the secular public.  
In 2017, a group of teachers announced a new plan for a high school with a humanist profile. 
They explicitly placed this initiative in the tradition of the struggle for public education, in the 
sense of offering educational options beyond Christian education and by being “generally 
accessible” (BK 2017, VOS/ABB 2017).432 A website for the planned school carries the slogan 
“because there must be choice” (HB n.d.).433According to the press, the humanist school 
initiative is described as a strategic consideration to establish a school that appears to be more 
easily realized (BK 2018). The local government’s coalition agreement from 2018 foresees an 
investigation into the demand for all educational profiles including both public and humanist 
education (GB 2018). The call for a public secular high school had already seemingly implied 
the confessionalization of the secular, a dynamic which has gained ultimate manifestation in 
this most recent initiative.  
8.2.3 A Confessionalization of Care? 
The political struggles for public education reveal the Christian dominance as well as the 
pillarized dynamics in the town. In that context, public education can only be one of several 
minority options. In addition to this local school struggle, an ongoing reform of the welfare 
sector and of the interrelations of state and cities stirred concerns about a dwarfing public or 
“neutral” care at the time of my research. Since 2015, municipalities have been given the 
 
432  To my knowledge, so far there is only one humanist secondary school in Amsterdam (VOS/ABB 2017). 
433  It also stresses that like many religions, humanism also exists in many different forms and that everyone 
was free to choose their own strand of humanism. It further describes a humanist identity via four points: to take 
note of values and norms that fit the culture of our society; to learn to collaborate for the sake of one’s own 
development and identity in respect for the development and identity of the other; to learn to aspire democracy in 
which liberty, justice, tolerance, the respect for the human worth, and humanity are central; education without 
distinction on the basis of religion or worldviews with respect to everyone’s religion or worldview (HB n.d.).  
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responsibility for three central aspects of social care: youth care, the stimulation of labor market 
participation of people with certain impairments, and long-term care for sick and elderly 
(deVolkskrant 2016a, Rijksoverheid n.d.). This decentralization has been paired with large 
budget cuts and is part of a gradual conversion of the welfare state into what has been called a 
“participation society” and comes down to a neoliberalization of the welfare state (Tijmen 2018, 
VNG n.d.), which critics contend have resulted in supply gaps and job cuts (Tijmen 2018, 
Wilken 2015).  
In the town, the shift from state to individual (or societal) responsibility has been ascribed the 
motto, “self, society, municipality” and implies a shift from social rights secured by a state 
welfare system to an emphasis on citizen’s duties and the policy aim to stimulate the self-
responsibility of citizens (GB n.d., SGP 2014a). At the time of my research, the concrete details 
of the reform were still unknown, but the impending budget cuts had already stirred concerns, 
as well as more or less implicit competition about the distribution of future resources. In that 
situation, pillarization once again became a matter of political contestation. The tensions also 
show the overall strength of Christianity in the town as well as the dynamics of pillarization 
mainly fostered by orthodox Protestants.  
Experts have stressed the importance of vital networks and social cohesion in a neighborhood 
as a precondition for society-based care, and the municipality has declared that its aim is to 
promote social cohesion (GB n.d., 9, Wilken 2015). In preparation for its policy making, the 
municipality had commissioned a research report to assess social cohesion and resources in 
terms of existing structures of care provision that had to be taken into account in defining the 
municipality’s new role as well as the contours of social care. The research was conducted by 
a research institute associated with the orthodox reformed university in Zwolle, and its findings 
constitute the later policy paper’s basis (Jager-Vreugdenhil et al. 2010). The text contains early 
reference to the role of religion in the municipality: Its introduction points to the major role of 
religious communities in the town, but also to the question of social cohesion beyond the limits 
of such communities and refers to the dealing with diversity as the municipality’s main 
challenge (Jager-Vreugdenhil et al. 2010, 5, 8).  
With respect to matters of social welfare, the non-affiliated are described as being particularly 
vulnerable, as they face a certain backlog in terms of care when they are compared to the 
church-affiliated parts of the population. On the one hand, the report states that contrary to the 
perception that support was mainly provided within church or ethnic circles, for church 
members alike nonmembers, in actuality, family, friends, and neighbors were the main 
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providers of help (Jager-Vreugdenhil et al. 2010, 21). Still, in comparison to the national 
average, informal care in the town is over-proportionally provided beyond the circle of family 
and friends, something which the researchers explain as a consequence of care offered within 
ethnic and faith communities (p. 21). Thus, church affiliated people in town also receive more 
help than non-affiliated inhabitants, given that they could rely on support networks within their 
religious community (p. 21). Non-church affiliated populations, by contrast, were less linked to 
care-providing networks (p. 27), and the final policy paper mentions that the non-church 
affiliated are less able to participate socially for different reasons (GB n.d., 10).434  
The report further ponders possibilities for integrating voluntary organizations in social welfare 
policies (Jager-Vreugdenhil et al. 2010, 8, 32, 34f.). In particular, institutions at civil society 
level become necessary where public responsibility has been dwarfed by financial cuts. 
Churches are identified as a core organization that offers social support, which has historically 
been partially in competition and partially in collaboration with the welfare state (ch.3.1.5). 
With respect to the Bible Belt town, the report identifies that churches are central for the 
provision of informal care and support, and while the reorganization of welfare gives renewed 
importance to their social contribution, there is no immediate secular equivalent (Jager-
Vreugdenhil et al. 2010, 22, 27).435 The report thus refers to church as well as neighborhood 
platforms (Jager-Vreugdenhil et al. 2010, 8, 32, 34f.). Many municipalities have introduced 
some variant of neighborhood teams, mainly meant to stimulate citizens’ participation (Van 
Arum and Lub 2014), and in that sense, the respective reference is not unique per se, but it has 
gained a specific meaning in the sense of a possibly secular equivalent to the social role fulfilled 
by churches in the local context. The local social security council (WMO-raad) advises that 
both neighborhood platforms and churches can be central in co-organizing social networks for 
clients to increase their autonomy in everyday life (WMO-raad) (8). It suggests that a 
brainstorming meeting ought to be held between neighborhood platforms and churches for this 
purpose. However, while churches and neighborhood and platforms are placed in a somewhat 
equivalent position, there are also clear differences between them as the former are presently 
active in providing care, while the latter only deals with matters of local livability rather than 
social matters to date. When I spoke about the matter with the ChristenUnie’s faction leader, 
 
434  The report is remarkable as such, given that in the national discourse it is mainly Muslim migrants or 
unemployed people whose participation is questioned.  
435  The report further distinguishes between local churches that provide support to members exclusively 
and those that offer charity in a more general sense and thus, similar to what has been stated with respect to 
education, points to the public role of some religious organizations (Jager-Vreugdenhil et al. 2010, 28).  
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Henk, he envisioned the platforms as community centers in the making, thereby drawing on an 
explicit communal rather than individualist ideal of society:  
well I think that people live in communities, […] eh ehm when you are a part of a church, that 
is your community. […] they take care of the poor and the ill people, so they take care, they 
look after you, so this community is also a social structure, in which people say, hey you are 
ill, shall i take care of you, […] and when you are not a part of that community well that is 
also a concern, then you have this wijkplatforms [neighborhood platforms] which can have, 
but that's they have to be brought up to power for this, because they are not used to this task, 
but they can eh make the community or the neighborhood where you live in, more active to 
look after each other (Interview Henk 2014, 259-270) 
In this notion, communities are considered a natural way of living together, while it also 
indicates that it is only for those without any community that the municipality remains 
responsible (Interview Henk 2013, 282-284). This indicates that the situation brought about by 
financial cuts has led to renewed ideas of a pillarized organization of society (Interview Henk 
2014, 286-306).436 My interview partners from Pro referred positively to the communal 
solidarity and welfare among orthodox Protestants, but their apparent advantage in coping with 
the welfare cuts in combination with their power position in local politics stirred concerns about 
how nonaffiliated people might be disadvantaged in future policies. As Marieke’s statement 
expresses, here the neighborhood platforms did not seem to offer a solution, and in comparison 
to the care-providing churches, the threat of the impending budget cuts became only more 
evident: 
and the difficulty is gonna be I mean if you are a member of the church of the SGP, as long as 
you go to church on Sunday twice then they will look after you, they will take care of you, 
because they have this church network, but once you don't have this network who is then 
going to take care of you? And I don't see their solution that then the wijkplatforms 
[neighborhood platforms] have to do that (Interview Marieke 2014, 439-442) 
Aside from the question of how civil society could cope with budget cuts could be coped with 
by civil society, the composition of different care providers also became a point of concern. 
Currently, the municipality has contracts with both religious and neutral care providers, and 
 
436  Ironically, the communal support among orthodox Christians has decreased the budgets of certain 
municipalities given that the budgets allocated to municipalities was based on their prior demands. Several 
municipalities in the Bible Belt received relatively less funds when compared to the national average (BB 2014). 
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according to the then-responsible alderman, there was no incentive to change this in the future. 
Still, the matter was an object of diverging concerns. On one hand, Christian parties feared the 
status of special care in the context of decentralization as municipalities would have to choose 
from a limited number of care providers (Haga n.d.). Religious “special” care was further 
challenged by economic considerations, such as when Marieke (Interview 2014, 409-412) 
raised concerns that the provision of identity-based care would increase the total financial 
means when compared to having public institutions. Both SGP and CU state their support for 
identity-based, Christian institutions in their election programs (CU 2014, SGP 2014b). It is 
noteworthy that this is framed as the freedom to choose by the SGP. On the other hand, the 
Christian dominance in the town, and the confessionalization of care was perceived to put 
secular “neutral” care at risk. The party has aimed to control the establishment of religious 
“special” care institutions as well as to achieve a political guarantee that secular care would 
remain the standard that is guaranteed by the municipality (Pro n.d.-a). In different 
contributions, the party faction claimed that neutral care and welfare offers comprise basic 
services (and thus must be guaranteed) and that identity-based care and welfare are special 
requests. Thus, the argument is that welfare organizations should be as broadly accessible as 
the municipality is “a place where everyone is welcome, regardless of their social, cultural, or 
worldview background” and was not a place guided by “one special belief” (Pro n.d.-a) see 
also: (Pro 2013b). 
Therefore, the apparent fear is that the situation in care might at some point resemble that in 
education. When I spoke with Mack about the impending reform, I mentioned the diakonia as 
a religious provider of social services which also offers support to nonreligious people. My 
diary notes tell that he expressed a dislike for being taken care of by the diakonia himself. As 
an explanation he recalled that at the time when his mother went to school, everyone was 
wearing wooden shoes and some girls would have them with a large D painted on top, the sign 
of the diakonia, something his mother apparently found so awful that the story became part of 
the family memory. The story thus points to the difference between charity received and social 
rights guaranteed by a welfare state, and it suggests that diaconal welfare comes at the price of 
equality. Moreover, he does not express a principled objection to receiving care from Christian 
providers as long as they do not lecture him about his personal choices such as end of life 
questions. Again, the themes of liberty and equality are central in his account, and, similar to 
the case of education, there is a concern that in consequences of an exclusive collective self-
organization of certain religious groups, the scope for secular public organizations will be 
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dwarfed and religious organizations might take over a public role by also catering to the non-
affiliated who are then subjected to their principles. 
All in all, the (impending) dwarfing of the secular public scope through a communal self-
organization of Christians is one aspect of (perceived) Protestant dominance in the Bible Belt 
town. The second aspect of such dominance is the direct influence on the general public order. 
Here, as mentioned, the question of Sunday Rest and legitimate Sunday activities is central, as 
the subsequent section elaborates.  
8.3 A Contested Public Order  
Sunday rest comprises a core issue of conflict which shows the contesting notions concerning 
the influence of Christianity on the legal and public order. At the time of my research it was 
one of Pro’s central political topics and, as I came to realize, it is centrally related to the party’s 
history in town. On Sundays, the town is a quiet place, as—at the time of writing—local 
restaurants and coffee places are only partially open on Sundays while most local museums as 
well as the library are closed. One of the local swimming pools is open on Sundays, the other, 
which is located in a large multi-function center that closes on Sunday. One of my interview 
partners told me that in his village even the ATM does not function on Sundays. Church-life, 
by contrast, is very visible in the town on Sundays, and my local interview partners 
recommended that I visit the town on a Sunday to see the crowds of churchgoers visiting the 
two mentioned large new churches.  
According to my Pro interview partners, the practice of Sunday rest is broadly supported in the 
town, and its observance was not only demanded by SGP supporters but was more broadly 
shared and considered part of a local tradition (Interview Marieke 2013, 513-516). Having 
grown up in the town or region, the local rest traditions on Sunday was something they were 
well acquainted with, and they were used to making certain accommodations and to adapting 
to the local tradition. At the same time, the assertion of Sunday rest hampered their sense of 
equal liberty and the party’s aspiration to make the town more sociable by creating more 
opportunities for going out, something which had been a core motive for many Pro members 
since the party was established (BK 2012). The struggle to create more recreational and social 
facilities made the observance of Sunday rest an issue of political conflict and, at least for some, 
a symbol of an illegitimate rule and a lack of liberty.  
In what follows, I first describe competing religious and secular notions of Sunday rest rooted 
in the 19th century and their legal institutionalization. I also show how these competing notions 
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of the debates about Sunday rest play out locally. Second, I describe how the local conflict 
about Sunday Rest was settled in a political compromise and how this compromise is challenged 
in the power struggle between orthodox and progressives and how it generates a more 
generalized and symbolic struggle for equal liberty among Pro’s politicians. Interrelatedly I 
point to changes and contestations with respect to national laws on Sunday rest, that create 
different opportunities for Pro. I close with a structurally similar, but more explicit contestation 
about the adequate relationship between religion and the municipality, that is the notion of 
secularity that should guide the municipality.  
8.3.1 Sunday Observance and Sunday Rest 
Sunday is a blessing of the Creator. A day to take a breath and be lifted above every 
day stress. On Sunday we don’t do politics. We rest. And we listen to the word of 
God, the bible. For that reason, the SGP keeps its ‘shop’ closed on Sunday. 
Tomorrow we hope to again be ready for you (SGP n.d.-b). 
On Sunday, SGP website and the newspaper, the Reformatorisch Dagblad, do not show their 
normal content but redirect visitors to their Sunday site which only displays a short disclaimer. 
That of the SGP is quoted above and explains that Sunday is a day of rest that is dedicated to 
God. The Reformatorisch Dagblad has a similar disclaimer, pointing to Sunday as a “mandate 
and gift of God,” an “echo of Easter Sunday when Jesus Christ rose from death,” as a reason 
why it abstains from updating the site on that day despite the fact that the world does not stand 
still and the difference between Sundays and workdays was gradually being blurred.437  
Sunday observance and Sunday rest have been important to orthodox political Protestantism 
since the late 19th century. The 19th-century ARP programs stressed the government’s 
obligation to both hold and assert Sunday rest to ensure that Sunday could be celebrated. The 
provision of Sunday rest is part of a section that defines the government as a servant of God. In 
his first programmatic text, “our program,” Kuyper explicitly rejected a competing secular 
notion of Sunday rest which had gained prominence among social democrats and liberals of the 
time, which framed Sunday as a pause from weekly wage labor (Kuyper 1907 [1879], ch.6), 
believing that this secular notion of Sunday rest would only lead to more cafés, concerts, and 
 
437  It states: “Today is Sunday The weekly day of rest that we have on Sunday is a mandate and gift of 
God. At the same time, Sunday is also a weekly echo of Easter Sunday when Jesus Christ rose from death for 
Christians. This is the reason for us not to update our site today. Does the news stand still on Sunday? No, it 
doesn’t—we are living in stressful times in which the difference between Sundays and workdays is unfortunately 
steadily decreasing. Tomorrow we will be pleased to update you with the daily happenings […]” (RD n.d.). 
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bars. In contrast, Kuyper derives the principle of Sunday rest from the biblical Sabbath law. 
While the government itself could not provide or assert spiritual teachings on people, it was 
obliged to provide others with the opportunity to practice their faith. As such, Kuyper contended 
that the government itself should abstain from work on Sundays and also prevent other facilities 
from opening on Sunday.438  
From the early 19th century until the mid-1950s, the Dutch Sunday law asserted Sunday 
observance (viering van den dag des Heeren) by banning public behavior seen to conflict with 
it, such as gambling venues, cinemas, or concerts (RD 1975). The law’s Protestant character 
also showed in the fact that it recognized Protestant holy days as being on par with Sunday 
(Wierdsma 1987, 186). By the 1950s, complaints abound about increasing legal violations as 
well as the government’s hesitance to assert it. However, at that time there was no longer a 
political majority in favor of asserting a religious principle, and in 1953 the law was replaced 
by a new Sunday Law (Zondagswet) which is still in place at the time of writing (Van Baalen 
and Ramakers 2001, 249-255). This new law limits itself to the more secular intention of 
protecting church service through safeguarding Sunday rest (zondagsrust) (TK 2016c). Beyond 
that (and in line with the general tendency of the 1950s), it was a compromise between different 
religious and nonreligious interests and Sunday activities.  
Since industrialization, as mentioned above, Sunday had also gained “secular” importance as a 
recreational day free from wage labor, and it had also become the day for organized sport (Van 
Baalen and Ramakers 2001, Wienen).439 Both practices echo in the Sunday law in the sense that 
it considers certain forms of labor, public sport events, as well as Catholic processions as 
acceptable activities and exempts them from the general Sunday rest restrictions (Van Baalen 
and Ramakers 2001, 249-255).440 In its current version, the law prohibits the disturbance of 
Sunday Church service through noisy events (Art. 2 and 3), as well as any public forms of 
entertainment and festivities before 1PM (Art. 4 and 5). Religious or worldview gatherings, in 
addition to hikers with accompanying music, are exempt from the prohibition. Furthermore, the 
law bans disturbing public peace with work (Art. 6). Finally, the law states that sports events 
as well as other recreational activities do not fall under the definition of entertainment used in 
the law and therefore may not be banned (Art. 7). This last point had been emphasized in a mid-
 
438  The other Protestant party at the time, the CHU, also stressed the importance of Sunday rest as an 
expression of the historically Christian character of the Dutch people. 
439  In the 1950s, Sunday was still the only labor-free day in the week which made it even more important 
and challenging to balance competing claims on the day. 
440  In predominantly Protestant settings, Catholic processions could otherwise be seen to conflict with the 
provisions of Sunday rest. 
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1970s legal change which meant to clarify that governments were not permitted to prevent sport 
events or other recreational activities from being held on Sundays (TK 1971-1972).  
Thus, while the Sunday Law restricts Sunday activities it also limits municipalities’ ability to 
prohibit Sunday events. The legislators at the time were not only concerned about the different 
freedoms, but also sought to mitigate religion-related tensions at the local level as well as local 
youth’s engagement in unorganized leisure activities (Van Baalen and Ramakers 2001, 252, 
254). The law nevertheless faced significant opposition: for giving up the religious motive of 
the former legislation (SGP), for granting parity to Catholic interests (ARP), for being an 
unnecessary regulation (VVD), and for hampering workers’ political activism (CPN) (Van 
Baalen and Ramakers 2001, 250-252, RD 1975). Eventually KVP, CHU and PvdA voted in 
support of it. 
The Sunday Law is not the only example of the ore general fact that during the second half of 
the 20th century, the former dominance of Protestantism had given way to a stronger role for 
Catholicism and secular interests. The CDA’s program mentions the idea of Sunday rest, while 
adopting a more secular reasoning in place of the ARP’s theocratic arguments. The 1993 
program of principles aims to protect Sunday as a special day of rest and sees the importance 
of Sunday rest in the protection of spouses and families, probably reflecting the economic 
liberalization at the time, and the individualism of the impending purple cabinet. Currently the 
strict observance of Sunday rest, as previously indicated, is a clear feature of the orthodox 
strands of Dutch Protestantism. In particular, among SGP supporters, the Sunday rest obligation 
has bearings beyond the responsibility of the individual believer: it concerns family life, social 
relations as well as society as a whole (Daniël 1977). According to the SGP, the government is 
responsible for upholding Sunday rest “so that everyone can sanctify this day according to 
God’s command” (SGP 2003, 29).441 Only charity and necessary work are allowed, while 
activities like sports, recreation, and other forms of relaxation are framed as misusing Sunday 
(SGP 2003, Daniël 1977).  
The CU defines the Sunday as a day of rest for man and society, and as the traditional day of 
Christian church service, and it claims that the state shall protect Sunday rest in order to allow 
for the proclaiming of the gospel (CU 2001). Compared to the SGP, the party has been less 
principled in its assertion of Sunday rest. Henk, the town’s CU faction leader, had explained 
 
441  It explains that to sanctify means to distinguish and that it means to “rest from work and life in the rest 
received from Christ. “ 
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this as a consequence of the two parties’ different electorates. For SGP voters, Sunday was 
exclusively reserved for church services, while the CU had voters and members—particularly 
evangelical ones—with more liberal views on Sunday, stressing people’s rights to decide these 
matters for themselves. In another small town, the CU has, for example, recently supported the 
liberalization of shop openings on Sunday in recognition of local diversity (RD 2016c). The 
SGP has strongly criticized this move, as it considers such a break with the principle of Sunday 
rest— albeit for apparently innocent enjoyment––as the beginning of an encompassing 
liberalization of society (RD 2016c). 
In 1996, under the first purple cabinet, the regulation concerning Sunday were further 
liberalized by the introduction of the law on shop opening hours (Winkeltijdenwet), which 
replaced the older shop closing law (winkelsluitingswet) and concerns the opening hours for 
shops, the catering industry, and other public institutions (Overheid n.d.). While Article 2 of 
the law forbids shops from opening on Sundays as well as on the most important Christian 
holidays, Article 3 allows city councils and local governments to make exemptions to this ban 
on twelve Sundays per year. It further allows a liberalization of the regulations to accommodate 
tourism.442 Thus, the law provides a legal frame to circumvent the Sunday law and as a 
consequence of these changes it has become common that shops are open on Sundays in most 
Dutch municipalities. It is only towns in the Bible Belt that break with the trend. Figure 5 
below, which was published by the reformed newspaper, RD, shows that the geographic 
distribution of municipalities with no more than six open Sundays a year follows the contours 
of the Bible Belt (RD 2018a). In 2018, there are only 53 municipalities where all shops remain 
closed on Sundays and the town of this case study is one of them.  
The local municipality does not make exemptions to the ban on Sunday shop openings law—a 
regulation that dates was dating back to 1996 and was still valid at the time of writing (GB 
2011). Only certain stores (such as those selling readymade food or renting videos or bikes) as 
well as museums are exempted from the ban on Sunday openings (Ibid.). Also bars and other 
catering industry locations are allowed to open on Sunday (GB 2016b).443 Events are regulated 
via the Sunday law and thus allowed at certain times of the day (GB 2016a). As this section 
will explain, the legal situation alone is not decisive in local expectations concerning Sunday 
 
442  At the time of its introduction, as mentioned. one motive stated for the legal change was 
accommodating the growing cultural diversity in the Netherlands. Article 6 of the law thereby states that those 
whose religious beliefs foresee another weekly day of rest than Sunday might open on Sundays for the sake of 
closing on the other day.  




rest, Sunday rest, as collective norms are negotiated between neighbors and co-citizens but also 
by the municipality through private contracts.  
In what follows, I draw on interview material to show how Pro members describe the local 
expectations of Sunday rest as something both known and alienating. Their elaborations give 
implicit expression to the two competing notions of Sunday rest already mentioned in the first 
section: the Christian notion of Sunday observance and the secular notion of Sunday as a day 
of recreation. At the same time, the interview material also speaks of the ambivalence between 
habitual accommodation and aspired liberty that shape my interview partners’ dealings with 
Sunday rest. 
 
Figure 5: Sunday Shop Openings.444 
 
8.3.1.1 Competing Notions of Sunday Rest 
As a first example for how the issue of Sunday rest was addressed, I refer to my interview with 
Mack. As with my other interview partners, I asked Mack to speak about his life, political 
activism, and to tell me specifically about life in the Bible Belt. He soon came to speak about 
 
444  The municipalities colored in dark brown allow shops to be open on all Sundays, those in light-brown 
restrict shop openings to 12 times a year, and those in white and light grey allow for a maximum of 6 open Sundays 
a year. (RD 2018a). 
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Sunday as that is what distinguished the town from other places in the Netherlands.445 He 
introduced this theme by telling me about a visit from his sister-in-law. 
She was there, on Saturday, and our neighbors have been mowing their lawn, and she said, 
ah Sunday noises, because she lived in Utrecht city, and there everyone does this on Sunday, 
because what is Sunday, that is a day when one works in the garden and ehm does such 
things, but here, ehm, one does not do such things, because Sunday, one should have Sunday 
rest and you don’t make noise, and I thought that is great that she said Sunday noises and 
here it is Saturday noises, that actually is a difference //^^// ehm that is eh, but that already 
says quite a lot, because the matter is, one accommodates; […] not always in a way that I 
ehm like what is happening, but one accommodates (Interview Mack 2013, 44-55)446 
Central to this episode is that his sister-in-law’s confusion brought the peculiarity of the Sunday 
in the town to his attention. While in Utrecht, the sound of lawn mowers accompanies Sunday 
as it is a day freed from wage labor, often shaped by the common and normal practice of 
gardening. In contrast, in the Bible Belt town Sundays are marked by exactly the absence of 
such sounds, which are linked with Saturday instead. Eventually, the description of this local 
particularity is stated to be indicative of accommodation as another aspect of the local 
normality.447  
Marieke also used Sunday to explain what life in the Bible Belt is about, and to elaborate a 
norm of respecting local expectations regarding Sunday rest. The subsequent dialogue between 
her (M) and me (I) further captures the competing notions of Sunday rest as a religious 
command or a secular day of rest. 
M: we wouldn't like mow our lawn for example or wash the car on a Sunday: make noise 
outside on a Sunday, we don't.  
I: Even washing the car, would make  
M: We would never do that on a Sunday; that is very disrespectful for the people, so I I grew 
up with that, so I will never do that, but it it is a bit silly, because washing your car doesn't 
 
445  He had first mentioned having grown up in the region and being used to the fact that many people went 
to church. He then states that he longer goes to church himself and positions as agnostic and somewhat 
indifferent to religion, stating that his village had no church and that people went to neighboring villages for 
service. All in all, religion in the sense of a local church appears to be not overly present in his immediate 
surroundings while still manifesting in the particularities on Sunday.  
446  The interview was held in German and I have translated the quote into English.  
447  He does not explain the generalized “one” that constitutes the subject of the sentence, but he makes it 
clear that this constitutes the other aspect of the local normality, a part he does not always like. 
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make much much; so what I do is, I do the garden, but then in the back because then they 
would not see me, but not in the front (Interview Marieke 2013, 483-489) 
The section begins with Marieke stating her inner commitment to abstaining from certain 
activities on Sundays as a way of respecting local expectations. She also suggests the notion of 
avoiding noise as a possible rationale for the local expectations. Subsequently, this rationale is 
challenged, given that Marieke’s way of dealing with these expectations suggests that it is more 
the public visibility of certain activities, and thus possibly the activities as such, that is perceived 
to be disrespectful in the local context.448 In the later interview section as well, Marieke 
expresses a certain understanding and valuation for a regulation of Sunday activities along with 
the logic of avoiding noise (at least in the morning), but she again emphasized that the criterion 
of noise was not at the core of Sunday rest in the town.  
and I really don't mind, I mean, ehm I don't like it on a Saturday when they start rebuilding 
their houses at eight or seven in the morning, right? It is great that they don't do that on a 
Sunday […] Eh but I wouldn't mind if that is after eleven or, then it is ok with me, then 
everyone is awake and […] But well. Here you, they, people tell you if you do something on a 
Sunday. We don't do these things here they say then, if you want to mow your loan […] 
(Interview Marieke 2013, 493-503)449  
Neither Mack nor Marieke explicate the logic of local expectations, but given that the religious 
imprint on the town was the declared topic of our talks, and drawing on the context knowledge 
about the importance of Sunday observance and Sunday rest among strict Protestants, it can be 
assumed that the section implicitly contrasts this Christian notion of Sunday observance with a 
 
448  Given that I found the section somewhat difficult to grasp at once, I will try to present a sequential 
reading: The section starts with Marieke stressing her commitment to refraining from certain activities of which 
mowing is an example and similar to Mack above, she speaks about avoiding noise on Sundays. At this point I 
interrupted her and questioned the noisy character of washing a car. Instead of explaining the noisiness in 
question, she repeats and emphasizes the behavioral norm. But then she comments on this norm or its 
observation as silly, whether the avoidance of noise was really the principle to explain this norm with. At this 
point, she could now comment on different sensibilities towards noise and thus explain the apparent silliness. Or 
she could draw a conclusion from the silliness by, e.g., announcing she would no longer observe it or by 
concluding that she could do it anyways. She goes on without taking the notion of silliness back, but rather 
announces a solution (“so what I do”), which is to hide her gardening (possibly in continuation of theme of 
mowing). This solution confirms that noise was not the point of disturbance after all but either activities as such 
or their public visibility. (In the first case, this would render her solution a mere formal accommodation.) 
449  As a side note, it is interesting that the distinction between different times at Sunday which Marieke 
makes in a taken for granted way and which is also characteristic for the Sunday Law discussed in section 
8.3.2.1, has been perceived to breach of the religious sanctity of Sunday rest by Christian critics. When the 
Sunday Law was passed in the 1950s, the protestant ARP opposed the division of the Sunday into different time 
slots (Van Baalen and Ramakers 2001, 252).  
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secular notion of Sunday as a secular day of rest.450 Within the secular notion of Sunday rest, 
as mentioned, Sunday is perceived as a weekend day that is freed from wage labor and used as 
a day for relaxation, leisure, and household related activities, and, as will be shown, for political 
activism and different forms of consumption. While the Christian notion of Sunday observance 
is based on the contrast between religious and profane activities, this immanent notion of 
Sunday draws a different contrast—that between labor and recreation. Nevertheless, it does not 
necessarily imply a principled avoidance of noise and clearly not the avoidance of any work-
like activity. Conversely, from this perspective church-going Christians can be framed as those 
who really violate Sunday rest. In an opinion piece for the local online news site, Frans 
criticized conservative Christians for disrespecting local wishes for Sunday activities while 
non-Christian minorities did not even complain about the traffic jams and about the fact that a 
car-free Sunday in the town was impossible, given that people used their cars to visit church 
service (Lubbe 2005).  
Thus, the tension between a Christian and secular motive for Sunday rest has its roots in 19th 
century but still has bearings on the local setting and is further linked to competing notions of 
respect. On the one hand, and in line with the principle of Sunday observance, there is the notion 
of respecting a principle, rule, or tradition. This is the form of respect Marieke spoke about, and 
which Mack referred to as accommodation. On the other hand, there is a notion of respect in 
the sense of respecting the freedom and individual choices of people, possibly modified by the 
mutual considerateness for people’s recreational needs. These two positions, and their relation 
to the different notions of the Sunday, can be discerned from an example of a public debate that 
was reported in the local and Christian press (CU 2008, RD 2008b). During this debate, a third 
Pro member (whom I did not interview) stated that on Sunday, she could only garden in the 
backyard and she thus perceived the local notion of Sunday rest as restrictive.451 One participant 
 
450  The interview quote is not clear in what motivates the complaints if not noise. The wording “if you do 
something” remains as unspecific as the notion of “these things” except for the fact that mowing one’s lawn 
counts as part of such things. One might assume that the objects relate to the noise of motor-driven lawnmowers 
(independent of the hour) but in the context of the interview with the theme of noise already being introduced, I 
would assume that this would be made more explicit then in the sense that people state their wish for things to be 
quiet all day or something similar. In that sense, we can hypothetically assume that a more principled concern for 
Sunday observance is at least a plausible explanation here.  
Besides, one might see the fact that in the interviews, the logic that informs the local expectations concerning 
Sunday rest is not explicated and is only contrasted with different rationalities, rhetorically functions to render it 
irrational rather than explaining its inner rationality. 
451  Her contribution once more shows that contestations about Sunday gardening seem common among 
neighbors in the town and serve as a core example for the competing ideas about Sunday. The similarity of the 
wording and examples taken in the interview and the public debate again show that the interview gives 
expression to common and shared position and experience. One of the press articles on the debate evening is 
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in the debate praised her for respecting the principles of others even if she did not understand 
them. Other participants stated that they also respected those who garden on Sunday and 
claimed social acceptance for such choice. The Pro member who had raised the issue stated that 
she gladly takes the feelings of others into account, but she disliked that even in her own garden 
she was not given the liberty to live as she saw fit. Similarly, Mack had also stated that everyone 
accommodated a single group, rather than every citizen being equally important.452 All in all, 
the motive of equal liberty is central to Pro in its approach to Sunday rest and guided their 2014 
election campaign. Before I elaborate the different motives at stake in the local debates on 
secularity, I briefly sketch how the Sunday question has been dealt with in the political arena 
so far, as well as what made it a core issue of the political struggle at the time of my research.  
8.3.2 A Fragile Balance  
The distinction between Sunday observance and the use of the Sunday for recreational activities 
is at the base of a local “historic” compromise. From the onset, Pro wanted to make the town 
more social and aimed to help accomplish this by creating more opportunities for people to go 
out. In their struggle for sociability the party members opposed a strict interpretation of Sunday 
rest and, in 1998, when Pro was about to enter a coalition with the CDA and SGP, the different 
expectations with respect to the Sunday had to be bridged. The mayor at the time, Jorrit, 
developed a compromise formula that recognized the contradicting wishes of the population 
that was for Sunday rest, as well as those who were in favor of Sunday activities as legitimate 
interests, and it obliged the local government to take a neutral stance with respect to the matter.  
We are aware that many inhabitants of the municipality are attached to the Sunday as a day 
of rest. We also realize that there are inhabitants that wish for more facilities, also or 
especially on Sundays, for the sake of recreation and relaxation. The government itself does 
not develop initiatives directed at an extension of such activities on Sundays. It shall neither 
counter economically realistic initiatives of others that concern activities of local associations 
or other initiatives. The parties in the city council are free to make suggestions for activities 
and/ or facilities on Sunday in the city council and put them up for discussion. The members 
of the council are thereby given the scope to act in line with their own principles.453  
 
entitled, “On Sunday I only work in the backyard.” The public debate also confirms that the matter at stake is 
indeed the acts as such and their visibility rather than noise per se.  
452  Later in the interview he makes it clear that the Sunday question would also not be solved by 
recognizing the religious holidays of all faith groups as this would bring social life to a halt.  
453  The coalition agreement from 1998 is not available online and I was only told the wording in 
interviews. This quote is taken from the agreements from 2010 and 2018. In Dutch, the text is: “Wij zijn ons 
bewust dat veel inwoners van de gemeente hechten aan de zondag als rustdag. Wij realiseren ons ook dat er 
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During an interview, Jorrit (Interview 2014, 39-66) said that the mediation between different 
local groups had been one of his core roles as mayor in the town, and he referred to Hume’s 
agnosticism as a source of inspiration for bracketing the question of religious truth, focusing 
instead on how people could coexist together peacefully.454 The Sunday compromise followed 
the logic of such agnosticism in the sense that it neither declared Sunday as holy nor as secular.  
The compromise clause required a neutral stance from the government but gives citizens, 
entrepreneurs, and party factions the freedom to come up with initiatives on the matter. Aside 
from the coalition contract, the formula was also used in the sense of a government standpoint 
vis-à-vis third parties. During the CDA-SGP- Pro coalition, a clause echoing the coalition 
agreement had been integrated into the contract with the new music center and theater. The 
sentence was explicitly worded to avoid implying a ban on Sunday openings, by requesting that 
decisions on Sunday events respect everyone’s wishes (CU 2005a). Consequently, the operator 
planned to open seven days a week and found this not to contradict a showing of respect for 
that “which lives in [town name]’s society” (CU 2005b).455 The theatre currently runs a very 
reduced program on Sundays with concerts in the theater’s coffee place and a children’s play. 
Most events are scheduled on other days of the week. While Jorrit has referred to the music 
center as an example of the compromise, not all members of the coalition considered it to be an 
 
inwoners zijn die behoefte hebben aan meer faciliteiten, ook of juist op zondag, voor recreatie en ontspanning. 
Het college ontplooit zelf geen initiatieven gericht op een uitbreiding van dergelijke activiteiten op zondag. Het 
zal evenmin economisch realistische initiatieven van anderen, die betrekking hebben op activiteiten van 
plaatselijke verenigingen en andere initiatieven, op enige wijze tegenwerken. Het staat de partijen in de 
gemeenteraad vrij voorstellen voor activiteiten en/of faciliteiten op zondag te ontwikkelen en deze ter bespreking 
voor te leggen. Daarbij wordt aan de leden van de raad de ruimte gelaten om overeenkomstig eigen 
uitgangspunten te handelen.”  
454  The quote below directly follows upon an elaboration of Hume’s agnosticism with respect to religious 
truth claims which he favorably compares to atheist and anti-religious strands of the enlightenment. That also 
inspired me as a mayor of [town name], I don’t know what is good or not good in matters of religion and 
nonreligion, but one thing I know, which is that I don’t know and what I know is that people have to live 
together. And religion is of all times and nonreligion is of all times […] and in [town name] I said, many people 
here are religious and also many people are not religious and we have to do it together. And for many people, 
Sunday is holy and one should respect it/ this, but one also has to be careful if others give a different meaning to 
Sunday, use it differently than people who have a religious idea of the Sunday (Interview Jorrit 2014, 64-76). 
In analogy to this agnosticism with regards to religious truth claims, he also formulates a normative expectation 
for dealing with the competing interests on Sundays. One should neither try to convince others of the secular 
character of Sunday, nor should they demonize those using it in a secular way. Accommodation and liberty, in 
his view, should thus be balanced in the sense that people should have the freedom to start initiatives on Sunday 
while at the same time, choosing forms that were not too provocative in the local context. Furthermore, he felt 
that the municipality itself should remain neutral on the matter while leaving room to an organic development at 
the level of society and private initiatives.  
455  “That which matters and is meaningful] to people in town.” 
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acceptable compromise, and the SGP (as well as the CU) opposed the establishment of the 
center at the time (CU 2005b).456 
As mentioned, the majority relations in the municipality have changed since 2006, and, more 
importantly, political decisions concerning local sport and recreational facilities as well as 
cultural institutions have reopened the political struggle concerning Sunday regulations. While 
the compromise formula has also been used in subsequent coalition agreements, my interview 
partners felt that the balance had been left for the benefit of orthodox Christians. They told me 
about several examples of sport and recreational facilities and cultural institutions being 
discouraged or explicitly prohibited from opening on Sundays. In 2008 e.g., the municipality 
decided on a policy to promote the town to potential entrepreneurs and investors. The city 
council was presented a draft framework for this policy which included a requirement to 
“respect the notions on Sunday Rest in [town name]” when planning events.457 In the 
subsequent debate in the city council on the ruling, ChristenUnie found that the phrase only 
confirmed the compromise clause, while Pro argued that the balance had been shifted by not 
mentioning those who would actually like to have access to more Sunday activities (GRB 
2008b, c, a). Without engaging in more detail in the case, the disagreement between CU and 
Pro speaks to the different notions of respect mentioned before, and the secular concern that a 
respect for diverse individual views might be exchanged for the respect of the Christian notion 
of Sunday rest (GRB 2008b, c, a).  
Similar struggles emerged in the case of the privatization of the local swimming pool as well 
as the local museum, when phrases concerning the respect for local feelings on Sunday rest 
were integrated in tenders or subsidy provisions (Pro 2012b, a, c).458 The Pro faction feared that 
the tone of the phrase suggested a restriction of Sunday openings, and their suspicion seems to 
be confirmed by the fact that the SGP’s 2014 election program not only asserts the policy of 
Sunday rest, but also appeals to entrepreneurs to respect the local feelings with respect to 
Sunday rest. This indeed gives the sentence a meaning in line with the principle of Sunday 
 
456  The SGP had claimed the right to act based on its conscious for itself even if this would imply 
dissenting from the standpoint of the government (RD 2002a). 
457  In Dutch: “waarbij terdege rekening wordt gehouden met de in [town name] levende opvattingen ten 
aanzien van de zondagsrust.” 
458  In particular, the question of subsidies also concerns the notion of the public. In the coverage of the 
evangelical broadcast organization EO, which is no longer available), an apparently orthodox Protestant women 
from the town is quoted stating that they paid for their churches themselves and then, additionally, had to pay for 




observance rather than a diversity of views. Subsequently, Pro has tried to change or prevent 
respective provisions in the contracts with private investors (Pro 2012b, a, c).  
Aside from that, the party members complained that the official application form with which 
one had to ask permissions for events did not provide the opportunity to apply for events on a 
Sunday. Besides, one of my interview partners told me that people were discouraged from 
opening on Sundays with informal suggestions that this might be a disadvantage in the town. 
The Pro members were critical about this implicit and apparently intentional suggestion and 
further tried to counterbalance this trend by explaining to people the legality of Sunday 
openings.  
and that is what I said before, on paper this restaurant could open on Sundays, but someone 
has told them, and it could be a wethouder [alderman], or it could be an ambtenaar [civil 
servant] it is not smart to do so. Marieke asked for the vergunningen [permission] for this 
restaurant on Sundays, and she saw that there were not any reasons to be closed on Sunday, 
and then she said, well why don't you open?, well somebody told me it's not smart, but eh 
after that they opened. (Interview Alwie 2013, 168-172).  
8.3.2.1 The Local Importance of Sunday Law  
For my interview partners, the Sunday law was of central importance in safeguarding their 
interests given that it outlined a compromise between competing notions of and interests with 
respect to the Sunday. The faction has frequently referred to the Sunday law to make sure 
secular interests are taken into account. At the occasion of the privatization of the swimming 
pool, for example, the faction had argued that the formula concerning Sunday rest and the 
implicit discouragement of Sunday openings would constitute a breach of Sunday law which 
protected sport and recreational activities on Sundays (Pro 2012b). At the time of my research, 
the party had further asked an Amsterdam-based lawyer’s office for legal advice on whether 
such policies conformed to the Sunday Law and they used the cases of the local sports hall and 
ice-skating rink as an example. To their satisfaction, with respect to the ice-skating rink, the 
lawyer found that the municipality’s policy conflicted existing law (letter 2013).459 The legal 
consultation gave the party a temporary victory in the sense that the municipality changed the 
application form for events and the mayor gave permission for the ice-skating rink to open for 
three subsequent Sundays (Mayor Bible Belt town 2013, Pro 2013a). Eventually though, it had 
 




to close again because the private rental contract for the building prohibited Sunday openings 
(RD 2014b).  
While the Sunday Law was important to them, my interview partners felt that the strict Christian 
parties tried to circumvent its pluralist character. At the time of my research, though, the main 
challenge to the law came from the national political arena as it contested the Sunday Law. 
Both D66 and VVD had for quite some time aimed to abolish the law. Respective initiatives 
from 2007 and 2010 did not find a majority in parliament, but, in 2012, parliamentarians from 
both parties had motioned the government to abolish the centralist Sunday Law and leave 
respective regulations in the discretion of municipalities (TK 2012c, Trouw 2012b). At the time 
of my research nothing had been decided but my interview partners were concerned about the 
plans for a legal change and tried to stop the initiative.460 The possible decentralization of the 
Sunday law in any case, seems to have influenced the election campaign.  
During the municipal elections, Pro centrally campaigned on the theme of equality and made 
the issue of Sunday openings a focus. The program section is entitled “Dealing with Sunday 
Liberally”461--using the mentioned expression “vrijzinnig” which has historically been used by 
both liberal Protestants and social liberals. The text prominently outlines an individual liberty 
and equality approach to the matter, stating that: 
Pro aims at balance in our society; one in which we give each other respect and space. This 
also means that everyone can live Sunday as he or she prefers. (Pro 2014) 
The program goes on, stating that the local government has repeatedly breached the historic 
balance with respect to the Sunday, and further refers to the possible abolition of Sunday Law, 
as well as the consequential shifting of political competences with respect to Sunday on the 
municipal level. In that case, Pro would support increased options for Sunday recreational 
activities and possibly also extended shop openings (Pro 2014). In a similar tone, a campaign 
video claimed that people should be free to decide themselves how they want to spend their 
Sundays, regardless of whether it was going to church, the theater, shopping, or sleeping in 
(Figure 6).462  
 
460  Marieke had contacted the responsible D66 minister and urged the local VVD members to call their 
people in The Hague as well. She had also written a letter to Frans of the Van Mierlo Stichting who showed 
interest in the case and apparently forwarded it because she received a letter from one of a staff member of the 
Second Chamber faction. The direct effect of this lobbying is hard to trace.  
461  In Dutch: Vrijzinnig omgaan met de zondag 
462  As such, the campaign echoes the 2010 national campaign for shop openings on Sunday, in which the 
VVD promoted the slogan “also shopping is Sunday Rest” (deVolkskrant 2010). 
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In terms of multiple secularities, the mentioned compromise with respect to Sunday resonates 
with type 2 as well, in the sense that it values social harmony and seeks to balance different 
positions. At least in former mayor Jorrit’s interpretation, this implied a compromise between 
both the expectations of Sunday observance as well as Sunday-liberties (Interview Jorrit 2014, 
155-162),463 which also resonates with the position associated with the CDA in general. 
Conversely, Pro’s election program has a more liberal tone as it emphasizes individual liberties 
(type 1) rather than balancing liberty and accommodation.464 Going to church is a legitimate 
freedom from this perspective, but the ideal of Sunday rest is not seen as a legitimate ground 
on which to limit the freedom of others. 
Aside from liberty and legality, two other motives can be considered as they are somewhat co-
present in the debate on Sunday rest. First, arguments about functional autonomy play a certain 
role with respect to the Sunday openings of private or privatized cultural or recreational 
facilities. Mack pointed to the ‘strangeness’ of requiring a privatized museum to act 
economically irrational by remaining closed on Sundays.465 When the privatization of the 
museum was discussed in the municipal council, for example, the faction reminded the coalition 
that privatization implied letting go control, and if the municipality wanted the museum to 
function autonomously, it also had to grant it the autonomy to decide its own course in terms 
of opening hours as long as it proved to be economically realistic (Pro 2012c). Here, as well, 
the faction emphasizes that the privatization of the museum also implies its autonomy. In other 
cities as well––Amsterdam being an example––an extension of shop openings is discussed in 
reference to individual liberty rights. Beyond that, modernization seems a second motive. In 
Amsterdam, D66 and GL have expressed that it is their aim to facilitate a 24/7 economy and 
 
463  Accommodation and liberty, in his view should thus be balanced in the sense that people should have 
the freedom to start initiatives on Sunday while at the same time, choosing forms that were not too provocative 
in the local context. Furthermore, he felt that the municipality itself should remain neutral on the matter while 
leaving room to an organic development at the level of society and private initiatives.  
464  To a certain extent, this liberal position as well as a stronger restriction on Sunday activities can be 
understood as somewhat in line with the compromise formula, given that it had confined the influence of the 
local government vis-à-vis the freedom of citizen and social organizations to act in liberty as well as agree on 
confines to such liberty. A compromise in the sense of type 2 by contrast, goes beyond that and expects people to 
internalize a compromise rather than act on the base of their liberties alone.  
465  “And there are such strange things happening, that one privatizes the museum to save money, but that 
one still wants to determine that it cannot be open on Sundays. Although […] especially in summertime when 
there are many tourists here, you have to be open on Sunday otherwise you do not earn money; that is real 
simple”. (Interview Mack 2013, 57-63). Once more, the logic that informs the provision of Sunday rest is not 
spelled out but contrasts it with a competing logic of economic rationality. By framing this attempt as “strange” 
and by spelling out the (violated) economic rationality for exploiting a cultural or recreational institution, he 
renders the religious principle incomprehensible and irrational. 
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spoke of the city’s image as a “vibrant international city” (D66 and GL 2014, 11).466 To a certain 
extent, this theme of modernization seems to also echo in interview partners’ references to 
making the town “more part of the world” (Interview Marieke 2014, 620). However, Pro has 
stressed that they do not view Sunday openings as such, but prefer to look at it from the 
perspective of being entitled to have the individual liberty to make a decision about the 
matter.467 After this explanation of the basic dynamic of the struggle about Sunday regulations, 
the next section engages in more detail with the motive of liberty and shows how, in the course 
of the political struggle for more social events in the town, the concern for rather concrete 
Sunday-freedoms has turned into a more general struggle for liberty.  
 
 
Figure 6: What do you like to do best on Sundays? Election campaign 2014 Pro, Bible Belt town. 
 
8.3.2.2 A Generalized Motive of Liberty 
In this section, I show how the struggle for recreational activities turned into a struggle about 
Sunday activities and, more generally, became a matter of liberty. Both the notion of Sunday 
and the theme of liberty thereby gained a symbolic charging that goes beyond the activities as 
such. In order to demonstrate this point, in this section I refer to an interview sequence taken 
from the second interview with Marieke, which I conducted shortly after the elections. In order 
 
466  The Amsterdam newspaper Het Parool, quotes D66 faction leader on the subject. While his main 
argument for extended opening hours is the liberty of shop owners and consumers, he also states that “also in 
other world-cities you could go to the supermarket at night; thus, why couldn’t you in Amsterdam?” (HetParool 
2015). 
467  It seems that recreational and cultural opportunities were of greater importance to Pro than shop openings. 
Possibly though, the theme of individual liberty opens the doors towards a more encompassing economic 
liberalization when, e.g., the logic of individual liberty is extended to large supermarket chains as well (Interview 
Marieke 2014, 217-223). On the other hand, such claims might be less ideologically informed than they are 
responses to the pull factor of supermarkets in neighboring municipalities, which, in contrast to local ones, are 
open on Sundays.  
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to understand the tone of the interview, it is important to consider the local situation after the 
2014 elections.  
As indicated, the Pro focused its campaigned with a strong focus on equality and the contested 
matter of the Sunday law. Eventually, the elections were both a great success for the party but 
were also deeply disappointing. The talks for a future coalition were led by the SGP, the town’s 
biggest party, and even though Pro had gained voters compared to the previous elections, it was 
not included in these talks. Eventually a new government was formed by SGP, CU, CDA, and 
VVD. Aside from being excluded from political power, Pro perceived its inability to participate 
in the coalition talks as a great injustice and as a breach of the democratic fairness of the political 
game. Moreover, Marieke felt that the new coalition was based on a gentlemen’s agreement 
that committed the VVD to abstaining from supporting Sunday openings (Interview Marieke 
2014, 117-126, 150-156) and the idea that the SGP, as the biggest party, could require that 
parties give up such principles for the sake of entering a coalitions, or even coalition talks, was 
very frustrating for them. It seemed that as long as the SGP remained the biggest party, they 
would be relegated to the opposition and that the political road for further liberalizations of 
Sunday was blocked.  
I met with Marieke shortly after the new coalition was formed and we spoke about the situation 
as well as her personal ambitions for the time after the elections. In that context, she also spoke 
about the symbolic importance of Sunday. I had asked her whether she would ever leave the 
town and as a first response, Marieke (Interview 2014, 578-582) stated that the idea of leaving 
seemed unfair to her, as a way of being driven out of her hometown by people who had just 
come there.468 She then came to speak about the difference between living in the town and being 
politically active there. Our following exchange and her elaborations, from which I quote 
selected parts below, show that the political struggle for more activities accelerated the 
perceived injustice of the regulations and thus translated the matter of Sunday activities into a 
struggle for liberty in a more generalized sense. Furthermore, the sections point to the 
interrelated positive and negative aspects of the motive of liberty. 
 
468  This probably refers to the place’s apparent increasing attraction for pietist reformed Christians. Here 
thus, one can see the relevance of the earlier mentioned theme of “belonging” and the distinction between local 
insiders and newcomers for the religious-secular dynamics in town (section 8.1). 
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no it is not so bad, no, but the difference between just living in [town name] and being in 
politics in [town name] and if you just live in [town name] and you just walk here and you 
think, o, //it's nice// it's nice, and it is. (Interview Marieke 2014, 582-586) 
At this point, I interrupted her, asking whether she really missed having more opportunities for 
things to do on Sundays in her everyday life, or whether it was merely the political work that 
had made her perceive that the Sunday regulations were unfair and undemocratic. Her first 
response emphasized the point of perceived political unfairness, but as she went on with her 
elaboration on the two themes, the desire for more sociability on Sundays and the frustration of 
being politically marginalized proved to be interrelated.  
so when we started and we said that we want [town name] to be gezelliger [social], like we 
want more life, being able to buy an ice-cream on a Sunday, […] the Sunday is not the 
problem, the Sunday is the symbol of well of eh () people trying to forbid someone else, that is 
the symbol, because it is Sunday I can forbid you to do something. (Interview Marieke 2014, 
611-624) 
The interview quote perfectly demonstrates the two aspects of the theme of liberty, the positive 
liberty to live one’s life according to one’s own standards, and, interrelatedly, negative liberty 
from an orthodox Protestant normative order. The desire for simple enjoyments on Sunday leads 
to feelings of being deprived of liberty, and this theme goes beyond the concrete matters of 
Sunday as such, and turns the Sunday into a principled question on which no compromises can 
be made. Ironically, the interview presents the dilemma of the conflicting interests by using an 
expression that is deeply symbolic for the confessional divides in the pillarized era, as well as 
the decline of orthodox Calvinism. The question of having or not having ice-cream on Sunday 
had once prominently distinguished Catholics from Protestants (Montfoort 1992). Within Dutch 
Protestantism moreover, the taboo break of having an ice cream on Sunday stands for a more 
encompassing decline of the once broadly shared orthodox Christianity. Kuitert, the mentioned 
liberal theologian and professor for ethics at the Free University who later prominently 
supported the liberalization of euthanasia, prominently wrote about the first time that he bought 
his children an ice-cream on Sunday, unrecognized and unbothered by those passing by. He 
interpreted this incident as a real deed, and as a sign of the vanishing of a shared Christian 
culture, centered around the church and a firm teaching, in which the Sunday ice-cream 
constituted a discernable act (Kuitert 1998, 15f. NRC 2002). Only recently, a high-ranking CU 
politician had to stepdown after a scandalized public statement, claiming that we should not be 
too strict with each other on the matter of Sunday ice cream (RD 2002b). The secular press 
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affirmed the symbolic gravity of his statement, suggesting that possibly the incident gave hope 
in a renewed CU with a “bit of same-sex marriage, a dash of abortion, and a cloudlet of 
euthanasia” (deVolkskrant 2002a). As such, her statements illustrate the two competing, 
equally principled positions, and their respective symbolized threats to each other. 
Giving the high importance of Sunday, the mentioned one-time Sunday-opening of the ice-
skating rink was celebrated as a break with the dominant order and a sign of a potential changing 
tide. In another part of the interview, Marieke echoes this sense of triumph.  
it was almost a revolution that the skating, that we could skate on a Sunday, there was this 
one Sunday that it was open the skate-hall right, and people were euphoric like almost 
euphoric, like yeaaah we can skate on a Sunday. (Interview Marieke 2014, 633-636) 
For Marieke, thus, the perception of political powerlessness accelerated the perceived injustice 
with respect to the local Sunday regulations. In contrast, in another interview with Alwie, the 
conservative character of the place was exactly that what also held a promise of liberty in a 
different sense. It is important to note that this second interview was nonetheless conducted 
prior to the elections. During the interview, we spoke about the local relevance of the Sunday 
Law which, as he told me, the national party considered a “dead letter” (Interview Alwie 2013, 
199). Later in the interview, I asked him whether he considered moving to a bigger city with 
greater liberties and his response showed that he also liked the intellectual challenge of the local 
debates about secularity as well as the uniqueness of the town in comparison to the national 
setup. Liberty, it seems, was not only something that was missing in the Bible Belt town, but 
also something that could be gained in a way impossible elsewhere. 
Well, it is something that really attracts me, because it is kind of typical that we are still 
resisting and confront- be confronted with the Christian powers in [town name]. In 
Amsterdam everything is already secularized […], but [town name] is well in that sense a bit 
of traditional and I think that is what gives interesting debates in the gemeenteraad [city 
council], it is something I really like, we are having discussions about things that they in Den 
Haag think are dead letters, but in [town name] it's really a thing, ^^ that motivates me. 
(Interview Alwie 2013, 401-406) 
What makes his statement remarkable is the reversed logic of modernization; his sense of 
specialness does not refer to being ahead of other cities in the sense of a national avantgarde, 
but of fighting for things that are considered part of the past in the center of the Netherlands. In 
my understanding, this sense of specialness derives from the fact that this time difference allows 
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him to link to a central part of the national history, and this makes the small-town part of this 
history while also making this history emotionally more accessible than the “taken for granted 
secular” politics in other places. My interviews also showed that others shared this sense of a 
local distinctiveness and took a certain intellectual joy from the principled debates which made 
values central to local politics, which for most parts were about small issues derived from 
national decisions as Marie put it (Interview Marie 2013, 276-291).  
In a different context, Alwie (Interview 2013, 439-452) pointed to politics as the only realm in 
which the distance to pietist reformed Christians could be bridged, and in which it was no 
problem to speak with each other. Thus, a different aspect becomes apparent in the sense that 
politics can also constitute an arena in which the heteronomy of religious orthodoxy is 
experienced and religious-secular divides can be produced or accelerated.  
8.3.2.3 A National Secular Initiative 
The events at the national level seem to have eventually taken a secular course, and in line with 
the more general shift in the dominant notion of secularity, emphasized individual liberty over 
the pluralist compromise course of the old Sunday Law. The plans to abolish the Sunday Law 
were eventually put to a halt after research into the legal meaning and factual importance of the 
law (TK 2015-16). The research showed that Dutch mayors were divided on the law’s factual 
importance and benefit, and the report further points to the possibility that Marieke and the 
members of Pro also feared: that the abolition of the law might allow municipalities to curb 
Sunday activities beyond what was possible under the current law. Some explicitly raised 
concerns that the abolition of the law would sharpen local conflicts. Taking all of this as well 
as the law’s symbolic importance for some parts of the population into account, the minister 
did not support the initiative. Although the minister in charge had announced intentions to 
develop a different bill, D66 took it upon itself to develop a new bill that took a different 
approach to the matter (TK 2016a, NOS 2016a).469  
The bill takes up the distinction between religious and secular notions of Sunday elaborated 
with respect to the interview quotes above. It claims that the law’s purpose of regulating Sunday 
observance and Sunday rest, regardless the specific balance sought by it, conflicted both the 
separation of church and state and the principled equality of all religions and worldviews (TK 
 
469  It seems that this was taken up in 2016 by his successor in office.  
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2016a).470 The bill further distinguishes between Sunday rest (zondagsrust) and public rest 
(openbare rust). Under Sunday rest, it understands a state when everyone is following strict 
Sunday observance and hardly any public activities are noticeable. Regulations aiming at the 
provision of Sunday rest were thereby likely to breach the liberty of people with different 
religious or nonreligious ideas. Public rest, by contrast, did not concern rest from human 
activities or social life, but the absence of noise and high traffic volumes. While larger events 
might be considered disturbances of public rest, normal sport activities as well as events taking 
place within buildings could hardly be seen to have a greater impact on the public rest than, for 
example, the comings and goings of people before and after church services. Moreover, given 
that local governments were supposed to be neutral with respect to religious and worldview 
commitments, they should be able to secure public but not Sunday Rest. Furthermore, the 
initiators suggested a complementing reform of the municipality law to ensure that sport and 
recreational activities are not restricted through communal regulations.  
Compared to SGP’s reasoning, the distinction here between Sunday observance and Sunday 
rest is rendered irrelevant given that the Sunday law places regulations on Sundays that are at 
least partly in line with the notion of Sunday observance. Different from the motive to 
compromise between religious and secular interests, the abolition of the Sunday law aims at a 
principled separation of church and state. Similar to the secular notion of Sunday rest as a time 
for recreation, the bill also adapts an immanent frame in the sense that it makes no qualitative 
distinction between religious and nonreligious activities, but rather considers both to be 
individual preferences and possible sources of noise and traffic load. Thus, it neither bans sport 
nor work on Sundays but places church bells in the same negotiable situation as sport events. 
Different from the notion of the Sunday as a day of recreation, though, the bill does not oppose 
Sunday work or shop openings—the notion of public rest does not prohibit individual labor. 
Therefore, the stance of public rest goes beyond the secular notion of Sunday rest, as it abolishes 
Sunday’s special character, which had been inherited from the Christian tradition of Dutch 
society. In its centralist character, the bill would also have bearings on the local situation as it 
would insist on the application of a secular approach to Sunday regulations.  
At the time of writing, however, the bill had yet to be voted on in the Second Chamber. A 
parallel initiative to abolish Sunday Law by the VVD minister of the interior from 2016 (the 
 
470  The initiators explicitly distinguish themselves from the alleged motive of the government bill to 
decentralize responsibility in matters of Sunday rest (see also (TK 2016b). It further states the intent to prevent 
municipalities from making respective regulations themselves. 
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announced response to the first D66/ VVD motion) was withdrawn during Rutte’s third cabinet 
(VVD, CDA, D66 and ChristenUnie; since 2017), and, more specifically, the D66 minister of 
the interior K.H. Ollongren (TK 2016c, TK 2017).471 According to the Reformatorisch 
Dagblad, this had been one of the Christian parties’ demands during the coalition negotiations 
(RD 2018b). The consequences of this for D66’s are not clear at the time of writing (August 
2018). 
With respect to national politics, Sunday Law is not the only example of ongoing contestations 
about the role and protection of Sunday in Dutch law. The law on shop openings has become a 
renewed matter of negotiation after the fall of the purple cabinet and different initiatives have 
offered local governments varying possibilities. In 2010, under Rutte’s first cabinet (2010-
2012), and under the responsibility of CDA minister M. J. M. Verhagen, the regulations 
regarding Sunday openings were tightened, giving way for the protection of Sunday rest (EK 
n.d.-i, TK 2008-09).472 Later the restrictions were undone by a legislative change initiated by 
D66 and the Greens, which also increases the autonomy of municipalities in the matter (EK 
n.d.-h).473 Consequently, Pro asked the government to investigate the local interests with respect 
to Sunday activities rather than simply stating deciding on the matter, but found no support for 
their claim (Pro 2013c). While in the case of Sunday law the decentralization endangered 
secular interests, here it seemed to create an opportunity for the party. 
In sum, the contestations about Sunday law show how the local dynamics again contrast 
national ones, in the sense that the secular constitutes a minority position. Already in the section 
on the local school struggle I showed how Pro members claimed their equal (parity) right to 
choose the education that best suited their values. In that sense, their struggle did not challenge 
the pluralist logic of education. The confessional organization of care, though, was, at least in 
the context of the massive social cuts, seen as an obstacle to economic rationality and the equal 
provision of care for all. With respect to the case at hand, the pluralist logic of the Sunday law 
is even of utmost importance to safeguard secular interests against a Christian majority—at 
 
471  This bill also foresaw reforming the municipality law to safeguard sport and recreational events on 
Sundays (TK 2016c). 
472  The introduction to the law laments the increased extension of Sunday shop openings and the excessive 
use of the tourism clause, stating that the original ban was increasingly undermined, harming vulnerable goods 
such as Sunday Rest, livability, security, and public order. Accordingly, the legislative amendment formulates 
conditions for using the tourism clause and requires municipalities to also consider the mentioned vulnerable 
goods in determining opening hours. 
473  They have scrapped the tourism clause and merely grants municipalities the freedom to decide what 
exceptions should be granted to the ban on Sunday shop openings. The law in the published version is signed by 




least this seemed to be the advantage of the Sunday law when compared to the decentralization 
of Sunday regulations. In contrast, the more recent D66 national bill would nationally assert a 
secular course and thus shift the balance towards the secular side, that is, towards an individual 
liberty model (based on the liberty of municipalities).  
8.3.3 Contested Secularity 
The question of Sunday rest was not the only example of the religious imprint on governance 
in the town. A second example was the practice of an official prayer at the beginning of council 
meetings. In preparation for the campaign, party members discussed whether or not to stand up 
during the prayer, again leading to different notions of respect being placed against each other. 
While they felt at ease with standing up out of respect for a prayer, its official place in the city 
council meeting and apparent obligatory character had changed this sign of respect into one of 
subordination. 
yea, we still, and it is also a kind of respect and if people would like to do a prayer, I don't 
mind and I like to give them the possibility to do so, but […] when it is part of the meeting and 
it is also written in the protocols of our meetings […] then I am pressured to be part of it, but 
I don't like to be, well I don't mind as well, but it is kind of a principled thing. I would like to 
resist. (Interview Alwie 2013, 582-588).  
Here as well, the law seemed to be on their side, given that in 2006 the then-minister of the 
interior had sent a letter concerning the matter to all Dutch the municipalities. The letter stated 
that if the prayer is part of the official council meeting this constitutes a violation of the principle 
of church-state separation as derived from Articles 1 (nondiscrimination) and 6 (freedom of 
religion) of the Dutch constitution.474 Alwie respectively argued that the prayer showed the 
theocratic orientation of the SGP. 
it is a theocraty, do you know the word? //hm// it is all given by God, and I think above the 
law for them is God, and God is all-knowing, and he is well, even higher than the law. that is 
why we also pray at the beginning of our (board)meetings (Interview Alwie 2013, 566-574) 
The opposition to standing up was accelerated by the fact that this demonstration of respect had 
once been a bargaining chip in the mentioned historical compromise between CDA, SGP, and 
Pro. Before that compromise, the faction had remained seated during the prayer, and Pro only 
 
474  The letter is apparently the reply to more encompassing secular concerns because it states that as long as 
no one is forced (e.g., by procedure) to take part in the prayer or demonstrate respect for it, and if it was placed 
before and after the official meeting, it did not contradict the separation of church and state (NGB 2006).  
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agreed to stand as part of the coalition agreement. In a conversation with one of the older party 
members, I could sense her bitterness over the fact that while they were now in the opposition, 
they would still stand up, but now without any compensation. Others, by contrast, felt that their 
flexibility in this point could still be of benefit for them in other matters.475 
We play along. […] If we did not, or come late for the prayer everyone would notice and that 
would not help us […] so it is a ritual you have to go along with to keep everything peaceful, 
and you want to be able to talk about SGP people later, about things that really matter, and 
the prayer, this really isn’t what things are about (Interview Mack 2013, 675-686). 
In sum, both the local dealings with Sunday rest as well as the official prayer in the city hall are 
examples of a Protestant Christian imprint on local politics and as such they are core issues in 
a struggle for secularity. Thus, it was no surprise that the notion of state neutrality was made an 
overt topic in the 2014 municipal elections, and Pro and the SGP were the main opponents. 
While the SGP elaborated its theocratic ideal, Pro stressed an ideal of a neutral municipality. 
SGP’s 2014 election program outlines a plan of governance under men’s dependency on God, 
and it further confines the scope of politics to the ten commandments said to constitute a guide 
for daily life conduct as well as politics. The Pro program claimed a “neutral municipality” that 
serves all its citizens, it withholds from making religious- or worldview-based truth claims, and 
from using them as a base for policies (Pro 2014). Thus, the theme of state (or municipality) 
secularity is explicitly linked with the individual equality of all citizens.  
8.3.4 Intermediate Summary and Discussion 
In the previous section, the perceived subordination to certain Protestant norms was the 
consequence of the collective self-organization of religious groups and the consequential 
dwarfing of secular-public space. Conversely, this section dealt with more direct struggles about 
the public order. The focus was mainly on the contested notions of Sunday as this constitutes 
the core conflict issues where religious and secular notions are placed against each other. As 
indicated, the conflicting positions are thereby directly linked with competing notions of 
governance in the sense that a theocratic ideal of the mundane institutionalization of a Godly 
command is placed against the secular ideal of governing mundane diversity through and for 
 
475  Eventually, the election program from 2014 would refer to the minister’s letter, claiming to schedule the 
prayer shortly before and after the official meeting. At the same time, this was not seen as a principled point to 
assert in possible coalition talks but rather as something one could trade for more substantive matters (Interview 
Marieke 2014, 230-234).  
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the sake of liberty. Beyond such a basic distinction “individualist” and “pluralist,” compromise-
centered secular positions can be discerned. 
Both this as well as the previous section showed the importance of equality and liberty as core 
motives in the party’s struggle for public education and a secular approach to Sunday. Both 
sections further emphasized the pluralist logic of the local dynamics—be it in the sense of the 
pluralist school setting and the consequential confessionalization of education or in the sense 
of the Sunday Law and the local historical compromise that sought to balance competing 
interests by partitioning the day. This centers on an ideal of compromising, and this pluralist 
logic resonates with type 2 of the multiple secularities’ typology. However, the freedom to 
choose (the education type of one’s preference or how one would like to spend Sunday) 
argument and the claim to be free from (religious) rule have a more individualist logic, which 
resonates with type 1, even if the realization of positive liberty for educational choices depends 
on collective mobilization. With respect to education I would conclude that a pluralist logic 
dominates the institutional setting, and the strategies of obtaining public education. With respect 
to the issue of Sunday rest, the traditional pluralist regulation seems to be challenged from 
different sides: on the one hand, by the apparent growth of pietist Calvinism and the—at the 
time impending—abolition of the Sunday Law and decentralization of political competences 
with respect to Sunday regulations; on the other hand, by a liberal-individualistic approach to 
the Sunday balance. The two principles thus seem to stand in mutual tension. 
In what follows, I focus more closely on the election campaign and how both the pluralist 
dynamic and the emphasis on individual liberty and equality are interrelatedly played out during 
it.  
8.4 Pluralist and Individualist Aspects of the Election Campaign  
This section shows how party’s election campaign responded to the pluralist dynamic in the 
town while also asserting a principle of individual liberty and equality. First, it centers on the 
party’s attempt to mobilize non-orthodox voters and relates this to the theme of non-
confessionals’ structural disadvantage. Second, it shows how the party envisioned a complete 
reversion of the local relations of secularity, attempting to achieve this through a focus on the 
theme of individual liberty. Consequently, the party emphasized the compatibility of such 
individual liberty and equality frame with liberal Christianity as a means to counter a binary 
divide between orthodoxy and irreligion.  
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8.4.1 Mobilizing a Secular-Liberal Electorate 
A number of years before my research in 2008, the Bible Belt town had made national headlines 
after a column by Marieke, originally published on the party website, gained wider publicity 
via a local news site476 and local media. In the column Marieke had spoken about the increasing 
strength of orthodox reformed Christians in the town.477 She mentioned that this group was 
successful in realizing their interests because of their strong links to both each other and the 
church. She urged progressive people to view such a form of self-organization as an example 
to also build better forms of cooperation. Otherwise, she warned, there would be political 
consequences given that the influence of the orthodox-reformed Christians in town was 
increasing. Her statements caused quite some controversy in the town. Marieke said that for 
half a year she was approached in public by people commenting on the matter both positively 
and negatively. Some readers left comments on the website that had distributed her post, calling 
upon people to vote for Pro, referring to the separation of church and state, and partly offering 
theological arguments against orthodox Protestantism (UB 2008a, b). Others criticized Marieke 
for polarizing social relations and for creating a negative image of the orthodox Christians.  
Leaving the details of this local scandal aside, this case is interesting as it related to a sense that 
the town’s nonreligious or secular residents were insufficiently organized and thus facing a 
disadvantage when compared to orthodox Protestants. Previously in the section on the local 
school struggle I pointed to this sense of lacking an efficient degree of organization. Some felt 
that this was the reason why there still was no public school while the orthodox reformed had 
managed to receive a school for themselves. In the wake of the 2014 elections, this theme once 
again re-emerged, now centering on the diverging degrees of political activism and commitment 
among different population groups.  
With the breakup of the 19th century pillarized organizations, commitment to political parties 
has declined both in terms of membership and voting behavior. In the first half of the 20th 
century, elections often came down to the census, which determined the numerical strength of 
different population groups (Thomassen, Aarts, and van der Kolk 2000, 20-22, Voerman 2004, 
7). Since the decline of the confessional system, elections bring much more changes with 
respect to individual party seats, and both Voerman and Thomassen et al. conclude that with 
 
476  This site, uitbarneveld, had been co-founded by Alwie before he became a member of Pro. 




increasing voter volatility parties can be less sure of expected votes.478 Furthermore, since the 
abolition of the duty to vote in 1970, voter turnout has fallen, with turnout for municipality 
elections ranging between 57.7 and 73.7 (Voerman 2004, 7f.).479 Voerman (2004, 12) concludes 
that parties were no longer the “political expression of a clearly defined worldview or clearly 
demarcated collectivities such as in the past times of pillarization.” Repeatedly, these 
developments are discussed as signs of a crisis of the party; D66 though has traditionally 
welcomed the de-confessionalization of politics (Koole 1988). At the time of the party’s 
foundation, pillarization seemed the model of the past, and in 1994 when party membership 
rates had dwindled below 3 %, the party’s election program praised the end of the old 
emancipation parties and the beginning of new types of parties. This new type, of which D66 
had been a pioneer, function like a small organization that offers a political product and is 
evaluated for that during each election anew.  
Thus, a flexibility of voting behavior, and the breakup of identity-based ties with a certain party 
was considered beneficial for the democratic process. In the local situation in the Bible Belt 
town, however, this flexibility created insecurity and disadvantage in the political competition 
with the SGP. Generally speaking, the orthodox Christian parties are considered an exemption 
from this trend of political depillarization (Voerman 2004, 4). In particular, the SGP has had a 
stable electorate (nationally around 2 %) since its foundation, and this stability is derived from 
its rootedness in several orthodox-reformed churches.480 As such, the party seems to represent 
the allegedly outdated confessional model and this renders it a comparatively strong political 
competitor.481 Pro has nonetheless explicitly pointed to SGP’s alleged over-proportional 
mobilization power as a challenge for their own electorate as well as non-orthodox voters in 
general.  
As part of their election campaign Pro published a short video in which it tried to convince 
potential voters of the importance of voting by exploring the consequences of different voter 
turnouts. It explains: “20% of the inhabitants of [town name] are orthodox reformed. They 
always go to vote, and almost always for the SGP. Now the SGP has 8 of 31 seats.” In the case 
 
478  Also the percentage of people that are members of political parties has declined from 13.9 % in 1948 to 
6.7 % in 1967 (Voerman 2004, 3). In 2003, only 2.6 % are members of a political party. 
479  While the turnout in 2014 averaged 54 %, in the town of this case study it was at 71.51% (Kiesraad).  
480  According to the dnpp this is mainly: Gereformeerde Gemeenten, de Oud-Gereformeerde Gemeenten, 
delen van de Christelijk-Gereformeerde Kerk, de Hersteld Hervormde Kerk en de ‘Bonders’ binnen de 
Protestantse Kerk in Nederland (PKN). 
481  Given their small overall number, this alleged mobilization power makes no difference at the national 
level other than the SGP representing a particular national minority. 
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of 100% voter turnout, the SGP would receive only 6 seats, a turnout of 60% it would get 10 
seats, and if the turnout would fall to 40%, the SGP would receive 16 seats and thus have an 
absolute majority in the city council. Respectively, the video concludes by urging people to go 
out and vote by any means. During campaign events, I repeatedly overheard this same argument 
being made in conversations with possible voters, always with the message that even if they did 
not vote for Pro, it was still important to vote. Therefore, a core aim of the campaign was to 
reach beyond the party’s electorate and stimulate voter participation in general.  
The comparison with orthodox reformed as a strong competitor creates a certain pull towards 
confessionalizing the secular, at least in the sense of comparing it with religion as the model 
case. At a party event, e.g., a Pro member spoke about motivating his friends to vote in the 
upcoming elections and then argued that this was difficult given that they had no churches 
where everyone met, in contrast to the SGP electorate, as they only had sport clubs. This shows 
that here churches are framed as a place for the distribution of ideas and as an anchor point for 
collective self-organization for which no secular equivalent seems to be immediately available. 
I tried to understand why, in his view, these sport clubs could not function in the same way and 
his point was that although there were people from different secular parties, as well as liberal 
Christians, it was simply not a place where people discussed politics. This assessment is 
interesting especially because certain cultural and recreational locations in the town were at 
other instances well perceived as places where people could meet people with likeminded views 
given that they were shunned by orthodox Christians. Such an identity as a progressive part of 
the population though is apparently not identical with a political self-understanding, or at least, 
these places do not function as sites of political mobilization. Similar to the case of care, here 
the strength of local Protestantism renders the church a mobilization base for politics, a model 
with which other parties have to compete. When during a street campaign a person from a 
liberal church expressed her support for Marieke, the latter replied: “well great, that is good, 
and say that in your church as well” (diary note).  
However, while Pro calls upon a certain “we” that should cooperate more closely, this is not a 
we in the sense of a clearly defined collective identity or party electorate. Rather, it includes all 
those who are not part of the orthodox reformed—not the strict but the rest of the population. 
The forms of collaboration however might then be more or less close, requiring collectively 
shared self-understandings and aims to different degrees.482 In what follows, I focus on the 
 
482  An initiative for a public school is then different from the mobilization of non-orthodox voters.  
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second aspect of the campaign, the emphasis on individual liberty and equality. Equality was 
thereby interpreted in a way that challenges the autonomy rights of Christian institutions and 
traditional exemption rights for religious people. 
8.4.2 The Ideal of Equality in Relation to Religion 
As mentioned, equality (gelijkwaardig) has been one of three core points of the party’s election 
program.483 More importantly though, the issue was given an individualist and universalist twist 
when compared to how my interview partners positioned in their struggle for public secular 
education. In my interviews claims for equal liberty were presented in a pluralist logic, without 
the autonomy of Christian schools or religious education in itself was challenged. In that sense, 
I spoke of their struggle being based on the logic of type 2 of the multiple secularities’ typology. 
On the contrary, in the election campaign, Christian institutions and traditional exemption rights 
were challenged in the name of individual liberty and equality. The program claims, e.g., the 
stimulation of inter-school cooperation beyond ideological divides and aimed at social 
cohesion—a point which clearly challenges the idea of school autonomy. Furthermore, echoing 
Art 1 of the Dutch constitution, the chapter on equality starts with the following section: 
The municipality must not discriminate between people. If you are man or woman, poor or 
rich, autochthone or allochthone, homo or hetero, religious or secular: everyone must have 
equal chances. And everyone must be able to life his or her life according to his or her liking 
within the boundaries of the law. (Pro 2014, 35)  
Given that it is exactly the principles of gender and sexual equality in the name of which 
religious autonomy and exemption rights are confined at the national level, this obvious 
reference to the constitution positions the party in opposition to the SGP. Accordingly, the 
program claims that the municipality should contribute to the acceptance of sexual diversity by, 
e.g., encouraging the obligatory integration of sexual diversity education in schools, and by not 
employing marriage registrars who conscientiously object to same-sex marriages. A Facebook 
post during the campaign emphasized the position on civil servants with conscientious 
objections (“weigerambtenaren”) (Figure 7). When I asked Marieke about this post, she stated 
that the post had been controversial and that not everyone agreed with it, but that for them this 
is just the way of saying that everyone was equal and that there were general laws a civil servant 
had to follow. The previous section on the Sunday Law has demonstrated the importance of the 
 
483  The two other points were “green” and “social.” Under the header of equality, five points are listed: a 
liberal approach to the Sunday, a neutral government, education as a base and close to home, sport brings the 
society into movement, and culture is social capital.  
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secular validity of general laws, and here this importance was stressed by the reference to the 
national debate. The equality of homosexuals thus becomes a token of equality in a more 
general sense, and, as such, functions as a point of identification in the emancipation struggle 
of a secular minority.484 Beyond that, as mentioned, the party emphasized the principle of 
church-state separation and claimed that the prayer should no longer take place during the 
council meetings as such (Pro 2014, 36).  
From what I was told by Alwie (Interview 2013, 662-680), it had not been clear from the onset 
whether to focus on the issues of the weigerambtenaren official prayer as part of the election 
program; Marieke had also been hesitant. Eventually, the themes were included, with some 
party members using the rationale that this position could be used as a bargaining chip in favor 
of securing other issues during the coalition formation process. Marieke (Interview 2014, 230-
235) further elaborated, that a polarizing a campaign had both strategic advantages and 
disadvantages. While their mutual polarization had in the past resulted in electoral gains for 
both Pro and the SGP, it also hampered the formation of a coalition between the two parties. 
Likewise, the local dynamics and factual differences made it difficult to avoid polarization 
regardless of such strategic considerations.  
8.4.3 In Accordance with Liberal Christianity 
Another risk of a polarizing campaign was that it could be perceived as anti-religious and thus 
lose the support of liberal Christian voters. This was important given that the party hoped to 
win over voters from the CDA. Respectively, when the party publicly presented its election 
program it staged its principled position on individual liberty and equality in a way that 
emphasized its compatibility with liberal Christianity—a strategy that had been consciously 
chosen as a means to compete with the local Christian Democrats. Three locally known people 
had been invited to publicly receive the program, each of them active in a field that fit the three 
key points of the campaign. The person they chose as a representative for equality was a pastor 
from one of the (liberal Christian) churches in the town who worked on gender issues.485 In her 
speech, she stated that as a theologian she felt honored to be invited to speak in such a neutral 
 
484  All in all, I was surprised about the campaign’s focus given that in particular issues of sexual diversity 
did not appear that central to the party when I started my research. While writing I also worried that my own 
presence and initial assumption that these issues would have a local resonance might have also been influential 
and one factor that pushed them towards such principled positioning. 
485  Resonating with what had been said above, a first idea was that a same-sex couple would receive the 
program on equality, but the idea was dropped when they could not think of a locally prominent same-sex 
couple. A somewhat jokingly made further suggestion was to choose a homosexual pastor. Also the other two 
representatives chosen were active in some church.  
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and secular space. Furthermore, she reflected on the principle of equality within the Christian 
tradition, stressing its importance, while also criticizing its recurrent violation with respect to 
the treatment of women, slaves, or homosexuals. The message to be delivered at the event was 
that a commitment to liberal values was not necessarily in opposition to religion, but could 
rather be explicitly supported from a Christian position.  
Additionally, a generalized opposition to religion was cautiously avoided at other events during 
the campaign. Alwie (Interview 2013, 708-712) told me that Marieke had hoped that he would 
take the religious oath when he was inaugurated as a member of the city council in order to 
show that there were also believers in the party. Alwie denied this request in order to stress his 
secular notion of politics. However, the line between a principled position on liberty and 
secularity on the one hand, and a public demonstration of anti-religiosity proved thin. On one 
occasion, Pro members were looking for a date to prepare giveaways for the campaign and a 
certain Sunday proved to be the only possible date. Marieke then joked that they could add a 
note stating “produced on Sunday.” The practicality of the Sunday undoubted, the previous 
section on the party-internal working group showed the delicacy of political gatherings on 
Sundays––a matter that goes beyond the local context (ch.6). Aside from the historical 
connotations, in the local context, having a political meeting on Sunday immediately became 
entangled in the local context and took on a relational meaning, a statement of pride or claimed 
freedom for some, while it might be read as a competitive or provocative positioning by others. 
At the least this shows that in a context where some religious claims are stated with 
absoluteness, the scope for indifference is dwarfed (Quack and Schuh 2017).  
 
 
 Figure 7: Campaign Post "Weigerambtenaren" Pro, Bible Belt town. 
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8.4.4 In the Opposition Again 
During the municipal elections, Pro received 18.74 % of the votes, a slight increase when 
compared to the previous elections. The SGP, the CU, and the local BI also gained votes while 
CDA and VVD lost. The SGP came out as the first party with 26.01 %, Pro was second, 
followed by the CU, the CDA, the BI, and the VVD. Despite this electoral success, the previous 
coalition of SGP, CU, and VVD announced its continuation the day after the elections without 
inviting Pro for coalition talks. Apparently the SGP leaders had expressed their determined 
objection to a coalition with Pro and their position as the biggest party seemed decisive.486 The 
SGP had allegedly argued that Pro had placed themselves outside the discussion by staging 
such a polarizing campaign and additionally, the Pro members recalled a statement by the SGP 
leader who had justified the decision not to hold formal talks with Pro by labeling such an act 
as mere theatrics.  
Pro members were indignant and offended and my interview partners perceived their exclusion 
as a breach of the political rules and democratic principles given that they had gained votes and 
represented a sizeable part of the local population. Beyond that, however, it also seemed to feed 
into the sense of subordination or imposed adaption given that they were excluded for 
expressing their standpoints in a principled way. Marieke stressed that she had not been more 
overt about her preference for individual liberty and equality than the SGP had been about its 
theocratic ideal, and that she had always been respectful in stating her view. Democracy should 
imply the possibility to express a position as a precondition of negotiating it later with other 
parties. When she approached the council after the decision was announced, she expressed her 
disappointment and stated that she had always learned that you are allowed to say everything 
you want as long as you say it in a friendly way and that this was what Pro had always been 
doing.  
Remarkably, during my interview with her, she had used a similar phrase when talking about 
her own as well as her children’s time and positioning in the Protestant high school. Some might 
interpret her emphasis on the right of respectful dissent during the interview as a mere political 
tactic, but I think this would underestimate the centrality of the theme in the interview, as well 
as the close entanglement of political struggles and lifeworld realities in the town. In my 
understanding, politics for her—at least in that moment—became a field of inter-religious 
contact and alienation similar to the experience in the school: less a public arena but a church 
 
486  The CU would have been interested in a coalition with Pro given that both parties focus on 
sustainability and are rather left on the local political spectrum. 
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setting where one has to adapt to the religious ideas. Marieke also felt their exclusion from the 
talks was something personal against her, and a form of punishment for inappropriate behavior. 
In the aftermath of the elections, she ended her political career and stepped down from the 
position of faction leader.  
In the course of writing this thesis, the legislative period has ended and a new city council was 
elected. In the years since the last election, a new generation has taken over the leadership of 
the party. The new election program was less principled; while the focus on state secularity and 
individual liberty and equality has not been removed, the overall tone is different. The program 
states that the boundaries of pillarization should be smoothened but with respect for the 
autonomy of parents in raising their children. For the debates on Sundays, it stresses the 
principle of individual liberty but in a softer tone, adding the ideal is a balance between those 
wanting Sunday rest and Sunday activities. In the elections, the party lost votes and came out 
with 15.5 % of the vote (Kiesraad n.d.). However, all other parties lost except for a new local 
party “Lokaal Belang” which was founded in 2016 and came out with 13.4 % of the vote. The 
local party positions itself as pragmatic and seems to avoid the polarized themes of the previous 
election.  
Eventually Pro has become part of a coalition together with SGP, CU, and the CDA. The 
coalition agreement places central focus on cohesion, stressing not individual liberty and 
equality but the ideal of an inclusive society in which one listens to each other and acts in 
solidarity despite mutual differences. Finally, the coalition agreement also entails the Sunday 
compromise formula, and, moreover, the aim to investigate the interest in public and humanist 
public education. Thus, eventually it seems that the model of pluralism, compromise, and parity 
has been restored, at the least on the level of political rhetoric.  
8.5 Summary 
At the beginning of this thesis, I described the historical emergence of a pluralist political field 
as a consequence of the emergence of orthodox Christian movements in opposition to the then 
dominant liberalism. I showed how the notion of an anti-thesis between belief and unbelief 
backed the orthodox attack on liberalism, as well as how the liberal notion of realms 
differentiated from religious and worldview divides was subordinated to the new confessional 
logic. To a certain extent, the members of Pro face a similar situation in the sense that against 
the background of legal provisions for institutional pluralism, the strength of local Christianity 
leads to a confessional logic in which the scope of public institutions is dwarfed and the secular 
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are integrated as another “confessional” minority. This struggle has been visible in the debate 
on public education and the concerns about the welfare reform. 
I showed how the combination of the institutionalized freedom of education and the Protestant 
majority in town led to a situation where Christian schools dominate the educational field, while 
secular public education is not only rendered a particular position within a pluralist setting, but 
where further demand for public education is too marginal to make it either a state responsibility 
or profitable for education providers. In that context, one Protestant school factually functions 
as a public school, which in the perspective of my interview partners harms the equality 
principle central to a public institution. The struggle for public education is linked with the 
ideals of liberty and equality, but are different from the tendencies at national level; the point 
is not to oblige religious schools to adhere to a universalized principle of individual liberty and 
equality, and neither to a strict differentiation between religion and science. Rather it is the 
secular minority’s struggle for parity which seeks public education as a means of its own equal 
standing and as a means to raise their children with these values.  
Additionally, with respect to the organization of social care, and in the context of budget cuts, 
the collective self-organization of Christians leads to concerns over a consequential 
marginalization of the secular public in a structurally pluralist setting. Conversely, the planned 
budget cuts also stir up criticism of the allegedly costly pluralization of care and, consequently, 
both Christian and secular parties guard their interests and prevent a possible marginalization 
of subordination. The more or less implicit competition over resources was accelerated by 
budget cuts and the responsibility shift from state to societal level. While strict communal 
churches are somewhat prepared to fulfill these tasks, equivalent institutions are lacking and 
would further imply a communalization of life rather than the individualization enabled by the 
welfare state.  
In both examples the conflict relates to dynamics of secular-religious competition (Stolz 2010) 
in a traditionally pluralist setting. The freedom of educational liberty is, as mentioned, 
constitutionally secured; with respect to care, SGP and ChristenUnie have successfully lobbied 
for an integration of a freedom to choose principle in the national framework for the 
decentralization (Haga n.d.). Given their minority position at the national level, this is meant to 
secure the enduring existence of religious care; thus, in the context of the reversed majority 
relations in the Bible Belt town, it is secular people who fear marginalization.  
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Besides the dynamics of confessionalization and the consequential dwarfing of the secular 
public, this chapter suggested that the local struggle for secularity concerns also a second aspect 
of Protestant dominance: the direct influence of Protestant Christianity on the general public 
order. With respect to this second point, the question of Sunday Rest and legitimate Sunday 
activities is central. Once more, the national legal frame constitutes the background of a pluralist 
compromise between the competing positions. The Sunday Law thereby stems from a period in 
which religious and secular concerns were balanced, and while perceived as outdated by liberals 
at the national level, it safeguards secular interests in the Bible Belt. I showed how in the context 
of a restructuring of municipality budgets, and in the light of a possible abolition of the pluralist 
legal framework, this pluralist balance turns fragile, leading to a polarized struggle about 
secularity. On the one hand, the Pro party struggled to maintain the pluralist order against a 
Christian theocratic model, and, on the other hand, it also positions along the lines of a 
principled notion of individual liberty and equality. As a second example to illustrates the 
apparently insufficient public secularity, the chapter pointed to the practice of an official prayer 
at the beginning of council meetings. While Pro’s members had agreed to stand up at the time 
of the prayer as a part of the historic compromise, under the changing power relations they 
increasingly perceived the continued practice as a form of subordination and adaption to the 
growing public influence of orthodox Protestantism. All in all, the chapter’s second part shows 
how, for the members of Pro, the theme of equal liberty was interrelated with the themes of 
legality and democratic transparency given that, in part, the party members’ frustration was 
derived from the perception that the local government, in particular the SGP, used its political 
power to consciously go beyond the existing Sunday Law by banning or informally 
discouraging Sunday openings. This focus on legality can be understood as an emphasis of 
functional autonomy in the sense of type 4. Also with respect to economic rationality, as 
mentioned, the ideal of functional autonomy is played out in the party’s struggle for secularity. 
The focus on legality and economic rationality, seems to be less an autonomous motive, but 
rather closely entangled with––and in the case of legality even a precondition of––individual 
liberty. To a certain extent, but less dominantly, also the motives of modernity and progress 
(type 3) play a role in the party’s positioning.  
The chapter’s last section showed how both the pluralist dynamic as well as the ideal of 
individual liberty and equality found expression in the election campaign: the first in the 
perception of the political struggle and the structural disadvantage of a secular party which no 
longer rests on a strong community, and the second in a campaign that stressed an individual 
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liberty and equality, which has gained dominance at a national level but has been at least 
symbolically (and possibly in reality) reversed in the local majority relations. 
 
Table 14: Election Results Bible Belt town (selective) (Kiesraad n.d.). 
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9 Overall Summary and Discussion 
This last concluding chapter starts with a detailed chapter-by-chapter summary of the thesis and 
proceeds with a discussion of this thesis’ findings.  
9.1 Summary  
The thesis centers on D66’s history to trace several shifts in the dominant notion of secularity 
in the Netherlands. The main shift described in this thesis occurred in the late-20th century and 
especially in the “purple period” of the 1990s and early 2000s. In reference to the multiple 
secularities approach by Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), it can be described as the shift 
from an institutionalized arrangement of secularity that focused on the pluralist accommodation 
of religious-nonreligious diversity––described as pillarization in other literature––to a model of 
secularity, centered on individual liberty and equality. The pluralist model understands people 
to belong to groups, including worldview groups, and it seeks to harmonize competing ideals 
and interests of religious and nonreligious groups through pluralist and parity-based 
arrangements. The individualist model, by contrast, understands diversity in an individualist 
way in the sense of understanding the individual as a carrier of liberty and equality rights, and 
it seeks legal and institutional arrangements that safeguard this liberty vis-à-vis the state and 
other groups. Again referring to the multiple secularities approach, I illustrate that both models 
of secularity are differently interrelated with the ideal of functional differentiation and the 
autonomy of differentiated realms. The pluralist model further understands also functional 
realms to be co-determined by such harmonizing and pluralist logic while the individualist 
model of secularity is positively interrelated with notions of functional differentiation.  
Besides, the thesis centers on the field of integration politics to analyze a recent challenge to 
the functionalist and individualist model of secularity, posed in the name of a third model of 
secularity that centers on national unity and defense and construes the nation in opposition to 
Islam as both Christian and secular. This national-cultural defense against Islam has had its 
institutional imprint but it is also still contested by the rearticulation of a functionalist-
individualist model of secularity.  
D66’s project of secularity centers on the values of individual liberty and equality as well as on 
the idea of a functional differentiation of society, respectively the autonomy of different social 
realms from religion. While both aspects matter to the party and are interrelated, depending on 




The political party D66 was founded in Amsterdam in 1966 by people dissatisfied with the 
political system and the existing parties. The period was characterized by the decline of the 
confessional model that had emerged in the second half of the 19th century and D66 contributed 
to this more general development by claiming the deconfessionalization of politics in the name 
of genuine democracy.  
D66 was not from onset labeled a liberal party. Some of the D66’ founders self-positioned 
between the existing liberal party and the social-democrats and aimed to succeed the Dutch 
social-liberal party that had merged into social-democracy in mid-20th century. This social-
democratic self-positioning however remained a subordinate faction and at the time of its 
foundation, it was positioned as pragmatic, a term that emphasized the opposition to 
confessional––that is principled––politics. Only since the 1970s, the party is gradually 
understood as social-liberal.  
Besides its claim for secular politics, and especially in its later history, the party became a 
central promoter of individual liberty and equality as the prime principle of governance and 
law, placed against residuals of religious establishment as well as religious autonomy- and 
exemption rights institutionalized as part of the confessional model. The party has advanced 
such an individual liberty and equality frame to advance the situation of homosexuals, to defend 
the equality of religious and nonreligious people, as well as for the sake of individual autonomy 
over end-of-life decisions. The party further approached also the integration of Muslim 
migrants and their descendants from a functionalist and individualist perspective. Here, it 
mainly competes with an anti-Islamic movement that construes the nation as both secular and 
Christian vis-à-vis Islam and questions the adequacy of the functionalist-individualist model 
with respect to Islam.  
All in all, this thesis presents D66 as a core agent of Dutch secularity in the sense that the party 
has recurrently issued and pushed for legislation that removes Christian influences from law 
and curtails religious autonomy- and exception rights in order to achieve the equal liberty of 
homosexuals, nonreligious people, or individuals more generally. The thesis combines a 
historical focus on the shifts in the dominant model of secularity with a comparative focus on 
different arenas of secularity. In what follows, I briefly summarize the historical chapters of 
this thesis as well as the case studies that complement this historic sketch and point to diverse 
arenas of secularity that simultaneously exist as part of the more general historical 
developments. Prior to this summary though, I briefly elaborate the thesis’ conceptual frame.  
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Theoretical Frame and Empirical Focus  
Conceptually, the thesis draws on and combines three distinct theoretical approaches that allow 
to analyze the contestedness of secularity from a value-neutral perspective while seeking to 
maintain the analytical insights of different critiques of secularism, and that further bring the 
diversity of secular or nonreligious positionings into perspective. In the first place, the thesis 
draws on Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt’s (2012) multiple secularities approach to focus on the 
problem constellations addressed and solved within different arrangements of secularity, the 
differentiational patterns of these arrangements, as well as the cultural ideas associated with or 
guiding such arrangements. In a slight modification of the authors’ typology, I have 
heuristically distinguished four types of secularity: Type 1 centers on religion from an 
individualist notion of social diversity and aims at safeguarding individual liberty and equality 
vis-à-vis groups and state. Type 2 centers on religion as something lived and shared in 
worldview groups. As a stance vis-à-vis the state, it can imply claims of collective autonomy, 
as a governance perspective it is aimed at the balancing of the competing perspectives and 
interests of worldview groups. Type 3 centers on the society, nation, or state as the most 
important social unit and is concerned about its progress or development, respectively its 
integration and defense. Type 4 is based on the notion of a functionally differentiated society, 
and thus stresses the autonomy of functional spheres or that of differentiated roles. As a 
governance perspective this type implies the focus on the functional integration of society. The 
positioning of D66, has been described in reference to types 1 and 4 of the multiple secularities 
typology.  
Second, the thesis draws on Quack’s (2014, 2013) diversity of nonreligion approach that points 
to differently related others of religion and allows to understand arrangements of secularity as 
also institutionalizing differentiations between different forms of nonreligion/ the secular. 
Quack’s approach further allows to focus on institutionalized differentiations between the 
secular as a neutral, autonomous and differentiated position on the one hand, and the secular as 
an irreligious antagonist of religion on the other hand, as well as on the contested labeling of 
concrete empirical positions.  
Third, the thesis refers to Bourdieu’s (2001, 2014) notion of the political field and the state to 
conceptualize the interrelated struggles about the secularity of politics and secularity more 
general. His notion of politics as a struggle about the dominant vision and division of the social 
world and his notion of the state as an institution in and through which particularistic positions 
are framed as general ones thereby links with the critiques of secularism without siding with 
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them, given that also competing models of social organization need to be understood through 
such a power-sensitive perspective.  
All in all, the notion politics of secularity refers first to the way in which competing parties seek 
political support for diverging notions of the appropriate relationship between politics and 
religion. Second, politics of secularity refers to the way parties can make use of their political 
power to change the relationship between politics and religion. While the term secularity 
implies a differentiation between religious and nonreligious realms, I use the notion politics of 
secularity more broadly, as to also include politics that counter such differentiations, given that 
they as well constitute part of political struggles about secularity.  
The overall focus of the thesis is both historical as well as directed towards the simultaneity of 
different arenas and arrangements of secularity. The historical focus on the different shifts of 
secularity is dealt with in three subsequent chapters which further differ in whether they focus 
primarily on the secularity of politics or the secularity of the state(’s laws). The three subsequent 
chapters each present one case study that zoom in on specific arenas of secularity. The first case 
study addresses the D66 party itself as an arena for negotiating the party’s secularity. The 
second and third case study each focus on two local settings and analyze how secularity 
becomes topical in the context of the campaigns for the local elections. In what follows I briefly 
summarize the individual chapters in order to then discuss the findings in the light of the 
conceptual frame. 
As outlined in chapter two, the thesis is based on a number of semi-structured interviews 
conducted during a ten-months stay in the Netherlands as well as on different kinds of material 
and data that could be accessed via online research. The research process and the data 
interpretation was thereby guided by the grounded theory approach.  
Chapter Summaries 
While chapter one outlined the theoretical perspective and chapter two the process of data 
gathering and interpretation, chapter three is the first historical chapter. It is divided in two 
parts, the first of which engages with 19th and early-20th century struggles between liberals and 
orthodox and thereby provides the historical background to the foundation of D66 by sketching 
the emergence of a pluralist model of secularity against which D66 positioned and which it 
helped to overcome. The focus on 19th century also allows to understand how, the emergence 
of a political field was from onset interrelated with a struggle about secularity, and how the 
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positions and divides of the political field gave expression to contested notion of secularity. The 
second part sketches the party’s foundation and early positioning.  
The period of mid-and late-19th century was characterized by the competition between liberals 
and confessionals, mainly orthodox Calvinists about the organization of the public-political 
spheres as well as that of other emerging social spheres, such as that of science. Liberals 
considered politics as a realm of the common and general, as a realm above particularistic 
religious divides and this claim for a common national political public oriented towards the 
continuity and unity of the nation as well as man’s universal rights. This ideal of a common 
public realm implied the privatization of religion in the sense that church teachings and interests 
were to remain outside the political sphere while as an individual source of inspiration religion 
could be linked with politics. The liberal project of secularity has been described in reference 
to types 3 and 4 of the multiple secularities typology in the sense that it entailed the notion of 
the public and political spheres as based on an autonomous logic, while at the same time aiming 
at the political integration of the nation. The notion of a “political morality” was mainly 
associated with a concern for political rule in accordance with the constitution as well as the 
common good.  
The liberal notion of a national public conflicted with the interests of orthodox Calvinists given 
that it rendered all those forms of Christianity sectarian or particularistic, which did not fit with 
liberal notions of a general religion above faith divide. Particularly controversial was that 
liberalism removed religious education in the form of the education in dogmatic knowledge 
from schools and substituted this with an education about general Christian values and virtues. 
While the liberal project of secularity provided a motive to an orthodox counter-movement, the 
liberal constitution from 1948 had changed the conditions of power struggles through 
introducing direct and census based suffrage for the Dutch parliament, which facilitated the 
emergence of a political field and eventually the mobilization along religion-related divides.  
Orthodox counter movements emerged beginning in the mid-19th century and in the latter half 
of the 19th century, successfully opposed the dominance of liberalism. Especially the Reformed 
antirevolutionary movement staged an intellectual and political attack on liberalism. While 
liberals opposed this movement as church-related and as a sectarian and minority position, the 
antirevolutionary leader Kuyper reframed politics as fundamentally religion-related and 
introduced the notion of an encompassing antithesis between belief and unbelief that shaped all 
realms including politics. Kuyper’s notion of a worldview struggle served as political 
mobilization strategy that led to a pluralization of the political field and further unpinned his 
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parity claims for orthodox reformed institutions and in addition to the pluralization of politics, 
these successful claims and the eventual compromise with liberals, laid the foundation of a 
pluralist model of secularity. The struggle about the secularity of politics was thus central to 
the struggle about secularity more general.  
The pluralist counter-model, in any case, centers on collective autonomy and a pluralist 
balancing of diversity (type 2) and it also compromises the notion of functional differentiation 
(type 4) with such a pluralism. The pluralist model is not limited to the balancing of religious 
diversity but rather constituted a pluralist accommodation of the (functional) differentiation of 
different realms and aims for national unity, and it could later––at the time of its decay––be 
widened to also include explicitly irreligious positions as equivalents to religion.  
The conflict between liberalism and the orthodox Reformed was not the only way in which 
religion-related divides were translated into competing positions in the political field. By the 
beginning of the 20th century, four different political strands had emerged: two confessional 
ones (Catholicism and Calvinism) and two secular ones (liberalism and socialism). 
Confessionalism was based on the binary distinction between religion and irreligion. 
Liberalism––at least as a political movement––however, positioned itself as being 
differentiated from particularistic (and private) worldview position and thus in opposition to 
the orthodox antithesis. Socialism again can be seen to have represented an irreligious position 
in politics in the sense that it positioned in a generalized opposition to religion (as illusionary) 
and further rivaled with it by understanding politics as a road to material, inner-worldly 
salvation.  
The historical (relative) defeat of liberalism against confessional movements of orthodox 
Calvinist and Catholic character led to the establishment of a pluralist model of secularity which 
integrated the neutral secular as a particularistic position alongside Christian confessions. This 
model had been challenged in the name of national unity and integration after the Second World 
War, but it remained without larger success. Since the 1960s though, many confessional 
organizations declined and this also motivated claims for the deconfessionalization of politics. 
Further, this period gave rise to an individual liberty and equality ideal in the name of which 
the pluralist model would be disestablished in the course of the 1990s and early 2000s.  
In the late-1960s, as mentioned, D66 positioned in the political field with a strong critique of a 
pluralist political system and the central role of the confessional parties therein. According to 
the party founders, these two factors hampered genuine democratic freedom as well as the 
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efficient functioning of politics as a system of collective action and decision making. The party 
opposed the quasi-ethical segmentation of an electorate into diverse pillars, which made it 
difficult to build majorities for matters on which the established parties were divided. Also more 
generally, the party founders claimed politics as secular (and distinct from religion and 
irreligion) in four interrelated ways: by aiming to shift its focus from the problem of balancing 
(religious-nonreligious) diversity to the problem of collective decision making and agency; by 
opposing the political mobilization and organization on the base of religious categories; by 
framing politics as an immanent and disenchanted realm, distinct from religious and religion-
like chiliasm; and by demarcating a common public-political realm against religious and 
religion-like sectarianism. The founders of D66 framed all established parties as adhering to 
outdated, distorted, and by tendency totalitarian ideologies. More importantly, they understood 
also the secular parties as insufficiently secular or “religion-like,” a critique that was mainly 
directed against socialism’s eschatological charging of politics, but in parts also against the 
liberalism’s eschatological charging of the market. The very notion of religion-likeness gives 
expression to an immanent understanding of the social world as well as of religion. The chapter 
briefly contrasted the party’s secular positioning with findings from election research of the 
time to illustrate how also the voters of D66 were deeply concerned with matters of secularity, 
with secular politics as well as with individual liberty.  
The party’s positioning as pragmatic, as mentioned, implied a counter-distinction from the 
Calvinist notion of the necessary religion-relatedness and “principledness” of politics. With this 
positioning, the party stepped into an established conflict with Christians about whether or not 
all positions were necessarily based in a worldview position and the party’s break-away from 
the notion of principles-based politics was respectively attacked as opportunistic and as lacking 
a vision for politics. The opposition to principled politics was not a generalized rejection of a 
political vision or a more general standpoint, but the founders felt that the time for such a vision 
was not yet there. Still, as the chapter depicted, also from inside the party, such a standpoint 
and clear profile was claimed and gradually also adapted. The chapter sketched the continuous 
tension between the aim to articulate such a standpoint and the caution against becoming 
ideological and dogmatic. This chapter traces the party’s claim for secular politics beyond its 
founding period and well into the 1990s.  
In the first place, D66’ call for secular and non-confessional politics was based on the concern 
with the efficiency of politics as a system of enabling collective decision making for the sake 
of world mastery. In that sense, the party’s project of secularity can be understood in reference 
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to type 4 of the multiple secularities typology, as a way of stressing the functional autonomy of 
the political realm. Respectively, the dominant role of the confessional parties was seen to 
impair the democratic freedom of individual voters, now primarily understood as political 
subjects rather than members of a certain worldview group.  
Beyond that, the party’s positioning also resonates with types 1 and 3 of the typology. The idea 
of democratization understood as part of a longer project of human emancipation, moving 
society and political culture away from paternalistic and oligarchic traditions also resonates 
with the theme of individual liberty and equality, while at the same time, this emphasis of 
societal progress also resonates with type 3 of the typology.  
To a certain extent the secularization of politics also constituted an empirical trend in the sense 
that the main confessional parties lost their absolute power position and, in consequence, 
merged into a single Christian Democratic party which also required them to find a common 
ground between their diverse confessional perspectives. This common ground was called a 
“political conviction” developed as a response to the gospel’s appeal and thus entailed a 
differentiation between religion and politics. Religious voices however have remained central 
in politics, and while the party has also in the 1990s centrally campaigned for a secular 
government, it seems that it no longer questions the legitimacy of the existing religious parties 
but has rather claimed a place within the political spectrum – yet in the opposite pole than the 
Christian parties with respect to immaterial matters. By contrast and as illustrated in chapter 
four, the party’s claim for state and legal secularity as a means to safeguard individual liberty 
and equality righty has been institutionalized in the course of the 1990s and early 2000s. While 
the pluralist model is also frequently challenged in the name of functional autonomy (type 4), 
it seems that it is especially with respect to the governance of diversity that a shift in the 
dominant model of secularity can be discerned. This might also be the case because the principle 
of functional autonomy has never been completely compromised.  
Chapter four deals the values of individual liberty and equality as D66’s second core motive 
for secularity, a theme that already emerged in the 1960s but gained centrality during the purple 
coalitions (1994-2002), and which was further interrelated with notions of functional 
differentiation. The principle of individual liberty and equality, as mentioned, implies an 
individualist way of perceiving and organizing social diversity and the chapter’s first part 
offers a brief review of 19th century struggles between confessional and liberals, to illustrate the 
contestedness of individualism. This first part points to three tensions between individualism 
and traditional and orthodox Christianity: 1) that between a self-determination of men and a 
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godly authority, 2) that between individual rights and the family as a social entity in its own 
right, and 3) that between individual equality and liberty and a social order based on 
complementary but different sexes and the normative restraint of sexuality within the confines 
of reproduction. The same part further sketches the changing political power relations in the 
party-political field since the 1970s and shows how the principle of individual liberty and 
equality became contested in debates about so-called “immaterial matters” concerning end-of-
life decisions as well as sexuality and gender relations. Since the late 1960s, individual liberty, 
autonomy, and equality became guiding values for different political movements such as the 
women’s movement. Later the emancipation of homosexuals and the integration of migrants 
challenged remaining institutionalizations of Christianity. All in all, the liberty of the equal 
individual vis-à-vis groups and state was recurrently stressed and this development also echoed 
in the legal recognition of non-discrimination and equal treatment principles.  
Generally speaking, the changes were partly welcomed and partly countered from within the 
confessional circles. In politics though, individualism remained an issue that divided religious 
and secular parties. While the orthodox Protestant parties tried to counter liberalizations of the 
immaterial matters, the Christian Democrats tried to depoliticize these matters, respectively to 
channel liberalizations in an overall pluralist and compromise-centered approach. D66 by 
contrast, was from the onset central to translating the rise of individualism to politics, and alike 
other progressives, it considered the Christian Democrats an obstacle to political reforms and 
respectively hoped and struggled for a secular government.  
The first part closes with a brief sketch of the equal treatment legislation from 1983 and 1994 
and it points to the debate about the equal treatment law in 1994 as characterized by the conflict 
between the established notion of secularity as a pluralist balancing of competing worldviews 
(type 2) and a principled assertion of individual liberty and equality (type 1). The same conflict 
pattern also shaped the negotiations about the opening of civil marriage to same-sex couples as 
well as other conflict about secularity. Until today these anti-discrimination regulations are core 
to determining the place of religion in Dutch society while at the same time these regulations 
and the adequate weighing of religious and other freedoms have been and remain contested.  
The second part of chapter four recalls the introduction of same-sex marriages in 2001 as a 
core example of the institutionalization of an individual liberty and equality frame. It points to 
the tensions between the idea of same-sex marriage and Christian objections to the formal 
recognition of same-sex partnerships. Most importantly though, it illustrates how the opening 
of civil marriage won over an alternative bill issued by the Christian Democrats that would have 
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recognized homosexual relations in a separate institution while retaining marriage as a 
heterosexual institution. By seeking to accommodate orthodox or “traditional” notions of 
marriage within a larger equal rights frame this alternative bill resonated with the pluralist 
model of worldview autonomy. Secondly and most recently, an individual liberty and equality 
frame was asserted against a pluralist model when in 2014 civil registrars were denied the 
possibility of religious objections to same-sex marriages, something which had been granted to 
them as a compromise since the opening of civil marriage.  
Aside from pointing to these legal changes, this part of the chapter also showed how the opening 
of civil marriage was consciously framed to fall within the already institutionalized notion of 
state-church separation, respectively the separation of civil and church marriage. It thus also 
states a secular self-restraint vi-a-vis the autonomy of religious organizations and this can be 
understood as a way of self-positioning as secular rather than irreligious. At the same time, the 
more recent change with respect to civil registrars obliges them concord with the secular 
character of civil marriage. This requirement is not only meant to safeguard the equality rights 
of homosexuals but also the negative religious freedom of heterosexual couples vis-à-vis the 
state as represented by the registrar.  
The third part of chapter four illustrates the assertion of an individual liberty and equality 
frame with respect to a second example – the legal acceptance of euthanasia, in the sense of a 
passive or active medical action that, on request of a terminally ill patient, accelerates his or her 
death. From the 1980s onwards, D66 supported a respective law and emphasizes the liberal 
focus on self-determination in the debate. Similar to the debate about a legal recognition of 
homosexual relations, also with respect to euthanasia, relevant changes happened within the 
religious field and through religious activities, yet still, the political debate still exhibited a 
religious-secular conflict line and especially the ideal of self-determination that motivated 
liberal positionings on the matters, was opposed by religious parties.  
In the bill supported by D66, liberty/ self-determination and equality constituted two central 
and interrelated motives. The shift from pluralism to individualism was most notably in the 
assertion of individual patients’ liberty against doctors’ conscientious objections by obliging 
them to refer patients with euthanasia requests to colleagues without principled objections. The 
shift further manifested in the assertion of patients’ liberty against objections from the sides of 
family members or relatives. The theme of equality by comparison mattered with respect to 
defending the legal reform against its critiques by framing it as the de-institutionalization of a 
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particular interpretation of) Christianity for the sake of an individual equal (moral) liberty in 
end-of-life decisions.  
Again, similar to the debate on same-sex marriage the debate on euthanasia, it seems, entailed 
an implicit negotiation over the qualification of this change. Politicians of D66 recurrently 
emphasized that the legal reform conformed with certain religious voices and gave expression 
to a moral concern with humanity in the context of technological and medical progress. These 
statements challenged the exclusive claim on Christianity articulated by the orthodox parties 
and further claimed legitimacy for a diversity of religious and nonreligious moral positionings 
with respect to end-of-life decisions. While politicians of D66 claimed to act on the base of a 
religious or moral conviction, just like their (orthodox) religious opponents, they also claimed 
that the law itself should not be based on a particularistic moral, but safeguard the moral 
autonomy of individuals. In the case of same-sex marriage, the legally codified distinction 
between church- and civil-marriage served as a reference point to claim that the bill merely 
advanced the neutral secular character of the state. In the case of euthanasia, the legal 
recognition of euthanasia was understood as a further differentiation of state-law from (a 
particular interpretation of) Christianity. 
The fourth part of chapter four complements the previous ones by showing that despite the 
contested shift from a pluralist to an individualist model of secularity, the competing parties 
agreed on a basic sense of political and state- secularity. The section analyzes debates about a 
scandalized expression the minister of public health made in the context of the euthanasia 
debate as well as her later murder, which, as argued, show such shared concern for politics as 
a realm in and through which people of diverse religious and nonreligious backgrounds can 
coexist and in which consequently religious and nonreligious passions must be tamed. The 
thesis argued, that this ethic of moderation resonates with the pluralist model of secularity and 
its concern for the balancing of diversity. While it seems that politicians of D66 as well commit 
to this moral ideal, they do so only with respect to inter-personal relations in politics but not 
concerning the process of legislation as such. In a later discussion about the Dutch blasphemy 
law in any case, party politicians once more asserted a liberty and equality model and 
successfully claimed the law’s abolition. 
The chapter’s fifth part sketch the power shifts after the fall of the second purple cabinet in 
2002 and points to the renewed political power of Christian parties in the Netherlands. It also 
illustrates the contestedness of both, the purple cabinets and D66: The secularizations of the 
purple cabinets alienated orthodox Christians and this also manifests in their perception of D66, 
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which is framed as irreligious. D66’ politicians by contrast, emphasize their ideal of a neutral 
and differentiated state, which would guarantee the equal liberty of all individuals. While D66 
is one of several secular parties that seeks to complete the purple period’s heritage, in particular 
orthodox Christians seek to counter the trend towards individualization and the secularization 
of state and law.  
Chapter five continues the chronological sketch while also shifting the focus to the field of 
integration policies as an arena in which Dutch secularity is renegotiated with respect to, 
mainly, Muslim migrants. It is the field of integration policies that gave rise to a nationalist 
challenge to the functionalist-individualist model of secularity. Again, the chapter entails five 
parts: The first part outlines a core policy shift with respect to Muslim migrants that concurred 
with the general shift from a pluralist to a functionalist-individualist model of secularity. The 
pluralist model was based on a positive idea of migrants’ religiosity as an emancipative factor 
in the process of integration and it was placed in relation to the past equally pluralist 
emancipation process of Dutch confessional groups. While the Christian Democrats were the 
main proponents of a pluralist frame, D66 centrally advanced the functionalist-individualist 
approach. 
The functionalist-individualist approach by contrast, centered on the concept of (individual) 
citizenship as well as on migrants’ socio-economic and political participation and it thereby 
takes the idea of a functionally differentiated and functionally integrated society as its base. The 
benefit of religion for migrants’ integration was seen ambivalently, but religious and worldview 
matters are, confined by the law, considered private and beyond legitimate state intervention. 
Also in previous chapters, differentiation (such as that of state and law) has been linked to 
individual liberty, here now, the interrelation of individual liberty with a broader notion of 
functional differentiation becomes evident. The notion of private culture and religion was 
further paired with an emphasis of a civic culture in the sense of being politically and socially 
active and oriented towards living in a context of diversity.  
After thus linking to the previous chapter, the first part then sketches the rise of a competing 
model of secularity that aims at national unity and defense vis-à-vis Islam (type 3) while 
construing Dutch culture as both Christian and secular. While the functionalist-individualist 
approach assumed the intransitive assimilation of migrants, the national defense model frames 
this assumption as ideological and is centered on concerns about an islamization of Dutch 
culture. The thesis mainly points to Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders (as well as to his affiliate 
Martin Bosma as central promoters of such a discourse, who further gave political weight to 
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the anti-Islamization discourse. All focus on Islam as a central ideological other. Fortuyn 
propagated an ideological battle with Islam as well as the ideological appropriation and defense 
of secular modernity. Wilders and Bosma conceive Islam as an essentially totalitarian and 
political ideology. Rhetorically the anti-islamization movement is placed against a former 
multiculturalist approach, a notion which centers on the political left more than on D66, but 
which dwarfs the scope for notions of differentiation and privatization.  
All in all, the anti-Islamization movement challenges D66 by framing Islam as an assertive 
ideology that cannot be privatized or liberalized, by claiming the necessity to take an ideological 
stand vis-à-vis Islam, and by subordinating the functionalist-individualist approach to a notion 
of multiculturalism. 
The chapter’s second and third part illustrate how D66 positioned itself as a defender of a 
functionalist-individualist model of secularity (mainly based on types 1 & 4), first vis-à-vis the 
new culturalist nationalism, and subsequently vis-à-vis Islam. The party’s immediate response 
to the rising critiques of integration and Islam is difficult to discern but it seems that at while 
Fortuyn was strongly criticized from the party leader of the time, other leading politicians also 
critically engaged with Muslim public figures, and in 2003, it joined Balkenende’s second 
cabinet that centered on a stricter tone with respect to integration and Islam. Since 2006 and 
under Alexander Pechtold’s leadership, the party prominently positioned itself as the counter-
pole to Wilders and his anti-Islamization critique and while Fortuyn’s rise had resulted in 
electoral losses for the purple parties including D66, Wilders’ emergence eventually gave the 
party the chance to rearticulate its standpoint on integration and religion as well as its general 
profile and thus eventually to stabilize its position in the political field. At least by some, this 
rearticulation of the party’s profile is understood as response to the ideological challenge of 
Fortuyn and Wilders. While the opposition to the theme of a national defense against Islam has 
largely determined D66’ public perception, the thesis points to examples of party-internal 
critiques against a one-sided opposition to Wilders that would not equally assert secularism vis-
à-vis Islam. Very tentatively thus, the thesis points to tensions within the party, respectively 
between the then leader Pechtold and a prominent former MP, with respect to an adequate 
positioning in the debate on Islam. With respect to the party’s programs, the emphasis on the 
separation of church and state, functional differentiation, as well as individual liberty and 
equality has increased since 2006. At the same time, party publications like the five booklets 
about the party’s core ideological starting points present, both, the protection and confinement 
of Islam as two sides of the same notion of secularity.  
341 
 
The third part of chapter five, elaborates in more detail the core points of the party’s positioning 
in the debate on integration and Islam, drawing on various publications of the party and the 
affiliated think tank, as well as the party’s positioning in parliament. In the first place, various 
publications give renewed expression to a relational and functional notion of integration and 
place this against the collectivizing and generalizing debate on Muslim migrants and Islam. 
Education is thereby presented as the party’s central selling point and as the key factor for a 
functional integration of society that centers on migrants in their roles as (future) labor market 
participants. While this functional perspective conflicts with comprehensive and totalistic 
notions of religion, Islam is not seen as an essentialist ideology. Rather, different forms of 
religiosity (and identity more generally) are portrayed as relationally determined. Religious 
radicalism is thus not the inevitable result of an Islamic ideology but has both secular causes 
and equivalents. While from a functional perspective on integration, religion is private, it is also 
constraint by the realities of the functional requirements of different spheres, and this includes 
not only the requirements of the market and the state, but also those of the public-political 
sphere. With respect to the latter concern, education is meant to foster a shared sense of 
citizenship, a plea that is placed against the established freedom of education as a core pillar of 
the pluralist model.  
The second point stressed in party publications and positionings is the already outlined 
individual liberty and equality approach to religion and this is also stressed in the debate on 
Islam and integration. In contrast to Wilders, Islam is naturally seen as a religion and as such 
protected and confined by individual liberty and equality laws. The party’s positioning with 
respect to the Islamic burqa shows this individualism (by considering the voluntary wearing of 
a burqa a liberty) as well as the functional confines of religious freedom (by considering people 
self-responsible for possible negative effects of their clothing choices at the labor market).  
Third, while throughout the thesis, the party’s stance on secularity has been indirectly analyzed 
through its claims for the deconfessionalization of politics and its assertion of individual 
equality and liberty as a core principle of governance, several recent publications of the party 
and its think tank emphasize and explicate the party’s notion of secularity. This indicates that, 
similar to the time of its foundation, matters of secularity are once more important for the party’s 
members, or at least its leaders. The notion of secularity entails three different aspects: first, the 
ontological primacy of an immanent realm and an immanent understanding of religion; second, 
the autonomy of human intellect and morality from the church or religion; and third, the 
separation of church and state and the primacy of immanent law over religious ones. The first 
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point, combined with an ontological primacy given to the individual, confines religion to the 
realm of the individual (as a form of privatization). The second point implies a counter-
distinction to absolutized notions of rationality placed in an (irreligious) binary opposition to 
religion, while also asserting actual human intellectual and moral liberty. The third point evokes 
the distinct autonomy of state and church, and thereby frames the state as neutral rather than 
irreligious, while at the same time, and linking back to the first point, the state’s rule via 
immanent legal principles as well as the validity of basic rights and democracy are accredited 
with the highest authority. This last point illustrates the hierarchies implied in the proposed 
functional differentiation of society.  
Chapter five concludes by placing the party’s rearticulation of a functionalist-individualist 
frame in relation to the positionings of other parties, who alike Wilders, have developed policies 
that operated through Islam, or religion and worldviews more generally. Last but not least it 
points to the party’s most recent provision of the Minister of Social Affairs and Work 
Opportunities, responsible for integration. It is argued that this possibly indicates a shift back 
to a functionalist-individualist frame with respect to the integration of Muslim migrants and 
thus to a form of secularity that resonates with types 1 and 4 of the multiple secularities 
typology.  
All in all, the thesis demonstrated that D66 has been a central agent in facilitating the shift from 
a pluralist to a functionalist-individualist model of secularity in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
while it has also defended the validity of this model with respect to the integration of Muslims 
against the secular-Christian nationalism placed against Islam. In reference to the notion of 
multiple secularities, the party’s ideal of secularity has been mainly placed against competing 
projects of secularity and mainly against a confessional model of secularity that emerged in the 
late-19th and early 20th century as a consequence of the defeat of an earlier project of liberal 
secularity. Compared to the positioning of D66, this earlier project was rooted in the notion of 
a general Christianity rather than an immanent conception of the world, and more strongly 
aimed at national unity rather than the equal liberty of individuals.  
Complementing this historical sketch chapters six, seven, and eight each entails a small case 
study that engages with the party’s ideal of secularity in more detail by focusing on different 
arenas of secularity below the national level. Together they point to the simultaneity of diverse 
arrangements of secularity and different arenas in which general patterns and ideas of secularity 
are negotiated.  
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Chapter six engages with two aspects of the individual liberty and equality centered notion of 
secularity, that aspect of defending and that of confining religious freedom. As briefly indicated 
in earlier chapters, these two aspects can be perceived to conflict and placed against each other 
as rival alternatives. This is exemplified by this chapter about an internal party working group 
on religion and worldviews, which became the site of contestations about the party’s notion of 
secularity. The chapter reconstructs a struggle about dominance between two distinct initiatives, 
both started in 2010, to establish the working group, both of which differed in their ideas about 
the group’s outlook.  
While the first initiative centered on the freedom of religion and apparently aimed to strengthen 
and to give publicity to religious voices within the party, the second aimed to engage with the 
party’s secularism and by tendency felt that this secular profile should be stressed with greater 
emphasis. While the founders of the first initiative were liberal Protestants, those of the second 
were nonreligious and at least in parts seemed to understand secularism as a binary other to 
Christianity. The second initiative’s members were further divided about whether Christian 
organizations and residuals of Christian laws considered the main problem against which 
secularism was to be asserted, or whether the party should begin to assert its secular profile 
more strongly with respect to Islam. With respect to the positioning in concrete conflicts about 
secularity the divides were neither clear-cut nor unbridgeable, but rather members of competing 
initiatives as well as actors from religious initiatives discovered that independently from their 
religious or nonreligious affiliations, they shared certain values as well as an interest to reform 
social practices.  
Still, a conflict dynamic emerged in which religion and secularism were conceived as two 
mutually exclusive alternatives. Part of this dynamic was that the second initiative was linked 
with a platform for secularism in the European Parliament (EPPSP), co-chaired by a prominent 
D66 MEP that is very active on matters of secularism. Working on different secularity-related 
issues as well as seeking to counter the influence of religious organizations and lobbies on 
European politics, the platform’s members find themselves in the awkward position of 
defending political secularism in the sense of a differentiation between secular states and law 
from religion, while simultaneously claiming political influence as worldview organizations. 
For at least some of the first initiative’s founders, this platform seemed a natural ally, while the 
founders of the second initiative would have preferred to side with a second group at the 
European level, that centers on religious freedom. The conflict climaxed when the someone 
from the second initiative changed the group’s twitter account from @D66religion to 
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@D66secularism––something which was apparently meant to emphasize a neutral secular 
position, but was read as shifting sides in a binary opposition between religion and secularism.  
The struggle was resolved through the group’s dissolution and the foundation of a new group 
in 2015. Online sources indicate that within this new group, the concerns with the defense of 
either, the freedom of religion or of secularity, are both still represented. Still, the apparent 
antithesis between religion and secularism as two mutually exclusive commitments seems 
tamed by giving the group a secular-neutral frame. It is now labeled a “working group 
worldviews” and subordinated to the “thematic chapter on social liberalism.”  
All in all, this small case study complements the thesis’ historic sketch by shifting the focus 
from D66 as collective agent in national struggles about secularity, to the way in which the 
party itself can become an arena for struggles about the precise interpretation of the party’s 
secular course. Beyond that, the case study gives an impression on how competing notions of 
secularity correspond to people’s diverse (and changing) positions in and with respect to the 
religious field. It thus shows how people’s identities and sensibilities with respect to notions of 
secularity are co-determined by their own religious and nonreligious affiliations. The heuristic 
distinction between irreligion and a neutral, differentiated secular position proved helpful to the 
understanding of the conflict dynamic, the attribution of what constitutes either perspective 
though, remains both blurred and ambivalent as well as contested. Last but not least, the case 
illustrates how contestations about an adequate positioning in the debate on Islam are part of 
more general divides about the party’s secular profile, even if the respective divides are not 
completely congruent.  
Chapter seven is the first of two case studies about the political negotiation of secularity in 
local settings with a very contrasting religious-nonreligious setup. It centers on the 2014 
municipal election campaign in one of the large secular cities of the Netherlands and more 
precisely on the party’s attempt to reach out to migrant and Muslim voters and its dealings with 
Muslim candidates. This political integration of Muslims, and the party’s attempt to emphasize 
the singularity, or universality, of its positioning is thereby linked with its more assertion of a 
functionalist-individualist model of secularity. The chapter illustrates how the party discovers 
Muslims as possible liberals and how a Muslim candidate discovers her own liberalism both in 
religious and political terms. The focus on the tension between universality and particularism 
that is central to this chapter, constitutes one aspect of the tension between, on the one hand, a 
functionalist and an individualist model of secularity, and on the other hand, a pluralist one. 
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Both formerly mentioned models stress the universality of a functional autonomy or of 
individual liberty and equality rights vis-à-vis the diversity of competing worldviews.  
The chapter starts with providing a historic background to the integration of Muslims into 
political liberalism by sketching a historical shift in migrants’ political preferences away from 
the labor party and towards a greater diversification of political preferences. This, as argued, 
also creates a new political competition about migrant voters. Against this background, the 
chapter elaborates how the reaching out to migrant voters becomes central to D66’s election 
campaign. Beyond that, I further point to two analytically distinct motives for diversifying a 
party list: first a pluralist assumption that migrant voters should be represented by or could be 
reached via migrant candidates, and second, the notion that individual migrant candidates might 
represent the party line just as much as others––a notion that resonates with a functionalist and 
individualist focus on political roles and preferences that comes with a comparably universal 
claim. Both notions can stand in mutual tension and there seems to have been an at least 
normative shift from pluralism to universalism. By tendency though, migrant candidates seem 
to be placed under a twofold pressure, when they are framed as migrant candidates rather than 
general ones, and depend on direct votes (rather than the party list) for entering parliaments or 
city councils more strongly than autochthone candidates, while at the same time, this makes 
them (and their parties) vulnerable for accusations of clientelism. For political parties, this 
makes both, the integration and non-integration of migrants a risky endeavor. I argue that this 
tension was also noticeable in the election campaign dealt with in this chapter.  
The chapter’s first part then briefly describes the city’s religious-secular setup by presenting 
basic numbers on people’s religious affiliations that point to the contrast between a growing 
secular majority and an increasingly religious Muslim minority. This part further outlines the 
political setup and points to the long-time political power of the labor party and a labor-inspired 
policy approach that sought to facilitate migrants’ integration by using Islam as a civilizing 
power. At the time of the research, the PvdA had lost its historic dominant position while D66 
was about to gain the upper hand and become the largest party in town. The party’s success in 
attracting votes from migrant voters was one factor in their electoral success.  
The chapter’s second part starts by introducing the informants, the interviews with whom 
constituted the data base for this chapter. Subsequently this part elaborates how these 
informants spoke about secularity as an issue of local politics and of the 2014 municipal 
elections more specifically. According to my informants, local politics are only very frequently 
concerned with matters of secularity in the sense of the separation of church and state. What 
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was notably beyond that, was their commitment to a secular notion of politics and governance 
in the sense of understanding religion as something private, that should neither be supported 
nor countered by politics as well as in the sense that politics should not treat different kinds or 
strands of religion discriminately. Even further, politics were also meant to treat religion alike 
other cultural expressions. In sum, the talks with my informants exhibited an immanent and 
functionally differentiated perspective on religion that resonates with the party’s program as 
elaborated above. The debate on Islam and integration as well found its echo in the local party 
chapter’s preparation for the election campaign, and after some internal debate, the chapter 
decided against the political language of integration and multiculturalism and instead merely 
promoted its policies on housing, education, the labor market, and security in order to stress its 
idea of functional integration. Beyond that, the chapter used the individualist language of 
human rights provided frames to address matters such as the acceptance of LGBTs, which are 
frequently discussed with respect to integration and multiculturalism.  
My informants, last but not least, illustrated how liberty and equality principles are fostered in 
pedagogical projects that sideline religious categories in order to focus on the complex social 
diversities in relation to which an ethic of liberty and equality claims its legitimacy.  
The chapter’s third part eventually centers on the special campaign for migrant votes that was 
developed for both, strategic and ideological reasons. On the one hand, the party discovered to 
need more votes of so far untypical voters, and on the other hand, for at least some party 
members the party’s defense of religious freedom and the reaching out to migrant voters deeply 
mattered. As it is the case with the debate on integration in general, the focus on migrants does 
not equate a focus on specific religious minorities, but still religion is part of how migrants are 
perceived. Strategically and communicatively, a campaign for migrant voters entailed the risk 
of being accused of clientelism or of giving up one’s values and universality for the sake of 
electoral success. The thesis centers on the development of campaign material, which was 
meant to communicate those parts of the party’s profile that could of particular interest of 
migrant voters. Especially when describing the party’s commitment to the freedom of religion 
as a right that Muslims are entitled to in equal ways, the campaign team negotiated to find the 
right words that fit the party’s individualist and immanent frame rather than suggesting a 
pluralist and religion-centered one. Also more generally, the interviews suggest that an 
unintended slipping into a pluralist logic was something to be prevented throughout the 
preparation period and the campaign itself. The strategic necessity of having migrant candidates 
was thus framed as a diversification of one’s messenger, rather than of the message itself.  
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Eventually as mentioned the campaign for migrant voters was based on the functionalist-
individualist approach to integration elaborated in earlier chapters, now however, Muslim and 
migrant citizens were no longer the mere objects of such frame, but rather this approach was 
discovered to be something to present to Muslim migrants as voters. This is to say, that Muslim 
migrant voters were approached in their respective roles as entrepreneurs, parents with a keen 
interest in their children’s’ social upward mobility, as well as citizens who might fancy a secular 
state that protects their rights alongside others. The campaign’s ideological thrust resonates 
with the party line elaborated in earlier chapters. The local case however illustrates the 
collective subjective realization of the party’s ideological promise as well as the possibility of 
addressing Muslim migrants as social liberals. Aside from the intellectual process of realizing 
this aspect of their party’s profile, my informants also felt that the resonance of their message 
with Muslim migrants was conformed in actual contacts with voters.  
The chapter closes with elaborating a young Muslim candidate’s complementary process of 
becoming liberal and of finding a place within the party. It thereby portraits the first “visibly” 
Muslim candidate with a background in a reform- and integration-oriented project of the local 
Muslim community, who, in the past, had made a controversial statement about homosexuality 
in the press, and was consequently considered with initial suspicion within the local party 
chapter. The thesis illustrates how this candidate’s personal shift from a frame of inter-religious 
solidarity to an individual rights and liberty frame brought her to D66, while this frame became 
also guiding for her integration within the party, given that a party-internal group of 
homosexuals were the first to accept her and when the party’s claim for LGBTs’ equality and 
liberty rights offered an opportunity to also claim Muslims’ equal liberty.  
In sum thus, chapter seven as well, points to the interrelation of people’s positioning in the 
religious field and their notion of secularity. It further complements the previous elaborations 
of the party’s positioning in the debate on Islam and integration by showing how the party’s 
claim for individual equality, functional integration, and the universality implied here, is put to 
a test when reaching out to Muslim migrant voters. While the ethnic diversification of the party 
is necessary to prove the universality of its approach, the special targeting of Muslim migrants 
equally puts this universality to test. The balance is not only sought through communicative 
means but also through the discovery of actual social-liberal Muslim migrants.  
The eighth and final chapter of the thesis presents a third case study about the political 
struggles about secularity in a small town in the so-called Dutch Bible Belt. This case study 
complements the historical chapters (and especially chapter four) as well as that about the 
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secular city by centering on a place that contrasts from the national setting and the city in terms 
of its religious-nonreligious setup as well as the dynamics of secularity. A core expression of 
the reversed dynamics of secularity is that D66 operates in a merger with two other (national 
and local) secular parties that together form a progressive alliance vis-à-vis a conservative 
religious stronghold in politics.  
The chapter starts by providing an overview on the Bible Belt and the orthodox Reformed 
communities that over-proportionally live in the area and constitute the electorates of the two 
small orthodox Christian parties in Dutch parliament. The chapter’s first part then introduces 
the town’s religious-nonreligious setup in greater detail and introduces the local party’s 
members interviewed. Drawing on these interviews, it sketches the religious-nonreligious setup 
as described by the informants as structured by different grades of strictness, a categorization 
that also pertains to the structure of the political field as well as to the positioning of different 
secular parties. Interrelatedly, it shows how the interview partners describe the local situation 
through the theme of confessionalization (or pillarization) and the theme of a Protestant 
Christian public order. Both themes and the social-political dynamics signified accordingly, are 
then described in greater detail in the chapter’s parts two and three. All in all, this sketch reveals 
that despite my interview partners’ diverse religious and nonreligious backgrounds they all 
positioned in opposition to a group of rather secluded strict Christians whose ideas of a basic 
Christian public order resonated with a broader group of semi-strict Christians. 
Part two outlines how, building on the legal residuals of the pluralist period and especially the 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of education, a local plurality of institutions with religious 
profile is enabled. While theoretically these institutions complement public ones, the practically 
dwarf the scope of the public ones – a situation that especially manifests in the lack of a local 
public high school. In this situation, a local semi-strict Protestant high school practically 
functions as a public school by also accepting Children whose parents are non-strict, Catholic, 
or nonreligious. At the same time however, the school is seen to harm the equal liberty principle 
central to my informants’ notion of the “public” by basing the school’s public order and some 
of the teachings on a particularistic Protestant faith, not shared by all students. The thesis 
sketches the party’s attempt to achieve a local public high school and the failure to mobilize 
and prove enough support for such a school. In reference to the overall thesis’ focus on 
competing notions of secularity, it illustrates how this struggle mainly follows a pluralist logic 
of making parity claims for the inclusion of a secular public as one of several minority options 
in a pluralist setting. Alternative motives, like a principled assertion of an individual liberty and 
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equality frame, a clear differentiation between religion and science in the school’s teachings, or 
the schools’ critique in the name of totalized notions of progress or unity are less prominent. 
Given its pluralist structure the party’s school struggle is compared with the situation of early 
20th century liberals who also saw their idea of a public realm integrated in a pluralist model of 
secularity. As argued, the paradox of the confessionalized public is symbolized in the most 
recent initiative that aims at the foundation of a humanist school to fulfill the function of a 
public one.  
Complementing the sketched school struggle, the chapter’s second part concludes with an 
analyzes of similar dynamics of confessionalization in the social care sector that are impending 
as a consequence of national welfare cuts. All in all, under the conditions of a strong Christian 
presence, the local dynamics of confessionalization dwarf the public space and create a public 
dependence on Christian institutions. This links the theme of confessionalization with that of a 
Protestant public order. Beyond that, and as demonstrated in the chapter’s third part, the 
contested Protestant imprint on the local public order shows in more direct ways in the claims 
for Sunday rest made by both strict and semi-strict Christians.  
The third part first starts by describing competing religious and secular notions of Sunday rest 
rooted in the 19th century as well as their legal institutionalization in the 1953 Sunday Law 
(Zondagswet) that seeks a compromise between safeguarding Sunday rest (zondagsrust) and 
different religious and nonreligious Sunday activities. I show how in line with religious and 
secular notions of Sunday rest, locals distinguish between two kinds of respect – that for a 
religious principle or tradition, and that for the diversity of people’s notions of the good life. 
The latter has been guiding for a “historic” compromise between the town’s orthodox Christian 
party, the Christian Democrats, and the progressive party merger. As shown however, the 
compromise has been rendered fragile by various developments such as the political power shift 
towards orthodox Christianity, various privatizations of former public institutions that have 
reopened the political struggle about Sunday rest, as well as a renegotiation of national laws 
concerning Sunday rest. In this context, the municipal elections contributed to a polarization of 
the respective positions and made the Sunday question central to political power. In terms of 
the multiple secularities typology, both the Sunday Law and the historic compromise can be 
understood as a pluralist accommodation of religious-nonreligious interests in the sense of 
type 2, while its increasing fragility creates the possibility for alternative regulations that either 
establish a Protestant Christian order or organize the public time and realm according to an 
individual liberty and equality frame (type 1).  
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The third part as well, offers a second example of the contested public order, this time by 
pointing to the religious imprint on the political governance- culture in the town, exemplified 
by the practice of an official prayer at the beginning of council meetings. As in the case of 
Sunday Rest, the practice and secular councilors in relation to it had been settled as part of the 
historic compromise, which was now challenged. The part concludes with pointing to the 
competing ideals of Christian, pluralist, and individualist forms of governance that are explicitly 
articulated by the rivaling political parties in town. 
After thus describing the two core aspects of how secularity is contested in the town, the 
chapter’s fourth part deals with the party’s election campaign. It shows how the party responded 
to the pluralist dynamic in the town by seeking to mobilize non-orthodox voters as a means to 
counter the over-proportional voter turnout among orthodox Protestants. This fear of a 
structural disadvantage of the non-confessional and loosely organized parts of the population is 
placed in relation to the history of depillarization. In contrast to the locally dominant pluralist 
dynamic and thus giving expression to the contested compromise, the party stressed a principled 
individual liberty and equality frame as part of its election campaign. This reference to the 
national dynamics of secularity symbolically reverse the local relations and has accelerated the 
tensions with the local orthodox party. Even though the party recurrently stressed and 
symbolically staged its secular neutral--rather than irreligious--character and despite its 
electoral victory, the progressive merger lost the political game and was excluded from the new 
government coalition. For its members, this exclusion symbolized the growing dominance of 
orthodox Protestantism and their increasing minorization and subordination.  
All in all, this final chapter concludes the thesis by pointing to the simultaneity and interrelation 
of contradicting dynamics of secularity. It showed how, in the context of a strong Christian 
presence, the legal remains of a pluralist frame, respectively a Christian imprint on law, can 
create a minorization and confessionalization of a secular public understood to be based on an 
individual liberty and equality principle. In such a context, pluralist regulations are also in the 
interest of a secular party merger including D66. The chapter further showed how the possibility 
of such local pluralism is challenged through legal reforms at the national level. While a first 
initiative would have abolished a pluralist legal guideline for the sake of a local autonomy that 
could also be used for a stronger institutionalization of Christian ideas of public order, a later 
revision gives up pluralism for a further disestablishment of Christianity.  
After this extensive summary of the thesis, I wish to briefly highlight and discuss a few final 




In the first place, this thesis aims to contribute to the general social-scientific debate about the 
secular*, secondly, it speaks to the relatively new field of nonreligion studies, and third, it is 
meant to contribute to the more specific debate about the cultural changes in the Netherlands 
since the second half of the 20th century. In what follows I stress a few points with respect to 
each of these aims. 
Liberalism and Secularism 
A first way in which this thesis aims to contribute to the more general debate about the secular* 
is by responding to a frequently stressed notion of liberalism as a carrier of secularity. Walzer 
(1984, 315) speaks of liberalism as an “art of separation,” as drawing a map of the social and 
political worlds and drawing lines, or walls, each creating a new liberty. The wall between 
church and state is liberalism’s most famous wall and it creates a private realm of equal 
individual religious freedom (Ibid., 315, 320). In drawing lines of separation, according to 
Walzer, liberal theorists have reflected on and reinforced an actual process of functional 
differentiation (Ibid. 319). Moreover, others have pointed to liberalism’s concern with 
secularity, such as Casanova (1994, 55) or Asad, who describes secularism as “a political and 
governmental doctrine” that originated in 19th-century liberal society (Asad 2003, 24). Liberal 
political philosophies of secularism, such as that of Rawls, are another core example of this 
interrelation between liberalism and secularism (Fuchs 2006), as is the assessment that liberal 
democracies cannot exist without secularism (Asad 2016). Others, like Weir (2014, 11-13), 
have argued that a tendency to exclusively associate liberalism with secularism concealed the 
variety of diverging historical notions and projects of secularism. Weir seeks to distinguish 
between different forms of historic secularism and points to organized secularism, as a self-
perceived totalizing worldview and rival of (liberal) projects of state-secularity (Weir 2014, 
2015a). His interest resonates with Quack’s focus on the diversity of nonreligious others to 
religion (Quack 2014, 2013). This thesis responds to the apparent interrelation of liberalism and 
secularism by focusing on a specific (social-)liberal political party in the Netherlands––D66––
and its politics of secularity, that is, the party’s political actions to disentangle both politics and 
the state(-law) from religion and religious divides. Despite this focus, this thesis does not 
assume liberalism to be the only carrier of secularity, and it neither identifies liberalism with 
nonreligiosity nor claims it to be the only “other” to religion. Instead, the thesis points to 
religious contributions to liberal secularity as well as to Christian Democracy as a central rival 
of liberalism and a carrier of an alternative notion of secularity. Moreover, it underscores the 
352 
 
tensions between the liberal project of neutral secularity and notions of the secular as an 
antagonistic rival to religion. 
Contested Secularism, Contested State Power 
Second, this thesis aims to respond to a normative strand in the debate about the secular* that 
challenges the epistemic and normative validity of secularism. One point of critique approaches 
secularism as a disguised form of state control over religion and people. Casanova, for example, 
speaks about a “secular European narrative,” that explains European democracy as a 
consequence of the historic secularization of the state in response to the experience of religious 
wars and confessional tensions (Casanova 2008). Casanova questions this “narrative” by 
pointing to the confessionalization (rather than secularization) of state and politics (Casanova 
2008). This confessionalization of European states, he contends, constituted a form of state 
control over religion rather than the state’s secularization and he sees this tradition as a root 
cause of an alleged failure of European states in treating all (and especially migrants’) religions 
equally (Casanova 2008). He further states that a strict separation of church and state was 
“neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for democracy” (Ibid.). Asad (2016) as well, in 
reference to Mahmood, points to the state and its sovereignty to define something as religion 
and regulate it accordingly as a cause of problematic diversity and minority issues. 
Against the background of his critique, a brief note should be said about the interrelation of 
state secularity and confessionalization dealt with in this thesis. It is indeed possible to speak 
of a certain confessionalization of the state in the Netherlands in the aftermath of the revolt 
against Spain. However, the institutionalization of an individual freedom of conscious in the 
same period was an achievement made in response to the experience of confessional tensions 
and it entails a basic sense of state secularity and religious freedom. The nation and its 
sovereignty was a guarantor of religious freedom, and it accordingly inherited the “problem” 
of religious diversity. In this sense, it seems not a complete myth that the secularity of the Dutch 
state finds its basic origin in the struggle for national and religious liberty that took place against 
the background of the confessional struggles after the reformation. This basic sense of state 
secularity (while differently framed) was also shared across the competing factions in the 19th 
century that continued to contest the organization of society. In the course of history, as shown 
in this thesis, other groups have been integrated into the normative frame of “who is to be treated 
with equal liberty” while more generally the notion of diversity has been individualized. 
Further, the 19th century confessionalization of politics and society, was the model fought for 
by religious actors to curtail the state’s influence over religious communities and it was placed 
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against the liberal idea of a public realm beyond confessional divides. Moreover, while 
Casanova argues that the state’s confessionalization constitutes an obstacle to the integration of 
migrants as religious minorities, this model of a confessional society has been framed, at least 
by some, as a model to integrate other religious minorities as well. Others by contrast consider 
this confessionalism as an obstacle to genuine equal liberty and countered the re-
institutionalization of confessionalism through integration-policies. They conceive the 
increasingly multifaceted and fragmented religious-nonreligious-areligious diversity as a 
reason to perfect state neutrality through disestablishing confessional organizations.  
Historically in any case, this thesis takes the state’s central power as a given and centers on the 
struggles about secularity that took place after the establishment of a political field opened new 
ways to control the state. For D66 politicians as well, historic or genealogical perspective on 
the state are less central and they are neither committed to a utopian search for alternatives to 
the state. Rather, they take both religious-nonreligious and other forms of diversity as well as 
the state’s unity and prime authority as social realities that need to be dealt with. Consequently, 
the relevant political-philosophical question is that of the state’s restraint and fairness for the 
sake of the equal liberty of all citizens, respectively the question of how a moral commitment 
to liberty and equality can be nurtured. The relevant political-strategical question is that of how 
those who care about state fairness get into and remain in power. Besides the control of state 
power, the possibility of collective agency through politics constitutes the party’s second ideal. 
Critics of secularism point to the contributions of public religions to processes of 
democratization and criticize normative claims for the privatization of religion (Casanova 
1994). Such contribution is not denied by this thesis. As said, religious parties (that is, the 
Christian Democrats) contributed to the emancipation and equality of certain nonreligious 
groups (e.g., homosexuals), but they did so in a pluralist fashion that safeguarded the autonomy 
of religious institutions. For some, therefore, the confessional model hampered individual 
freedom and equality and they view the current individualist model of secularity to have 
increased the state’s neutrality by rendering the state neutral with respect to religious and 
nonreligious worldviews as well as religious and other (such as sexual) identities. Others, by 
contrast, contend that the state has given up neutrality by challenging institutionalized 
autonomies of certain groups for the sake of the equal liberty of others. The focus on “multiple 
secularities” (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012) allows to focus on such competing projects 
of secularity, including those of Christian origin.  
The Secularity of Politics 
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Another point recurrently raised by critiques of secularism is directed at liberal political 
philosophies and their emphasis on the secular character of political discourse and practice and 
the respective confinement of religion to the private realm and civil society (Casanova 2008, 
Bader 2010, 17, 24, Stepan 2000, 45). Casanova (1994, 55) spoke out in favor of a public (while 
not political) role of religion under the precondition of accepting modern freedoms and 
functional differentiations (p. 57). Later, he also claimed a legitimate political role for religion 
(Casanova 2008). Commenting on his first proposition, Asad (2003, 182, 185-87) pointed out 
that a political role of religion was likely to have consequences beyond the scenarios envisioned 
by Casanova and could possibly undermine the functional differentiation of society and the 
secular logic of political discourse while also claiming the authority to make political 
decisions—predictions that fit the Dutch example.  
With respect to Dutch history, the claim that “no group in civil society—including religious 
groups—can a priori be prohibited from forming a political party” (Stepan 2000, 40) aptly 
describes the political reality after the liberal project of secularity was successfully challenged 
by confessional parties.487 According to Stepan, the Dutch case further illustrates the possibility 
of successful democratic bargaining between religious and secular parties (Stepan 2000, 45). 
This public role of religion, as predicted by Asad (2003), has also shaped the path of Dutch 
modernity in a broader sense. The point of stressing this is not to defend philosophical calls for 
a secular political discourse but to highlight that respective calls might have more specific 
rationalities empirically. Conceptually, this thesis in any case, understands contestations about 
the secularity of politics as part of power struggles in the political field and broader struggles 
about secularity.  
Having said this, while conceptually central, the D66 party’s positioning with respect to the 
contested “secularity of politics” was not explored in great detail.488 Based on the available 
data, however, it seems that D66 has shifted in its respective positioning. At the time of its 
foundation, the party positioned itself in opposition to the political spectrum and criticized the 
ideologies of the existing parties, a critique that was based on a multifaceted ideal of secular 
politics that was not derived (or at least not exclusively) from ideological or philosophical 
literature. Rather it was based on and backed by the aim to create a political debate on and reach 
political majorities for matters the religious parties were divided on, as well as on the experience 
of actual tensions within the religious parties that tested their religious party ideologies. In the 
 
487  Taking the Christian element of 19th-century liberalism into account, even earlier.  
488  During my empirical research phase, I was not yet aware of the importance of this theme. 
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course of its history, the party positioned itself as a part of the political spectrum and its later 
critique against the Christian Democratic party seems to have been based less in a principled 
opposition to religious voices in politics, but rather centered on its somewhat exclusive power 
position in the political field. The party’s most recent explication of its secular profile 
emphasizes the principled legitimacy of public, yet disestablished, religion, and tasks liberals 
with countering religious voices in the public debate.  
At a different level, however, a basic sense of the secularity of politics is shared across 
competing factions in Dutch struggles about secularity. This manifests itself in the commitment 
of competing factions to the idea of democratic politics. While 19th-century confessionals 
opposed the principle of popular sovereignty, they accepted the constitution and the political 
process including popular influence (ARP 1918). Currently, even the SGP, although it rejects 
the principle of popular sovereignty, endorses democracy as the least bad form of governance 
(SGP n.d.-a). The shared idea of secular politics further shows that from the normative 
disaffirmation of the denigration of citizens’ and politicians’ religious ideas as well as the 
complementing disaffirmation of their demonization. This basic sense of political secularity is 
rooted in the understanding of politics as a realm of unbridgeable differences, including 
differences with respect to people’s religious and nonreligious worldviews.  
The Cultural Particularism of the Secular* 
Yet another aspect of a recent critical approach to secularism is to refer to its culturality to 
emphasize its particularism and challenge notions of secular neutrality. Taylor’s historical 
genesis of an immanent frame and the reflexive position he adapts to this notion of immanence 
is one example (Taylor 2010, Koenig 2011). Others emphasize secularism as a project of 
particularistic groups with special interests who might further identify with it and sacralize it 
(Gorski and Altınordu 2008, 73f.). All in all, it seems that secularism and the secular are 
increasingly understood as a particularistic position rather than that a secular or immanent 
perspective on religious and worldview diversity would be understood as a key to neutrality.  
The creation of a reflexive distance to an immanent frame might thereby be contrasted with 
Zucca’s (2012) defense of secular law as a tool “framed to respond to human needs and 
problems arising in a world with natural laws” (p. 182) and aiming to deal with “conflicts 
between people and ideas” in an immanent world” (p. 187). Here, an immanent frame is central 
to a law which is still understood as differentiated rather than irreligious. Similarly, D66’s 
notion of state and political secularity is also based on such an immanent perspective on the 
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world and religion. Accordingly, state secularity requires the recognition of the immanent law 
as the highest authority above religious law. 
Beyond that, while some seem to place the observation of the political particularism of 
secularity and its culturality against the idea of secular state neutrality, Zucca (2013) 
distinguishes between different notions of neutrality applicable here. Commenting on the case 
of Lautsi vs. Italy, Zucca (2013, 223-225) criticized one of the judges for challenging the idea 
of “secularism as a neutral stance on the part of the state” and framing it as a “political position 
that […] was not neutral” and as an ideology. Against this position he asserts secularism can be 
both an ideology as well as a philosophical and a legal/constitutional approach. He further 
asserts that as a stance that also embraces and guarantees diversity, secularism would still not 
be purely neutral in the sense that it conflicts political doctrines that embrace a single 
comprehensive worldview. Similarly, this thesis centers on politics as an arena in which 
competing notions of secularity are placed against each other, a perspective which implies that 
a certain idea of secularity is always a particularistic political stance that competes with 
alternative political ideals and alternative visions of secularity. From this perspective, the social 
sciences can hardly challenge the neutrality or fairness of a certain vision of secularity without 
thereby adapting a competing and equally particularistic political position.  
For the understanding of D66 in any case, the distinction between political particularism and 
the binary divide of particularistic and public values is central. The party currently positions 
itself as a particularistic political stance that, different from religious or worldview positions, 
only sets those values that guaranteed the individual liberty of every person in society. It further 
distinguishes basic rights from (necessarily particularistic) religious dogmas or truth claims, 
and, in a similar tone, the party defies that the culturality of democracy automatically placed it 
on the same level as particularistic worldviews. Rather, also the commitment to what is 
perceived as a public democratic or state culture was to be nurtured and lived both subjectively 
and collectively.  
Irreligion and Secular Neutrality 
The thesis recurrently showed how differentiations between differentiated secular and 
irreligious positions were institutionalized in law and at the level of organizations, thus drawing 
lines and highlighting the distinction between on the one hand, religion-like things and on the 
other hand, things autonomous from religion. The thesis further showed how qualifications of 
the secular remain contested and that from the perspective of an anti-thesis between religion 
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and irreligion, which frames all genuinely immanent perspectives as mere variants or irreligion, 
secularity is not possible. Aside from such a totalized religious perspective, commitments to 
diversity constitute another ground from which irreligion is judged. Both, the individual liberty 
and equality ideal of D66 as well as the rival pluralist notion of secularity focus on legitimate 
diversity as a reference problem interlinked with and consequential to the shared value of 
liberty. From this perspective, irreligion is considered a legitimate expression of individual 
liberty and a possible worldview alike religious ones, but it cannot legitimately be a position of 
the state, as this would conflict with the freedom of religion and the equality of religious people. 
This is a core reason why a Minister of State cannot use blasphemous expressions in a public 
statement directed at a religiously and nonreligiously diverse population. And even as a public-
political statement, it is judged from a political ethic of moderation. This normative weighing 
of irreligion resonates with the social-scientific debate’s concern with the capacity of secularism 
to create justice in terms of the equality between religious and nonreligious people and ideas. 
The symbolic gravity of accusing D66 as irreligious, can be understood against the background 
of such a normative frame.  
Nonreligion and Secularity  
Aside from the debate on the secular*, as mentioned, this thesis aims to contribute to the 
emerging field of nonreligion studies. I wish to raise two points in this respect:  
First, the field of nonreligion studies has been claimed to complement studies on secularization 
and secularism by substituting the negative focus on the decline of religion and religious fields 
with the positive focus on nonreligious positions, and by emphasizing the diversity of 
nonreligious positions (Quack 2014). Yet, while others have distinguished between religious 
decline and functional differentiation (Casanova 1994), here notions of functional 
differentiation are not much discussed (Quack 2014, Lee 2015, 46). Based on the briefly noted 
reference to institutionalized differentiations between autonomous secular and irreligious 
positions, I think that nonreligion studies can profit from relating to this strand of the 
secularization theory and from empirically focusing on institutionalized and contested 
differentiations between different kinds of nonreligion. From this perspective, it also makes 
sense to analytically distinguish between a culture of secularity (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 
2012, 892), as something possibly shared by religious and nonreligious actors alike, and 
nonreligious cultures (Lee 2015) as something counter-distinguished from and equivalent to 
religious cultures.  
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A second point refers to Quack’s notion of a religion-related surrounding of the religious field, 
which encompasses all nonreligious positions (Quack 2014, 450). As mentioned, Quack 
himself is ambivalent as whether to use this as a genuine conceptual term and this thesis has 
conceptually rather centered on the political field, and empirically even more narrowly on the 
party-political field. This however does not deny the analytical value of the notion of a religion-
related surrounding for the case at hand. First, such notion helps to understand the differences 
and tensions between competing forms of nonreligion, between differentiated and irreligious 
positions, but also between positions that would have to be labeled in a more nuanced way. 
Second, the notion of a religion-related surrounding helps to grasp the contested border between 
religion and its possible equivalents—in the Dutch context eventually framed as nonreligious 
worldviews. At the same time, I found the concept somewhat bulky for the case at hand, as 
here, the border drawings between such equivalents and differentiated positions was more 
central—something which Quack’s original concept seemed not to be focused on. Further, I 
found it difficult to link this broader perspective with the focus on the (party-)political field 
which seemed of the most immediate relevance for understanding the positioning of D66. 
Looking back, the most adequate way of conceptualizing the matter would probably be to speak 
of an extended religious-nonreligious worldview field as well as of a field of religious and 
nonreligious everyday positionings (Karstein 2013, 72f.), in the sense of capturing the lay 
positions in an extended religious field, and the contested relationship of politics and state with 
these two interrelated religious-nonreligious fields.  
The Relevance of Conflicts and their Dynamics of Secular  
A third broader discourse this thesis relates to is the analysis of the cultural changes in the 
Netherlands since the second half of the 20th century. In the first place this thesis responds to a 
discussion about whether “religion” was integral to this change or whether the change implied 
a conflict with and an emancipation from religion. While Kennedy (2007 [1995]) stressed that 
for some actors emancipation was indeed a core theme, he, as well as Bos 2017) emphasized 
the contributions of religious agents as well as churches to this change. According to this line 
of argument, progress and reform was not exclusively promoted by secular actors and was not 
exclusively countered by religious ones.  
Generally speaking, the emphasis on religious contributions to the contemporary “liberal” 
culture of the Netherlands resonates with the findings of this thesis in various ways. First, 
chapter four, in particular, points to liberals and Christian Democrats as pursuing competing 
models of integration and “liberalization” rather than merely as antagonists. Second, D66 
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politicians recurrently refer to liberal religious positions and reforms in the religious field to 
counter essentialist notions of and claims to religion––the debates on euthanasia (ch.4.3) and 
on Jewish and Islamic slaughtering practices (ch.5.3) illustrate this. Aside from pointing to the 
empirical presence of liberal religious voices in the religious field, the notion of religion as 
something cultural and reformable is central to the party’s notion of a neutral state and universal 
principles as it allows to claim these principles’ compatibility with religion and the state’s 
legitimate expectation that religious groups (freely) develop ways of dealing with general rules 
and fundamental principles.  
Second, however at a different level, some D66 members, like those who started the first 
working group on religion, felt that they had to emphasize the compatibility and like-
mindedness of liberal Protestantism/ religion with political liberalism within the party and 
against those party members who exclusively centered on the illiberal forms of public religion, 
while ignoring progressive ones. They thus countered what Casanova had criticized as 
“cosmopolitanism”—a position that considers religion as being either irrelevant or reactive 
rather (Casanova 2008). Fourth and finally, the question of how liberals should deal with the 
apparent diversity of liberal and illiberal forms of religion emerged as a topic in the context of 
the Islam debate and Wilders and others’ claim that an active distinction between different 
religions was necessary. D66 politicians have emphasized the state’s obligation to abstain from 
interferences in the religious field as well as the task of liberals to counter illiberal religion in 
the public debate (chs.5.3.3, 7.1). 
Bos places the observation of religious contributions to the emancipation of Dutch homosexuals 
against the common narrative of a “triumph of emancipation and secularization” (Bos 2017, 
188). Kennedy (2007 [1995]) though, also points to a certain religious-secular divide with 
respect to these liberalizations. This thesis emphasizes that in the political field, the assertion 
of individual liberty and equality rights divided parties along a religious-secular divide and it 
further seems to be based in an alternative definition of secularization. As I understand it, both 
Kennedy and Bos defy a binary divide between religious and nonreligious people in cultural 
struggles that would result in religious decline or the political exclusion of religious voices a 
necessary condition for cultural and legal change. Different from that, this thesis uses secularity 
to denote differentiations between religion and other spheres mainly those of the state and law 
and it understands secularity as something that can be supported by religious and nonreligious 
actors alike. The distinction between civil and church marriage or claims of state neutrality with 
respect to people’s moral views about death and dying are core examples of such 
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differentiations. The fact that secular parties have religious members is one illustration of 
religious contributions to secularity. Furthermore, the thesis emphasizes that there can be 
different and competing notions and arrangements of secularity and it has especially focused 
on the competition between Christian Democrats and (social-)liberals about the dominant 
model of secularity institutionalized in the Netherlands.  
A second and interrelated theme, this thesis responds to, is the more general notion that the 
cultural changes in the Netherlands occurred with a relative lack of conflict. Kennedy explains 
the relative absence of conflict with a shared belief in history and modernization as a scheduled 
or at least inevitable processes (Kennedy 2007 [1995], 14-21, 178f.). According to Kennedy, 
this belief is a long-term consequence of the Calvinist imprint on Dutch political thought and 
its notion that the course of history was determined by God, and he further points to romanticism 
and organic ideas of society that have also conceptualized history as a scheduled process (Ibid. 
15f.). Kennedy argues that the belief in an inevitable modernization led political elites to 
facilitate a number of reforms in the second half of the 20th century and that it also shaped their 
response to the 1960s protest movements (pp. 19f). Kennedy explicitly refers to a D66 politician 
to illustrate his argument (p. 18).  
According to Kennedy, this belief in a somewhat inevitable historical development also shaped 
the debate about euthanasia (Kennedy 2002, 57f.). Again, he quotes D66 politicians who urged 
that the legal framework be reformed in the light of apparent social developments (p. 94f.). 
Other parts of his argument, especially his account of the legal reform process, underscores 
different aspect of the debate that centered on human political agency as well as individual 
autonomy. One argument in favor of the creation of legal options for euthanasia was based on 
the perceived necessity to create a counter-weight to the power that had emerged in 
consequence to medical-technical progress (Kennedy 2002, 67-75). This motive and the 
emphasis of a politically secured realm of liberty and humanity was evident in D66’s first 
euthanasia bill (section 4.3). Moreover, the Christian Democrats’ opposition to the change was 
not only criticized in the name of social developments but also in the name of democracy and 
the wishes of a political majority (Kennedy 2002, 94, 192). Last but not least, the ideal of 
individual autonomy––and thus the maintenance of the individual’s agency at the end of life––
became central to the debate (p. 146). In that sense, the legal framework’s emphasis on the 
transparent regulation of euthanasia can also be read as a countertrend to an idea of historic 
inevitability in the sense of creating a framework for agency and responsibility (pp. 178f.). 
Similarly, the ideal of a conversation between all stakeholders foreseen by the legal regulation 
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for euthanasia, in my understanding, speaks of a self-conscious trust in human agency, 
including the capacity to deliberate and decide upon the course of an individual’s life (pp. 201-
203).  
My point is not to challenge Kennedy’s overall argument about a catalyzing role of a, differently 
grounded, belief in a God-designed or organic-autonomous course of history. Based on my 
reading of his work as well as my own research however, I think, it might be of value to 
distinguish between such belief on the one hand, and on the other hand, the idea that shifts in 
the public opinion as well as different emancipation movements should find a resonance in 
politics as a way of democratically realizing collective agency and self-rule. In my 
understanding, the various forms of historicisms stand in conflict with the ideal of democracy 
and the emphasis of collective agency and autonomy, and I tend to see D66 as a promoter of 
the second idea. Without denying that ideals of modernity as such also mattered for the party, 
my impression is that the focus on agency and autonomy is more important.  
As shown in chapter 3, the pillarized political parties were seen as no longer being in touch with 
social realities but this evaluation did not so much draw on an organic notion of history, but on 
the idea of what relevant parts of the population cared about. At the core of D66’s ideology 
critique was the idea that the democratic process (and not the course of history) was hampered 
by the other parties’ political ideologies. Also in the euthanasia debate they emphasized agency 
and also Kennedy writes that for D66 politicians, the euthanasia legislation constituted an 
“emancipation from the Judeo-Christian ideas about death and dying” (Kennedy 2002, 208)––
something which at least in my understanding suggests a clear focus on agency and self-
determination rather than an inevitable modernization or secularization. In that sense, I also see 
evidence for the suggested distinction between a belief in modernization and a focus on 
democracy in Kennedy’s writing about the euthanasia debate and this fits other examples given 
in this thesis of D66 politicians explicitly stating their intent to change social realities, rather 
than settling for the status quo or hoping that history would simply go its way.  
A Shared Culture of Secularity  
A last point to raise aims to complement the thesis’ overall focus on shifts and tensions between 
competing arrangements of secularity, distinguished by the reference problems and guiding 
ideas they refer to as well as by the social differentiation they institutionalize. More specifically, 
the thesis centered on a shift from a pluralist model of secularity to an individualist-functionalist 
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one as well as on the more recent challenge of this individualist-functionalist model in the name 
of a third model of secularity centering on national unity and defense vis-à-vis Islam.  
Going beyond the tensions between the distinct arrangements of secularity, there is also a 
“culture of secularity” more generally shared across different factions, irrespective of whether 
they favor an individualist-functionalist, pluralist, or nationalist model of secularity. Central to 
this culture of secularity is the value of liberty and the reference to the problem of organizing 
the diversity which consequentially and legitimately results from the granting of liberty. 
According to Van Gelderen (1989, 1986), liberty and diversity have been core to Dutch political 
thought since the 16th century revolt against Spain. Liberty has thereby always been linked to 
both the individual (or its conscious) and the nation. That is, it is liberty that constitutes the link 
between nation and individual in the sense that individual liberty is defended through discourses 
of national liberty in the face of illiberal forces. Additionally, in the struggles about secularity 
central to this thesis, liberty in particular constitutes a core value with which otherwise 
contrasting notions of secularity have been linked. Kuyper, e.g., conceived of Calvinism as a 
central guarantor of liberty and further called his university the “Free University.” The pluralist 
school system is based on the freedom of education and it is this freedom—or the autonomy of 
their organizations—that religious stakeholders defend in Dutch struggles about secularity. This 
resonates with the mentioned observation of Lorwin (1971, 143), that pluralism can be initially 
based on individual choice, while developing a certain force or stability over time and through 
various institutionalizations. Beyond that and to give another example, Wilders called his party 
the “party of liberty” and thus takes up Fortuyn’s claim that Dutch liberties need to be defended 
against Islam (as well as supra-national organizations like the European Union). Here, liberty 
is both national heritage while also being dependent on a strong nation––a notion shared, in 
principle, by liberals alike, but in different terms and with a much stronger emphasis on the 
individual’s religious liberty vis-à-vis the state and religious/ nonreligious (national) majorities. 
The thesis showed how D66, emphasized the individual’s liberty vis-à-vis both groups and the 
state, and how, especially in the polarized debate on Islam, the balance between these two 
aspects is a fragile and tentative one (ch.5). Here as well, however, the state as a guarantor of 
individual liberty is an important idea, while the rise of illiberal movements and their claim on 
the state informs a recent re-ideologization of liberalism as a way to safeguard the state as such 
a guarantor of liberties. This being said, other and in particular social notions of liberty have 
not been discussed, although such a focus would have surely enriched the overall thesis.  
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A second shared aspect of a Dutch culture of secularity, as mentioned, is the reference problem 
of legitimate diversity. In its most basic sense, legitimate diversity is placed against the historic 
inquisition and implies the freedom of conscious (Van Gelderen 1989). Diversity constitutes a 
point of reference for the individualist and the pluralist model of secularity in the sense that 
both focus on the negative and positive freedoms of certain population groups, particularly their 
individual members. Also the described “ethic of moderation” is built on such a notion of 
legitimate diversity and consequently prescribes the abstinence from denigrations and 
demonization as a precondition to the functioning of politics in a context of (expectably lasting) 
epistemic and moral differences (ch.4.4). The nationalist model, by contrast, excludes Islam 
from that diversity that is considered legitimate while it further blurs religious-secular divides 
in Dutch society. On a different level, though, its problematization of Islam obviously takes 
epistemic and moral diversity as a starting point or reference problem to be solved. 
Aside from the value of liberty, legitimate diversity also correlates with the value of equality. 
Still, equality seems to be used less as an overt motif when compared to liberty, assumedly 
because of its rhetorical ambivalence: on the one hand, equality can also imply a negation of 
legitimate diversity rather than the equal status of individuals from different minorities or 
groups otherwise deprived of such equal status. Matters of equality thus seem to also be linked 
with liberty as an overt motif, such as when D66 politicians criticize an allegedly claimed 
monopole on values (ch.4.3), or when, in the secular city, D66 claims “free to believe” (ch.7.3). 
In the latter example, the alternative claim of the equality of all religions is further rhetorically 
close to a pluralist model of secularity.  
In the conceptual understanding of this thesis, the notion of social (religious-nonreligious) 
diversity is analytically distinct from the diversity of perspectives that derives from a 
differentiation of functional spheres. Historically, the awareness of this kind of diversity further 
seems to date from the 19th century rather than the 16th. As outlined before, this second notion 
of diversity matters differently for different action groups and interrelates differently with the 
reference problems of individual liberty, the balancing of diversity, or national integration and 
defense. This underscores a more general interrelation of social diversity with functional 
differentiation. For D66 politicians at least, the functional differentiation and autonomy of the 
state, including its secularity (type 4), is central to individual liberty and equality (type 1), while 
that of politics (type 4) further enables collective agency and decision making and thus progress 
with respect to (or at the least the mastery of) real challenges (type 3). 
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Last but not least, as already indicated, a core theme in the social scientific debate about the 
secular* is its culturality. Regardless of whether interlocutors use this notion with a 
deconstructive tone or not, and independent of whether they are interested in secularity or 
nonreligion, this awareness of the culturality the secular* constitutes a shared interest. While 
centering on the secular’s culturality by focusing on the motives for secularity and by partly 
tracing their relatedness with people’s lifeworld situations, this thesis gave only little attention 
to symbolic representations of secularity. Respectively I wish to close with an episode from my 
field research, which constitutes one example of someone giving a symbolic expression to his 
ideal of secularity as an institution that guarantees individual liberty and equality. The episode 
occurred during the interview with a young party member in the Bible Belt town that I 
eventually did not focus on. At some point during the interview, my informant showed me a 
shelf in his apartment that contained little statues and symbols of different religious traditions. 
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Table 15: Election Results, Second Chamber. 
(%)489 1963 1967  1994  2002 2006 2012 
KVP 32 27 CDA 22  28 27 9 
ARP 9 10  
CHU 9 8  
PvdA 28 24  24  15 21 25 
VVD 10 11  20  15 15 27 
D66  4  15  5 2 8 
SGP 2 2  2  2 2 2 
GPV 1 1  1 CU 3 4 3 
PVV       6 10 
 
Table 16: D66 electoral strength and government participation (P&P n.d.-j). 
Year  Seats Second 
Chamber (D66) 
Percentage of votes 
Second Chamber 
Elections 
D66 participation in 
cabinets 
Coalition partners 
1967 7 4.4   
1971 11 6.7   
1972 6 4.1 Den Uyl PvdA, PPR (KVP, 
ARP) 
1974490   1   
1977 8 5.4   
1981 17 11 Van Agt II CDA, PvdA 
1982 6 4.3   
1986 9 6.3   
1994 24 15.4 Kok I (purple 
cabinet)  
PvdA, VVD 
1998 14 8.9 Kok II (purple 
cabinet) 
PvdA, VVD 
2002 7 5.1   
2003 6 4.1 Balkenende II CDA, VVD 
2006 3 2   
2010 10 6.9   
 
489  The numbers have been rounded. The table only lists the most important parties. 
490  Provincial Elections. 
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2012 12 8.3   
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